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Norval Morris’ statement that ‘[n]o principled jurisprudence of sentencing will emerge before 
legislatures bring order to their penal statutes or before judges routinely provide reasons for the 
sentences they impose’ aptly describes the range of sentencing problems in Nigeria. Although 
Nigeria attained self-rule in 1960, its criminal justice system remains hamstrung by the colonial 
mould in which it was framed, unable to respond to the evolving challenges of combating crime 
in the twenty-first century. The system’s failure is acute in criminal sentencing, exacerbated by 
common law and sharia based penal systems that encourage excessive penalties, a Constitution 
that offers minimal protection to convicted offenders, and sentencers who exercise largely 
unfettered discretion. These factors, together with a narrow construction of the doctrine of 
separation of powers that precludes courts from subjecting statutory penalties to constitutional 
scrutiny, result in punitive and frequently disproportionate punishments in Nigeria. This thesis 
investigates measures to ensure that sentencers introduce proportionality to sentencing and 
refrain from imposing penalties that infringe constitutional rights. The investigation involves two 
stages of analysis. First, the thesis examines the socio-historical context in which the practice of 
punishment evolved in England, South Africa and Nigeria in order to unveil how evolving 
concepts about punishment regulate or fail to regulate penal severity. Secondly, the thesis 
examined the normative basis of sentencing in South Africa and Nigeria, both of which are 
constitutional democracies and former English colonies. The analysis leads to two critical 
findings. First, Nigeria lacks the rich tapestry of constitutional jurisprudence that South African 
Courts have developed around punishment. Secondly, neither South Africa nor Nigeria has a 
structured system for rationalising sentencing discretion, with the result that sentencing can lead 
to widely disparate and disproportionate outcomes in both countries. The thesis thus proposes 
that Nigeria adopts constitutional provisions that restrain penal severity, and that it harmonise its 
pluralistic penal system, scrutinise statutory penalties in the light of constitutional norms, and, 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the Research 
Recurrent themes in criminal justice discourse in Nigeria have centred on perennial delays in 
criminal trials, poor coordination between agencies of the criminal justice system, the abuse of 
bail and excessive use of custodial measures, amongst others.1 These problems have been widely 
blamed on dismal failures of governance in post-colonial Nigeria, which have rendered the 
criminal justice system ineffectual.2 They have also been widely cited for abridging due process 
and contributing to prison congestion. The more drastic abuses, however, are associated with the 
use of custodial measures,3 which generally take two forms. The first is called the holding 
charge, a procedural term that describes how Nigerian courts remand suspects pending the 
completion of police investigations into their cases. The police habitually resort to this process to 
keep suspects detained while conducting investigations. The problem, however, is that 
investigations often go on indefinitely, while the suspects remain incarcerated on the authority of 
a judicial order, but without arraignment before a competent court.4  The second form of 
custodial measure is the prison sentence, a dispositive measure that concludes a criminal trial. 
In recent years, Nigeria’s prison population has fluctuated between 42,000 and 55,000 
inmates.5 Studies associate these statistics with excessive reliance on custodial measures.6 They 
                                                          
1 Ayo Atsenuwa ‘Criminal justice reforms in areas of bail, remand and sentencing’ in Otteh J.C. (ed.) Reforming for 
Justice: A Review of Justice Sector Reforms in Nigeria, 1999-2007 (2007) 75-107 at 80-83 & 88. 
2 Etannibi EO Alemika ‘Criminal justice: Norms, politics, institutions, processes and constraints’ in Annie Barbara 
Chikwanha (ed) The Theory and Practice of Criminal Justice in Africa Monograph 161 (June 2009) 11-33 at 24-28; 
O Oko Elechi Doing Justice Without the State: The Afikpo (Ehigbo) Nigeria Model (2006) 75-95. 
3 For a detailed analysis of Nigeria’s criminal justice problems, see The Nigerian Law Reform Commission Towards 
a More Consistent and Uniform Sentencing Programme in Nigerian Courts (1983); see also Chudi Nelson Ojukwu 
& Onimim E. Briggs ‘Developing justice in developing states: The Nigerian experience’ (Undated) available at 
http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2005/Briggs.pdf,  accessed 29 July 2013. 
4 This portrays the holding charge as a mechanism for circumventing the constitutional requirement to arraign 
suspects within a reasonable time. See s 35(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. The 
holding charge is a pretrial detention process permitted by s 236(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law Cap 32, Vol. 2 
Laws of Lagos State 1994. The provision authorises magistrates to detain offenders for indictable offences, pending 
their arraignment before a court of competent jurisdiction. Abuses of the power abridge constitutional rights to 
liberty and fair trial. Often, the term has been used to refer to detainees who are undergoing trials that have been 
unduly prolonged and for which an end is not in sight.  
5 See Nigerian Prisons Service ‘The reformer’ Vol. 2 No. 5 (January to March 2008), 62-68; Nigerian Prisons 
Service ‘The reformer’ Vol. 4 No. 4 (January to June 2012) 11; see also Amnesty International Prisoner’s Rights 
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also indicate that pre-trial detainees make up 64 ‒ 72 per cent of the prison population.7 
Apparently, it is this larger percentage of the prison population that has focused the attention 
academics and penal reformers on reforming pre-trial detention. Important reforms have indeed 
been achieved in this regard,8 facilitated by the publicity that persistent objections to human 
rights abuses associated with pre-trial detention garnered. The objections, which were conveyed 
through well-articulated papers, essentially constructed the abuses as violations of constitutional 
guarantees for the rights to liberty and a fair trial.9 However, the debates have also raged on 
another forum. In the Supreme Court case of Lufadeju v Johnson,10 lawyers framed the holding 
charge – the main contributor to Nigeria’s pre-trial detainee population ‒ as an infringement of 
constitutional rights. Even though the constitutional challenge was lost, opposition to the practice 
has persisted.11  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Systematically Flouted (2008) 22-23, 55-56; Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre ‘Senate seeks to end the problem of 
prison congestion in Nigeria’ available at http://www.placng.org/new/main_story.php?sn=35, accessed 10 March 
2012.  
6 Ibid. 
7 See OA Ogundipe ‘Pre-trial detention and contemporary corrections: The Nigerian dilemma’ being a paper 
presented at the 11th Annual Conference on the International Corrections and Prisons Association, Bridgetown, 
Barbados, October 25-30, 2009; Uju Agomoh ‘Prison decongestion and reforms in Nigeria – issues and methods’ 
available at http://www.prawa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Prison-Decongestion-and-Reform.pdf, accessed 11 
March 2014.  
8 Lagos State in South-West Nigeria offers a tangible example; it enacted the Administration of Criminal Justice 
Law (Repeal and Re-enactment) Law 2011, which instates tighter controls over remand processes than was the case 
under the repealed Criminal Procedure Law Cap C18 Laws of Lagos State 2003. See Atsenuwa op cit note 1 at 93-
96, 98-104. Sections 264-267 of the new law more clearly spells out circumstances and procedures for issuing 
remand orders. They limit pre-trial detention to 30 days, allow a month’s extension and subsequent extensions if the 
prosecution can show cause. These measures strengthen judicial oversight of pre-trial detention and empower 
magistrates to make reasonable cause enquiries, review and monitor the progress of criminal investigations. A 
federal bill to instate similar reforms has been much delayed. See Comfort Chinyere Ani ‘Reforms in the Nigerian 
criminal procedure laws’ (2011) Vol. 1 NIALS Journal on Criminal Law and Justice 52-90 at 74-77, 82-85. 
9 Eric Ayemere Okojie and Lucky Ehinem Enakemere ‘The legality of the practice of holding charge under the 
Nigerian criminal justice system’ (2014) Vol. 4 No. 1 African Journal of Law and Criminology 1-10; see also 
Amnesty International op cit note 5 at 7-11.  
10 (2007) NWLR (Pt 1037) 535. However, in this case, the court upheld the constitutionality of the procedure, saying 
no rights were abridged in the circumstances of the case.  This decision has been severely criticised for overlooking 
the human rights dimensions of exploitative pre-trial detention processes. See Agbakoba, Olisa ‘Criminal justice 
reform and challenge of holding charge’ available at http://www.agbakoba-associates.com/media/articles/Criminal-
Justice-Reform-and-Challenge-of-Holding-Charge.pdf, accessed 12 March 2014; Okojie and Enakemere op cit note 
9: see also Amnesty International op cit note 5. 
11 See Chijioke Ogham-Emeka ‘Nigeria: Issues in administration of criminal justice reform’ Daily Independent 18 
August 2010 available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201008190565.html, accessed 12 March 2014. 
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In the light of the foregoing, resolving pre-trial detention procedures – alongside bail ‒ 
became central to criminal justice reforms in Nigeria12 and to prison decongestion measures.13 In 
the process, the need for sentencing reforms was overlooked or given less than the attention it 
deserved. Yet, sentencing, and its problems, has been the subject of study for much longer. 
Studies have noted that as far back as 1962, courts relied heavily on prison sentences, even when 
they lacked demonstrable penal value. Evidence at the time pointed to the high failure rates of 
imprisonment in correcting criminal behaviour and to serious disparities in sentences. These 
disparities were attributed to the wide, unbridled discretion that sentencers exercised in most 
cases and to the elimination of discretion in others.  The problems were also compounded by 
ineffectual sentencing guidelines.14  
These studies were sustained into the 1980s and their observations were consistent, 
backed in some cases by empirical narratives.15 In 1983, a national study of sentencing reported 
‘highly discretionary and most discrepant [patterns], varying largely from rural to urban areas 
and even from state to state’.16 The study went as far as considering and recommending the 
establishment of an agency to develop sentencing standards and guidelines.17 From the late 
1980s until recent years however, the intensity of this promising engagement with sentencing 
almost completely evaporated. The paucity of engagement on the subject apparently led Ayo 
                                                          
12 Indeed, reforming pre-trial detention went hand in hand with reforming bail. See J Nnamdi Aduba & Emily I 
Alemika ‘Bail and criminal justice administration in Nigeria’, in Annie Barbara Chikwanha (ed) The Theory and 
Practice of Criminal Justice in Africa, (June 2009) Monograph 161 85-109; Y Osinbajo ‘Approaches to reducing 
pre-trial incarceration in Lagos’, available at http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2006/Osinbajo.pdf, accessed 25 July 2012.  
13 See Agomoh op cit note 7 at 6-9; Federal Republic of Nigeria ‘National action plan for the promotion and 
protection of human rights in Nigeria, 2009-2013’ paras 5.4.3.4, 5.4.4, 5.4.5, 5.5.4, 5.5.5 available at 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/NHRA/nigeria.pdf, accessed 12 March 2012. In a recent prison update, the 
National Human Rights Commission recommended collaboration between the Nigeria’s Legal Aid Council and the 
Nigerian Bar Association in the provision of free legal aid services to pre-trial detainees, in order to ‘foster fair 
hearing, access to justice and … encourage decongestion’. A National Decongestion Committee was also 
established to manage the process. See National Human Rights Commission Harmonized Report of 2012 Prison 
Audit (2012) 8, 11-12, 50 available at http://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/resources accessed 12 March 2014. 
14 The guidelines were offered in judicial pronouncements. See AA Adeyemi ‘Administration of justice in Nigeria: 
Sentencing’ in Adeyemi, AA (ed) Law, development and administration in Nigeria (1990) 109 at110-111, 121, 140-
141; JA Adefarasin ‘Sentencing’ in AA Adeyemi (ed) Law, Development and Administration in Nigeria (1990) 159.   
15 In 1972, a publication was dedicated to recording the experiences of Nigerian judges and magistrates. See Fatayi 
A Williams ‘Sentencing processes, practices and attitudes: As seen by an appeal court judge’ in TO Elias (ed) The 
Nigerian Magistrate and the Offender (1972) 31-38; IO Fadipe ‘Sentencing processes, practices and attitudes: As 
seen by a magistrate and customary court judge’ in TO Elias (ed) The Nigerian Magistrate and the Offender (1972) 
39-48.  




Atsenuwa,18 a leading Nigerian professor of criminology and criminal justice, to refer to 
sentencing studies that were mostly published before the 1990s, in her 2007 review of criminal 
justice reforms that had taken place in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007. Since the 1980s and until 
the last few years when interest in sentencing revived, there was a prolonged hiatus of interest on 
the subject. As a result, despite an extensive search of libraries and online data bases, very few 
resources ‒ particularly recent sources ‒ could be found for his study. It is hoped that this thesis 
is one step to building current literature on the subject. 
The recent revival of interest suggests that Nigerian academia, penal reformers and 
administrators are awakening to the importance of reforming Nigeria’s sentencing system. 
Proposals for the development of sentencing guidelines in Nigeria have been made.19 Despite 
these laudable developments, however, inadequate attention has been given to the constitutional 
and human rights implications of the sentencing problem in Nigeria. Studies about how 
sentencing practice impacts the rights of convicts, or whether courts weigh the sentences they 
impose against constitutional imperatives to preserve the rights of offenders are painfully scarce.  
As this thesis will show, a cogent human rights perspective that explores and develops 
the constitutional basis for penal law and sentencing has yet to be injected into current efforts to 
review penal laws and reform sentencing. As a result, recently enacted penal statutes or those 
pending enactment continue to omit important sentencing principles or safeguards. This thesis 
urges two safeguards in this respect. First, sentencing needs to be infused with constitutional 
protections for human dignity. Secondly, Nigeria needs a sentencing scheme that regulates 
punishment on the basis of offence gravity and maintains (within the overall sentencing scheme) 
relative proportionality between sentences for types and subtypes of crimes. This scheme would 
enhance relative equality in the treatment of offenders, making sure that similar offences receive 




                                                          
18 See generally Atsenuwa op cit note 1. 
19 See discussion in chapter 4 section 4.6 below. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria contains no provision that regulates 
penal severity in Nigeria. Even if one were to be inferred, it would be so vague, oblique and 
inadequate as to render it ineffectual. Two consequences flow from this observation.  First, the 
absence of a constitutional provision encourages penal statutes that prescribe penalties that are 
often seriously disproportionate to offence gravity. Secondly, courts have maintained an 
obligation to apply statutory penalties without necessary regard to whether the penalties are so 
disproportionate as to violate standard international norms against cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment. Together, penal legislation and judicial sentencing combine to produce a harsh 
regime of punishments in Nigeria. These assertions are illustrated in the following examples. 
The first illustration exemplifies how Nigeria’s sentencing scheme fails to maintain an 
effective ceiling on penal severity, or relative penal severity (proportionality) between types or 
subtypes of crimes, or between the different levels of seriousness or harm that may accompany 
the commission of a crime. Under the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act20 for 
example, the penalty for robbing with a firearm or other offensive weapon (commonly called 
armed robbery in Nigeria) is death. As long as the offence is perpetrated with the aid of an 
offensive weapon, the penalty will apply regardless of whether or not grievous bodily harm or 
unlawful killing occurred. Thus, the Act exacts the most severe punishment where no life is 
taken, or bodily injury is inflicted. Further, it provides no internal scheme for differentiating 
between armed robberies that differ significantly in terms of the value of the stolen item, or the 
levels of threat employed. This, in other words, suggests that the Act regards all armed robberies 
                                                          
20 Chapter R11 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. Section 1 thereof provides: 
1. (1) Any person who commits the offence of robbery shall upon trial and conviction under this Act, be 
sentenced to imprisonment for not less than twenty-one years. 
(2) If 
(a) any offender mentioned in subsection (1) of this section is armed with  
any firearms or any offensive weapon or is in company with any person so armed; or 
(b) at or immediately before or immediately after the time of the robbery the  
said offender wounds or uses any personal violence to any person,  
     the offender shall be liable upon conviction under this Act to be sentenced to death. 
 (3) The sentence of death imposed under this section may be executed by hanging the offender by the 




as equally blameworthy.21  A similar predicament is portrayed by recent laws that prescribe the 
death sentence for kidnapping.22  
The absence of relative proportionality does not only occur within the structure of a 
single crime only; it is also found across different statutes. Stealing under the Criminal Code that 
applies in southern Nigeria attracts a sentence of up to three years in prison,23 while it attracts up 
to five years imprisonment under the Penal Code of Northern Nigeria.24 The different levels of 
penal severity that these unveil within the same national legal system will be discussed later.25 
Yet another example of the lack of relative proportionality can be found between crimes that fall 
within the same genre, which may be regulated by the same or by different statutes. Examples in 
this category include the penalties for stealing on one hand and for criminal misappropriation on 
the other.  Both offences are property crimes. Although the latter involves an element of the 
breach of public trust that could raise the degree of blameworthiness, both are liable to the same 
                                                          
21 While this thesis was being written, a Bill for an Act to Amend the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) 
Act 2013 was introduced to Nigeria’s federal parliament. The aim of the bill is to amend the Act ‘in order to bring it 
in consonance with the dictates of natural justice, equity and good conscience’. The Bill probably reflects new 
sensitivity to the severity of sentences prescribed by the Act as it proposes to amend s 1(2) of the Act by replacing 
the death penalty with a life sentence and creating a new subsection (3) that requires the death penalty where armed 
robbery results in the death of the victim. This is a welcome development, but the proposed law still fails to 
differentiate between levels of seriousness for armed robberies in which a life sentence would be imposed. Until the 
bill becomes law, the Act will continue to be enforced. Thus far, its enforcement reflects the absence of proportion.  
In Joseph Amoshima v The State (2011) LPELR-SC.283/2009, the appellant was sentenced to death for robbing with 
a firearm and causing the death of another. However, in Francis Odili v The State (1977) A.N.L.R 49, the same 
sentence was imposed on the appellant, who participated in a robbery in which several machete cuts were inflicted 
by his accomplice on the victims while he brandished a gun, even though the victims recovered from the wounds. In 
Anthony Isibor v The State (2002) 2 S.C (Pt.II) 110 the appellant stole a car and money at gunpoint and was 
sentenced to death. No actual physical violence was involved besides the fact that the items were stolen at gunpoint. 
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction.  See also Udeh Kingsley Emeka v The State LER[2014]SC.347/2011. It 
must be noted, however, that where death results from an armed robbery, the suspect may be charged with armed 
robbery and for culpable homicide punishable with death, in which case he will be liable to two death sentences. See 
Adamu Saliu v The State LER[2014]SC. 366/2011.   
22 Abia, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Ebonyi, Edo, Enugu and Imo States have enacted laws that make death penalty the 
punishment for kidnapping even when it did not result in death. See Death Penalty Worldwide ‘Nigeria’ (2014) 
available at http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=Nigeria#a22-3, accessed 16 
January 2015. 
23 See s 390 of the Criminal Code Act, Cap 77, Laws of Nigeria 1990. 
24 See s 287 of the Penal Code of Kano State of Nigeria. This provision in the Kano State Law was adopted from s 
287 of the 1959 Northern Nigeria Penal Code. The provision is reproduced in Gledhill, Alan ‘The Penal Codes of 
Northern Nigeria and the Sudan (1968) Sweet & Maxwell, London and African Universities Press, Lagos, 542. 
25 See chapter 1 section 4 and chapter 2 section 3 below. 
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sentence under the Criminal Code.26 Under the Penal Code however, such conversion would 
amount to criminal misappropriation, which attracts less punishment than theft.27  
The second illustration describes how judicial sentencing intensifies the absence of 
relative penal proportionality between crimes. To illustrate this point clearly however, it is 
necessary to depict the context in which the illustration is made. Nigeria has one of the worst 
corruption profiles in the world. Corruption became endemic during military rule,28 but 
following Nigeria’s democratic transition in 1999, legislative and other measures were adopted 
to combat it.  One of these, 29 the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) 
Act 2004, established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to investigate 
financial crimes and enforce laws and regulations relating to economic and financial crimes. 
Despite this and other anti-corruption efforts however, perceptions of corruption in public life 
have remained intolerably high.30 
These perceptions have factored high in the prosecution of economic and financial crimes 
in Nigeria. In January 2013 the EFCC secured a conviction against Mr John Yakubu Yusufu for 
his roles in the criminal misappropriation of police pension funds.31 Criminal charges were 
brought pursuant to s 308 of the Penal Code and punishable under s 309, which prescribes a 
sentence of two years imprisonment, or fine, or both. Mr Yusuf was arraigned under a 20 count 
charge, to which he pleaded not guilty. However, he changed his plea when the counts were 
reduced to three and admitted converting N2 billion in pension funds to personal use. He was 
                                                          
26 See s 383 of the Criminal Code, which also extends the meaning of stealing to include the fraudulent conversion 
of money to personal use. 
27 See s 309 of the Penal Code; see also Timothy F Yerima ‘Criminal Law Protection of Property: A comparative 
critique of the offences of stealing and theft in Nigeria’ (2012) Vol. 5 No. 1 Journal of Politics and Law 167-179 
28 John Mukum Mbaku Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Cleanups (2007) 8-48. 
29 The other statute is the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. The Act established the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission. 
30 Nigeria is among the worst performing countries in the global corruption perception index. In 2011, Nigeria 
ranked 143rd, and 139th in 2012. In 2013, it slipped to 144 out of 177 countries. Transparency International attributes 
the poor showing in global rankings to high rates of abuse of public power for personal gain, suggesting there are no 
effective control mechanisms for corruption. See Transparency International Corruption perceptions index 2011 
(2011); Transparency International Corruption perceptions index 2012 (2012); Transparency International 
Corruption perceptions index 2013 (2013); see further Transparency International ‘Corruption by country/territory’ 
available at http://www.transparency.org/country#NGA, accessed 16 March 2014. 
31 FRN v John Yakubu Yusufu Unreported case no FHC/ABJACR/54/2012 (28 January 2013).  
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consequently convicted and sentenced to two years with the option of N250,000 fine on each 
count. He paid a total of N750, 000, forfeited assets, and was released.  
The sentence was puzzlingly lighter than what an offender could have received for 
stealing N10032 under s 287 of the same code, which prescribes a maximum of five years 
imprisonment, without the option of fine.33 A huge outcry ensued and government’s commitment 
to the anti-corruption fight came under public ridicule. Knee-jerk reactions also followed. 
Embarrassed, the EFCC re-arrested Mr Yusuf within 24 hours of his release, to re-arraign him on 
fresh fraud charges.34 Parliament’s lower house35 called for an appeal against the sentence and 
vowed to amend the Penal Code to make punishment for such crimes stiffer.36 The National 
Judicial Council (NJC), Nigeria’s apex judicial disciplinary organ, also weighed in and 
suspended the trial judge for one year without pay, on the ground that he did not exercise his 
discretion ‘judicially and judiciously’.37  
The above illustrations portray the legal concerns that this research addresses. The first 
illustration depicts how penal statutes fail to measure offence gravity and prescribe 
                                                          
32 N100 is less than R10 or US$1. 
33 This is the punishment that would be imposed for theft to the value of more than N100, or where the theft is 
committed outside a building or dwelling house. Under some circumstances in the code, sentence could be up to 
seven years’ imprisonment, with or without fine. See ss 287 and 288 of the Penal Code; see also Mariam Ishaku 
Gwangdi & Sule Musa Tagi The Law on Armed Robbery, Theft and Housebreaking in Nigeria: A Survey of 
Adamawa, Borno, Taraba and Yobe States (2012) 39-42. 
34 See Economic and Financial Crimes Commission ‘N32.8 bn police pension scam: efcc kicks as court sentences 
John Yusufu to 6 years imprisonment’ 28 January 2013 available at https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/index.php/news/293-
n32-8-bn-police-pension-scam-efcc-kicks-as-court-sentences-john-yusufu-to-6-years-imprisonment, accessed on 3 
January 2015.The Punch Newspaper ’N27bn pension thief rearrested after outcry’ 30 January 2013 available at 
http://www.punchng.com/news/n27bn-pension-thief-rearrested-after-outcry/, accessed 15 March 2014; The Sun 
‘EFCC re-arrests convicted pension director … faces another N300m fraud charges today’ 30 January 2013 
available at http://sunnewsonline.com/new/?p=16857, accessed 15 March 2014. Mr Yusufu was in fact subsequently 
arraigned on fresh fraud charges. See Economic and Financial Crimes Commission ‘Police pension: EFCC arraigns 
Yusufu over N250 million fraud’ 30 January 2013 available at https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/index.php/news/294-
police-pension-efcc-arraigns-yusufu-over-n250-million-fraud, accessed 3 January 2015. 
35 Nigeria’s lower house in the National Parliament is called the House of Representatives.  
36 Vanguard Newspaper ‘Police pension scam: Reps ask EFCC, AGF to appeal judgment’ 30 January 2013 available 
at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/police-pension-scam-reps-ask-efcc-agf-to-appeal-judgment/, accessed 15 
March 2014; Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre ‘Police pension scam: Reps decry judgment on Mr. John Yakubu 
Yusuf, resolves to amend the Penal Code Law’ available at http://www.placng.org/new/main_story.php?sn=22, 
accessed 15 March 2014.   
37 See National Judicial Council ‘Press release’ 26 April 2013, available at http://njc.gov.ng/news.php, accessed 15 
March 2014; see also Daily Trust Newspaper ‘Rise and fall of Justice Talba 30 April 201) available at 
http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/old/index.php/law/53309-rise-and-fall-of-justice-talba, accessed 15 March 2014.  
In reality, even if the trial judge exercised discretion judicially and judiciously, he could not have imposed more 
than two-year imprisonment as prescribed by law. Some may still consider that to be disproportionately lenient.  
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commensurate penalties. The second illustration describes how judicial sentencing may also fail 
to reflect offence gravity.  Upon closer examination however, both illustrations show what 
sentencing legislation and decisions fail to achieve. Succinctly, the failure can be stated as 
follows: neither statutory penalties nor judicial discretion in sentencing ensures proportionate 
allocation of punishments in Nigeria. This failure persists and frequently results in grossly 
disproportionate and inconsistent sentences. Grossly disproportionate sentences, according to 
Van Zyl Smit and Ashworth,38 offer a basis for urgent reforms because they foster serious 
breaches of human rights. In the Nigerian context, this thesis will argue that constitutional 
breaches occur because, among other things, there are neither salient provisions within the 
Constitution nor a well-articulated principle of proportionality that regulates sentencing 
legislation and discretion in Nigeria.   
 
1.3 Research Question 
This research study will seek answers to the following question:  
What measures, within the context of Nigeria’s legal system, are necessary to ensure that 
sentencers integrate proportionality principles in sentencing and avoid imposing penalties 
that infringe constitutional rights?   
To answer this question, the thesis will consider the following sub questions: 
1. Should a dominant principle or principles underline the choice of sentence?  
2. Does sentencing practice in Nigeria reflect a dominant principle or principles? 
3. If it does, are there deficits in the application of such principle or principles in Nigeria? 
4. What, in the event of a negative response to question 2, or a positive response to question 
3, should the fundamentals of a model sentencing policy framework for Nigeria look 
like?  
 
1.4 Research Justification 
This research is warranted for a number of reasons. First, sentencing is an important subject 
because it involves resolving the degree to which an offender’s rights may be curtailed by the 
                                                          
38 Dirk van Zyl Smit & Andrew Ashworth ‘Disproportionate sentences as human rights violations’ (2004) Vol. 67 
No. 4 The Modern Law Review 541-560. 
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state.  Criminal sanctions invariably impact constitutionally protected rights, especially the rights 
to life, liberty and human dignity. This suggests that rights, or more accurately, some rights, are 
not absolute. In Nigeria, the rights to life and liberty may be curtailed by lawful judicial order.39  
Under the South African Constitution, the rights to respect for human dignity,40 to life,41 and ‘not 
to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman and degrading way’ are ‘non-derogable’.42 Under 
the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, however, the scope or content of 
equivalent protections for human dignity seems to be unclear. Unlike the South African 
Constitution, the Nigerian Constitution does not specifically prohibit cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishments. Besides, although it recognises the death penalty, it offers no standard 
for ensuring that imposing the penalty meets basic proportionality principles. This observation 
extends to other statutory punishments in Nigeria. It will be asserted in this thesis that penal 
statutes in Nigeria lean towards excessive penal severity because the Constitution does not 
establish a clear standard against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, or against grossly 
disproportionate sentences.   Excessive severity has serious repercussions for the rights of 
offenders.  
The array of available literature on punishment informs this researcher’s view that the 
constitutional lacuna presented above has not yet been made the subject of sentencing research in 
Nigeria, or that no attention has been given to the dilemma it presents. Although studies 
acknowledge the excessively punitive and incarcerative nature of statutory penalties, as well as 
the questionable deterrence value of incarceration,43 they neither discuss sentencing extensively 
from the standpoint of constitutionality and proportionality, nor offer any useful prognoses of 
how the failure to inject these values into punishment contributes to sentencing problems in a 
                                                          
39 The 1999 Constitution protects the rights to life and liberty in ss 33(1) and 35(1) respectively. 
40 Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
41 Ibid at s 11. 
42 Ibid at s 12. See also the Table of Non-Derogable Rights in the Constitution. See further S v Makwanyane 1995 
(2) SACR 1 (CC) at 41 paras C-E, where South Africa’s Constitutional Court interpreted the constitutional 
protection for human dignity in the context of punishment. 
43 See Roger G Hood & Carolyn Hoyle The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (2008) 328-329. The authors 
rely on research by AA Adeyemi ‘Death penalty: Criminological perspectives. The Nigerian situation’ (1987) 58 
Revue Internationale de Droit Penal 485, and a Report of the National Study Group on Death Penalty, Abuja, 2004, 
which reviewed evidence that the death penalty lacks deterrent effect.  
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post-colonial Nigerian society that is governed by a Constitution that contains a Bill of Rights.44 
Debates on the constitutionality of punishments in Nigeria have only touched on what has been 
satirised as the contradiction in the Constitution’s guarantee of the right to life and its recognition 
of the death penalty.45 This research will maintain that such debates46 wrongly assume that the 
prohibition of ‘torture, cruel and degrading treatment’ by s 34(1)(a) of Nigeria’s 1999 
Constitution applies to judicial punishments that fit the ‘cruel’ and ‘degrading’ epithets.  They 
are wrong because they are founded on flawed jurisprudence: it is not as clear that the 
Constitution prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments as do some other national 
Constitutions. To assume that it does may be misleading, as the assumption cannot be supported 
by the history of constitutional provisions regarding protections for human dignity in Nigeria.  
A probable legal consequence of this constitutional vacuum is that it fosters a 
presumption that judicial sentences are constitutional when they give effect to the clear intent of 
statutorily prescribed penalties. That this presumption precludes judicial evaluation of the 
constitutionality and proportionality of statutory punishments is implicit in the views that the 
Supreme Court held in Joseph Amoshima v The State,47 that where the legislature has imposed a 
mandatory sentence for a crime, it is consistent with the obligation of the court under the 
doctrine of separation of powers to impose that sentence. In other words, it is not open to the 
court to question the constitutionality or proportionality of a penalty that has been duly enacted 
by parliament. Also, in Umoh Ekpo v The State,48 which was decided in June 2014, the relative 
                                                          
44 Though not called a Bill of Rights, Chapter 4 of the 1999 Constitution spells out the fundamental human rights 
that are enforceable in Nigeria. 
45 Onyekachi Wisdom Ceazer Duru ‘The constitutionality of the death penalty under Nigerian law’ (2012) available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2142981, accessed 25 March 2014. 
46 Ibid. However, the constitutionality of the penalty has been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court of Nigeria. 
In Okoro v State (1998) 14 NWLR 584 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the penalty and the 
method of executing it. See Oluyemisi Bamgbose ‘Towards the global abolition of the death penalty: Comparing the 
criminal laws in the United States of America and Nigeria’ (2007) Vol. 13 Issue 1 East African Journal of Peace 
and Human Rights 30 at 37-39; the author presumed that a right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman and 
degrading punishment was protected under the Nigerian constitution. Essentially, she relied on Supreme Court of 
Nigeria decisions, such as Kalu v State [1998] 13 NWLR 531, where the court declined ‘to consider whether the 
death penalty violated the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading punishment’. However, the 
1979 Constitution under which the decision was considered only prohibited ‘torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment’. Chapter 4 addresses any presumption that this prohibition extends to judicial punishment. 
47 (2011) LPELR-SC.283/2009. 
48 LER[2014] CA/L/96/11 The accused person was 28years old when he robbed his victim using a pair of pliers, 
pretending it was a gun. The court found that the pliers was an obnoxious weapon under the relevant statute and 
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youth of the offender, his potential for reform, the relatively small value of the stolen items, the 
fact that the weapon used – a pair of pliers – though offensive, was not inherently lethal and that 
no life was taken, prompted the court to fleetingly consider the appropriateness of imposing the 
death sentence in the case. However, considering itself to be bound by the statutory penalty, the 
court went on to uphold the death sentence that was imposed by the lower court. This rather 
restrictive judicial outlook on the separation of powers doctrine within Nigeria’s constitutional 
scheme imposes a duty on courts to pass sentences that may be so severe and offensive to 
important constitutional or proportionality principles.   
This leads to the second reason for the research. Judges need the aid of lucid, regulating 
constitutional principles and a system of guidelines to achieve proportionate sentencing.  To 
some degree, the absence of such guidelines may also be attributed to inadequate research on 
sentencing in Nigeria. Imposing sentences without clear guidelines has been detrimental, 
resulting in criticisms that sentencing is ‘incoherent’, ‘irrational’ and ‘perhaps the most confused 
area of criminal legislation’.49  Nigeria’s sentencing landscape portrays an ‘incredibly intricate 
variety of sentences [that are] legally pronounced by different Courts exercising the same 
jurisdiction in respect of the same or similar offences’.50 It has also been described as chaotic and 
lacking uniformity, clear principles or guiding policies51 or as having its basis not in merits, but 
in the incomprehensible temperaments of judges.52 Although attempts have been made through 
case law to develop principles to regulate the mitigation or aggravation of sentence,53 the 
principles are a rough and imprecise guide. As this thesis will illustrate with the aid of recent 
judicial pronouncements, the above depictions of Nigeria’s sentencing scheme still hold true, 
underlined by criminal statutes that ensure that sentencing is exclusively the function of judges, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
proceeded to impose the death sentence on the accused person. The total value of the possessions that were stolen 
was N17, 210. This amounts to about R1, 145 or US$102 by current exchange rates. 
49 See A Fatayi-Williams ‘Sentencing processes, practice and attitudes: As seen by an Appeal Court judge’, in TO 
Elias (ed) The Nigerian Magistrate and the Offender (1972) 29-38 at 33. 
50 Ibid. 
51 CO Okwonkwo ‘Sentencing’ in EI Nwogugu (ed) Current Legal Problems in Nigeria: Proceedings of the 
Anambra State Law Conference, 1986 (1988) 154-171 at 157. 
52 J Nnamdi Aduba ‘Some mitigating and aggravating factors in Nigerian sentencing practice’ (Undated) available at 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/40439860, accessed 5 January 2014; see also LO Fadipe ‘Sentencing 
processes, practices and attitudes: As seen by a magistrate and customary court judge’ in TO Elias (ed) The Nigerian 
magistrate and the offender (1972) 39-48 at 41-42, 45-47; See also Atsenuwa op cit note 1 at 91-93 but see also 94-
104.  
53 See section 5.7 below. 
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who must implement penal prescriptions without the aid of a lucid sentencing policy.54  It is not 
uncommon that judges do not offer reasons for the sentences the impose.  In the 2014 case of 
Anthony Omoruyi v The State,55 the Court of Appeal overturned a conviction and death sentence 
for murder, returning instead a conviction for manslaughter, which carried a sentence of life 
imprisonment. The court imposed a sentence of 20 years instead, without offering any more 
reasons than the follow statement:  
Hence, in the circumstances, therefore, having allowed the appeal in part, the verdict of 
guilty for murder and the sentence of death by hanging passed upon the Appellant by the 
court below are hereby set aide and a verdict of manslaughter and a sentence of twenty (20) 
years imprisonment are hereby substituted therefor. The sentence shall run from the July 15, 
2009, the date the Appellant was convicted and sentenced by the lower court in question. 
This, unfortunately, tends to be the norm, a norm that apparently compelled the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria in its 2011 decision in Ndewenu Posu & Anor v The State,56 to remark per 
Adekeye JSC, that ‘the sentencing policy of judicial officers need to be revisited’. No portion of 
the sentence in the Omoruyi case was devoted to explaining why the court thought 20 years’ 
imprisonment was the appropriate sentence.  No aggravating or mitigating circumstances, or 
principles or objects of sentencing were evaluated.  The sentence points to a widely discretionary 
judicial fiat.  The only mitigation in the judgment, was the defence of provocation which 
changed the conviction from murder punishable by death, to manslaughter punishable by life 
imprisonment. Having convicted the appellant of manslaughter however, no reasons whatsoever 
were given for further mitigating the sentence. 
Considering that between 64-72 per cent of Nigeria’s prison population await trial, it 
could be argued that pre-trial detention is the obvious problem that needs to be addressed in 
Nigeria’s criminal justice process. Indeed, the sheer size of the detainee population in Nigerian 
prisons and the problems this poses have already earned the dilemma considerable attention in 
scholarly discourse and in recent criminal justice reforms in the country, so much so that there is 
                                                          
54 Alan Milner The Nigerian Penal System (1972) 54.   
55 LR-e-LR/2014/18. 
56 2011 Legalpedia SC NBIW. 
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probably little else can be said about it that will be new.57 On the other hand, far less attention 
has been given to the problems associated with custodial sentencing. It is partly this that informs 
the focus of this thesis on sentencing.  But there is yet a more compelling reason: every awaiting 
trail detainee faces the prospect of being subjected to a sentencing process that does not 
guarantee that he or she will be sentenced proportionately, in a manner most consistent with his 
rights as an offender. This, and the fact that the subject has received little attention from policy 
makers, judges and academia, offer further reasons for this research. 
Coldham58 has observed that the lack of attention to criminal justice reforms in Nigeria is 
striking, especially in the light of far reaching legal reforms in other sectors of the economy. 
Although he rightly blames the lack of ‘official interest … on the paucity of research in the 
field’,59 another reason may be that policy makers have not conceived penal reforms as an 
economically viable course of action. Criminals are seen as a burden to society, a threat to be 
incapacitated. Consequently, the processes and institutions of penal justice in Nigeria have only 
functioned as a system for warehousing offenders.60 Beyond the rhetoric of reforms, Nigeria’s 
penal system has never seriously been organised with a view to reforming offenders but rather to 
furthering the aims of retribution, deterrence or incapacitation.61 However, while incarceration 
may offer immediate utility by removing perceived threats for periods of time, overusing it is 
significantly more costly, both economically and socially.  
The costs of imprisonment have been much debated world over. First, it exacts a 
prohibitive toll on the taxpayer, on correctional services, on family income and relations and on 
                                                          
57 For example, bail and pretrial detention reform were given considerable attention in the new Lagos State 
Administration of Criminal Justice Law 2011. For scholarly material on the subject, see Atsenuwa op cit note 1; 
Agomoh op cit note 7; Aduba & Alemika op cit note 12. 
58 Simon Coldham ‘Criminal justice policies in Commonwealth Africa: Trends and prospects’ (2000) Vol. 44 
Journal of African Law, 218-238 at 223. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Johnson Olusegun Ajayi ‘Nigeria Prisons and the dispensation of justice’ (2012) Vol. 1 Issue 3 AFFREV IJAH 
208 at 221; Alemika and Chukwuma, writing in the context of juvenile justice administration, blamed warehousing 
in Nigerian prisons on ‘policy defects, inadequate funding, incoherent and punitive programmes…’ See EEO 
Alemika & IC Chukwuma Juvenile Justice Administration in Nigeria: Philosophy and Practice (2001) 16 & 62; 
Innocent Chukwuma ‘Nigeria: Social structure, criminal justice and criminology’ in Cindy J Smith, Sheldon X 
Zhang & Rosemary Barberet (eds) Routledge International Handbook of Criminology (2011) 463 at 445-446. 
61 Underlying penal attitudes generally support harsh incarcerative regimes in the misguided belief that such 
treatment would deter or reform, even when no rehabilitative programmes are provided for prisoners. See generally, 
Ikuteyijo Lanre Olusegun & Agunbiade Ojo Melvin ‘The evolution and social dynamics of prisons in Nigeria’ in K 
Jaishankar International Perspectives on Crime and Justice (2009) 690-710. 
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the individual offender. Secondly, it weakens the fabric of society, reduces employability, drives 
up unemployment rates and hinders economic growth.62 Its value as a crime deterrent has also 
been seriously challenged: available evidence does not conclusively support the claim that 
incarceration deters crime.63 Adeyemi poignantly described the costs of incarceration as 
‘[lacking] both deterrent and reformative value, [as] immensely costly to the economy… 
physiologically, psychologically, and emotionally destructive … socially damaging … culturally 
abhorrent and penologically disastrous’.64 However, despite research emphasising these 
problems,65 Nigeria continues to embrace incarceration as a first-line remedy. This suggests an 
enduring need to persuade policy makers that sentencing reforms are a viable and achievable 
goal to pursue, both from an economic and sociological standpoint.   
There are indeed good reasons for policy makers to reconsider the criminal justice 
system’s excessive use of incarceration: on the one hand, studies have shown that there is no 
                                                          
62 Todd R Clear Imprisoning Communities: How Mass Incarceration makes Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods Worse 
(2007) ch 1. Although the relationship between crime, employment and incarceration can be difficult to clarify or 
detangle, most research agree that incarceration (especially when the rates are high) negatively impacts economic 
and social relations, especially among low income groups. Prison has been noted to exacerbate social inequities.  
See Richard B Freeman ‘Crime and the job market’ (1994) NBER Working Paper No. 4910 at 23-24 & 27; Bruce 
Western & Becky Pettit ‘Incarceration and social inequity’ (2010) Vol. 139(3) Dædalus 8; Harold Watts & Demetra 
Smith Nightingale ‘Adding it up: The economic impact of incarceration on individuals, families and communities’ 
(1996) Vol. 3 Journal of Oklahoma Criminal Justice Research Consortium 55.  
63 Valerie Wright ‘Deterrence in criminal justice: Evaluating certainty vs. severity of punishment’ (2010) available 
at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf, accessed 24 March 2014. Citing various 
researches, Wright argues that severity does not deter offenders, but that deterrence is enhanced by the certainty of 
punishment. Deterrence may also be attributed to extra-legal factors, such as the fear of family or peer disapproval, 
social stigma, shame, etc, rather than to punishment itself.  See generally Daniel S Nagin & Greg Pogarsky 
‘Integrating celerity, impulsivity and extralegal sanction threats into a model of general deterrence: Theory and 
evidence’ (2001) Vol. 39 Criminology 855, but see particularly 866-870, 873-884; Robert Apel & Daniel S Nagin 
‘General deterrence: A review of recent evidence’ in James Q Wilson & Joan Petersilia (eds) Crime and Public 
Policy (2011) 411 at 413-416. 
64 Adedokun A Adeyemi ‘The problem of imprisonment in the Nigerian penal system’ in Ademola O Popoola & 
Ebenezer OI Adodo (eds) Current Legal Developments in Nigeria: Essays in Memory of Professor J.D. Ojo (2007) 
23. Adeyemi’s view about the culturally abhorrent nature of incarceration supports arguments that imprisonment is 
alien to African societies and conceptually opposed to the principles of restorative justice that underpins African 
notions regarding criminal justice. See Oko O Elechi ‘The Igbo indigenous justice system’ in Saleh-Hanna, Viviane 
(ed) Colonial Systems of Control: Criminal Justice in Nigeria (2008) ch 20; see also Nigerian Law Reform 
Commission op cit note 3 at 13, 29-37. According to 2014 budget proposals, N47.520bn was proposed for the 
Nigerian Prisons Service. Of this, N38.184 was allocated to personnel costs and N2.310bn to capital expenditure.  
N5.287bn was proposed for food supplies and catering materials (for roughly 55,000 prison inmates). The year 
before, total allocations were N50.161bn, indicating a fall of about N2.641bn in the proposed budget for 2014. See 
Federal Government of Nigeria ‘Summary by MDAs: 2014 FGN budget proposal’ available at 
http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/2014_budget_proposals/20.%20Summary_Interior.pdf, accessed 24 March 2013; 
Federal Government of Nigeria ‘2013 budget’ available at http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/2013-
budget_details/20.%20Summary_Interior.pdf, accessed 24 March 2014.  
65 See for example, National Human Rights Commission The State of Human Rights in Nigeria 2007 (2007) ch 4. 
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conclusive evidence the harsh sentences or incarcerative penal regimes have a deterrent value, 
that they do not enhance public safety, and that imprisonment increases public safety expense.66 
According to available evidence, alternatives to prison sentences are less expensive. In the 
United States of America for example, each imprisoned non-violent offender that is moved into a 
probation or parole programme saves the correctional system between US$23,000 and US$25, 
000 per annum.67  Such potential savings for Nigeria’s developing economy could prove 
beneficial.68 Of course, while it is not the aim of this research to dwell on the socio-economic 
ramifications of a failing penal system, it is pertinent to point them out.69  
Prolonged delays in implementing the recommendations of various commissions of 
enquiry into criminal justice reforms provide yet another reason for this research.   In 2005 and 
2006 respectively, a National Working Group on the Reform of Criminal Justice Administration 
and a Presidential Commission on Reform of the Administration of Justice in Nigeria pinpointed 
regulatory and structural deficiencies in the sentencing system. They recommended a flexible but 
uniform sentencing framework that balanced public security concerns with protecting victim’s 
                                                          
66 Wright op cit note 60 at 6-9, see also discussion in section 2.4.1.2. 
67 John Schmitt, Kris Warner & Sarika Gupta ‘High budgetary cost of incarceration’ (2010) 10-12 available at 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf, accessed 24 March 2013. 
68 Incidentally, the government of Nigeria has acknowledged the need for reforms in this area. In 1980, it 
acknowledged that justice administrators were barely utilising probationary sentences, even though evidence 
suggested that about 40 per cent of offenders met the statutory criteria for probationary sentences. It attributed the 
reason to the ‘colonial heritage and training of our justice administrators, their belief in deterrence, and their 
tendency to take the path of least resistance (i.e. imprisonment and/or fine)’. Other reasons the government provided 
include the dangerous offender, lack of trained staff, public insistence on prosecution and the challenges of carrying 
out penal code reforms.  It also identified a ‘lack of any long standing “tradition” for research and professional 
competence to “guide” social policy’, and ‘government’s concern with, and concentration on, the technical and 
economic aspects of development and the resignation of social problems to “sermonisation” and “traditional” 
institutions that are no longer viable for such purposes’, as obstacles. See Government of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria ‘Crime and the quality of life in Nigeria’ (1980) The Nigerian National Paper for the Sixth United Nations 
Congress on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders, holding at Caracas, Venezuela August 25 to September 
5, 1980, 46-47. 
69 The economic costs of Nigeria’s imprisonment was the subject of a paper by Yahaya Abdulkarim ‘An analysis of 
Socio-Economic Impact of Imprisonment in Nigeria (2012) Vol. 2 No. 9 Developing Country Studies 148 at 151-
152.  The author drew attention to the fiscal burden it creates, but also to other social costs that may have economic 
dimensions. These include the impact of imprisonment on an ex-offender’s income and employability, the impact on 
poor families, on the stability of the family unit and of social relationships. It may well be that some considerable 
portion of these costs may be eliminated if Nigeria’s pre-trial detention system is overhauled to ensure that offenders 
are processed through the criminal justice system expeditiously.  However, even when this is achieved, Nigeria will 
still find itself saddled with a significant cost burden under its current prison management system.  This is because 
as research has suggested, the legal status of pre-trial detainees makes them a secondary factor when budgeting for 
prisons. They tend not to be ‘provided … the basic needs to which convicted prisoners have access.’ See Aduba & 
Alemika op cit note 12 at 103. 
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interests and suspect’s rights, enhanced proportionality, consistency and deterrence, strengthened 
restorative elements in criminal justice and promoted a range of sentencing options that reserved 
prison sentences for very serious offenders.70 In 2006, these recommendations were included in 
legislative bills71 that have not yet been passed by parliament.72 Pertinently, the 
recommendations are important statements of general principles or goals that should underpin a 
new sentencing policy and framework. This thesis examines how the principles can be achieved. 
 Lastly, this thesis is necessitated by the dilemma of the plurality of penal systems in 
Nigeria,73 which creates different standards regarding punishment.  There are two principal codes 
in the country, which define and stipulate penalties for criminal conduct. The Criminal Code 
Act74 applies to Southern Nigeria while the Penal Code75 applies in the North.  These are 
complimented by two principal criminal procedure statutes, namely the Criminal Procedure Act76 
for Southern Nigeria and the Criminal Procedure Code Law of 1960, for Northern Nigeria. These 
statutes differ in a number of respects,77 but operate as uniform statutes in their respective 
territories. However, some states have their own penal codes which may reflect slight to major 
                                                          
70 Presidential Commission on Reform of the Administration of Justice in Nigeria Proposals for Reform of the 
Administration of Justice in Nigeria (2006) 62-63, 120-121, 180, 238; see also First Report of the National Working 
Group on the Reform of Criminal Justice Administration (2005). The Administration of Criminal Justice Bill 
recommended by this report proposes a uniform criminal procedure law for Nigeria. 
71 Critical among these bills include the Community Service Bill 2006 which introduces community sentences for 
minor offences, the Criminal Justice (Victim’s Remedies) Bill 2006, which promotes restorative elements of justice, 
and the Administration of Criminal Justice Bill which harmonizes criminal procedure law and introduces elements 
that potentially check abuses in sentencing. 
72 Alewo Musa John Agbonika ‘Delay in the administration of criminal justice in Nigeria: Issues from a Nigerian 
view point’ (2014) Vol. 26 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 130-138. 
73 Amnesty International ‘The death penalty and women under the Nigeria penal systems’ (undated) 4-5 available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/001/2004/en/071a7428-d64e-11dd-ab95-
a13b602c0642/afr440012004en.pdf, accessed 26 March 2014. 
74 Cap C38 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
75 Cap 30 Laws of Northern Nigeria 1963.  
76 Cap C41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
77 For example, while the Criminal Code defines murder, corresponding provisions in the Penal Code define 
culpable homicide, with greater detail and clarity. Further, ss 387-389 of the Penal Code criminalise adultery but the 
Criminal Code does not. The Penal Code also prescribes punishments that are not recognised under the Criminal 
Code, such as haddi lashing, which is a Muslim form of corporal punishment.  These and other examples of 
divergence have informed calls for a unified code for Nigeria. See Charles Mwalimu The Nigerian legal system: 
Public law, Volume 1 (2007) 505-506; see also Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies ‘Proposed unification 
of criminal laws of Nigeria’ available at 
file:///G:/Thesis/Chapter%201/unification%20of%20the%20criminal%20law%20and%20penal%20code%20(1).pdf
, accessed 26 March 2014.  
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differences.78 Added to the challenge that arises from this is the introduction of sharia penal 
codes in parts of Northern Nigeria. These codes increase the number of offences that are 
punishable by death or by corporal punishment.79 They also introduce other offences, sanctions 
and standards of proof that are peculiar to sharia.80 Besides complicating penal pluralism in 
Nigeria, sharia introduces levels of penal severity that imperil human rights safeguards.  
Advocating some measure of uniformity amidst the plurality of penal laws in Nigeria – to the 
extent that it enhances sentencing reform ‒ lies at the heart of this research.  
 Overall, this thesis embarks on research in an area that is largely neglected in penal 
discourses in Nigeria. This neglect has been reiterated in this chapter to emphasise the 
astonishing dearth of jurisprudence on principled sentencing in Nigeria. The limited resources on 
sentencing in Nigeria suggests a pretty chaotic trail in the country’s sentencing practice, and 
while it certainly is a positive development that judges admit this problem,81 little attention has 
been given to resolving it. As with the abovementioned Amoshima and Ekpo cases82 decided in 
2012 and 2014 respectively, courts have repeatedly overlooked opportunities to found their 
approach to sentencing on a rationalised basis that infuses punishment with principles that 
enhance human rights guarantees against excessive penal severity. Coldham’s83 allusion to scant 
research in this field in Nigeria reiterates a knowledge gap in Nigeria’s sentencing jurisprudence 
and practice that needs to be filled.84 This, the importance of the subject, and the fact that rights 
bearing individuals continue to be subjected to the abuses and inadequacies of the current 
system, highlight the importance of this thesis. The thesis seeks to make a contribution that 
rekindles interest in discourses about principled sentencing in Nigeria. It proposes to do so by 
                                                          
78 Most states in Nigeria have adopted their own Penal or Criminal Codes, which were similar to the principal codes. 
In 2007 however, Lagos state adopted the Administration of Criminal Justice Law, which repealed the erstwhile 
criminal procedure law and introduced substantial changes to criminal law and procedure. See Peter A Anyebe 
‘Sentencing in criminal cases in Nigeria and the case for paradigmatic shifts’ Vol. 1 (2011) NIALS Journal on 
Criminal Law and Justice 151 – 153.  Subsequently, the 2007 law was replaced by the Administration of Criminal 
Justice Law 2011. 
79Carina Tertsakian ‘“Political Shari’a”? Human rights and Islamic law in northern Nigeria’ (2004) Vol. 16 No 9(A) 
Human Rights Watch 1-111 at 37-38, 99–102. 
80 Rudd Peters ‘The reintroduction of Islamic criminal law in Northern Nigeria’ (2001) being a study conducted on 
behalf of the European Commission, available at http://rezaei.typepad.com/hassan_rezaei/files/islamic-criminal-
law-nigeria_en.pdf, accessed 26 March 2014. 
81 See Fatayi-Williams op cit at note 49 op cit. 
82 See notes 47 and 48. 
83 Coldham op cit note 57. 
84 See discussion about the knowledge gap in chapter 2 section 3. 
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attempting to fill the jurisprudential gap and to propose a structured or principled approach to 
sentencing. 
   
1.5 Research Methodology  
How sentencers in Nigeria exercise discretion when interpreting sentencing legislation is crucial 
to this research. Since sentencing power derives from the common law or from constitutional and 
statutory provisions, the research will examine how these sources of law influence sentencing. 
The research questions have been framed to explore this influence and to usher the enquiry into 
an extensive doctrinal and comparative review of sentencing in South Africa, England and Wales 
and Nigeria. Doctrinal research entails expositions of legal concepts and principles, through 
analyses of the interactions between rules, legislation and case law. It has also been described as 
a core method of legal research that requires the critical, rigorous and creative processes 
involved in legal reasoning.85  
This research employs the deductive method of doctrinal research to analyse the 
adequacy of regulatory frameworks for sentencing and to evaluate judicial compliance with the 
rules and principles that have evolved to guide sentencing discretion. The aim is to determine 
how or whether judicial compliance fulfils the penal policy considerations that underlie 
sentencing legislation.  The research is also reform-oriented, in the sense that it seeks to unveil 
inadequacies in extant sentencing policy and legislation and how these impact sentencing 
discretion, so that recommendations for reforms can be made. The law in context paradigm 
summarises this approach; it describes analyses that utilise practical illustrations to portray the 
social context within which the law operates. It portrays the problems that arise from the 
application of the law and the legal challenges arising therefrom (i.e., within specific social 
contexts).86 In chapters one and two, the law in context paradigm is utilised to portray policy 
                                                          
85 Terry Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan ‘Defining and describing what we do: Doctrinal legal research’ (2012) Vol. 17 
No. 1 Deakin Law Review 83 at 84 -85.  The authors rely on definitions that describe doctrines as a ‘[a] synthesis of 
various rules, principles, norms, interpretative guidelines and values’. The doctrinal method is an attempt to 
elucidate or justify a rule of law, which having evolved through a gradual organic process, is meant to be applied on 
a consistent basis.  
86 For an explanation of the law in context method, see Philip Selznick ‘‘Law in context’ revisited’ (2003) Vol. 30 
No. 2 Journal of Law and Society 177-186. 
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changes and the need for reforms. Going forward, the dissertation will examine the features, 
interactions and limitations in sentencing law and how these impact sentencing discretion.87   
Doctrinal analysis will also be deployed within a comparative component that aims to 
enhance an understanding of sentencing across different legal systems. A basis for this 
comparative approach can be found in Okeke’s88 and Eberle’s89 comments, which describe the 
comparative legal research method as allowing juxtapositions of similarities and dissimilarities 
between legal systems, in order to explore historical and doctrinal dimensions in the law, so as to 
enhance an understanding of the role of law in different national contexts, or facilitate the 
replication of the best attributes of one legal system by another. Comparative law therefore 
involves an ‘analysis, differentiation, and assessment of [different] legal systems,’90 of the 
interactions between legal systems and how they influence each other. Kahn-Freund91 identified 
three purposes for deploying the comparative law method: first, the method facilitates 
‘international unification of the law’; secondly, it gives ‘adequate legal effect to a social change 
shared by a foreign country with one’s own country’; and thirdly, it ‘[promotes] at home a social 
change which foreign law is designed either to express or to produce’.92  
Kahn-Freund’s aims suggest that legal transplantation is possible, though he warned that 
not all forms of legal arrangements are transplantable, due to social, environmental and political 
factors. Using labour relations as an example, he pointed out that ‘standards of individual 
protection’ in relations between employers and employees ‒ such as are expressed in substantive 
laws regarding workplace safety, wages, health, leave, pension and the rights to associate and 
bargain collectively among others ‒ are readily amenable to transplantation. These fall within the 
sphere of individual labour law and are often expressed strictly as substantive law. Conversely, 
                                                          
87 See Hutchinson & Duncan op cit note 84 at 101-113. For further discussion on methods of legal reasoning, see 
Chynoweth, Paul ‘Legal research’ in Knight, Andrew and Ruddock, Les (eds) Advanced research methods in the 
built environment (2008). 
88 Chris Nwachukwu Okeke ‘Methodological approaches to comparative legal studies in Africa’ (2012) being a 
paper presented at the inaugural methodology workshop organised by The Centre for Comparative Law in Africa 
(CCLA) Faculty of Law, 22nd – 24th October 2012 at the Oliver Tambo Moot Court, Kramer Law Building, 
University of Cape Town, South Africa, 1-3; Chris Nwachukwu Okeke ‘African law in comparative law: Does 
comparativism have worth?’ (2011) Vol. 16 No 1 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 1 at 5-6. 
89 Edward J Eberle ‘The methodology of comparative law’ (2011) Vol. 16 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 51. 
90 Okeke (2012) op cit note 87.  
91 O Kahn-Freund ‘On uses and misuses of comparative law’ (1974) Vol. 37 No. 1 The Modern Law Review 1 at 2.  
92 Ibid at 5-6. 
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standards or rules that define relationships between organised interests resist transplantation. 
These rules define power relations between institutions and the interests they represent. As such, 
they are (national) context specific. In labour relations, the rules specify obligations regarding 
the promotion of collective bargaining, relations between trade unions and employers and 
strikes93 ‒ issues that raise the ‘problem of how far one can transplant institutions closely linked 
with the structure and organisation of political and social power in their own environment’.94 
In the context of Nigeria’s criminal law, there have been objections to the transplantation 
of English criminal law concepts and institutions, based on the obliterating effect that they had 
on African customary criminal law.95 This research acknowledges that the objections are real and 
that the problems that Kahn-Freund warned of are ever present. For instance, questions about 
how to measure sentence severity can be particularly context specific, depending on how each 
society defines criminal conduct, regulates and places value on punishment and how much 
human suffering a society can tolerate.  However, though countries may differ in their responses 
to these questions, the usefulness of a comparative analysis of contemporary sentencing systems 
is not diminished thereby. Such analysis is necessary for understanding how criminal justice 
systems evolve or work in the context of cultures, differentiating and highlighting those 
experiences that can be shared, for the purpose of enhancing reforms or reducing disparities 
between penal systems, as may be necessary.  
Hence, while this research is not oblivious of the ‘dangers’ of transplantation or 
harmonisation, it is keenly aware of evolving international and regional instruments that 
influence or are being influenced by national sentencing standards. For example, article 7 of the 
1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, article 5 of the 1982 African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights and article 3 of the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights, all prohibit torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in 
member States.  In Resolution 8/8, the United Nations Human Rights Council recalled that ‘a 
                                                          
93 Ibid at 20-24. 
94 Ibid at 24. 
95 See Karibi-Whyte, AG History and Sources of Nigerian Criminal Law (1993)  64-65, 67; Karibi-Whyte, AG 
Criminal policy: Modern and traditional trends (1988) 25, 45; see also Viviane Saleh-Hanna ‘Alternative to 
imprisonment: community service orders in Africa’ in Viviane Saheh-Hanna (ed) Colonial Systems of Control: 
Criminal Justice in Nigeria (2007). 
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number of international, regional and domestic courts have held the prohibition of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to be customary international law’.96 Also, under 
the Treaty on the European Union, member States are obligated to foster cooperation in fulfilling 
treaty obligations.97  This obligation extends to state organs, such as the Sentencing Council of 
England and Wales, a statutory body under English law.98 Of particular interest to the current 
discussion are the influences that European and England and Wale’s99 sentencing standards have 
had on each other.  According to Baker,100 there is a ‘degree of correspondence’ between 
penalties in UK’s Sexual Offences Act 2003 (and the sentencing guidelines prepared thereunder) 
and penalties proposed by the Union’s Child Pornography Directive. Consistent with these 
degrees of correspondence, Nelken101 noted the ‘difficulties of drawing boundaries between 
systems of criminal justice’ in the age of globalisation. 
These developments cannot be ignored, especially because the United Kingdom’s 
Sentencing Council has issued guidelines that will be examined in this thesis. That being said, 
the thesis carefully delineates the scope of the comparative analysis it proposes to conduct. It 
does not consider the institutions per se, or the processes and other arrangements that have been 
concluded regarding the allocation of sentencing power. Rather, its focus will be on the 
principles that underlie the sentencing systems in Nigeria, South Africa and England and Wales, 
and what lessons may be shared or borrowed. To this end, the thesis adopts the socio-historical 
and functional approaches to comparative study, in order to portray different eras and 
continuities (if any) in social attitudes regarding punishment and how these are impacting 
sentencing law and policy in each of the three countries.  
                                                          
96 Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES8/8, adopted on 18 June 2008.  
97 See article 4(3) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union of 2008. 
98 Estella Baker ‘Sentencing guidelines and European Union law’ in Andrew Ashworth & Julian V Roberts 
Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring the English Model (2013) 257-282 at 276. Baker remarks that the potentials for 
greater influence on national penal law was heightened following the introduction of legal and institutional reforms 
after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in December 2009. 
99 Except for references to Britain in a historical context, other mention of Britain in this thesis is a reference to 
England and Wales.  
100 See Baker op cit note 97 at 271-282; see also Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 2011 on combating sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA. 
101 David Nelken ‘Comparing criminal justice’ in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan & Robert Reiner (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Criminology 5 ed (2015) 138 at 141, but see generally 139-143. 
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A socio-historical analysis explains the genesis of the law, how it arrived at its present 
state and why it has worked or failed to work in particular settings. As a method, it is helpful 
when transplantation is a possibility. In this research, the approach will explore commonalities or 
explain dissimilarities between different sentencing systems as they evolved, examine how 
problems were resolved and enhance understanding regarding why certain sentencing principles 
may or may not work across different penal systems.102  The functional method will analyse 
sentencing law in the context of the problems they were intended to resolve and what they in fact 
achieved.  Focusing on epistemologies surrounding punishment (that is, the culture-specific 
contexts of understandings regarding sentencing), this thesis proceeds on the premise, as 
functional comparative studies are wont to do, that sentencing disparities are experienced in 
different penal systems for similar reasons and that sentencing legislation and guidelines are 
adopted for similar reasons ‒ to rationalise sentencing discretion and thus eliminate or reduce 
sentencing disparities. Therefore, the principles that underpin the processes and institutions that 
rationalise discretion, and the processes and institutions themselves, will to some degree, share 
similarities. In essence therefore, the functional method will direct attention to the attendant 
impacts of (sometimes coterminous) developments in the field of sentencing and their effects in 
the three countries (or legal systems) selected for this research.103 Of course, the functional 
approach will not be focused on epistemologies only. It will also appraise sentencing policy and 
legislation in the selected legal systems to determine which model can better fulfil the aims of 
rationalising sentencing discretion in Nigeria, while also responding to the penal system’s need 
for frugality.   
The thesis’ choice of comparative methodology is informed by the common thread that 
connects the three legal systems in the study.  Nigeria, South Africa and England all share an 
English common law tradition, especially in the sphere of criminal law, though South Africa also 
                                                          
102 Historical analysis of the law in comparative perspective does not necessarily entail a thorough historical study. 
Rather, the historical component features as one of other ‘important ingredients’ of understanding law from a 
comparative perspective. See Mathias Reimann & Alain Levassuer ‘Comparative law and legal history in the United 
States’ (1998) Vol. 46 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 1-16 at 1-4;  Reinhard Zimmermann ‘Legal history and comparative 
law’ Being a speech at the University of Lleida on 25 October 2007 available at 
http://www.udl.es/export/sites/UdL/organs/secretaria/honoris/zimmermann_discurs.pdf, accessed 31 March 2014;  
Okeke (2012) op cit note 87 at 12-13. 
103 See Ralf Michaels ‘The functional method of comparative law’ in Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann 
The Oxford handbook of comparative law (2006) 339-338. 
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has the added impact of Roman-Dutch law on its legal system. Nevertheless, similarities can be 
found in their common law histories and in the purposes to which criminal law and sentencing 
have been directed. While their respective sentencing systems have progressed along 
significantly different tangents, the fundamentals may, in principle, not be too different. Rather, 
it will be argued that tangents of progression reflect different states of development and contexts. 
This then provides a basis for studying experiences across each legal system, for comparing 
lessons and engaging in some degree of selective borrowing.   
Ordinarily, a study of this nature may require a collation and analysis of primary data 
regarding the root causes of the sentencing disproportionalities and inconsistencies that have 
been identified in this chapter, using case-by-case analogies to illustrate the dimensions of the 
problems and how they depict the need for reforms. Such an enquiry may be particularly 
desirable where serious problems arise from the use of judicial discretion. However, there are 
official state reports and other literature104 that acknowledge and illustrate these problems. These 
make researching the root causes unnecessary. The problems have also been acknowledged in 
judicial pronouncements especially in Nigeria and South Africa.105  The thesis accepts these 
acknowledgments as accurate depictions of the problem.   
Accepting these acknowledgements is consistent with the criminological approach in 
punishment discourses. Generally, such discourses follow at least one of three traditions ‒ the 
philosophical, sociological, or criminological approach. The philosophical approach is also 
called the traditional or classical approach. It engages with the ethical basis of punishment and 
the State’s power to punish. Simply stated, it seeks to resolve moral objections to the infliction of 
penal suffering and to interests or purposes such treatment is designed to serve.106 The 
sociological approach explores the social foundations of punishment for a comprehensive 
                                                          
104 See for example, Nigerian Law Reform Commission op cit note 3; See also South African Law Commission 
Sentencing: A Sentencing Framework (2000); see further South African Law Commission Sentencing (A New 
Sentencing Framework): Report (2000).  
105 See for example, Onyilokwu v Commissioner of Police 1981 (2) NCR 49; S v Vilakazi 2009 (1) SACR 552 
(SCA). 
106 David Garland ‘Sociological perspectives on punishment (1991) Vol. 14 Crime and Justice 115-165 at 116; 
Kevin Murtagh ‘Punishment’ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/punishment/, 
accessed 20 April 2014. According to Duff, ‘the central question asked by philosophers of punishment is: What can 
justify punishment?’ See Antony Duff ‘Legal Punishment’ (2013) in Edward N Zalta (ed) The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/legal-punishment/, 
accessed 20 April 2014.  
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account of the social functions it fulfils, its unintended social consequences and the impact that 
punishment has on the offender and society.  It seeks an explanation of the relationship between 
punishment, penal institutions and society, and views punishment as a ‘complex social 
institution’, defined, given meaning and assigned functions and form by a combination of socio-
historical forces that shape the institution.107 A distinctive method of the sociological approach is 
that it ‘views the institutions [of punishment] from outside, and seeks to understand their role as 
one distinctive set of social process situated within a wider social network’.108   
The criminological approach studies penal institutions from within, in order to 
comprehend their penological functions.109 It assumes that philosophical and sociological 
accounts of punishment and the State’s reasons for using punishment as a crime control measure 
are generally true,110 and preoccupies itself with finding solutions that will help the State realise 
its goals or ideas regarding punishment.  For example, the criminological approach seeks to 
understand or discover how penal measures can be made to reduce penal severity and maximise 
security, and how reforms can be directed to achieve the objectives of punishment. It is 
particularly more concerned with the values of fairness and consistency that penal justice ought 
to embrace, and with testing the efficacy of the strategies for implementing its goals, than with 
the outcomes of its processes.111    
Given this thesis’ focus on reforming Nigeria’s sentencing system, it adopts a method of 
enquiry that is consistent with the criminological approach. This thesis proceeds from the 
assumption that the problems exist for the same reasons expressed by Atsenuwa,112 for doubting 
the ‘need for fresh studies to document the nature or scope or dimensions of problems facing 
criminal justice administration in Nigeria … as available data does not indicate that significant 
changes have taken place vis-à-vis the situation of … sentencing.’ She resolved any doubts over 
                                                          
107 Garland (1991) op cit note 105 at 119; David Garland & Peter Young ‘Towards a social analysis of penality’ in 
David Garland & Peter Young (eds) The Power to Punish: Contemporary Penality and Social Analysis (1983) 4-5; 
But see also David Garland Punishment and modern society (1990) 10. 
108 Garland (1991) op cit note 105 at 119-120. 
109 Ibid; see also Garland (1990) op cit note 106.  
110 For instance, compromise or hybrid theories that justify punishment agree that punishment may serve legitimate 
retributive and utilitarian ends in any given penal system. See Barbara Hudson Understanding Punishment: An 
Introduction to Ideas, Perspectives and Controversies in Modern Penal Theory (1996) 57-58; Barbara Hudson 
Justice in the Risk Society: Challenging and Re-Affirming ‘Justice’ in Late Modernity (2003) 23-24, 28. 
111 Hudson (1996) op cit note 109 at 10-11. 
112 Atsenuwa op cit note 1 at 107. 
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the veracity of this observation by further stating, after conducting a review of criminal justice 
sector reforms between 1999 and 2007, that: 
there are areas directly and gravely impinging on the ability of the justice system to deliver 
justice where judicial activism is required to clarify the law and thus impact the criminal 
justice system … [One] area is the area of sentencing. It would have been expected that the 
judiciary by now would have started to self-regulate sentencing practice through the 
adoption of Practice Directions and providing case law precedents.  Interestingly, all 
sentencing related reforms have emerged from the executive arm in form of legislative Bills. 
However, none of the Bills … was enacted before change of government in May 2007 … [I]t 
is yet possible to argue that failure of the legislature to provide support to the many 
initiatives introduced, rests on the failure of the other key stakeholders namely: the 
executive, the judiciary and civil society to engage it as partners… .’113 
 
How the courts approached sentencing in the above mentioned cases of Amoshima and 
Epko suggest that Atsenuwa’s observation remains valid today. However, though the 
philosophical and sociological approaches are not the preferred approach in this thesis, elements 
of both approaches will be seen in discussions of the ethical basis of punishment, as well as in 
the socio-historical context of punishment in the three countries examined in this study. 
 
1.6 Delimiting the Scope and Foregrounding the Limitations of the Research 
It is necessary to clarify the way in which the word postcolonial is used in this thesis. The notion of the 
‘postcolonial’ stands central to the rapidly evolving field of postcolonial studies. As an area of inquiry it 
reflects considerable diversity and complexity. Contestation over concepts, and the interpretative 
frameworks best suited to analysis of, for example, relationships, identity formation and power in the 
postcolony characterise the debates. The notion of the postcolony is frequently invoked as an analytical 
lens to explore how formerly colonised people re-construct their identities and navigate the impact of 
structural and psychological effects of colonial domination. In recent years South African debates too 
have come to grapple with the postcolony both as theoretical lens and political practice. Spirited 
conversations over the legacies of colonialism and apartheid have become part and parcel of the kinds of 
political activism amongst students and staff on many South African campuses.  
 
                                                          
113 Ibid at 106-107. 
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Having recognised briefly the conceptual/analytical and deeply political facets of postcolonial 
studies above, it needs to be understood that in this thesis the notion of the postcolony is used in a purely 
descriptive manner.  Although the thesis explores the historical development of penal policy in two 
former colonies, it is simply for didactic and comparative purposes. No critical post-colonial lens 
has had to be deployed for this purpose. ‘Post-colonial’ has been employed in a literal and purely 
descriptive manner to allude to Nigeria as a former colony that has retained grossly dysfunctional 
colonial penal structures since it became politically independent.     
This thesis is about rationalising the use of discretion in judicial sentencing. Its focus is 
on the principles that have evolved to help judges impose penalties that meet the need for 
proportionality between the crime and punishment.  It explores the origins of these principles and 
imagines a role for them in achieving proportionality and consistency in the sentences that 
Nigerian judges impose.   Its overarching goal is to find a structured framework that judges could 
use when awarding punishments, which infuses judicial ratiocinations of punishment with 
principles that enhance penal moderation and ensure the consistency of punishment with values 
that are (or ought to be) protected by the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.  Although the thesis 
examines the principles in the context of how thinking about punishment evolved, the objective 
is to provide a basis for understanding how judges interact with them.  
Sentencing is a broad component of studies about punishment. This thesis does not aim to 
cover every question that could be considered under sentencing. For instance, even though the 
thesis writes about the need for judges to utilise penal alternatives to prison (and briefly 
discusses a few alternatives in chapter six), its thrust is not to discuss what those alternatives 
entail.  Also, it does not examine how sentencing interacts with or responds to specific, special or 
vulnerable categories of offenders, such as children. A focus on children is not indispensable to 
understanding the principles that should rationalise sentencing discretion generally.  Besides, a 
discussion of sentencing for juvenile offenders would require a consideration of issues that will 
make enough content for another doctoral thesis. It is hoped that a sentencing scheme that is 
founded on the principles that this thesis proposes will provide a useful foundation for further 
developing a sentencing scheme that is adapted to the needs of juvenile offenders or other special 
interest groups.  At the moment, that foundation does not exist in Nigeria.   
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  A considerable body of Nigerian and international literature already debate the abolition 
of the death penalty in Nigeria and this paper will not retrace this ground. The thesis will thus 
maintain a focus on finding a principled approach that brings international human rights 
standards into what ought to be the model scheme for moderating punishment in Nigeria. 
Accordingly, any discussion of the death penalty in Nigeria in this paper will be in the context of 
making a case for penal moderation. 
Further, the thesis does not examine questions about how parole influences the portion of 
a prison sentence that an offender serves. The reasons are as follows: first, parole – or the 
absence of it – has not been identified or prioritised as a problem in the available few texts that 
have been written on punishment in Nigeria.114 Secondly, parole is hardly the primary factor 
when a judge evaluates penal proportionality. Release on parole is a post sentence administrative 
decision that is dependent on the discretion of the correctional officer.  Besides, a parolee is still 
considered to be serving his sentence under supervised release. Should the conditions of parole 
be breached, parole will be revoked and the offender must serve the rest of the sentence in 
prison.115  Lastly, parole is limited to prison sentences. It does not apply to other penal 
alternatives to which the same principles of proportionality also apply.   
 
1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
The outline flows from the methodology adopted. This chapter illustrated how Nigeria’s failure 
to move away from the colonial mould in which its criminal justice system was cast has foisted 
incoherence on the country’s post-colonial sentencing policies, resulting in disproportionate and 
punitive punishments. It portrayed the wide discretionary powers that judges exercised during 
sentencing to be an impediment to principled sentencing and called for changes that place 
proportionality and human dignity protections at the heart of sentencing. Chapter two focuses on 
finding a conceptual basis for criminal punishment in Nigeria and interrogates the reasons behind 
                                                          
114 One of these texts by Gena Barbieri ‘Prisons’ in Rita J Simon (ed) A Comparative Perspective on Major Social 
Problems (2001) 41-78 at 69-70, points to the absence of a parole system in Nigeria, but recognises that certain 
categories of prisoners may be granted pardon by the state, or that prisoners may earn time off for good behaviour, 
thereby becoming entitled to early release. However, bad behaviour could also result in loss of time, in which case 
the prisoner may have to serve out the prison sentence. 
115 Michael Jacobsen Downsizing Prisons: How to Reduce Crime and End Mass Incarceration (2005) Chapter 5. 
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Nigeria’s sentencing dilemma. It offers clarifications about concepts associated with criminal 
punishment and discusses how theories of punishment respond to moral, rights-based or other 
challenges to the practice of punishment. The chapter seeks to fill a jurisprudential gap in debates 
about punishment in Nigeria, and to shift the approach to sentencing from a mechanically driven 
approach to a rational one. It accordingly explores the literature on mainstream theories and 
compromise theories, measuring them against prevailing attitudes about punishment in Nigeria. 
It explains the relative strengths and weaknesses of the theories and why no single theory 
adequately justifies the practice of punishment. It then attempts the reconstruct the conceptual 
basis for punishment in Nigeria. 
 Chapter three examines the socio-political contexts of discourses in punishment. It argues 
that time, political ideology and social contexts instigate shifts in cultures of punishment and that 
debates about punishment have been waged within shifting streams of ideological thought, which 
give meaning and content to penal policy.  It shows how socio-political thoughts and 
developments have come to influence – and in many respects – temper modern or postmodern 
attitudes regarding punishment. It examines these influences in the three legal systems, starting 
with Britain in the medieval era, through the renaissance to the modern era. For South Africa, the 
journey begins in the colonial era, traverses different stages up until the post-apartheid era.  The 
history of modern criminal law in Nigeria also starts with the colonial era, though nothing has 
changed much in the criminal law since that era. Nevertheless, the chapter reviews the progress 
of efforts to reform sentencing in Nigeria and highlights what more needs to be done.  
Chapter four examines the normative framework of sentencing in Nigeria and South 
Africa in their most developed form. It conducts in-depth analysis of the legal framework for 
sentencing in both systems, paying particular attention to how courts have given meaning to the 
framework. Two other factors inform the choice of Nigeria and South Africa. First, both 
countries are democracies with written Constitutions. This offers a basis for a comparative 
constitutional analysis of punishments in both legal systems. A constitutional analysis for 
punishments could have been done for Britain as well, but this would not be from a single 
constitutional instrument as can be found in the other two countries. Besides, Britain lacks the 
context that Nigeria and South Africa offers, of studying sentencing policy and legislation in the 
30 
 
peculiar context of a contemporary developing economy. Nigeria and South Africa offer a setting 
to discuss punishment both in a constitutional and developing country context. Accordingly, the 
chapter examines the constitutional basis of punishment and various pieces of sentencing 
legislation. It studies how courts have interpreted these sources of law and applied them in 
combination with the goals and principles that underpin sentencing. The chapter focuses on 
judicial decisions to portray what Nigerian courts can learn from the process of judicial 
reasoning that South African courts have employed.  
Using sentencing for rape crimes as an illustration, chapter five examines the 
inadequacies of the South African sentencing system in particular. It discusses whether 
sentencing legislation and the principles that have been judicially developed have indeed 
enhanced sentencing proportionality and consistency.  South Africa and Nigeria form the basis of 
the discussion, for the same reasons offered above.116 At the heart of this analysis in particular, is 
South Africa’s Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. The chapter looks at the 
inadequacies of s 51 of the law in rationalising discretion and reducing disparities. Its focus on 
rape is predicated on the convergence of societal apprehensions over the crime’s prevalence and 
threat, which has provoked a corresponding desire within the South African society to act with 
urgency and decisiveness against the crime and to punish offenders with a measure of severity 
that reflects society’s moral trepidation at the crime. A few corresponding features are also 
highlighted in rape crimes and punishment in Nigeria. For both countries, rape provides an 
example of the socio-cultural context of crime and punishment that chapter three discussed. In 
exploring rape sentencing, however, the chapter brings to the fore sentencing aspects that require 
further development. It concludes that inadequacies in sentencing legislation portray the need for 
sentencing guidelines.  
Chapter six explores model sentencing guidelines. It compares two models, namely the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guideline and English Sentencing Guidelines, focusing on the policies 
and principles that underline them and on how the guidelines have rationalised sentencing 
discretion and enhanced consistency. It identifies those elements, particularly from the English 
                                                          
116 Besides, exploring the challenges in the English context may be unnecessary because the three countries in the 
study have experienced similar challenges. Examining those challenges in the English system therefore does not 
offer any particularly different perspective, or additional value. 
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model, which would enhance the type and quality of guidelines that current attempts at 
sentencing reforms in Nigeria should seek to develop.   
Chapter seven summarises findings and concludes amongst others, that constitutional and 
legislative reforms and guidelines are necessary to rationalise sentencing discretion. It 





Chapter 2  Imagining a Principled Basis for 
Sentencing in Nigeria 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one identified the absence of a constitutional principle that regulates penal severity and 
preserves proportionality in punishments as a reason for gross disproportionalities in 
punishments in Nigeria. It also asserted that there has been little judicial or scholarly engagement 
with rationalising punishment, which creates a knowledge gap on the subject in Nigeria. This 
chapter examines these assertions further by considering how proportionality enhances 
sentencing fairness and strengthens protections against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. 
The chapter commences with a few clarifications regarding concepts and principles that are 
frequently associated with the distribution of punishment, but which are often absent from 
sentencing jurisprudence in Nigeria. It then explores the theoretical foundations of punishment in 
Nigeria and proceeds to discuss how these need to be developed to embrace new principles that 
have been utilised to regulate sentencing discretion and penal severity in jurisdictions like 
Britain.  These principles are important because they are taken into consideration when 
developing sentencing guidelines.  
In line with explanations offered in chapter one regarding criminological discourses 
about punishment, this chapter accepts the veracity of official claims about the purposes of 
punishment in Nigeria and explores their meaning within Nigerian jurisprudence, and within 
broader philosophical discourses about the theories of punishment. It then attempts to imagine a 
principled rationale for distributing punishments in Nigeria. Again, following the criminological 
approach, the chapter is less concerned with illustrating the effects of sentencing processes in 
Nigeria. There are useful resources in this regard already, which are corroborated by a number of 
judicial decisions considered below, that highlight or confirm the inconsistencies and 
punitiveness associated with sentencing in Nigeria. This work can therefore assume the 





However, there is a challenge that confronts this chapter’s attempt to imagine a principled 
basis for punishment in Nigeria, which emerges from the focus of existing research on 
identifying and understanding the problems. The focus has hitherto diverted scholarly attention 
from attempting a principled resolution of the problems, or from systematically developing 
jurisprudence around the purposes to which punishments may be directed, which leaves the 
present effort with scant Nigerian resources to draw from. Thus, an attempt as the present one, to 
kindle interest in such engagement in Nigeria must draw inspiration from the developments that 
have happened in other penal climes during the prolonged scholarly hiatus on the subject in 
Nigeria. This entails reviewing changes in penal thinking that has happened outside Nigeria in 
the past two or three decades. But first, the section below clarifies the sense in which 
‘punishment’ and other concepts associated with punishment are used in this thesis. 
 
2.2 The Meaning of ‘Punishment’  
‘Punishment’ has a variety of meanings. It may refer to fines for civil infractions, to disciplinary 
measures that a parent or teacher imposes on a ward, or to penalties for infringements of the rules 
of a game. When the word is used in these contexts, a civil, rather than penal connotation, is 
intended. However, when punishment refers to penalties that are imposed as a response to 
criminal behaviour, a penal meaning is conveyed.1  Attempts to define criminal punishment often 
                                                          
1 It has been argued that these variations in meaning show that ‘punishment’ has a vagueness or elasticity of use and 
meaning that renders any definition inconclusive and incapable of providing a normative basis for theoretical 
justifications of punishment. See Anthony Flew ‘The justification of punishment’ (1954) Vol. 29 No. 111 
Philosophy 291-307 at 291-4. Dolinko, on the other hand, acknowledged different approaches to defining 
punishment. One approach extends the definition beyond legal punishment ‒ which is only a variety of punishment 
‒ to include more general uses of the word, such as when it is used in connection with parental discipline. However, 
Dolinko alludes to a broad recognition among even those who adopt a more expansive definition that ‘legal … 
punishment is a distinctive practice that calls for a justification of its own’. See David Dolinko ‘Punishment’ in John 
Deigh & David Dolinko (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law (2011) 403-405. This broad 
recognition is important.  It has been argued that justifying a practice presupposes clarity of meaning regarding the 
subject matter of the discussion. See Stephen Sverdlick ‘Punishment’ Law and Philosophy Vol. 7 No. 2 (1988) 179–
201 at 179-180.This does not necessarily require incorporating every possible nuances of the word, because that is 
hardly the goal of theoretical disciplines in penology. Such a catholic approach is antithetical to a definition. Thus, 
Berman agreed with Duff, that efforts at definition are doomed to fail if the goal is to arrive at a definition that 
captures all the elements that feature in punishment, and to offer this as the standard for ‘any normative discussion’ 
on the justification of punishment. Traditionally, definitions of punishment offer a list of its constitutive elements. 





distinguish between civil and penal uses of the word.2 Typically, they list up to five definitive 
elements that associate censure with criminal punishment.3 For the purpose of this dissertation, 
they will be summarised into three elements. First, criminal punishment involves the intentional 
infliction of suffering or deprivation, which ordinarily ought not to be done. Its infliction 
therefore, must be predicated on a justified premise.4 This premise is provided by the second 
element, to wit, punishment may only be inflicted for breaking a rule that proscribes conduct that 
society disapproves as inimical to its interests. Underpinning the second element is the legitimate 
expectation that a person may only be punished because he or she broke the law, not otherwise.5 
The third element requires that punishment be only inflicted by someone who has the authority 
(usually assumed to be the State) to do so and in accordance with the due process of law.  
 From the foregoing, punishment may be defined as a treatment or deprivation that 
communicates censure, which is imposed under the authority of the state and in accordance with 
due process, on someone who commits an act that is prohibited by law.  A very important and 
distinctive feature of this definition is the fact that punishment censures behaviour. The 
discussion below explores the relationship between punishment and censure. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
offender for a supposed offense by someone with (supposedly) the authority to do so’. See Mitchell N Berman 
‘Punishment and Justification’ (2008) Vol. 118 No. 2 Ethics 258-260.  
2 Barbara Hudson Understanding Punishment: An Introduction to Ideas, Perspectives and Controversies in Modern 
Penal Theory (1996) at 1-2. According to Hudson, ‘the punishment that is the subject matter of penology … does 
not encompass everything that is painful or demanding … [or] all kinds of control or discipline of one person by 
another’.  
3 See Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (1998) JCA Gaskin (ed) 205. Flew op cit note 1; SI Benn ‘An approach to the 
problem of punishment’ (1958) Vol. 33, No 127 Philosophy 325-341. Hart, relying on Flew and Benn, listed five 
definitive elements, namely punishment must: (i) involve pain or some other unpleasant experience; (ii) be inflicted 
for rule breaking; (iii) on an actual or supposed offender, and for his offence; (iv) intentionally by someone; (v) who 
has duly constituted authority under by legal system whose rules were violated by the offensive act, to impose the 
punishment. HLA Hart ‘The Presidential Address; prolegomenon to the principles of punishment’ (1959-1960) Vol. 
60 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 1-26 at 3-4; see also Dolinko (2011) op cit note 1 at 404. 
4 Kevin Magill ‘The idea of a justification for punishment’ (1998) Vol. 1 No. 1 CRISPP 86; see also Jeremy 
Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1970) 158.  
5 Penal law is suspect without such expectation. See Russell L Christopher ‘Deterring retributivism: the “injustice” 





2.2.1 Punishment as Censure 
In his theory of the expressive function of punishment, Feinberg6  wrote that punishment had a 
symbolic function; through punishment, a community communicates its disapproval of the 
offender’s conduct. Although this function is often associated with retributivism, the element of 
censure (disapproval) in punishment may also have a deterrent effect. Von Hirsch and 
Ashworth’s7 explanations in this regard are useful; they articulated the censure element as 
conveying a normative message of moral disapproval regarding offensive conduct. In their 
views, it is this element that distinguishes criminal punishment from other forms of sanctions 
that utilise pain without communicating disapproval.   
Implicit in Von Hirsch and Ashworth’s account of censure is the claim that punishment 
treats the offender as a moral agent who is both capable of moral reflection and can understand 
the rightness or wrongness of his or her conduct. In this regard, the strength of ‘censure’ lies in 
the moral appeal it addresses to the offender as someone capable of moral judgment, or the 
normative reason it provides against acting in ways that will attract public disapproval. In 
punishment, the offender is confronted with the wrongness of his or her conduct and offered the 
opportunity to acknowledge the wrongdoing or make ‘effort[s] at better self-restraint’.8  
However, censure does more than provide normative reasons for desistance. A second 
constitutive element in censure is hard treatment, which provides a further incentive for rule 
compliance, especially to those who may not be sufficiently motivated by the moral appeal of 
censure. For such individuals, censure works through hard treatment. It is here that the 
preventative function in censure features; censure warns that certain conducts are reprehensible 
and punishable, thereby providing a prudential reason for exercising self-restraint that is ‘tied to 
the normative reason conveyed by penal censure’.9  However, this preventative function cannot 
stand alone; it may only be expressed within a structure that places censure at the heart of 
punishment, so much so that the manner in which it is expressed also ‘embodies a prudential 
                                                          
6 Joel Feinberg ‘The expressive function of punishment’ (1965) Vol. 49 No 3 The Monist 397-423 at 401-404. 
7 Andrew Von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (2005) 17-21. 
8 Ibid at 18, 24-26. 
9 Ibid at 22-3, see generally pp 18 & 21-2; Andrew Von Hirsch ‘Proportionate sentences: A desert perspective’ in 
Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth (eds) Principled Sentencing: Readings in Theory and Policy (1988) 168-





disincentive’.10 This view of the relationship between censure and hard treatment plays an 
important role in Von Hirsch and Ashworth’s views about distributive principles in a sentencing 
scheme, discussed later in the chapter. 
 
2.2.2 Punishment as a Curtailment of Rights 
One may proceed from the assertion that punishment asserts the moral agency of the offender to 
discuss the claim that punishment curtails human rights that are protected in national 
Constitutions. The rights to liberty, life and human dignity, or the right not to be intentionally 
subjected to suffering or harm, are rights particularly threatened by punishment. Their 
curtailment through punishment would ordinarily be morally objectionable. In penal thinking 
however, when the curtailment of rights can be justified, it is not a violation. A person may only 
assert his rights against the State when he or she lives within reasonable constraints established 
by the law. When an offender criminally encroaches on the rights of another however, he or she 
incurs punishment. Punishment, in this sense, entails the deprivation or removal of something 
typically valuable, such as liberty or property, or life (in countries that permit death sentences).  
To not inflict punishment that the offender deserves deprecates the freedoms that others enjoy 
and undermines the promise of the criminal law, or the system of punishments that underline that 
promise.11   
The above depiction of the relationship between rights and punishment adjusts the focus 
of efforts to justify punishment. It shifts the debate, however slightly, from attempting to provide 
an excuse for the intentional infliction of penal suffering per se, to responding to moral 
objections to the intentionality in bringing about suffering. The human rights principle assumes 
                                                          
10 Von Hirsch & Ashworth (2005) op cit note 7 at 23-4, see generally pp 22-25. The authors’ views are consistent 
with Feinberg’s observation that hard treatment conveys censure because it is conventionally believed to do so. See 
Feinberg op cit note 6; Andrew von Hirsch Censure and Sanctions (1993) 12-14. 
11 Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1978) 10, 194-5; Michael Cavadino & James Dignan Michael 
Cavadino & James Dignan The Penal System: An Introduction 3 ed (2002) 55-6; see also James Griffin On Human 
Rights (2008) 65. An explanation of the relationship between punishment and rights curtailment has been suggested 
in the doctrine that the offender forfeits his rights.   Griffin describes the doctrine as a factitious proposition that has 
not been ‘deeply worked out’. The problem with the doctrine stems from having to decide what precisely the 
offender forfeits.  Therefore, Griffin preferred the notion of deserts, which determines the nature and amount of 
punishment that the offender receives according to what his crime deserves.  Thus, what the offender ‘forfeit[s] is 





that criminal punishment provides countervailing reasons that demonstrate why its curtailment of 
rights does not amount to a violation of those rights.12 Within national contexts however, the 
principle yields different standards that reflect the interpretations that domestic courts place on 
constitutionally guaranteed rights and the limitations thereto. Thus, in the case of S v Williams 
and Another,13 the Constitutional Court of South Africa held that corporal punishments violated 
constitutional prohibitions against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
guaranteed by s 11(2) of the 1993 Interim Constitution of South Africa.14 Subsequently in S v 
Makwanyane,15 the same court held that the death penalty was an unconstitutional violation of 
the rights to life and human dignity. Conversely, however, in Gregg v Georgia,16 the United 
States Supreme Court held that the death penalty ipso facto did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits excessive fines and ‘cruel and 
unusual punishments’; it is unconstitutional only when it is disproportionately severe in 
comparison to the gravity of the alleged offence for which it is sought to be imposed. These 
decisions illustrate that punishments may only amount to violations when objections to how they 
curtail rights cannot be overcome within the (constitutional) jurisprudence of individual penal 
systems. In Nigeria, the Supreme Court affirms the constitutionality of the death penalty and 
enforces it.17  
 
2.2.3 The Principle of Proportionality  
A significant aspect of this chapter focuses on proportionality; its meaning and applications will 
become clearer as the discussion progresses.  Proportionality is a principle of distribution that 
requires punishment to be commensurate to the offence. The principle is hinged on the 
conventional belief that a sanction is  more equitable when it compares in gravity with the 
                                                          
12 Berman (2008) op cit note 1 at 267-8, 272-4 & 284-5. 
13 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC). 
14 Act 200 of 1993. The prohibition is now contained in s 12(1)(e) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996.  
15 1995 (2) SACR 1. 
16 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
17 See for example, Onuoha Kalu v The State [1998] 13 NWLR 531; Okoro v The State [1998] 14 NWLR 584; 





seriousness of the offence and that equity is breached when a sanction is not proportionate to the 
crime.18   
 As a principle for distributing punishment, proportionality responds to critical questions 
about measuring penal severity. It is a measure of the degree of disapproval with which society 
regards an offender’s conduct; the more blameworthy the offence is, the higher the punishment 
becomes in severity. A severe punishment communicates that the offence is very reprehensible. 
Conversely, a lenient punishment communicates a lesser degree of blameworthiness. A 
proportionality-based penal scale therefore organizes offences in their order of 
blameworthiness.19 The principle is very important, because a disproportionately ordered scale 
may convey wrong messages regarding the relative severity of offences.20 Sometimes, judicial 
decisions equate grossly disproportionate sentences with injustice,21  or regard proportionality as 
a principle that lies at the heart of determining whether punishment violates the constitutional 
prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments.22 
 
2.2.4 The Principle of Parsimony 
Succinctly, parsimony is the requirement that punishment should select the least restrictive or 
punitive measure to achieve the desired end.23 Tonry24 traces the principle to Bentham, who 
argued that ‘avoidable human suffering is undesirable, and urged the adoption of a “principle of 
parsimony” by which punishment would be justified to the extent that suffering by others was 
reduced’.25 In the nineteenth century, parsimony provided a reason for rejecting penal 
                                                          
18 Von Hirsch (1993) op cit note 10 at 6. 
19 Ibid at 15-16. 
20 Cavadino & Dignan (2002) op cit note 11 at 56. 
21 For example, in S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) at 472 paras H-I, 480 para H – 481 para D, and 482 para 
E, South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal expressed concern about sentencing legislation that obligate courts to 
impose sentences which, in the circumstances of the case, would be manifestly unjust. 
22 See S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) at 403 para H - 404 para B; Dirk van Zyl Smit ‘Sentencing and punishment’ 
in Stuart Woolman, Michael Bishop & Jason Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed Revision 
Service 4 (2012) Juta, Cape Town 49-14 to 49-16. 
23 Andrew Von Hirsch ‘The future of proportionate sentence’ in Thomas G Blomberg & Stanley Cohen (eds) 
Punishment and Social Control (2003) 271-290 at 283; Norval Morris ‘The future of imprisonment: Toward a 
punitive philosophy’ (1974) Vol. 72. No. 6 Michigan Law Review 1161-1180 at 1162. 







punitiveness. Subsequently in the mid to late twentieth century, the principle was again used to 
counter retributivist objections to utilitarian approaches to punishment. Within this period, a 
strong presumption in favour of sanctions that were less restrictive and intrusive than 
imprisonment became pervasive in scholarship. The interest was hinged upon humanitarian and 
utilitarian considerations that penal suffering beyond what has deemed necessary by society was 
cruel.26  
As a principle therefore, parsimony calls for measures that are less drastic than 
incarceration.27  However, the need for such measures is neither purely humanitarian, nor limited 
to the best measures that would achieve crime reduction. Parsimony also requires frugality in 
public expenditure on penal corrections. For humanitarian and economic reasons therefore, the 
American Law Institute (ALI), amongst others, has supported the adoption of the ‘least 
restrictive penal policies’.28  Led by the principle, the ALI adopted a Model Penal Code that 
required courts to impose other punishments unless imprisonment was necessary for purposes of 
public protection. Section 7 of the code provided the conditions for imposing prison sentences. 
These included where the offender presented a high risk of re-offending if he or she were placed 
on a suspended sentence or probation, or where the offender’s rehabilitation could only be 
effectively provided through confinement in a correctional institution.  Inspired by the Model 
Penal Code, more than half of America’s states substantially revised their respective criminal 
codes.29  
From the foregoing, it can be seen that proponents of parsimony view incarceration as a 
severe penalty that should be used sparingly in the most serious cases where the offender posed a 
serious risk of danger to the public.  Morris30 offered one other condition: imprisonment should 
be used ‘only when any alternative punishment would deprecate the seriousness of the crime, or 
is necessary for general deterrence, or when all else practicable has been applied…’  
                                                          
26 Morris (1974) op cit note 23 at 1163. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Tonry (1998) op cit note 24. 
29 Morris (1974) op cit note 23 at 1163. 





 Having made these clarifications about punishment, the stage is set for a discussion on 
the theoretical basis of punishment, starting first with how Nigeria rationalises punishment. 
 
2.3 Rationalisations of Punishment in Nigeria 
Although the Nigerian Law Reform Commission31 has claimed that sentencing in Nigeria is 
conceptualized around deterrence, retribution, reformation and victim reparation, opinions are 
divergent regarding the objects of Nigeria’s sentencing policy, or whether in fact a policy exists. 
At a conference of Nigerian judges in 1988, Douglas J32 argued that no sentencing policy can be 
distilled from Nigeria’s criminal statutes and that the wide discretionary powers that courts 
exercise frustrate efforts to unravel a sentencing policy from judicial decisions. At the same 
conference, however, Okunribodo J33 expressed the contrary view that criminal statutes express 
the lawmaker’s policy on sentencing ‘based on his understanding, or perhaps, assessment of the 
object and purpose of punishment’. Differences of this nature forced the Presidential 
Commission on the Reform of the Administration of Justice (PCRAJ)34 to acknowledge in 2006 
that the ‘true purpose of sentencing in the Nigerian criminal justice systems is very contentious’ 
even though it is theoretically agreed that the system’s goals are conceptualised around 
‘retribution, reformation… and victim reparation’. Complicating this picture is Nigeria’s penal 
pluralism, which belies penal uniformity across the country.35  None of Nigeria’s penal regimes 
provides a statement of the sentencing objectives that courts should uphold. 
                                                          
31 Nigerian Law Reform Commission ‘Towards a more consistent and uniform sentencing programme in Nigerian 
courts’ (August 1983) N.L.R.C. Project No. 5, 14.  
32 DO Douglass ‘Sentencing Policy’ in All Nigeria Judges’ Conference Papers (1988) 410-433 at 427. 
33 SO Okunribido ‘Commentary’ in All Nigeria Judges’ Conference Papers (1988) 450-475 at 466-467. According 
to the jurist, ‘there is a sentencing policy, embodied in the law, which [though] deficient in detail, would only need 
to be more comprehensive and more detailed…”. 
34 Presidential Commission on Reform of the Administration of Justice in Nigeria Proposals for Reform of the 
Administration of Justice in Nigeria (2006) 54-55. Even if it were possible to distil a policy from legislation, 
different researches note the difficulty of discerning the reasons for the decisions that sentencers make. These 
reports portray wide sentencing disparities that belie the existence of a sentencing policy. See AA Adeyemi 
‘Scientific approach to sentencing’ in TO Elias The Nigerian Magistrate and the Offender (1972) 49. See JA 
Adefarasin  ‘Sentencing’, in AA Adeyemi (ed) Law Development and Administration in Nigeria (1990) 159. 
35 Between 1982 and 1983, the Nigerian Law Reform Commission conducted what is probably the first nationwide 
study of sentencing in Nigeria. The study reported sentencing inconsistencies, partly because of complex 
relationships between diverse systems of criminal justice at different levels of government in Nigeria, which 
imposed substantive and procedural differences in the criminal laws enforced and resulted in ‘differential treatment’ 





Another striking observation about penal discourses in Nigeria is that they rehash well-
worn accounts of punishment, mostly of English origin.36  To be fair, given the influence of 
British colonisation on modern criminal law in Nigeria, some reliance on English principles and 
concepts may be expected.  However, problems will arise when such reliance is not in step with 
modern penal developments, or with the present needs of criminal justice administration in 
Nigeria. These needs are unique to the Nigerian context and require the development of a 
responsive penal jurisprudence.  Unfortunately, and as asserted in chapter one, available texts on 
punishment in Nigeria are dated and unable to address contemporary penal needs.  They also 
offer no different accounts of punishment than the philosophical traditions have.37 These 
accounts were discarded in the new thinking that have dominated penality in the West since the 
1980s especially. The tendency to rehash traditional accounts has encouraged Nigerian 
sentencers to apply limited penal formulations in infinitely varied factual circumstances.38 It is 
portentous that these formulations originated in punitive attitudes that prevailed in the Britain of 
yesteryears. The most recent debates in Nigeria do not draw significantly on new thinking about 
deserts and proportionality that began to influence sentencing reforms in the West in the 80s.39  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
personal discretions’ that were shaped by the sentencer’s background, emotions, outlook, training and experience. 
See The Nigerian Law Reform Commission (1983) op cit note 31 at 9. See also Ruud Peters Islamic Criminal Law 
in Nigeria (2003) 1-5 & 13-15. 
36 Some of Nigeria’s leading criminal law texts offer brief accounts of the theoretical basis of punishment. See CO 
Okonkwo Okonkwo and Naish on Criminal Law in Nigeria (1980) 28; EH Ofori-Amankwah Criminal law in 
Northern States of Nigeria (1986) 13-18. Others do not mention the theories, possibly because they assume the 
theoretical basis of punishment in Nigeria. See JA Yakubu & AT Oyewo Criminal Law and Procedure in Nigeria 
(2000); Akinola T Aguda The Criminal Law and Procedure of Southern States of Nigeria 3 ed (1982). 
37 Nigerian authors also rely on classical theorists like Bentham, Beccaria, Kant, and twentieth century philosophers 
like Flew, Mabbott and Durkheim, to explain or teach punishment. See Okonkwo (1980) op cit note 36; AB 
Dambazau Law and Criminality in Nigeria: An Analytical Discourse (1994) 107-127.  
38 Alan Milner The Nigerian Penal System (1972) 54. 
39 In Britain, although efforts to humanise punishment gathered steam with the introduction of rehabilitation in the 
nineteenth century, the resultant changes were not extended to the British Colony of Nigeria. Much later, in 1963, 
Nwabueze wrote about a growing school of thought in English justice about that time, which demanded that 
punishment ought to fit the offender, and that sentencing should have regard to the likely effects it would have on 
the offender.  The new trend received some recognition in ss 391 and 435 of Nigeria’s Criminal Procedure Act, and 
in the requirement amongst others, that insane offenders be committed to asylums rather than imprisoned. Section 
391 obligates courts to take the offender’s means into consideration when awarding a sentence of fine, while s 435 
empowers the court to place an offender on probation or order nominal punishment when having regard to the 
character, age, antecedents, health of the offender, or the trivial nature of the offence, it forms the opinion that a 
sentence is inexpedient. See BO Nwabueze The Machinery of Justice in Nigeria (1963) 238. These shifts may have 
drawn on the rehabilitative ideal behind twentieth century reforms in Britain. As far as the Colony of Nigeria was 





At this juncture, an illustration of how Nigerian courts have grappled with traditional 
accounts of punishment will help to elucidate the jurisprudence that has evolved.  First, however, 
it must be observed that judicial cogitations about punishment in Nigeria (as elsewhere) often 
regard retribution, deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation as the aims, objectives, goals or 
purposes of punishment, rather than as theories.40 This judicial approach is consistent with Sir 
Fitzjames Stephen’s41 views. Stephen deplored the tendency of theories of punishment to fit 
‘philosophical explanations’ and the practical realities of judicial sentencing into separate planes, 
resulting in the ‘desiccation, preciousness and insignificance of each’.42  In Stephen’s view, 
theory and practice ought to be coterminous; they are better explained when they work hand in 
hand, checking and refining each other.43  
The above observation is pertinent. Theoretical disciplines have an inherent susceptibility 
to exclusivity, to offer one theoretical account as the sole basis for punishment. No theory, as 
Stephen44 argued, can on its own offer a comprehensive account of an institution as complex as 
punishment. After all, in all practicality, judges are not called upon to find exclusive premises for 
the sanctions they impose, but to judiciously weigh the different aims that compete in 
punishment. Exclusive reliance on sole principles could derail that process and impede a proper 
consideration of all the values that bear on a prudent choice of punishment. Inclusivity therefore, 
rather than exclusivity, is key.45 Others, such as Flew,46 Hart,47 Rawls,48 Walker49and lately, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
expediency of maintaining socio-political and control, rather than reform. See Simon Coldham ‘Criminal justice 
policies in Commonwealth Africa: Trends and prospects’ (2000) Vol. 22 No. 2 Journal of African Law 218-238 at 
219-223. See also section 3.4 below.  
40 Thus, in Onyilokwu v Commossioner of Police 1981 (2) NCR 49, the court referred to the values as purposes of 
sentencing. In S v Makwanyane supra note 15, the Constitutional Court of South Africa referred to them as the main 
goals of punishment. 
41 Marc O DeGirolami ‘Against theories of punishment: The thoughts of Sir James Fitzjames Stephens’ (2012) Vol. 




45 Ibid at 722-28. 
46 Flew (1954) op cit  note 1 at  295-6. Flew argued that exclusivity promotes a preferred alternative, while 
devaluing or vaguely comprehending others. For him, it was possible for ‘logically separate acceptable 
justifications’ to provide ‘independently sufficient’ grounds for punishment.  
47 Hart op cit note 3 at 1. 
48 John Rawls ‘Two concepts of rules’ (1955) Vol. 64 No. 1 The Philosophical Review 3-32 at 4-5. 
49 According to Walker, ‘In practice … sentences often appeal to different justifications in different circumstances or 





DeGerolami,50 agree that sentencing involves an evaluation of different theories of punishment, 
which are often in conflict.  Such conflicts are inevitable, because the reasons that underpin each 
theory articulate legitimate social expectations about punishment.51 Hence, a penal system may 
rightly offer all of the theories as reasons for punishment and judges usually evaluate them when 
considering sentences. Their evaluations seek to achieve a balance between the goals that the 
theories articulate, such that a well-reasoned judicial sentence should reflect judicious attention 
to the relative impact that each theory or combination of theories should have on punishment.52 
In the final analysis, the punishment should also reflect the judge’s perception of the premium 
that the lawmaker places on the penal reasons behind a criminal statute.53  
Nigerian courts generally regard the balancing of competing penal aims to be an 
imperative, though sentencing decisions hardly show how this is done.  In Onyilokwu v 
Commissioner of Police,54 the High Court of Benue State in North-Central Nigeria somberly 
remarked that ‘a good number of courts’ were not giving adequate thought to sentencing 
principles.55  In Onuoha Kalu v The State,56 the Supreme Court of Nigeria was presented a 
unique opportunity to do what the Constitutional Court of South Africa did in S v Makwanyane.57 
In the latter case, the underlying objectives of punishment, the principles of sentencing and how 
these should influence sentencing decisions were robustly deliberated in the parties’ arguments 
and the court’s decision. An important issue for determination turned on whether the death 
penalty was ‘a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment within the meaning of section 11(2) of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
retribution (or expressive reasons) while others (e.g. mala prohibita) should be punished only for utilitarian reasons. 
There is nothing inherently illogical in this argument, so long as one can offer an explicit and plausible distinction 
between situations in which each justification is appropriate ...’ See Nigel Walker Punishment, Danger and Stigma: 
The Morality of Criminal Justice (1980) 30-31. 
50 DeGirolami has also argued that theories are ‘never capable of expressing in fully satisfying fashion the 
complexity of the world that it means to describe, order, and judge. … [There is] the possibility that rigidity in one’s 
ideas about punishment will choke off the ability to recognize and exist in a position of tension between conflicting 
values and purposes’. See DeGirolami op cit note 41 at 278. 
51 Hudson (1996) op cit note 2 at 3-4. 
52 Ibid at 4. 
53 S v Malgas supra note 21 at 476 para G – 477 para H; 481 paras F-G.  
54 Supra note 40.  
55 Ibid at 54 para 25. 
56 [1998] 13 NWLR 531. 





[the South African] Constitution’.58 In Kalu, however, which also involved the constitutionality 
of the death penalty, not once were the principles or objectives of sentencing mentioned.59  
Onyilokwu offers what is arguably one of the clearest elucidations of the principles of 
punishment in Nigeria.  The court made two important acknowledgments. First, it recognised 
sentencing as a crucial phase at which major problems frequently arose in the criminal process. 
Secondly, it acknowledged that sentencers were often subject to idiosyncrasies or undisclosed 
elements that influenced the choice of punishment, even though they were irrelevant to the 
material facts of the case. These elements constituted impediments to the judicious use of 
discretion and potentially countermanded the public interest considerations that inform the 
content of particular penal prohibitions. A judge could, for instance, be influenced by 
unidentified biases or rumours, or some personal traits that incline him/her toward a severe, 
crusty or lenient disposition to the offender. Such idiosyncrasies are intensified by the burden of 
determining what proportion of the punishment should be allocated to retribution, reform or 
deterrence.60 
For these reasons, the court expressed the view that sentencing principles were necessary 
in order to exclude or limit the effect that subjective elements have on the choice of punishment. 
In the court’s views, sentencing principles force sentencers to clarify their thoughts and resolve 
intervening emotions through a ratiocination of the process of awarding punishment, using 
clearly articulated statements to justify the object, quality and amount of the punishment 
selected.  They also rationalise sentencing discretion and ease appellate reviews of sentences. 
Principles, however, must not be confused with the purposes of punishment.  They only help to 
resolve the penal purpose(s) that should be dominant in a sentence. The principles, which include 
                                                          
58 Ibid at 41 paras C-E. 
59 See chapter 4 section 4.1.  
60 Onyilokwu supra note 40 at 55 para 25 - 56 para -10; see also Nigerian Law Reform Commission op cit note 31 at 
13, where the Commission wrote that sentencers bring an ‘indefinable element’ into sentencing, which influences 






mitigating and aggravating factors, are ancillary and the eventual sentence must be guided by the 
court’s conclusions regarding the purpose(s) to which punishment must be directed.61 
The Onyilokwu case comes across as a very important decision because rarely do 
Nigerian decisions articulate the principles and purposes of sentencing better.  However, the 
decision has its limitations. It perpetuates a tradition of unbridled sentencing discretion62 that 
regards maximum and minimum sentences in penal statutes as little more than broadly 
demarcated guides within which sentencers may roam.63  Thus, the court held that maximum and 
minimum sentences only serve as ‘a good reminder that the legislature has given the court 
enough amplitude in which to operate’.64 Although the court acknowledged that sentencing 
‘must be administered within the known principles if it is not to be taken as a sport, or as an 
unbridled stage in criminal proceedings’,65 this does little to rein in discretion, as courts have 
consistently applied discretion within an ample range that fosters sentence disproportionalities in 
Nigeria. The court could have situated its discussion of discretion within a principled structure 
that would ensure that the purposes and principles it enumerated enhanced sentencing 
consistency and placed reasonable limits on penal severity.   
If sentencing decisions and academic writers in Nigeria are this fixated on traditional 
accounts of punishment, it behoves any study of sentencing in Nigeria to examine those accounts 
and understand why they are inadequate to respond to today’s penal requirements, or facilitate 
the achievement of the sentencing framework that the PCRAJ proposed in 2006. Essentially, 
those accounts fall within the philosophical theories that have been offered in justification of 
punishment. 
 
                                                          
61 Onyilokwu supra note 40 at 55 para 25 and 56 para 20 - 57 para 10.  
62 See AA Adeyemi ‘Administration of justice in Nigeria: Sentencing’ in AA Adeyemi (ed) Law, Development and 
Administration in Nigeria (1990) 109 at110-111, 121, 140-141; JA Adefarasin ‘Sentencing’ in AA Adeyemi, (ed) 
Law, Development and Administration in Nigeria (1990) 159; Douglass op cit note 32. 
63 Aguda op cit note 36 at 213 para 561; see also s 382(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. C 41 LFN 2004, 
which provides that courts have discretion to impose fines in lieu of imprisonment for an offence for which under 
written law, a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed, even though the law provides no specific authority to 
impose fine.  






2.4 Traditional Justifications of Punishment  
The intentionality involved in inflicting penal suffering provides the first premise that penal 
theorists almost unanimously agree on, that punishment needs to be justified against moral 
objections to it. ‘The clearest motivation for justifying punishment’, argued McAnany and 
Gerber, ‘lies in its negative and deprivative character … [in] the seeming reciprocity of evils … 
the paradox of following up pain with pain’.66  But there may be further reasons as well. The 
pain of punishment extends beyond the offender to a network of relations that include friends 
and family who care for him and whose rights may be affected one way or the other. Running a 
system of corrections also comes with significant material and social costs to the public and to 
those charged with administering punishment.67  
Theories that have been offered to justify punishment are broadly classified into two: 
retributivism and utilitarianism. Retributivism asserts that offenders are punished because they 
deserve it, while utilitarianism maintains that punishment is necessary to deter crime, protect 
society from criminals and dispose offenders or members of the public to rule compliance.  
Utilitarian claims are forward looking in nature, in the sense that they focus on preventing future 
crimes. As such, they have been variously described as preventive, reductivist, instrumentalist or 
consequentialist theories. Retributivism on the other hand is backward looking, because its focus 
is on the deservedness of punishment. It looks back to punish crimes that have been committed.  
The primary contestation between both theories (often referred to as traditional, classical or 
philosophical accounts or theories of justification of punishment) is with regards to whether 
punishment should be imposed because it is deserved, or because it will prevent future crimes.68 
Debates about the justification of punishment aim to resolve three important questions: 
who should be punished; how much is enough punishment; and by what method should 
                                                          
66 Rudolph J Gerber & Patrick D McAnany (eds.) Contemporary Punishment: views, explanations and justifications’ 
(1972) University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 2; See also Richard W Burgh ‘Do the guilty deserve 
punishment’ (1982) Vol. 79 No. 4 The Journal of Philosophy 193-210 at 193. Burgh pointed out other political 
institutions that intentionally impose restrictions on citizens, but do not require justification as punishment does. 
However, penal suffering raises moral issues in a way that other privations do not. 
67 Berman (2008) op cit note 1 at 258 & 266. 





punishment be imposed?69 The last two questions in particular raise practical issues regarding 
how to assign and measure criminal liability (i.e., distribute punishment).70 Traditional accounts 
of punishment approached these questions by muddling them with questions about the moral 
basis of punishment and proffering an exclusive utilitarian or retributive response. However, 
modern approaches to justification decry this approach and call for clear distinctions between 
questions about distribution and questions about justification. According to such arguments, 
utilitarianism explains why a society maintains a system of rules that prescribes punishment for 
rule breaking, while retributivism justifies specific applications of punishment.71 The former 
calls for a preventative answer (i.e. a system of punishment exists to prevent rule breaking) while 
the latter explains why ‘punishment should be levied proportionately’.72 However, even when the 
case for a distinction has been effectively made, there are situations where these functions will 
overlap. This prompts the need for clarity ‘when rationales for punishment such as rehabilitation, 
deterrence or retribution are suggested as justifying principles, and when they are suggested as 
principles of distribution’.73 The following discussion examines how traditional theories of 
punishment attempt to navigate these issues. 
 
 
2.4.1 Utilitarianism.  
Understanding utilitarianism requires exploring the concept within the broader theory of utility. 
According to Bentham,74 utility is the principle that approves or disapproves of actions according 
to the tendency that they have to augment or diminish happiness, or to promote or diminish 
interests to which the happiness of an individual or community is tied. A utilitarian endorses an 
action if it has capacity to augment happiness and disapproves of it when it diminishes 
                                                          
69 At a practical level, at issue in S v Makwanayane supra was whether the death penalty was a suitable method of 
punishment.  
70 Paul H Robinson ‘Hybrid principles for the distribution of criminal sanctions’ (1988) Vol. 82 No. 1 Northwestern 
University Law Review 19-42 at 34. 
71 Hart, op cit note 3 at 8-9. 
72 Andrew Von Hirsch ‘Proportionality in the philosophy of punishment’ (1992) Vol. 16 Crime and Justice 55-98 at 
71-72. 
73 Hudson (1996) op cit note 2 at 6. 





happiness. Thus, utility provides the basis for all moral actions.75 Mill’s76 views are similar; 
utility validates the moral rightness of actions in proportion to the extent that they promote the 
greatest happiness (where happiness signifies a state of pleasure and freedom from pain) or 
wrongness, to the extent that those actions tend to reverse happiness. Human actions kowtow to 
and take their character from ends to which they are subservient. Pleasure and freedom from pain 
are the only things desirable as ends. They are to be sought either for the pleasure that is inherent 
in that state of being, ‘or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain’.77 
Therefore, actions are right in proportion to the extent that they promote these ends.78 
Based on these constructs, Bentham and Mill offered their views on law and punishment. 
For Bentham,79 the utilitarian measures the value of law in terms of how it is fitted to augment 
total happiness and exclude mischief. Punishment is therefore moralised if it prevents a greater 
evil.80  A corollary of the principle is that punishment should seek the least drastic or least 
restrictive measure, calculated to deter offenders. For Mills,81 the urge to punish was 
spontaneous and natural, but must be subordinate to, and in conformity with the common good 
for it to be morally justified.  How then, does the common good justify punishment? Mill’s 
response situated individuals in a community of connected interests, in which a threat or injury to 
one person endangers the entire community.  Therefore, every member of the community retains 
a common interest in expiating threats or injuries. Punishment is ‘moralized’ by this ‘social 
feeling’ and  justified when it conduces to the common good.82 This utilitarian view of 
punishment also underpins the social defence theory, which posits that punishment has no value 
in and of itself, save in the protection that it gives to the public.83  
  
                                                          
75 Mark Tunick Punishment: Theory and Practice (1992) 69. 
76 John Stuart Mill Utilitarianism (2001) 10. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Bentham op cit note 4 at 14-15 &134.  
80 Tunick (1992) op cit note 75 at 71. 
81 Mill op cit note 76 at 49-50. 
82 Ibid at 50-51. Mills argued that man’s higher intelligence enables him to empathize beyond personal injury, and to 
situate his personal interest or injury in a community of interests held with other members of his community. 
83 Thomas Mathiesen Prison on Trial 3 ed (2006) 24, 55, 85; Matheisen discussed rehabilitation, incapacitation and 





2.4.1.1   Utilitarian Theories of Punishment 
Utilitarian justifications of punishment assert that punishment deters crime, protects society from 
criminals, or disposes people to obeying the law. This section discusses four variants of the 
utilitarian theory.84  
 
I    Deterrence 
Bentham and Beccaria are among the foremost proponents of the theory of deterrence. 
Bentham85 believed that punishment is evil. Consistent with his utilitarian views, he maintained 
that punishment may only be utilised when it promised to exclude greater evil.86 In other words, 
punishment should augment pleasure and prevent pain to the greatest majority. Believing that 
offenders are motivated to or deterred from breaking the law by the same human propensity to 
maximize pleasure and exclude pain, Bentham argued that punishment was justified by the 
surpassing utility of its threat; would-be offenders are deterred from committing criminal acts 
that would cause more pain, and the community is better for it. Mill’s arguments were in tandem; 
punishment is unnecessary when it carried no promise of utility.87  
In the utilitarian account therefore, the emphasis is not on punishment in and of itself, but 
on the threat of pain that it holds forth.88   Utilitarian accounts presume that offenders act 
rationally with knowledge of the probable consequences of the intended criminal action. The 
decision to offend is therefore predicated on a calculation of the anticipated benefits. The 
offender commits the crime if the anticipated benefit outweighs the pain of punishment.89 As a 
                                                          
84 This discussion does not examine one aspect of the utilitarian rationale, which is that punishing the innocent may 
be justified if it results in good consequences. This thesis accepts Rawls’ view that no penal system is set up to 
punish the innocent, as an adequate response to this utilitarian position. See Rawls op cit note 48 at 10-13.  
85 Bentham op cit note 4 at 158. 
86 See Ross Harrison. ‘Jeremy Bentham’, in Ted Honderich (ed) The Oxford Companion to philosophy  (1995)  85-
88, available at http://www.utilitarian.net/bentham/about/1995----.htm.  
87 In Mill’s words ‘[i]t would always give pleasure, and chime with our feelings of fitness, that acts we deem unjust 
should be punished, though we do not always think it expedient that this should be done by the tribunals. … If we 
see that its enforcement by law would be inexpedient, we lament the impossibility, we consider the impunity given 
to injustice as an evil, and try to make amends for it by bringing a strong expression of our own and the public 
disapprobation to bear upon the offender’. See Mill op cit note 76 at 306-7. For a discussion of Mill’s theory of 
utility and justice see Tim Mulgan Understanding Utilitarianism (2007) 26-7.  
88 See Phillip Bean Punishment: A Philosophical and Criminological Inquiry (1981) 396. 
89 Richard Brandt ‘Rule Utilitarianism’ in Gertrude Ezorsky (ed) Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment, (1972) 
93-101 at 93-4; Brandt argued that it is the fear of punishment that deters offenders. See also RG Singer & MR 





principle for measuring the proportion between crime and punishment therefore, Bentham90 
suggested that the value of punishment must outweigh the profit of the crime. The greater the 
level of mischief or gain that the offender anticipates from the crime, the greater the severity of 
the sentence should be; the more habitual the offender’s crimes become, the more severe the 
punishment should be, etcetera.91   
Beccaria92 is reputed to have refined the deterrence theory.93 He argued that the State’s 
right to punish arises from the necessity of defending the general wellbeing from individual 
trespasses.  As such, punishment must never go beyond what is absolutely necessary to preserve 
the general wellbeing. Otherwise, it becomes abusive and unjust.94 At the heart of Beccaria’s 
deterrence theory is a principle of moderation; the relief that is sought through punishment (e.g., 
crime reduction) must be sought through the least painful measures possible. This limiting 
element suggests a potential for frugality in deterrent punishments. In the final analysis however, 
deterrence invests heavily in the threat of punishment. It hopes that by holding forth the threat, 
potential offenders will desist from their criminal schemes, thereby making the actual imposition 
of punishment avoidable.95  
Deterrence is said to be specific when punishment is directed at a particular offender to 
dissuade him or her from reoffending.  Here, the individual offender is the intended beneficiary 
and deterrence may be achieved by reforming, rehabilitating, or incapacitating him or her. The 
goal is to give the offender a foretaste of what awaits him should he or she reoffend.96 Deterrence 
is general when the benefit accrues to the public as a whole. Here, the threat of punishment is 
directed at would-be offenders. Criminal statutes that threaten punishment are examples of 
general deterrence. An individual offender’s punishment also serves as a message of deterrence 
to potential offenders.  
 
                                                          
90 Bentham op cit note 4 at 141 – 142 & 145-146. 
91 See also Tunick (1992) op cit note 75 at 73. 
92  Cesare Beccaria On crimes and punishments and other writings Richard Bellamy (ed) (1995) 31. 
93 Bean (1981) op cit note 88 at 30. 
94 Ibid at 10-11.  
95 Hudson (1996) op cit note 2 at 20. 





II   Reformation and Rehabilitation 
Reformation and rehabilitation theories seek the same objective ‒ to remove the desire to offend 
from the offender and reintegrate him or her into society.97 Consequently, the words tend to be 
used interchangeably. However, their claims are differentiable; while reform theorists claim that 
punishment, in itself, reforms the offender, proponents of rehabilitation contend that what 
changes the offender are therapies designed to alter behaviour and that punishment merely 
supplements therapies. The element of punishment consists in the obligatory nature of the 
treatment the offender undergoes.98 The rationale behind reform-oriented and rehabilitation-
oriented interventions can also be differentiated. Reform targets the will of the offender and 
presumes that the decision to offend is a rational choice.  Its goal is to make the offender accept 
the wrongfulness of his or her action and to commit to not reoffending.99 Conversely, the 
rehabilitation theory reconstructs the offender as someone acting without free will, who is not 
blameworthy for his criminal actions. His crime is a reaction to adverse criminogenic factors 
within his environment, or even ‘biological, physiological and psychological defects.100  
                                                          
97 Ibid 26. 
98 See Bean op cit note 88 at 46. Bean uses the words interchangeably in explaining the reform theory of 
punishment; cf McTarggart, who draws his own distinction between Hegel’s theory of reform and reformation, by 
which he defines what Bean calls the rehabilitation theory. J Ellis McTaggart ‘Hegel’s Theory of Punishment’ 
International Journal of Ethics Vol. 6 (1896), 479-502 at 484-499. 
99 It is arguably for this reason that Hudson suggested that ‘reform can logically stand alongside deterrence’. Hudson 
(1996) op cit note 2 at 27. Garland and Young have also argued that ‘deterrence and reform were joint aims which 
were advocated simultaneously and coherently as early as Bentham and the [English] 1779 Prison Act’. See David 
Garland & Peter Young ‘Towards a social analysis of penality’ in David Garland & Peter Young (eds) The Power to 
Punish: Contemporary Penality and Social Analysis (1983). That said, the origin of the theory is traced to Hegel, 
who maintained that punishment may be adapted to achieve deterrence or reformation, provided a prior foundation 
was laid in deserts. In Hegel’s theory, punishment ought to be understood as a measure that is imposed for the 
offender’s sake.  This view entails that punishment is inflicted with an eye on two objects; to force the criminal into 
recognizing the validity of the law he has violated, and to bring about his repentance, or make him desist from his 
crime. Hegel’s theory held ‘rationality as the principled core of punishment’ and emphasized the instrumentality of 
pain in reforming offenders. See GWF Hegel The Philosophy of Right (2001) 90-91; see also Markus Dirk Dubber 
‘Rediscovering Hegel’s theory of crime and punishment’, Mich. L. Rev. (1994) 1577-1621 at 1580; McTaggart op 
cit note 98.  
100 The rehabilitation theory’s focus on treatment assumes the offender is a victim of psycho-social factors that 
predispose him to crime.  These factors could be poverty or inequality, and may include a dysfunctional background 
that may have impacted the offender’s development.  Rehabilitationists assert that crime is a social disease that 
ought to be cured, not punished. The theory has two implications. First, it sees no link between guilt and punishment 
and the offender is not responsible for his actions. Society must assume responsibility for his cure, by redressing the 
predisposing factors, and by subjecting him/her to therapy. Second, there is no deserts or proportionality principle in 
the rehabilitation theory. Rule breaking cannot be the primary determinant of punishment, because the offender is 





Beyond these differences, no very practical purpose is served by discussing the theories 
separately. Both seek the same objective and proponents of rehabilitation would also consider an 
offender to be ‘reformed’ when his or her values change, he or she accepts the wrongfulness of 
the conduct, becomes disinclined to reoffend as a result of the treatment and successfully 
reintegrates with society. However, rehabilitation has dominated contemporary debates about 
penal interventions that target behavioural change in offenders. Succinctly, rehabilitation 
requires punishment to be fitted to the offender’s criminological needs. Its critical strength lies in 
its emphasis on individualising punishment.  Punishment, in this sense, is those therapeutic 
interventions that draw on scientific knowledge regarding human behaviour, which the offender 
must undergo to be cured of his or her criminal tendencies.  The treatment is provided at a prison 
or hospital facility and is withdrawn when the offender has been cured.101  
 
III    Incapacitation 
The aim of incapacitating prisoners is to protect the public from known offenders by physically 
rendering them incapable of reoffending. The most common form of incapacitation is 
imprisonment, but it includes the death penalty in countries that retain the penalty as a legal 
sanction.102 Incapacitation through imprisonment can go hand in hand with rehabilitation, 
because the latter requires periods of confinement to be implemented.  However, the 
incapacitation theory is devoid of rehabilitative elements. Its emphasis is on protecting the public 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Katherine M Campbell ‘Rehabilitation theory’, in Mary Borsworth (ed) Encyclopedia of Prisons and Correctional 
Facilities (2005) 831-4; see also CS Lewis ‘The humanitarian theory of punishment’ in Rudolph J Gerber & Patrick 
D McAnany (eds.) Contemporary Punishment: Views, Explanations and Justifications (1972), 194-199.  
101 The rehabilitative ideal found impetus in socio-economic developments during the industrial revolution, which 
drove up a need for labour that was supplied by reintegrating offenders into society. However, the ideal  and its 
practices concretised through ideas that were developed in the Jacksonian era, starting first with the emergence of 
systems of penitence, and evolving later into reformatory programmes that were  delivered through educational and 
vocational training, and a strict, physically demanding regime.  See Hudson (1996) op cit note 2 at 26-28; Karl 
Menninger ‘The crime of punishment’ in Michael Palmer (ed) Moral Problems: A Coursebook  (1991) 101-103;  
see also Francis Allen ‘Legal Values and the rehabilitative ideal’ in Michael Tonry (ed) Why Punish? How Much? A 
Reader on Punishment (2011) 97-105 at 97-99; Marie Gottschalk The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass 
Incarceration in America (2006) 52-53. 





from future crimes that an incapacitated offender might otherwise commit.103  Often, its target is 
the dangerous or habitual offender who is deemed to have a high propensity for reoffending.104  
 
2.4.1.2    Criticisms of Utilitarian Theories of Punishment 
Some weaknesses of the deterrent theory lie in the preconditions for it to work. The theory 
assumes that the decision to offend is a rational choice. For deterrence to work therefore, the law 
and particular instances of its enforcement must have been publicly communicated so as to 
forewarn potential criminals. Without prior communication, deterrence is ineffective.  A second 
precondition is that punishment must be administered with celerity. It must follow the crime 
immediately105 for it to reinforce the association between crime and punishment, thereby 
enhancing deterrence. Conversely, delaying punishment diminishes deterrence.106 Thirdly, the 
chances of apprehension have to be strong, as it is the certainty of apprehension, rather than 
punishment itself, or the severity of it, that has the more deterrent effect.107  
Important as these preconditions are, they are not, in reality, always feasible.  The 
presumption that offenders are calculating criminals does not always hold true. It certainly does 
not apply to crimes of passion; not all offenders know or understand the law and most certainly 
do not weigh the consequences of their criminal intentions before carrying them out. Indeed, 
empirical research suggests that rational decision making by offenders is improbable.108 Besides, 
it is not always the case that criminal justice systems can ensure that all crimes are detected, 
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reported and punished. If deterrence were solely based on the efficacy of crime detection alone, 
it diminishes when crime detection capacities are deficient.109 Another objection to deterrence 
asserts that for true individual deterrence to be achieved, punishment must be individualised with 
the object of rehabilitating the offender. This may lead to considerable disparities and 
immoderation in sentences, which could impede general deterrence.110    
Rehabilitation and incapacitation have also attracted criticisms for failing to do 
substantial justice.111 In rehabilitative incapacitative regimes, an offender may only be released 
when he is deemed to be cured or ceases to be a threat, and this is usually after indefinite or 
prolonged incarceration. This easily leads to exacting punishment at a value that is higher than 
the gains of the crime, with little regard to the gravity of the offence itself. Yet another criticism 
attacks incapacitation’s fixation with the concept of dangerousness, the idea that the habitual, 
violent or criminally insane offender has a high propensity to reoffend. Therefore, society must 
protect itself by keeping such offenders out of circulation, through incarcerations or 
institutionalisations for long periods of time. The problem with the scheme arises from having to 
determine dangerousness, as a predictor of future criminality. The science of predicting 
criminality is inaccurate. As a concept, dangerousness has been described as ‘so vague and 
plastic, [and] its implementation so imprecise, that it could not substantially reduce the … 
excessive use of punishment’.112 There are moral dilemmas associated with the concept. False 
predictions of dangerousness are frequent113 and incapacitation, in itself, has a tendency to 
punish for supposed predilections to offending. That is, the offender is punished not just for an 
offence he has committed, but for one that he has not and may in fact never commit if he were 
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not incarcerated. Such punishments cannot be justified on grounds of public protection. They 
offend the principle of fairness: their decidedly forward looking nature must ignore 
considerations of commensurate justice in order to punish an offender for a yet-to-be-committed 
offence.114   
Such punishments are underserved and must incline towards severity to achieve 
deterrence. The appropriate level of severity becomes whatever is necessary to deter.115 This 
might, in individual cases, mean leniency or undue severity. On the severe side, rehabilitative 
and incapacitative punishments force prisoners to endure longer prison terms than their crimes 
deserve. This problem, it has been argued, shows that utilitarian theories do not offer a practical 
guide for placing acceptable limits on punishment. Although rehabilitationists may counter argue 
that theirs is the only theory that integrates crime reduction and the offender’s right to return to 
society,116 no conclusive evidence supports the theory’s effectiveness. Its inability to arrest 
recidivism led to a radical decline in its utility in the 1970s.117 
Another attack on utilitarian theories relies on a considerable body of empirical data that 
challenge the claim that punishment deters criminals or prevents crime. Some of these reports 
use findings that show that the death penalty has not reduced murder rates.118 Others point to the 
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shortcomings in the studies to illustrate that there is no conclusive evidence regarding the 
deterrent value of punishment.119 Generally therefore, there is insufficient evidence to support 
utilitarian claims that punishment reduces crime.  Even when utilitarian punishments can be 
assumed to work, the high social costs of implementing them undermines the utilitarian principle 
of parsimony.120  
 
2.4.2 Retributivism 
Claims that the only basis for subjecting a person to punishment is that he broke the law,121  or 
that punishment is payback for moral lapse,122 or that only the guilty may be punished123 all 
iterate the underlying principle in traditional accounts of retributivism. The claims assert a 
necessary ‘connection between crime and punishment’, so that ‘punishment is punishment only 
when it is deserved’.124 Retribitivism regards punishment as having intrinsic value, validated by 
its innate appeal to moral persuasions regarding right and wrong and grounded in the moral, 
intuitive belief that an evil act mush be punished.125  In retributivism, punishment is grossly 
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inappropriate when it is administered other than because it is deserved.126 The theory firmly 
repudiates the utilitarian claim that punishment is justified by good consequences.127 
Among the foremost theorists in classical retributivism are Kant and Hegel.128 Kant129 
argued that punishment is justified only when it is imposed on a person because he or she broke 
the law.  He rejected the utilitarian thesis on one principal ground: punishing a person with a 
utilitarian object in mind treats that person as ‘a means subservient to the purpose of another’.130 
Such punishment dispenses with the requirements of justice, or of punishing a person according 
to his or her deserts. Kant’s arguments also turned on the right to punish. The right, he argued, 
derives from the right that society reserves to avenge actions that harm or threaten its interests. 
Punishment is therefore a ‘categorical imperative’, a phrase that connotes that a person must first 
be found ‘guilty and punishable’131 before punishment can be administered.  
In Hegel’s retributivism, punishment is inherently just because it expresses the offender’s 
will. The theory regards the offender as a moral agent who is capable of acting with reason and 
volition, and who makes a rational choice to break rather than keep the law, knowing full well 
the consequences that will follow. Therefore, punishment honours the rational choice the 
offender made. Denying him punishment denies him that honour. It injures his worth as a moral 
agent.132 There are certain corollaries to this theory: first, an offender is deemed to have willed 
the punishment he receives for breaking a rule; secondly, the argument that punishment is willed 
presupposes a right to be punished. Thus, the pain of punishment is the offender’s by right, 
because he willed it.133 How then does society acquire the right to honour the offender’s will? 
Hegel argued that crime is a negation of right that must be negated;134 otherwise the negation that 
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is implicit in the crime is validated.135 Punishment negates the negation of the victim’s right and 
restores the status quo before the offence was committed.136 To restore the status quo, 
punishment must be proportionate to the crime, so that equivalent values are achieved between 
the criminal damage and the penal suffering therefor.137 A variant of this theory regards the 
inference that punishment can undo wrongdoing as rather absurd. Crime cannot be undone. 
Punishment may only undo the false message that the offender expresses through his crime that 
the victim is of less worth. Punishment restores that worth.138  
According to Morris,139 the right to punishment is an incident of the offender’s right to be 
treated as a rational person. Explaining this point, he contrasted regular systems of punishment 
with systems that proffer therapeutic responses to offenders, and observed that while the former 
respects an offender’s choice, the latter does not.  The right to punishment also implied a right to 
the institutions and practices associated with it,140 as well as the benefits attached to the system, 
which afford the offender the ability to predict the probable consequences to his actions and the 
dignity of choosing which of those consequences should follow. Punishment merely responds to 
and respects this choice. Therapeutic systems on the other hand do not affirm the offender as a 
rational person, but subject him or her to the indignity of having the consequences of his or her 
choice determined by others. This diminishes an offender’s right to be treated as a rational 
person because the logical consequences of his or her choices are not allowed to take effect. In 
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Morris’s views therefore, the right to punishment is fundamental, natural, immutable and 
unqualified.141 
Traditional retributivists do not necessarily reject good consequences in punishment, but 
they resist using good consequences as a basis for punishment.  Kant142 and Bradley,143 for 
example, agree that consideration may be given to good consequences, or that it may be 
expedient to adjust punishment to a useful object, but this may only occur after guilt has been 
positively established. In retributivism, ‘doing justice … needs no further justification’144 
because punishment, in itself, is the end. It corresponds with justice.145 Retributivism’s insistence 
on establishing guilt repudiates any contemplation that futuristic purposes may provide a basis 
for imposing punishment.146  
There are different accounts of retributivism. In one account, punishment satisfies 
legitimate feelings of indignation and resentment, which Bradley describes as ‘salutary and 
worthy of cultivation’.147 Another account maintains that punishment expresses or communicates 
society’s indignation to the offender.148 Whatever the account, retributivism asserts that 
punishment must be deserved and administered in proportion to the offender’s blameworthiness. 
This assertion points out two important principles in retributivism, namely just deserts and 
proportionality.   
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2.4.2.1    Measuring Punishment under Traditional Retributivism 
The claim that punishment negates wrongdoing presumes that punishment restores the moral 
balance that was disturbed by the offending conduct.149 The balance is described as the 
equilibrium between benefits and burdens,150 or the ‘proportion between welfare and well 
doing’.151 It is grounded in the idea that the general happiness of a society is guaranteed when 
each member of the society observes the rules that secure that happiness, as his or her 
contribution to the general wellbeing. Rule breaking upsets the balance, but punishment restores 
it. Kant152 illustrated the balance using the system of property relations, in which ownership is 
established on legal rules that impose benefits and burdens that secure property rights. The 
burden restrains actions that threaten the security of property, so that all can enjoy the security of 
their property (the benefit). Stealing upsets the balance; in theft, the thief rejects the burden while 
purporting to retain the benefit. He gains undue advantage over others, but threatens the general 
security of property by his act.  Punishment reverses this undue advantage and restores the 
balance.153  
By what measure then, does punishment restore the balance?  Kant proposed a ‘Principle 
of Equality, by which the pointer of the Scale of Justice is made to incline no more to one side 
than the other’.154 In other words, the offender should be made to experience the same measure 
of pain caused by his or her act. Kant argued that the right to exact such pain derives from jus 
talionis, the right of retaliation. The right provides a regulating principle for measuring ‘the 
quality and quantity of a just penalty’155 and for ensuring that punishment kowtows to the ‘pure 
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and strict’ requirement of justice ‒ to treat like cases alike.156  Kant essentially advocated a 
principle of equalisation, to level off punishment with the crime for which it is imposed and 
ensure that punishment is proportionate to the degree of ‘internal wickedness [or moral lapse] 
manifested in the crime’.157  This also is the sense conveyed in Morris’ claim that punishment 
‘was related to maintaining and restoring a fair distribution of benefits and burdens’ (emphasis 
supplied).158 
Two principles emerge from the foregoing. The first, just deserts, asserts that punishment 
must be deserved. It is essentially a moralising principle. The second, the principle of 
proportionality, requires the pain of punishment to be comparable to the pain or damage caused 
by the offence. Both principles are prominent and necessary features in classical retribution.  In 
the classical tradition however, no clear distinction is drawn between deserts as a justifying 
premise for punishment and proportionality as a distributive principle.  
In summary, deserts and proportionality iterate the justice of balancing penal severity 
with offence seriousness,159 with the latter being a measure for evaluating moral culpability. So 
then, the intensity of punishment depends on the degree of moral wrong.  This ‘like for like’ 
measure implicitly conveys the notion that deserts or moral wrongness can be possessed in 
‘different degrees’.160  
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2.4.2.2     Criticisms of Traditional Retributivism 
There are several objections to retributivism. One of these is a utilitarian criticism of its efficacy 
as a theory of justification. The criticism maintains that the theory merely elucidates the meaning 
of punishment by illustrating the logical connection between crime and penal suffering, as 
between cause and effect. Thus stated, the theory responds to the question of when punishment 
may be administered, and should be distinguished from rules that justify specific applications of 
punishment in individual cases. The latter function responds to moral objections to punishment 
and is best resolved by utilitarian accounts. 161 In a related context, Flew162  argued that just 
deserts merely rehashes and clarifies factual claims regarding the meaning of punishment and 
offers no constructive contributions to the debate about justification.  However, the objection 
stretches the point.  For one thing, Kant and Bradley were as keen as any utilitarian with 
proffering a moral basis for punishment. This is evident in the relationship they found between 
crime and liability, which suggests that an offender must be morally culpable before he or she 
can be punished.163 Thus, retributivists may rightly assert that the justification for punishment is 
evident in the word, or that punishing wrongdoing is the appropriate thing to do.  This assertion 
essentially maintains that punishment is self-justifying and elucidates the fact that in debates 
about punishment, it is particularly difficult to separate the meaning from the reason.164 At some 
point in the debate, even utilitarians are forced to concede that punishment must be deserved.165 
The second objection attacks retributivism’s model for allocating punishment, namely the 
principle of equality (or equivalence). It rejects the principle for requiring punishment to literally 
match the crime in its physical and non-physical components. This is tantamount to seeking the 
measure of punishment in the crime itself. It is an improbable measure, because there is no 
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‘conceivable’ calculus ‘for equating pain with pain’. 166 Individuals experience pain differently, 
even when the physical elements are identical.167 Even though Kant conceded that not all cases 
will meet the equivalence principle,168 he nevertheless argued that the pain of punishment must 
be commensurate in degree to the pain caused by the crime, according to the right of retaliation 
he propounded. The problem with this, is that he offered no meaningful account of the extent to 
which the right should be taken.169  This, arguably, is traditional retributivism’s greatest hurdle. 
Even if jus talionis is interpreted as not requiring ‘exact likeness in all respects’170 but as offering 
a general scheme for ‘specifying ... what the costs in life and labour of ... crime might be, and 
how the costs of punishment might be calculated, so that retribution could be understood as 
preventing criminal profit’,171 it would still be beset with real challenges of measuring penal 
severity.  
Yet another difficulty associated with measuring penal severity arises from 
retributivism’s reliance on moral intuition. Bradley describes it as follows:  
If you are to estimate morally, then, in proportion as the moral standard grows more inward, the 
genuine facts become inaccessible. And it becomes less and less possible anywhere to measure 
exactly moral responsibility.  But with a more external standard, you are left in doubt if your 
estimate is genuinely moral.  And in particular you have to struggle with the task of drawing in 
each case a line between wilful badness and unwilled disease.  Such internal difficulties are a 
serious hindrance to retribution.  If you can acquire the right to punish only by proving moral 
crime, it seems hard to be sure that this right is really secured.  Thus the principle is good, but its 
application is seriously embarrassed.172  
Measuring wickedness entails assessments of moral character, which would necessarily 
involve difficult intuitive processes.  What retributivism offers here, is a rough guide to the 
arduous task of distributing punishment.173 There are yet other difficulties. The criminal law 
punishes legal wrongs and not moral wickedness, and while all legal breaches would attract 
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punishment, not all moral wrongs do.174  Also, reliance on moral wickedness appeals to popular 
moral convictions that shift with time.  It provides a variable premise to found a system for 
allocating punishment.175  It has also been suggested that retributivism’s support for punishment 
as an end in itself portrays a bent towards vindictiveness.176   
2.5 How Do Traditional Accounts of Punishment Impact Sentencing in Nigeria? 
As noted earlier in this chapter, sentencing literature in Nigeria has recycled traditional accounts 
of punishment, without more. How then have contestations between these accounts impacted the 
development of Nigeria’s sentencing jurisprudence? As pointed out in chapter one, sentencers 
have tended to not offer reasons for sentences they impose. Even if they were to rationalise the 
objects of punishment, their ability to do so could be impeded by limitations in traditional 
accounts of punishment. Some of the cases accessed during this research showed that sentencers 
referred to the objects in the classical sense. Since neither classical utilitarianism nor 
retributivism can offer an acceptable basis for matching crime with punishment, Nigerian 
sentencers who rely on the accounts may well face the same predicament. A case in point is 
Onyilokwu v Commissioner of Police,177 where the court acknowledged and briefly discussed the 
objects of sentencing,  saying they were from sentencing principles. In the end, it is not clear that 
the objects or principles were used to determine the sentence imposed.    
The inability of utilitarian and retributivist theories to provide a satisfactory account of 
punishment resulted in a range of hybrid theories that sought to reconcile the conflict between 
both theories. The core principles in these accounts are discussed below.   
 
2.6 Hybrid Accounts of Punishment 
Hybrid theories seek to reconcile the antinomy between utilitarianism and retributivism and find 
an acceptable formula for allocating punishment.178 The theories reconstruct the debate by 
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showing that no account of punishment need be exclusive, and by re-directing the focus in each 
theory in order to overcome its main weaknesses. In a sense, the emergence of hybrid theories 
acknowledged there are strengths in utilitarian and retributivist claims.179  
Hybrid (or compromise) theories start with the premise that utilitarianism and 
retributivism address different questions about punishment; the former seeks an account of the 
general justifying aim of punishment, while the latter explains specific instances of the 
application of punishment.180 Conflicts are avoided when these questions are kept separate.181  
There are three useful points to note here. First, the functions allocated to each theory also 
attempt to skirt the weakness in each.  For utilitarianism, the weakness lies in its inability to offer 
a guiding principle on how to distribute punishment; for retributivism, it is the inability to 
satisfactorily explain why a system of binding rules that promises punishment for infringements 
is necessary.182 Secondly, the functions are allocated to show those aspects of punishment that 
each theory explains better. Thirdly, the allocations emphasise a complimentary relationship 
between the theories.  Thus, compromise or hybrid theorists seek to show that utilitarianism and 
retributivism play distinct but complimentary roles in explaining punishment. While 
utilitarianism is better able to explain why society maintains a system of binding rules, 
retributivism does better at explaining why a particular action ought to be punished under the 
system of rules. Thus, hybrid theorists aim to show how no theory of punishment can be tenable 
when it is wholly utilitarian or retributive.183 
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Rawls’184 account of how the separation works is helpful.  Punishment is an institution 
that is established by a system of rules and it includes those processes and stations involved in 
the criminal process, including the rules that proscribe conduct, regulate the judicial process and 
prescribe punishments.  This obviously utilitarian construct embodies the function of the 
lawmaker, who makes law with an eye to the future, in furtherance of the public interest. The 
lawmaker grapples with questions regarding what actions ought to be punished. Retributivism, 
on the other hand, embodies the function of the judge, who looks back to the wrongful conduct 
and applies the penalty prescribed in the infracted rule on the guilty offender.185 According to 
this construct, the institution of punishment affirms the deserts premise in retributivism, sets 
limits regarding who may be punished and provides guidance regarding the quantum of 
punishment.186 In Rawls’ theory therefore, utilitarianism and retributivism become the two sides 
of one coin. Utilitarianism functions with a general aim to moderate behaviour and holds forth 
the threat of sanction for that purpose. Retributivism, on the other hand, deals with specific 
instances when those threatened sanctions may be imposed. Hart187 saw a complementary 
relationship in this arrangement and argued that the pursuit of the general aim ought to be 
moderated by deference to the principle that punishment should be deserved.  
Hybrid theories also attract criticisms. According to one criticism, hybrids establish a 
hierarchical relationship between utilitarianism and retributivism, which tends to prioritise the 
purposes of one theory while marginalising, diminishing or contradicting the requirements of the 
other.188 One attempt to respond to this criticism resulted in hybrid accounts that assigned ‘equal 
weight’ to retributivism and utilitarianism. However, these accounts were criticised for ‘[yoking] 
different considerations together in an ad hoc manner’.189 Objections to hybrid accounts show 
how they never completely resolve contentions between utilitarianism and retributivism.  
Fortunately, however, other hybrid versions have emerged which offer something close to a 
principled basis for allocating punishment.  
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2.7 Towards a Principled Basis for Distributing Punishments  
In sentencing, judges choose between multiple penal goals that often conflict.190  The difficulty 
of deciding what goal should influence the choice of sentence led to the search for a guiding 
principle or primary rationale.191  Useful efforts in this direction emerged in the 1970s, on the 
heels of two important developments in penal theory. First, rehabilitation became burdened with 
its excesses, resulting in its rejection and a revival of interest in tough-on-crime measures. The 
second development is linked to the first; it caused a resort to retributive principles. This caused 
a heightened level of penal severity that inspired a new movement towards moderations in 
punishment. It was this movement that began to articulate a mixed or modified theory of deserts, 
as a more principled approach to punishment. By the 1980s, its ideas had become ‘the most 
influential penal theory’.192 
Its premise was simple and consistent with the hybrid model.  Offenders may only be 
punished to the extent that their crimes deserve.  Furthermore, unnecessary suffering is 
unreasonable and should be avoided because it lacks utility.193 This noticeable bent towards 
moderation reveals two important features, namely commensurability (proportionality) and 
parsimony.194 The new theory contrasted with theories that propose the distribution of 
punishment on the basis of elements that predict future offending, or of the potential for 
rehabilitation.195 However, it should be emphasised that the theory’s appeal lay in the responses 
it offered to four interrelated needs. The first was for a distributive principle for allocating 
punishment, which would guide sentencers in choosing between conflicting goals of punishment. 
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The second dwelt on how to rank punishment in order of severity, while the third mulled the 
need for equal treatment for like-situated offenders.  Lastly, the theory offered a paradigm for 
choosing between penal sanctions.  These responses are relevant to imagining a principled basis 
for punishment in Nigeria and are discussed below. 
 
2.7.1  Resolving Conflicting Goals through the Aid of a Guiding Principle 
Conflicting sentencing purposes occur because each purpose requires the consideration of 
different factors, each of which may demand different sentences. A guiding principle was 
therefore considered necessary to help sentencers choose between sentencing purposes in 
individual cases196 and settle hard practical questions. These questions include: i) the degree to 
which sentences should be influenced by retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation or incapacitation; 
ii) whether sentences should be determined or limited by any one goal or combination of goals; 
and iii) how conflicts between the goals should be reconciled. On the practical level, the 
questions also turn on when imprisonment is an appropriate sanction and when other penal 
alternatives ought to be applied.  
From the judicial perspective, conflicting goals explore tensions in a triad of interests that 
converge in punishment. The victim has a right of redress against the offender. The public also 
sustains a vested interest in seeing that right redressed, both for the victim’s sake and for the 
broader object of preserving and restoring respect for the law, and of preventing future crime by 
punishing the offender.197  Lastly, the offender also has a right to proportionate punishment and 
to opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration into society.198 These interests or the penal 
purposes they inspire are not necessarily harmonious and resolving them is of utmost practical 
consequence in sentencing. The sentencer’s responsibility therefore is to find a balance that 
reflects judicious consideration of each purpose before a sentence is selected.199 However, 
seeking a balance does not necessarily entail according equal weight to each purpose of 
punishment. If that were possible, there probably would be no conflicts to reconcile.   
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Sentencers seek a balance by weighing sentencing purposes and/or interests against each 
other.  In the cases of S v Rabie200 and S v Makwanyane,201 balancing interests was held to be a 
very important part of sentencing.202 However, sentencing decisions have not always yielded a 
principled, step-by-step method for resolving the conflict,203 or for measuring penal severity. 
Different solutions have therefore been proffered in this regard, ranging from single-purpose 
distributive principles to hybrid distributive principles.204 In a single-purpose distributive model, 
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation or retribution may be adopted as the sole purpose to be 
sought in any individual instance of punishment.  However, the discussion on traditional theories 
has shown that no single purpose can provide a satisfactory account of punishment. A hybrid 
distributive principle on the other hand allows for a combination of purposes and potentially 
offers a guiding principle for resolving purposes when they are conflicted.   
An example of a hybrid guiding principle was offered by Robinson,205 who proposed that 
deserts should be the basis for determining the amount of punishment, while utilitarian 
considerations determine the method of inflicting it.  This hybrid brings retributive and utilitarian 
considerations into a relationship in which deserts functions as a determining principle, while 
utilitarian considerations operate as a limiting principle. Thus, the quantum of punishment is 
selected according to deserts, subject to limitations imposed by utilitarian considerations.206 
Where, for example, the elements of a crime suggest a certain level of sentence severity, the 
individual circumstances of the offender may suggest that a community service or probation 
order, rather than a prison sentence, is the more appropriate punishment. The deserts requirement 
in such sentence is fulfilled by adjusting the length of time the offender is required to undergo 
community service or probation, so as to reflect the seriousness of his or her crime.207  
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Robinson crafted a ‘limiting criteria’ for his distributive principle; deserts would always 
enjoy priority, as long as it did not result in such intolerable crime levels that could have been 
averted by applying a utilitarian method.208  In other words, a deserts-based sentence ought not to 
be asserted when this would defeat the goal of deterrence. On the flip side, the preferred 
utilitarian method ought not to result in punishment that is ‘intolerably unjust’.209 Where this is a 
probable consequence, resort must be had to deserts as a ‘second limiting principle’.210 The 
challenge with Robinson’s principle, however, is that it suggests a rather fluid standard for 
adjusting sentences.  When, in the Nigerian context for example, would a death sentence be 
considered intolerably unjust?211 This question portrays the difficulty of attempting to satisfy 
utilitarian and retributive requirements in individual cases of punishment.212 
 
 
2.7.2   A Primary Rationale as an Alternative Approach to Resolving Conflicting Purposes 
A primary rationale allows for an overriding purpose or principal aim of punishment, but it may 
allow the application of that principle to be moderated by the claims of another rationale.  It may 
also allow a compromise when the primary rationale proves to be untenable.213 But why is a 
primary rationale necessary?  The significance of the question is amplified by the often disparate 
outcomes of discretionary sentencing in Nigeria. An overriding aim of the criminal law is to 
promote respect for the law, which it does by prohibiting and threatening punishment for rule 
breaking. Punishment communicates society’s censure for such actions, but it may well fulfil 
other legitimate purposes, such as deterrence, or rehabilitation.  Sentencing policy ought to 
promote these purposes. However, promoting them together, in equal order of importance, can 
be confusing and unproductive. As Ashworth rightly observed, ‘[u]nless decisions of principle 
are taken on priorities and spheres of application of two or more sentencing aims, the resultant 
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uncertainty would be a recipe for disparity’.214 Thus, the main goals of a primary rationale is to 
introduce certainty to sentencing and spare sentencers the burdensome task of deciding what 
principle should receive priority in any given case.215   
A penal system may adopt one or a combination of the purposes of punishment as primary 
rationale. In South Africa for example, the dominant rationale is deterrence.216 In Nigeria, 
punishments are generally punitive, but sentencing policy is generally presumed to be retributive 
and deterrent.217 In England and Wales, it is a mix. Section 142 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003218 obligates courts to regard retribution, crime reduction (including reduction through 
deterrence), reform and rehabilitation, public protection and reparation when sentencing. The 
English Court of Appeal has followed these principles ‘in a promiscuously eclectic mixture’.219 
Government policies have been similarly eclectic.220 However, the sentencing guidelines 
developed by the Sentencing Council of England and Wales, which the courts follow, point to a 
deserts-based scheme.221 For the reasons offered below, this thesis prefers the deserts-based 
approach. 
 
2.7.2.1    Deserts as a Primary Rationale 
In traditional retributivism, deserts was criticised for offering an imprecise formula for 
measuring severity. In a modified deserts theory however, deserts is retained as the primary 
sentencing rationale, subject to modest deviations for utilitarian purposes.222 The uniqueness and 
strength of the rationale lies in its emphasis on proportionate punishment and its exclusion of 
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considerations regarding future criminality from being decisive in defining the nature and 
measure of punishment. In Von Hirsch’s223 words:  
[T]he sentencer, instead of having to address elusive empirical questions of the crime-
preventative effect of the sentence, can address matters more within his or her ken, 
concerning the seriousness of the criminal offence – how harmful the conduct typically 
is, how culpable the offender was in committing it. 
The modified deserts theory maintains belief in the capacity of deserts to give better 
guidance in selecting punishment.  It perpetuates some elements of retributivist thinking.  For 
example, it maintains that punishment has a communicative value; it expresses censure and 
censure affirms the importance of the infringed right and treats the offender as a moral agent by 
appealing to his sense of right and wrong.  These are functions that cannot be adapted to 
preventative crime policies, since no purpose would be served, for example, by punishing 
repentant offenders. For the victim, however, punishment communicates an important 
acknowledgement of the wrong he or she has suffered. 224 
 As a primary rationale, deserts also avoids objections to the retributivist concept of 
equivalence. Its insistence on allocating punishment according to the seriousness of the offence 
does not necessarily support the proposition that punishment must produce suffering that is 
equivalent to the damage caused by the crime.  Rather, the gist of punishment lies in the blame 
that it communicates. In this respect, the element of hard treatment that accompanies censure 
only provides a prudential reason for compliance. Thus, hard treatment functions as a 
supplement; it may be regarded as fulfilling a preventative role (to keep criminal behaviour 
within tolerable levels), without necessarily replacing the normative reasons for refraining from 
crime, which censure communicates.225 The supplemental value of hard treatment injects 
moderation into sentencing. Von Hirsch226 explained why this should be the case. ‘The harsher 
the penalty is,’ he argued ‘the less plausible it becomes to see it as embodying chiefly a moral 
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appeal instead of a system of bare threats’. The measure of severity fulfils a function though; it 
signifies the degree of censure accompanying the conduct.227 
 
2.7.2.2    Two Constructs of Deserts as a Primary Rationale 
How then does deserts operate as a primary rationale? Its main advantage is that it gives 
proportionality the key role in deciding punishment, without foreclosing ulterior purposes from 
refining the sentence.228 Different approaches to the proportionality principle in deserts-based 
sentencing have been adopted. One of these, proposed by Morris,229 is called ‘limiting 
retributivism’. It requires establishing upper and lower limits of penal severity, so that 
punishments imposed outside the outer bands are considered undeserved. Morris reserved a 
limiting role for deserts in this approach, making sentence severity determinable on the basis of 
deservedness. However, within those limits, utilitarian considerations, such as the need to 
prevent reoffending or protect society, may operate as defining principles, allowing the adoption 
of a particular type of sanction that is equal in penal value to the deserts-based sanction. In this 
manner, parsimony is brought to bear on deserts. The problem with this approach however, is 
that it forfeits penal parity for the sake of parsimony. By allowing the actual sanction to be 
determined by utilitarian motives, it creates a propensity for disparate sentences for like-situated 
offenders. Thus, offenders may be subjected to different levels of censure (depending on the 
utilitarian end that is sought to be achieved) even when their actions are equally reprehensible.230   
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Von Hirsch231 adopted a different approach. He articulated a scale for ranking 
punishments based on two distinguishable values, namely cardinal and ordinal proportionality. 
Simply stated, ordinal proportionality requires comparable levels of penal severity for offences 
with comparable levels of seriousness;232 persons who have been convicted of crimes of relative 
seriousness should be sentenced to punishments of relative severity. Likewise, persons convicted 
of crimes that differ in seriousness should receive ‘punishments correspondingly graded in their 
onerousness’.233 In essence, ordinal proportionality reinforces the principle of equality in 
punishment, the requirement that like-situated offenders be treated alike and that unusually 
serious crimes be treated with punishments that are ‘correspondingly ranked in severity’.234 
Using the principle, a penalty scale may then be organised to rank different crimes according to 
their relative seriousness and allocate punishments that correspond to those crimes in order of 
severity.  
How then should relative sentence severity be established? Von Hirsch235 suggested 
starting with the known and then comparing seriousness between crimes. Where for instance, the 
punishment for offences A, B and C are known, the punishment for offence ‘X’ can be 
determined by comparing its seriousness with the seriousness of A, B and C. But then, how is 
sentencing severity for offences A, B and C determined? This question presupposes the need for 
a starting point for punishments. Von Hirsch’s censure theory proposes a solution:  
The amount of disapproval conveyed through penal sanctions is a convention. When a 
penalty scale has been devised to reflect the comparative gravity of crimes, altering the 
scale’s overall punishment levels by pro rata increases or decreases in all penalties 
would represent a change in that convention.236 
Generally, convention defines the limits of tolerable punishment. For example, to 
determine what levels of penal severity should attach to domestic burglary, England’s 
Sentencing Advisory Panel (SAP) conducted a survey of the levels of seriousness that the public 
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attached to different kinds of burglary.237 However not all conventions may be agreeable and 
some limits on penal severity are necessary. Such limits are instated by pegging or anchoring 
overall penalty levels in a penal scale (or sentencing range) at some predetermined levels, above 
or below which sentences may not be imposed. This pegging function is fulfilled by cardinal 
proportionality and is essentially ‘non-relative’.238 Cardinal proportionality anchors the scale’s 
overall dimensions or outer limits, setting the stage for ‘the more restrictive requirements of 
ordinal proportionality [to] apply’.239 Ordinal proportionality is achieved when there is relativity 
(i.e. correspondence) between the gravity of the offence and the severity of the punishment 
therefor, and, depending on how the penal scale is anchored, between punishments for different 
crimes.240 This portrays proportionality as a mechanism for maintaining sentencing parity 
between crimes of relative seriousness. Parity is sacrificed when this relationship of relativity is 
overlooked.241 
 It should be noted however that the above discussion does not presuppose a scheme of 
penalties that furnishes specific, deserved punishments for any one crime or the other.242 What 
cardinal and ordinal values do is to provide starting points on a penal scale and a method for 
moderating and achieving relative severity between crimes of corresponding seriousness. 
Starting points are rooted in conventions of censure that convey a society’s levels of tolerance 
for suffering.  Since punishment, as Von Hirsch243 observed, is only one type of suffering that 
can be experienced in a community, its value as a penal intervention must be appraised by 
comparison with other types of suffering. Punishment qualifies as severe when it is regarded as 
very painful by such appraisal.244  
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Of course, this does not furnish an accurate measure and some conventions regarding 
penal severity will be unacceptable.245  In Gross’246 critical view, determining penal severity on 
the basis of ‘considered judgments in the community … leaves the matter unacceptably obscure’. 
Accordingly, Gross247 proposed fair market value as a model for determining proportionality.  
Fair market value is the amount that a buyer and seller voluntarily determine as the purchase 
price of an item. It is arrived at through rational judgments regarding factors that define the 
market value of goods and services. Although these judgements are based on the presumed 
‘normal dispositions and attitudes’248 of those who constitute the market, they nevertheless yield 
logically objective standards, so much so that even when changing dispositions modify 
valuations, they do not occasion mercurial shifts. The dispositions and attitudes remain 
‘sufficiently stable to allow for judgments of value that seem settled at any given time’.249  Gross 
found parallels between this model and proportionate sentencing. He considered proportionality 
to be an equally objective standard that depends on valuations that can be defended through 
careful judgment.  Even when social dispositions (or conventions) change, they are not so drastic 
as to fundamentally revise underlying expectations about proportionality.250  
 Von Hirsch and Gross’ views are apposite and are affirmed by the example of England’s 
SAP mentioned earlier. To determine appropriate sentences for burglary, the SAP relied on 
empirical data that suggested people from ‘widely different walks of life can make common 
sense judgments on the comparative gravity of offences and come to similar conclusions’.251  
Even though disagreements may arise, they tend to be about ‘powerful intuitions or deeply 
embedded values’252 on what sentencing principles should be decisive. However, of the various 
views that have been put forward to resolve these differences,253 Von Hirsch seems to offer a 
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more practical guide for determining proportionate sentences.  To start with, his view that 
individuals have a roughly intuitive idea about disproportionate penalties warns that punishment 
ought not to be excessive or unduly lenient.254 This, potentially, offers a guide regarding how to 
anchor the outer limits of a penal scale. However roughly intuitive this appears, there is a sound 
commonsensical basis to suggest, for instance, that a sentence of imprisonment might be too 
severe for petty theft and a reprimand too lenient for causing public disorder.  Within the 
structure of a scale however, measuring penal severity requires a more ratiocinated process, in 
which sentencing levels are ordered in terms of how crimes compare in seriousness.255 
 
2.7.2.3     Underlying Principles in the Structure of a Penalty Scale 
As may now be obvious from the foregoing discussion, a deserts-based penalty scale enshrines 
deserts as the primary rationale and uses ordinal proportionality to define the internal 
composition of the scale and to ensure that punishments correspond with the relative gravity of 
crimes. A critical feature in the internal composition broaches the need for spacing between 
severity levels.  This ensures that penalties are not clustered in a manner that obscures 
differences in the seriousness of crimes. However, departures from ordinally determined 
sentences may be allowed on the basis of factors that aggravate or mitigate liability.256  
The outer limits of the scale are determined by important cardinal principles. First, the 
limits should be guided by prevailing levels of tolerance for pain and should avoid punishing 
non-serious offences with greater severity than is deserved.  Severe penalties should be reserved 
for serious crimes. Further, the overall sentence magnitude must not be so inflated as to make the 
punishment for non-serious crimes severe. Secondly, and with regards to the censure function of 
punishment, the penalty must bear a corresponding relationship with the seriousness of the 
offence. It must correspond to the degree of blame implicit in the crime and convey the message 
that the offender receives no more censure than he or she deserves. Accordingly, a lengthy prison 
sentence should indicate a greater degree of blameworthiness commensurate with the seriousness 
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of the crime. Conversely, a lenient sanction will communicate that the crime is less serious.257  
However, sentences should not be unduly lenient, as that would devalue the interest that is 
sought to be protected by the proscription of a criminal act.258 
If offense seriousness is a determinant of penal severity, determining seriousness 
becomes a crucial element. Seriousness consists of two variables, namely harm and culpability.  
Harm measures the degree of threatened or actual damage. The greater the harm or threat of 
harm, the graver the crime becomes. According to Von Hirsch259 measuring seriousness requires 
more than substantial inconvenience. Emphasis must be on the damage typically caused or risked 
by an offence of that kind. Culpability, on the other hand, defines the degree of blameworthiness 
for actual or threatened harm.  It determines the extent to which a person may be held liable and 
punishable for his or her conduct. In other words, culpability determines whether a person should 
be punished at all, and how severely.  It requires a consideration of elements that may excuse or 
mitigate liability, such as whether the crime was intentional, negligent, or reckless, as well as the 
roles played by the offender and the victim in the commission of the crime.260  
On the whole, sentencing levels in a deserts-based penal scale are organised within the 
overall dimensions established by the principle of cardinal proportionality, such that sentences 
may not be imposed outside this overall dimensions.  The cardinal principle ensures that 
punishments are kept within acceptable limits of tolerance for penal suffering and that crimes are 
not punished any more or any less severely than their perpetrators deserve.  
 
2.7.2.4  Benefits of the Deserts Model 
The first advantage of note is the unique advantage the model claims, of being the only principle 
that ensures that offenders are not punished beyond what they deserve.  This, according to 
proponents of the model, places deserts as the only principle that meets the requirement of 
justice. It avoids excessively severe or disproportionately lenient sentences, in a way that 
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utilitarian principles fail to, because they may require undeserved punishment when the 
anticipated benefits (of crime prevention for example) outweigh the costs (of incapacitating an 
offender).261 Secondly, deserts avoids the onerous task of balancing conflicts between sentencing 
aims by giving deserts a dominant influence. Von Hirsch262 conveys this advantage as providing 
a ‘workable starting point’ for allocating punishment that other theories do not.  On the strength 
of these advantages, it can indeed be maintained that deserts satisfies the requirements of justice 
more than any other rationale. Even when some ancillary utilitarian motives are allowed to 
intervene, deserts ensures that an offender’s rights are not unfairly invaded because of some 
anticipated public benefit.   
 It remains to be seen how deserts as a primary rationale interacts with utilitarian 
principles. Essentially, both fulfil different roles; deserts responds to the requirement to do 
justice, while utilitarian principles function as crime prevention strategies, the pursuit of which 
must be constrained by deserts. While deserts enjoys pre-eminence in this relationship, the pre-
eminence is not absolute. Special situations, such as aggravating or mitigating circumstances, 
may require adjusting the impact that deserts has on punishment.263 An example is when a court 
is called upon to take account of an offender’s criminal history when imposing punishment.  
Here, the utilitarian goal may be to incapacitate the repeat offender in order to protect the public 
from further crimes he or she may commit. In such cases, the justification for allowing criminal 
history to influence sentence severity lies in the predictive theory that an offender’s chances of 
re-offending increased with each offence he or she committed in the past.264 Associated with this 
theory is a presumption, which gives a first offender a benefit of the doubt that he or she may not 
have acted with criminal intent, or intended the criminal consequences of his or her action.  This 
presumption diminishes with every subsequent offence, so that the degree of blameworthiness 
inclines upward as the criminal history increases. Blameworthiness becomes more certain with 
repeat offending and increasing penal severity on this account may be consistent with the 
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deterrent theory that harsher punishments induce habitual offenders to desist from a life of crime. 
Even then, the deserts principle operates to regulate the upward incline, so that a subsequent 
offence does not become subjected to a harsher punishment unless the damage caused or risked 
by the previous offence was serious. Also, where the previous offence is unrelated to the present 
one, or occurred in the distant past, it may not be considered for the purpose of sentencing.265   
 The strongest appeal of the deserts model is the scheme it offers for ordering penal scales. 
However, the model is not perfect and difficulties may arise when penal parity is attempted 
across genres of crimes.  Von Hirsch266 illustrates this difficulty by portraying bribery and theft 
as genres of crimes for which a relative penal value may be improbable. At the same time 
however, he points to a host of other crimes, including theft and burglary, which share enough 
commonalities that enable a valuation of their relative seriousness. Even for crimes that do not 
share such commonalities, deserts-based sentencing still offers a principled approach. At the 
least, it provides overall dimensions over and below which penalties may not be imposed. Within 
those limits, deserts and utilitarian considerations may be allowed to regulate one another in the 
manner suggested by Morris.267 Better still, another theory, called the rights based theory, may 
be utilised as a limiting principle. 
 
2.7.2.5    Criticism of the Deserts Model 
A foremost critic of Von Hirsch’s model is Tonry,268 who objected to what he called the model’s 
strong proportionality requirements. He described the requirement as grouping offenders and 
offences into standard and overgeneralised categories that do more injustice than they prevent. 
Apportioning similar punishment for like-situated offenders overlooks the fact that socio-
economic conditions may differ significantly and these have markedly different crimonogenic 
influences on offenders. Ignoring these subjective elements, as deserts does, attaches greater 
importance to objective legal measures, resulting in sentences that are unduly severe. Justice, 
Tonry argued, is hardly achieved through proportionality-based sentencing when socio-economic 
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conditions are unequal.269 He also queried Von Hirsch’s scheme for spacing penal severity, 
arguing that it offered no guidance regarding how many sentencing levels should be in a penal 
scale and  whether differences in sentence severity should be the same throughout the scale, or 
different, and by what measure.270   
Tonry offered two other noteworthy objections. One, applying Von Hirch’s model to 
intermediate sanctions could ‘stifle their development, circumscribe their use and produce 
avoidable injustices’.271 Intermediate sanctions comprise multipurpose penalties that are less 
severe than prison sentences, but more punitive than probation orders. Examples include boot 
camps, community service, day fines, electronic monitoring, house arrest, intensive probation 
and restitution, among others. Their value rests in the fact that they save costs and minimise 
prison use, while also meeting public safety needs.272 Tonry273  argued that deserts’ emphasis on 
penal parity circumscribed such sanctions.  
Tonry’s other objection is obviously hinged on a presumed conflict between 
proportionality and parsimony. He argued that proportionality and parsimony are focused on two 
different ends. While parsimony leans toward the least painful measure, proportionality 
objectifies equivalence in penal suffering,274 which makes resort to the least onerous measure 
difficult.  The presumed conflict looms in intermediate sanctions, with the result that a 
sentencing scheme in which parsimony features prominently leans more to intermediate 
sanctions than a proportionality-based scheme would.  To reconcile the conflict, Tonry275 
proposed a middle ground of ‘presumptive sentencing ranges’, comprising upper (maximum 
sentences) and lower limits determined on the basis of proportionality. Within these outer limits, 
he proposed that ‘judges should seek the least severe sentence that is consistent with the 
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governing purposes at sentencing’.276 This, in his view, would prevent disproportionately severe 
penalties.277 
It does appear that the crux of Tonry’s objections is the presumed inconsistency between 
deserts’ inclination toward severity on one hand and parsimony’s preference for the least drastic 
measure on the other.  However, the model he proposed may not necessarily yield a better 
scheme for measuring severity. His ‘presumptive sentence range’ is in principle somewhat 
similar to the deserts model’s starting points. It presupposes Von Hirsch and Gross’ point that 
judgments about penal severity originate in conventions or social dispositions regarding penal 
suffering. Therefore, it would seem that the essence of Tonry’s scheme lies in seeking a greater 
moderating role for parsimony.  In his support for parsimony however, he alludes to a punitivism 
in deserts that is hardly consistent with modern accounts of the model. Proponents of the model, 
such as Von Hirsch and Ashworth,278 have rejected suggestions of a conflict between 
proportionality and parsimony, or of punitivism in deserts-based sentencing. They have argued 
that proponents of deserts have often championed moderations in penal severity. In their words, 
‘[t]he basis of proportionality is not the return of penal suffering for suffering, but rather penal 
censure; and the latter conception allows substantial reductions in overall sentencing severity, so 
long as penalties express the requisite disapproval of criminal behaviour’.279 In support of their 
position, they point to several sentencing systems that have adopted deserts as a primary 
rationale and witnessed a reduction in the use of prison sentences as a consequence.280 This, 
doubtless, is an outcome that proponents of parsimony would support.  
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That said, could there be situations when proportionality yields to parsimony? Tonry 
argued for the outer bounds of a penal scale to be determined by proportionality, while 
parsimony guides judges in resolving issues about the quality and quantity of punishments in the 
scale. Tonry’s allocation of functions is essentially a balancing scheme281 that allows greater 
flexibility for sentencers. Deserts proponents would rather have a more structured ordinal scale 
for resolving questions about quality and quantity: 
What the proportionality-principle provides then, is not simple answers but a common 
starting point and a common vocabulary. One begins by scaling punishments according to 
offence seriousness. Then, one confronts the issue over which legitimate disagreement may 
exist: what other values might trump proportionality, and warrant sentence inequalities? By 
taking this approach we have a workable way of grading penalties pro tanto. And we can 
focus on where we may disagree: departures from proportionality designed to meet other 
ends. Even those who diverge in theory, however, may agree that there are limits on how 
much those other ends can feasibly be implemented in a sentencing system.282 
Adopting deserts as a primary principle offers a more practicable framework that is 
founded on two deserts values, namely deservedness and penal parity. The values represent 
deserts’ strongest points and they are neither rigid nor ambitious. Importantly, these elements 
compel a systematic evaluation of ‘the relative seriousness of offences (both when comparing 
one offence with another, and one instance of an offence compared with a different instance)’.283  
Sentences that are selected according to these deserts values may yet be modified by 
parsimonious considerations, while still preserving the underlying deserts principle.  In other 
words, whatever the modifications may be, they should never fail to communicate the requisite 
level of censure. In the end therefore, it can be suggested that concerns about parsimony can be 
addressed in a deserts-based sentencing scheme.   
However, there remains an issue of considerable difficulty for the deserts model – that of 
anchoring the cardinal magnitudes of a penal scale.  Proponents suggest reliance on general 
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tolerance levels for pain in a society, but this may yet be crude and unsatisfactory.  Human 
societies differ on tolerance for human suffering. Although the maximum allowable sentence in 
Nigeria and the United States of America is the death penalty, Britain and South Africa have 
proscribed the penalty, though their approaches to the length of imprisonment differ. In Britain, a 
life sentence could mean imprisonment for life. In South Africa, an offender on life sentence will 
be eligible for parole after serving at least 25 years in prison.284  What then, beyond social 
attitudes about penal suffering, should influence how cardinal magnitudes are anchored? A 
probable answer could be found in injecting human rights a limiting principle in punishment. 
 
2.8 Introducing Human Rights as a Limiting Value in Penal Severity 
In section 2.3 above, it was suggested that human rights may only be curtailed if it can be 
morally justified. Criminal punishment provides a justifying reason. However, the section also 
noted that punishment ought to be inflicted within certain limits. The human rights theory claims 
the right to define the limits.285 According to the theory, even though offenders forfeit some of 
their rights when they break the law, they retain their humanity, which entitles them to a measure 
of rights.  Consistent with the retributivist theory, the human rights theory accepts that 
punishment may only be inflicted on someone for a blameworthy act. However, once 
deservedness is established, the choice of punishment may be influenced by utilitarian concerns 
to prevent or reduce crime. Even so, these utilitarian concerns must be pursued within limits 
imposed by the rights of the offender. 
The above suggests that the human rights theory proposes a distributive principle that 
combines retributive and utilitarian purposes. According to Cavadino and Dignan,286 the theory 
provides a measure that is roughly in proportion to the moral gravity of the offence, which also 
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affirms an important principle of justice, to wit like cases should be treated alike. For the authors, 
proportionality is consistent with the human rights theory, because disproportionality ‘convey[s] 
incorrect messages about the relative gravity of offences’.287 While utilitarian ends may still be 
sought, these need not make punishments tougher in order to reform or incapacitate. Neither 
should fulfilling the requirements of proportionality preclude recourse to utilitarian principles.288  
To satisfy both ends, Cavadino and Dignan adopt Morris’ concept of ‘limiting retributivism’ 
discussed earlier. Thus, even when the maximum proportionate sentence may be imposed, there 
ought to be no obligation to impose it ‘if other valid considerations indicate that a more lenient 
course will be more constructive or humane’.289 At this intersection between proportionality and 
utility, a strong element of parsimony operates in the rights-based scheme to ensure that no more 
freedom than is necessary is circumscribed in order to achieve crime reduction. It also ensures 
that prison sentences are used sparingly, reserving them for dangerous offenders who present a 
real threat to others. For offenders who repeatedly fail to comply with the terms of their non-
custodial sentences, brief periods of incarceration should be utilised.290  
In sum, the human rights theory suggests its own limits on penal severity, whether for 
utilitarian or retributive motives. How the theory may influence a penal scale may be 
summarized as follows. Human rights considerations determine the limits of cardinal severity. 
These limits may differ between societies. Nevertheless, a human rights principle, such as the 
prohibition against inhumane and degrading punishment, may be utilised to set the cardinal limit, 
which would not only be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with that society’s views 
about humaneness, but also developed incrementally as international human rights jurisprudence 
regarding punishment and human dignity evolve. Thus, a society may reject certain forms or 
levels of punishment because it is no longer consistent with contemporary understandings 
regarding human dignity, or with the prohibitions against inhumane and degrading 
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punishments.291  Next, the approach can also be deployed to regulate sentencing severity within 
ordinal scales by setting the limits to whatever utilitarian aims may be sought and by ensuring 
that those aims do not undo the important requirements of fairness and justice. This would affirm 
deserts even when a sanction has been adjusted to fulfil some utilitarian objective. An ordinal 
scale that is properly set to communicate these values ‘infuses the real content to the question of 
what are the offender’s due deserts’.292  
The above structure suggests that there are no apparent conflicts between the rights-based 
approach and the deserts model that cannot be reconciled.  Indeed, the rights-based approach 
assumes the deserts premise when it recommends that maximum tariffs need not be imposed if 
there are valid utilitarian reasons to adopt a more lenient, constructive and humane penalty. This 
portrays human rights as operating as a limiting principle that restrains severity without 
necessarily diminishing deserts.293 
 
2.9 Taking the Human Rights Theory Further to Instate Constitutional Moderations 
for Punishment  
The human rights theory offers a paradigm that can be deployed to strengthen constitutional 
safeguards for punishment and define the parameters of a national sentencing policy. In most 
Constitutions, there are provisions that establish fundamental principles of justice and fairness, 
together with the important human right requirement that sentences ought to be proportionate to 
the offence. Punishments that do not meet these requirements are prima facie unconstitutional, 
because they violate rights and constitutional constraints on the power to punish.  Accordingly, a 
sentencing scheme that integrates constitutional rights and values places proportionality at the 
core of respecting rights.294 While proportionality may not be expressly stated in Constitutions, 
the principle has been judicially affirmed as integral to determining whether punishment violates 
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constitutional prohibitions against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments.  It has also been 
rightly argued that these provisions not only prohibit punishments that are manifestly cruel or 
degrading, they also prohibit punishments that are excessive or grossly disproportionate to the 
gravity of the crime.295 
There are important observations to draw from the foregoing. To overcome the objection 
that punishment is a violation of a constitutionally protected right, it must be shown that the 
curtailment or limitation of the right is reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society. The 
limitation must demonstrate a ‘rational connection between the means and the ends’296 to avoid 
being branded as a violation. Under the South African Constitution, for instance, s 36(1) states: 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all the relevant factors, including 
(a) The nature of the right; 
(b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) The nature of the extent of limitation; 
(d) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
This provision provides the standard that penal and other statutory limitations on human 
rights must comply with in South Africa. In S v Makwanyane,297 the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa applied the criteria in s 33(1) of the Interim Constitution, which were in pari 
materia with s 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution, to determine whether s 277(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act,298 which prescribed the death penalty for murder, was a constitutionally valid 
limitation on the right to life. The court found that it was not because the right was a fundamental 
right upon which the enjoyment of other rights depended, and that the death sentence terminated 
these rights abruptly and irretrievably. Furthermore, the court found that the sentence had a 
history of being imposed arbitrarily and that it does not serve any penal purpose that could not be 
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satisfied by the less drastic measure of long term imprisonment. The court applied a similar 
analysis in S v Williams and Another.299 In both decisions, elements of proportionality and 
parsimony were noticeably at work in the court’s findings that there ought to be a reasonable 
connection between the method of punishment applied and the purpose it is intended to achieve, 
and that a rights limitation must employ the least invasive measure.   
 The benefit of instilling punishment with a constitutional principle is that it imposes 
restraints on penal severity.  It does seem however, that a constitutional principle does better at 
establishing cardinal limits. This is obvious from the requirement that the sentence must deviate 
significantly from the deserved punishment before it can be said to be disproportionate and in 
violation of the Constitution.300 This suggests that only grossly disproportionate sentences may 
violate the Constitution. This standard may give rise to unsatisfactory outcomes, such as is the 
case in the United States of America where offenders can be sentenced to life imprisonment 
because they had a history of property crimes, without regard to the gravity of their crimes.301 
Besides, it is difficult to find agreement in judicial pronouncements regarding when sentences 
may be regarded as grossly disproportionate.302 Thus, beyond defining the outer boundaries of 
punishment, constitutional provisions alone may not be very helpful in establishing ordinal 
rankings.303   They must be supplemented by sentencing guidelines.304   
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This chapter sought to find a principled basis for sentencing in Nigeria, starting first with an 
attempt to demonstrate how inadequate attention to the subject in penal discourses in Nigeria 
create a critical knowledge gap, and suggesting that the gap impedes the development of a 
principled approach to sentencing in Nigeria. The consequences have been an inclination toward 
penal severity in Nigeria, lack of clarity regarding sentencing policy and apparently disparate 
sentences.  To fill the gap, the chapter reviewed penal discourses that have influenced sentencing 
reforms in the West in the last few decades. This led to an examination of modern penal theories 
that chart a more principled approach to allocating punishment, with the object of understanding 
how this could help imagine a principled basis for sentencing in Nigeria.  
Of the different modern theories examined, Von Hirsch’s model offers the more suitable 
approach for achieving a principled basis for sentencing in Nigeria.  This suggests the adoption 
of deserts as a primary rationale, based on its consistency with the basic principle of justice that 
punishment should be deserved. Adopting a primary rationale would avert the burden that 
Nigerian courts have acknowledged of having to determine in each case what proportion of the 
punishment should be allocated to each sentencing goal. The deserts model provides a scheme 
for ensuring penal parity and moderating severity.  Such a scheme is vital for Nigeria because of 
persistent wide disparities in sentencing. It will enhance consistency between sentences and rein 
in punitive inclinations among penal policy makers, lawmakers and sentencers. It will ensure that 
the element of censure in punishment corresponds with the gravity of the crime.  
However, a suitable model for Nigeria must also integrate a rights-based approach. This 
is particularly needful because of the serious human and constitutional rights abridgments that 
accompany punishment in Nigeria. At the moment, Nigeria’s pluralistic penal system allows 
extremely severe punishments that may not pass muster in a democratic society that upholds 
constitutional rights.305 However, to ensure that human rights protections are firmly entrenched 
in punishments, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments need to be unambiguously prohibited 
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by the Nigerian Constitution. The prohibition is a necessary step to finding a suitable conceptual 
basis for punishment in Nigeria. 
Introducing human rights to Nigeria’s sentencing policy will provide necessary 
safeguards for punishment. Beyond Nigeria, the rights-based approach has increasingly 
moderated penal severity. It has prompted different criminal jurisdictions to drop certain 
punishments from their laws, or to seek proportionality between crime and punishment.  
Although national responses to international human rights standards differ, the human rights 
theory has continued to grow in influence and has become a ‘generally acceptable standard for 
evaluating the practices of criminal justice in different countries.306 This may well be one of the 
most remarkable penal developments of the late twentieth century.307 Greater respect for human 
rights supplies the cap on penal severity in Britain and South Africa. As a result, the death 
penalty has been excluded from both countries, convicts can be eligible for parole systems, and 
there are alternatives to prison.308 How penal developments in Britain and South Africa evolved 
to this point is one of the subjects of the next chapter. Nigerian sentencers and penologists will 
do well to pay close attention to them. 
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Chapter 3 Punishment in a Socio-Historical 
Context: Exploring Influences that 
Shape Penal Policy  
 
Indeed, the story of the changes in social attitudes toward the offender is essentially the story 
of how the roles of the various means and motives of punishments have progressively lost or 
gained importance. And the story is inextricably interwoven in the history of cultural change 
in general; for the nature of punishments and the motives behind them, reflect the 
fundamental character of the structure, the institutions, and the intellectual life of society; as 




One of the points explored in chapter two was that punishment communicates a degree of 
censure that is consistent with underlying social attitudes that define tolerance for human 
suffering, or penal suffering in particular. How societies tolerate penal suffering differ. In 
Nigeria’s pluralistic penal system, the differences are portrayed in the varied penalties that attach 
to the same crimes under the English common law based codes or sharia codes. This has resulted 
in parallel penal regimes that adopt different scales for measuring sentence severity. The scales 
offer insight into the different value systems of the cultures (peoples) that embrace the codes, and 
to the levels of penal suffering they can tolerate.2  Chapter two also examined different theories 
about allocating punishment and concluded with the observation that a deserts-based theory 
rooted in a rights-based approach provides better guarantees against disproportionate severity in 
punishment.  
This chapter explores how the sentencing systems in South Africa, England and Nigeria 
arrived at the different points they are today. It approaches the inquiry by looking at the socio-
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cultural context in which each country formulates its approach to punishment. The context is 
important to this study, because punishment assumes different nuanced meanings, symbolisms, 
significances and usages that can be culture specific. It is therefore necessary to examine the 
contexts in which these nuances are formed.3  Accordingly, the chapter will attempt to illustrate 
how the ideas and practices that surround punishment today evolved - and were in fact debated - 
in a socio-historical context, as each society pondered questions about how to respond to crime 
and criminality and how to set limits to the State’s power to punish. It will attempt to show that 
societies typically frame traditions of punishment in ideological moulds and that these moulds 
often change because of mutable (moral) values that underpin punishment.4 
Generally, debates about punishment have been significantly influenced by the dominant 
culture in each age. Judges are necessarily a part of that culture. ‘The judicial mandate to 
punish’, argued Smith,5 ‘is underpinned by cultural codes requiring practical solutions to the 
peculiarly cultural and moral problem of disorder’. There is a temptation to limit this function to 
applying principles that have been developed by criminologists and philosophers.  However, in a 
way that is uniquely juridical, judges bear the responsibility of bringing their society’s values to 
bear upon punishment. This uniquely judicial function, which involves resolving hard questions 
of life and liberty in real – not imagined – cases, deserves reckoning in the punishment discourse. 
That said, it must be conceded that what may be defined as crime and appropriate punishment 
are not questions of a strictly legal or judicial nature.  They are questions that are first engaged in 
a social context, through the political process.  
                                                          
3 See Phillip Smith Punishment and Culture (2008) 1, & 6 -7. 
4 Beccaria so well captured the socio-historical context of the changing values in punishment with the following 
statement; ‘Anyone who reads the laws and histories of nations with a philosophical eye will see the changes that 
have always occurred over the centuries in the words vice and virtue, good citizen and bad, not as a result of changes 
in the country’s circumstances and so in the common interest, but as a result of the passions and false beliefs which 
at various times have motivated the different lawgivers.  The reader will see often enough that the passions of one 
century are the basis of the morals of later centuries, that strong emotions, the offspring of fanaticism and 
enthusiasm, are weakened and, so to speak, gnawed away by time, which returns all physical and moral 
phenomenon to equilibrium, and they become the common sense of the day and a powerful tool in the hands of the 
strong and astute.  In this way, the very obscure notions of virtue and honour were born, and they are so obscure 
because they change with the passage of time which preserves words rather than things, and they change with the 
rivers and mountains which so often form the boundaries not only of physical but also of moral geography.’ See 
Cesare Beccaria On crimes and Punishment and Other Writings (1995) 20-21. 





Human societies are distinctly peculiar, and it is trite to say that society, culture and 
ideology constantly evolve. When ideological shifts occur, they precipitate social changes that 
include shifts in thinking and practices surrounding crime and punishment. These changes 
unavoidably reflect the peculiarities of each society, its legal and political traditions, and the 
exigencies that shape and prioritize its crime problems and responses. Thus, political and cultural 
dynamics in crime and punishment reflect the diversities of individual national contexts.6 The 
dynamics also reflect how changes in penal thought and practice are driven by underlying 
economic relations and class structures that characterize society. As one author observed, ‘the 
ideas and practices of punishment are not only culturally and historically specific but are 
simultaneously embedded in the class and structures of particular societies …’7 
This chapter examines the above claims through different eras of Western civilization and 
through different phases of colonial influence in sub-Saharan Africa to date, using penal 
developments in Britain, Nigeria and South Africa as illustrations. Britain’s colonial foray in 
Nigeria and South Africa provides the common law heritage that connects all three countries. 
But there is another common thread. All three are constitutional democracies and have all 
instated constitutional protections for human rights. Nigeria and South Africa have inserted a Bill 
of Rights in their Constitutions.8  Britain’s Constitution on the other hand is uncodified and has 
been subject to continual development, some of which have been brought about by national 
legislation and international treaties. A particularly important constitutional development in this 
respect occurred when Britain adopted its Human Rights Act,9 which incorporated substantial 
parts of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 into domestic law.10  
                                                          
6 Richard Sparks ‘State punishment in advanced capitalist countries’, in Thomas G Blomberg & Stanley Cohen (eds) 
Punishment and Social Control (2003) 19-44 at 25; Sparks writes that ‘[t]he pressures that drive penal politics do 
not originate within the criminal justice system alone.  Rather, they concern the very character of our political 
culture, of which our choices about punishment are among the most telling and consequential expression’. 
7 Gail Super ‘Punishment and the body in the ‘old’ and ‘new’ South Africa: A story of punitivist humanity’ (2011) 
Vol. 15 Theoretical Criminology 427 at 429. 
8 Chapter V of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, and Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
9 Chapter 42 of 1998. 
10 See Elizabeth Wicks The Evolution of a Constitution: Eight Key Moments in British Constitutional History (2006) 





It is not the aim of this chapter to launch into an exhaustive treatment of the history of 
penal developments in the three countries. Such an inquiry is outside the scope of this thesis. 
Neither is it the intention to periodise penal history into neat chronological compartments. The 
aim of the chapter is to sketch a broad outline of important moments in the penal histories of the 
countries for two reasons; first to illustrate cultural and political influences on penal policy and 
secondly, to spotlight constitutional developments that are changing penal policy in each 
country. In the context of Nigeria’s penal history, it is of particular interest to see how penal 
developments in Britain impacted penal policy in Nigeria.  Accordingly, the inquiry begins with 
Britain.  
 
3.2 Crime and Punishment in Britain: From Medieval Society to the 17th Century 
Medieval Britain was a feudal society; the modern State, its institutions of crime control and 
notions of crime and punishment ‒ as used today ‒ were unknown to that society.11 Offences and 
the methods of dealing with them were defined by community norms, which regarded ‘crime’ as 
a violation of personal rights, or a personal wrong for which the victim retained the right of 
revenge.  No distinctions were made between civil and criminal wrongs; neither were there 
public authorities to moderate the right of retaliation. As a consequence, punishments were 
markedly ferocious.12 This ferocity persisted through later middle ages when the monarch began 
to assume control over punishments. For the most part, the preferred punishments were ‘corporal 
or capital’.13 Although jails existed, they were used to detain offenders until they could be tried 
and punished. The feudalistic structure of the society brought social stratifications into 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
allowed the rights, to which Britain had already shown some commitments, to be secured in British courts, or to be 
secured in the European Court of Human Rights, if resort to British courts failed. See also Vernon Bogdanor The 
New British Constitution (2009) 59 & 63-64, see generally 54-64; David Feldman ‘Civil Liberties’ in Vernon 
Bogdanor (ed) The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century (2003) 401-481 at 464-467. 
11 John Lea Crime and Modernity: Continuities in Left Realist Criminology (2002) 25-27. 
 12 Ibid at 27-30; see GR Elton 'Introduction: Crime and the Historian' in JS Cockburn (ed) Crime in England 1550-
1800 (1977) 1; Jim Sharpe ‘Crime, order and historical change’ in John Muncie & Eugene McLaughlin (eds) The 
Problem of Crime, 2 ed (2001) 107-150 at 110-111; HR Hahlo & Ellison Kahn The South African Legal System and 
its Background (1968) 472. 
13 Seán McConville ‘The Victorian prison: England, 1865-1965’, in Norval Morris & David J Rothman (eds) Oxford 





punishment; different punishments applied to the gentry and peasantry, as did the manner in 
which they were executed.14 
From mid-seventeenth century, Britain began to experience historic developments.  A 
powerful landowning ruling class emerged that took control of parliament and subsequently 
succeeded ‒ after intense political struggles ‒ at subjecting the monarch’s powers to 
parliamentary assent.  A metamorphosis was also evident in Britain’s economy; its erstwhile 
agrarian rural economy began to give way to a market economy, creating with it new forms of 
property relations.  New epicenters of human activity instigated rapid urbanisation. Alongside 
these developments, however, were new social problems; an impoverished urban underclass was 
rapidly being created, and seen by the ruling, property owning class as threats to property rights. 
To resolve this threat, the ruling class assumed responsibilities for (re)constructing crime and 
punishment, and reeled out laws that radically increased the number of offences for which capital 
punishment could be imposed. The laws mostly defined crime in terms of relations with 
property15 and were infamously dubbed the ‘Bloody Code’16 for their frequent resort to capital 
punishment even for petty crimes involving property.17 They embodied the brutality and 
symbolism that depicted punishment in the Middle Ages,18 as well as the class relations that 
would define crime and punishment in the British society of later ages.  
 
3.2.1 The Enlightenment and Punishment in Eighteenth Century British Society 
By the eighteenth century, the old feudal economy had become obliterated by rapid 
industrialization. Industrial and commercial activities fuelled urbanisation, affirmed the 
importance of property ownership and created new paradigms of social relations.  Unprecedented 
levels of wealth circulated amongst a few. Urban poverty spiralled and with that came new social 
                                                          
14 Ibid at 132-133. 
15 Lea (2002) op cit note 11 at 36-37. 
16 See Sharpe op cit note 12 at 116-117; Joanna Innes & John Styles ‘The crime wave: Recent writing on criminal 
justice in eighteenth-century England’ (1986) Vol. 25 No. 4 Journal of British Studies 380-435 at 421; Clive Emsley 
Crime and Society in England, 1750-1900 3 ed (2005) 33.   
17 Sharpe op cit note 12 at 129-130. 
18 Ibid at 130-131; see also Michel Foucault Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1995) 75. There were 
fewer actual crimes at this time, and a few of those convicted were executed. The retention of the laws, and selective 





tensions, including those that resulted from soaring crime and conviction rates.19 Crime 
continued to be defined in connection with property rights. The prisons also acquired new status 
as a penal alternative. Indeed, so frequent was the resort to incarceration that prisons became 
overcrowded and the conditions inhumane. The English justice system came under significant 
distress as a result of property-related crimes.20 
However, other positive forces of change were at work during this period. The 
Enlightenment had commenced and it was beginning to foster political awareness and new 
attitudes about crime and punishment. Up until this time, the Monarch and Church had overseen 
brutal punishments. The new intellectual and social culture of the age was set to change that, as it 
prompted demands for political reforms, democracy and the rule of law.  These demands altered 
existing paradigms of social control, so that debates about crime and punishment began to be 
waged in the context of changing political realities, and around the need to adapt and refine the 
state’s capacity to regulate public affairs, reinvent the machineries of social control and improve 
the capacity of the criminal justice system to respond to crime.21  These developments signalled 
monumental changes that would redefine social relations. Although change was slow in coming, 
there was no doubt that the Enlightenment had set it in motion. 
 
3.2.2 Still on Eighteenth Century Penality: Public Hangings and the Quest to Humanize 
Punishments  
Industrialisation created significant dislocations in the social fabric and fostered class conflicts 
that emerged as traditional land relations (between landowners and the peasantry) gave way to 
modern forms of employment relations.22 Soon enough, ‘[c]rime became tied up with the social 
conflicts and antagonisms associated with these changes’.23 With time, crime almost entirely 
                                                          
19 John Lea ‘Crime and protest in eighteenth century England’ (2006) available at 
http://www.bunker8.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/history/36803.htm, accessed on 15 June 2013. 
20 Pieter Spierenburg ‘The body and the state: early modern Europe’ in Norval Morris and David J Rothman (eds) 
The Oxford Prison of the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in Western society (1995) 49-77 at 49-61. 
21 See Lea (2002) op cit note 11 at  34-5; McConville (1995) op cit note 13 at 133; Randall McGowen ‘The well-
ordered prison, England, 1780-1865 in Norval Morris & David J Rothman (eds) The Oxford History of the Prison: 
The Practice of Prison in Western Society (1995) 79-109 at 92-97; Foucault op cit note 18 at 77. 






assumed economic dimensions, shifting from its focus on the human body to a focus on fraud. 
The shift reflected how crime embraced new patterns of production and wealth creation, and the 
‘higher juridical and moral value placed on property relations’.24  
A consequence of the shift was that by the nineteenth century, crime became something 
only the criminally savvy could do. There were refinements in punishments as well, though it 
would take much longer for punishment to shed its brutality.25 More pertinent, however, was the 
civilising effect that the Enlightenment was having on debates about crime and punishment, as 
was fittingly illustrated in Gatrell’s26 study of public hangings during the period.  The study 
portrayed conflicts over whether to preserve public hangings, withdraw them from public view, 
or abolish the death penalty altogether. Instructively, the Bloody Code’s prescription of public 
hangings for crimes like arson, burglary, forgery, coining, housebreaking, murder or attempted 
murder and theft amongst several other crimes, raised a spectre of extreme brutality that repulsed 
a few refined minds and prompted calls for reforms. 
Among the voices that called for reforms was Samuel Romilly’s, a member of the British 
Parliament and critique of distortions in Britain’s criminal justice system.  In Romilly’s27 view, 
the object of the criminal law was to deter crime by holding forth the deterrent of punishment. 
However, it is the certainty of punishment, rather than its severity, that deters offenders. The 
threat of punishment loses efficacy when the criminal law becomes a cure all for society’s 
problems, and when violations are dealt with through disproportionate criminal sanctions.  Thus, 
Romilly28 protested the excessive criminalization of minor infringements to property rights and 
the use of capital punishments for petty offences like theft. Although several capital offences had 
fallen into disuse at this period, the State justified their retention in the statutes by presuming that 
they continued to fulfil a deterrent function.  However, English sensibilities were changing 
considerably, so that judges and juries who found the penalties repulsive began to find ways to 
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25 Ibid at 75-76. 
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27 Samuel Romilly The Speeches of Sir Samuel Romilly in the House of Commons:  In Two Volumes, vol. I (1820) 
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circumvent laws that prescribed them. Their continued retention was therefore 
counterproductive; it multiplied rather than prevented crimes,29 and bespoke a standard of cruelty 
that justified ‘every harsh and excessive exercise of authority’.30 
Much as finer sensibilities were emerging in British society, effort to revoke capital 
offences achieved modest results.31 The French Revolution of 1789-1799 may have played a part 
in circumscribing reform efforts. The Revolution offered enough reasons for Britain’s  wealth 
owning class to reject Romilly’s efforts to end decapitations for treason.32 In their minds, the 
Revolution reinforced the necessity of retaining a punishment that impressed the public with 
complete disgust for treason. Relying on a centuries-old tradition of support for decapitation, 
therefore, they argued that beheading was no more painful than hanging. Even if it was ‘in 
appearance theoretically severe, [it was] in reality practically human. … the body was dead’33 at 
any rate.  ‘Parliament’s resistance to the abolition of the aggravated sentence (for treason) could 
[therefore] be construed as a reasoned response to social disorder.  This was no time for 
gratuitous mitigations of the law.  The lessons of the French revolution could not be denied.’34 
Nevertheless, there were reformers who embraced the Revolution,35 and whose rejection 
of public hangings was deepened by the cruel injustices of the English system.  They were 
particularly incensed by the execution of a certain Mary Jones ‒ the poor mother of a suckling ‒ 
for shoplifting, and by other instances of cruel injustice in which capital punishments were 
                                                          
29 Romilly op cit note 27 at 41-44; see also K ‘Observations on the Criminal Law of England as it relates to capital 
punishment, and the mode in which it is administered by Samuel Romilly – a Review (May 31, 1880) Vol. 4 No 22 
Belfast Monthly Magazine 353-364 at 354; Emsley op cit note 16 at 192, 202. 
30 Their retention revealed an official mind-set that was enamoured with the brutal imagery of punishment. See K op 
cit note 29 at 355, 361-2. Romilly argued that sustaining this rigid system defeated the aims of criminal justice.  
Executions for petty crime repulsed the public, invoked their sympathy, and repelled their support for the system. 
Romilly illustrated how the official mindset became heedless of emerging sensibilities. Complainants failed to show 
up at trials, while jurors dispensed with justice according to the inhibitions or permissions of their consciences. They 
returned ‘compassionate verdicts’ even if the facts were plain and a finding of guilt would have been legally 
justified. Members of the public also refrained from giving information when they knew that the information could 
result in a death sentence. 
31 Some of these efforts were championed by Romilly. See Romilly op cit note 27 at 48-51; Gatrell op cit note 26 at 
332; however, those that were repealed had been disused anyway, or were being circumvented by the enforcers. 
32 Romilly op cit note 27 at 461-479. 
33 Gatrell op cit note 26 at 319. 
34 Ibid at 320. 





exacted.36  One of these reformers was Capel Lofft, who together with John Jebb, penned the 
following criticism of English criminal law in the eighteenth century:  
[I]t would appear that the objects of commerce and trade, instead of being protected with 
a wise and temperate vigilance, have been nominally secured with a vindictive jealousy: 
the amusements of the great and wealth guarded as the very existence of society; and 
guarded with exclusive rigour.37  
This statement was directed against the deployment of the criminal law to protect the 
exploitative interests of Britain’s wealthy class. Lofft38  also condemned the high number of 
crimes that attracted excessive sanctions, which he claimed was the corollary of channelling the 
criminal law for the purposes of protecting revenue. Together with other liberal-minded 
reformers, he advocated respect for civil and political rights, the rule of law and law reform. 
Unfortunately, however, it would take a while longer for official attitudes to budge.39  
Although official attitudes remained fixated, social feelings continued to move away 
from brutal and disproportionate sentences, and may have been galvanised by the social 
trepidation that followed the public hangings of Sarah Lloyd and Eliza Fenning in 1800 and 1815 
respectively. Sarah Loyd was pregnant when she was hanged for stealing items valued at forty 
shillings. Fenning received a similar sentence for allegedly poisoning the meal that she and her 
employer’s family ate.  Her pleas of innocence, the fact that she also fell ill from eating the same 
food and other circumstances that could have exculpated her were all ignored in an irrational 
haste to convict her for attempted murder. Both hangings stirred a sense of injustice and became 
the themes of widely disseminated discourses on the injustices of the English criminal justice 
system. The executions provided an outlet for growing frustrations with the system.40 These, 
                                                          
36 Ibid at 331-334, 360-70. 
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(1785) 34. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Gatrell op cit note 26 at 343-344 & 353. 
40 Ibid at 369. According to Gatrell, ‘[m]any other factors contributed to this outcome in the post-war years. With 
the country in turmoil, political trials numerous, the regent despised, radical satire constantly dripping, and traitors 
decapitated outside Newgate [the main convict prison], radical iconography … was awash with virulent images of 
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together with other executions that further entrenched opposition to public hangings, instigated 
some changes; some capital crimes were revoked, while judicial executions were reserved for 
murderers. Public hangings also ceased. However, the callousness with which punishments were 
executed remained, courtesy of ‘old punitive voices’41 that would not go away. Rising crime 
rates ensured that these voices retained centre stage a while longer.42 Nonetheless, limited as the 
changes may be, new attitudes were crystallising; whereas punishments in the middle ages 
spared little thought for human suffering, the eighteenth century witnessed a ‘[g]rowing 
sensitivity to violence and an aversion to physical suffering [that had] an impact on ideas about 
appropriate forms of punishment’.43 Emerging sensibilities favoured a relaxation of punishment 
and a shift toward correctional measures. It was a development to which imprisonment as a penal 
alternative would become pivotal.44  
The emerging sensibilities announced the Enlightenment’s culture of legal liberalism,45 
the principles of which promoted individual freedoms, equality under the law and the rule of 
law.46  Reformers like Romilly sought to humanize punishment by proposing just deserts and 
proportionality as new frontiers to the power to punish. In principle, the frontiers did not disavow 
anything utilitarian in punishment, because they presumed the propriety of using commensurate 
exemplary punishments to achieve crime prevention. Their aim, therefore, was to stress the 
importance of demonstrating a connection between the amount of punishment and its anticipated 
result. It was as it were, an attempt to idealise a new penal economy, which integrated notions 
that punishment ought to be according to the offender’s deserts (proportionality), with the idea 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Paley, a theologian and philosopher who wrote that the purpose of punishment is not to satisfy justice (i.e., 
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42 See Johnson, Wolfe & Jones op cit note 28 at 149-150. 
43 Spierenburg op cit note 20 at 52. 
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that it should seek to prevent crime and involve the least painful penal measure calculated to 
achieve that outcome.47  
That said, eighteenth century reforms tended to have been more ideological than tangible. 
They did not fundamentally alter the status quo. As McGowen48 observed, they ended up giving 
‘more attention to punishment, not to its relaxation’. The promise of civilising punishment was 
largely unfulfilled,49 while corporal and symbolic punishments remained. The only difference 
was that incarceration came into reckoning as a penal alternative and went on to become the 
centrepiece of eighteenth century penal transformations.50 
 
3.2.3 Rethinking Punishment in the Nineteenth Century 
Nineteenth century debates about punishment became increasingly informed by utilitarian 
thinking. Old, punitive methods of punishment were denounced as irrational and 
counterproductive and driven by ‘emotion, instinct and superstition’.51 In their place, a 
rationalised system evolved, which promoted deterrence, reformation, rehabilitation and respect 
for the offender’s rights as ideals that punishment ought to promote. The system also sought to 
ensure that punishments were consistent with parsimony and that the offender’s potentials were 
preserved. The idea of painful punishment was abhorrent to this ideology.52  
The new outlook gave birth to the rehabilitative model, which regarded criminality as a 
pathological condition that can be treated like other medical ailments, through therapies that 
should last as long as was necessary to achieve a cure. The apparatus for accomplishing this was 
a penal institution that integrated prisoner welfare and social defence. Basically, it required ‘in-
depth knowledge and in-depth intervention, individual investigation, and customized treatment 
regimes ...’53 This apparently involved adapting the use of prison, from merely warehousing 
offenders for patently retributive purposes, to deploying prison as a correctional institution, 
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52 Ibid. 





where advances in the behavioural sciences can be utilised to resocialise offenders through 
treatments that alter behaviour. The model went on to become the penal legacy of this era of the 
modern state.54 However, individualizing punishment came with intractable problems. It gave 
judges unbridled discretion to impose open-ended prison sentences and to make release 
contingent on when the offender is deemed to have been cured of criminal behaviour.55  
Although the rehabilitative model offered a new penal rationality, thinking about 
punishment remained ambivalent and no acceptable standards crystallised. At any rate, the model 
failed to deliver on its promise, due to its focus on the criminal rather than the offence and its 
neglect of ‘crucial legal and sociological aspects of crime’.56 Its underlying assumptions were 
proved wrong by rising crime rates and recidivism. Besides, it raised questions about the limits 
of the state’s power to punish, particularly the ethic and legitimacy of compelling offenders to 
undergo therapies they did not consent to and of incarcerating them indefinitely for longer 
periods than their offences deserved.57 In the absence of guidelines for measuring sentence 
severity, the rehabilitative model encouraged sentencing inconsistencies.58  
There were further problems. Indefinite incarceration caused severely overcrowded, 
awful, inhumane and coercive conditions in prison.59 Also, the model deepened erstwhile 
property relations and class structures, together with the social tensions that went with them, as 
most offenders belonged to an impoverished underclass. While rehabilitating them dominated 
political discourse on crime and punishment well into the twentieth century, recidivism made 
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nonsense of the expectations and economic considerations that underpinned the model,60 such 
that it became clear that correctional institutions were costly to run and failing to rehabilitate. 
British prisons at the time laboured under a major ‘crisis of legitimacy’.61  
Amidst this crisis in Britain, the Lord Carnarvon Select Committee of the House of Lords 
was constituted to consider penal reforms. Some background to the Committee’s work is 
needful. In the late nineteenth century, crime and imprisonment rates in Britain were dwindling 
and alternatives to prison were emerging. However, there was a dilemma; hitherto, criminally 
ruthless and subversive elements were transported to the British colony of America as a form of 
punishment. America’s independence from Britain in the late eighteenth century halted that. In 
its place, convict prisons emerged in Britain.62 The treatment regime in these prisons comprised 
progressive penal servitude, which enlisted a combination of tight restrictions intended to purge, 
break, ‘test, encourage and deter’63 the criminal through threats and inducements that offered a 
chance to reform. The treatment was gradually relaxed as the convict showed signs of 
improvement, with the benchmark for early release being good behaviour.64 However, penal 
servitude came nowhere close to facilitating rehabilitation. Other categories of prisoners were 
housed in several other local prisons. Convict and local prisons were administered separately and 
this led to inconsistent penal standards in Britain.65   
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detain persons who were convicted of minor offences. Local prisons were run by counties or municipalities.  See 
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The Carnarvon Committee examined these inconsistencies and made critical 
observations, but of particular interest is the disdain it expressed for reforms that indulged 
convicts. The Committee ‘bemoaned the many and wide differences, as regards construction, 
labour, diet, and general discipline in the various Gaols and Houses of Correction in England and 
Wales, leading to an inequality, uncertainty and inefficiency of punishment, and productive of 
the most prejudicial results’.66 Its response to these problems consisted of recommendations to 
centralize prison administration and ensure rigid adherence to procedures. It also encouraged a 
harsh penal tradition. Using epithets as ‘hard labour, hard board and hard fare’,67 and punishment 
that ‘work[ed] on the senses to produce a state of constant misery, discomfort, and even some 
pain’,68 the Committee promoted ‘a deterrent, depressive and severely punitive regime…’69 It 
was drawn to such methods by resurgent crime rates that threatened public safety,70 and a firm 
belief in the ability of severe penalties to deter crime. The recommendations became the corner 
stone of Britain’s penal practice from the mid-nineteenth century, as was evidenced by their 
inclusion in the Prison Act of 1865.71   
Following these recommendations, prison sentence with hard labour became a ‘near 
universal substitute for flogging and other forms of corporal punishments.72 As may be expected 
of these methods, prison conditions remained brutish. According to McConville,73 hard labour 
meant hours of working the tread wheel, crank and capstan to no productive end. It involved 
intensifying the pains of imprisonment and making quartering conditions so bare that inmates 
could not hope for respite.  A progressive dietary programme was also instituted, but the food 
allowances were basically starvation rations. Leisure was curtailed and prisoners were 
sequestrated from each other. These conditions resulted in a public outcry,74 and the first convict 
prison had to be demolished in 1893,75 resulting in yet another need for new solutions. 
                                                          
66 See McGowen op cit note 21 at 94. 
67 McConville (1995) op cit note 13 at 146. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid at 83; see generally 64-86. 
70 McGowen op cit note 21 at 94;  McConville (1995) op cit note 13 at 105-107. 
71 No. 28 & 29 Vict. Cap. 126. 
72 McConville (1995) op cit note 13 at 146-147. 
73 Ibid at 147, see generally 147-151. 
74 Ademola Ogunlewe The Nigerian Prison System (2007) 36. 







3.2.5 Ideological and Political Variations in Penal Policies in the Late 20th Century 
3.2.5.1 The Failure of Rehabilitation and New Thinking about Punishment 
In late twentieth century, penal thinkers came up with new classifications to explain new 
thinking about punishment. It started with a series of contemporaneous developments in Britain 
and the United States of America. In the latter, ‘justice model,’76 was used to described efforts to 
counter the inadequacies of rehabilitative punishments in the US, by restoring focus on the 
criminal and his crime.77 The concept was instigated by a number of factors. To start with, the 
period’s increasingly liberal intellectual culture deplored the arbitrary exercise of public power 
that accompanied the rehabilitative model and the inconsistent sentences it occasioned. 
Accordingly, it highlighted the need to regulate judicial discretion, ensure proportionate 
punishments and extend due process guarantees to punishment.78 The method for achieving that 
was the justice model. The model reintroduced the concept of blameworthiness ‒ which stood at 
the heart of classical retributivist thinking ‒ into punishment, moderating same with the 
requirement that punishment must be deserved. This, in essence, was an effort to bring deserts, 
proportionality and parsimony together into a principled framework for regulating sentencing in 
the US. It disavowed disproportionate rehabilitative sentences, without rejecting utilitarianism 
altogether, as it also acknowledged the desirability of using punishment to achieve socially 
beneficial consequences.79 However, it was sceptical of deterrence as a penal value, or of the 
possibility of ascertaining a specific amount of severity that would achieve deterrence.80   
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Across the Atlantic in England, penal focus shifted to substantive justice.81 The shift lent 
much less weight to deterrence and, though the offender’s individual circumstances might still be 
factored into sentencing, it was for the purpose of making moral assessments about the 
seriousness of the crime and the harm suffered. It was not an attempt to reintroduce traditional 
retributivist principles, as the question regarding an appropriate punishment was to be 
determined on a non-retributive and non-rehabilitative basis. While rehabilitation could still be 
sought (meaning punishment could still be individualized), it was not the overarching goal.  The 
goal was to achieve a fairer, effective and possibly less punitive distribution of punishment.82 
This apparently pointed to underlying liberal attitudes about punishment.   
Although these developments in England shared some of the elements that were present 
in the American justice model, they were not so described. The British approach maintained an 
attachment to rehabilitation that prompted Bottomley83 to call it the ‘just-deserts theory of 
rehabilitation’. Yet another description by Bottoms84  presented the developments as an evolving 
pattern of bifurcation in sentences that were imposed between 1948 and 1974. The sentences 
were generally less severe, but serious offences attracted longer fixed sentences while ordinary 
offences were treated to lenient measures, i.e., short sentences and fines. Bifurcation was 
encouraged by increasing attention to the notion of the dangerous offender, i.e., the 
psychiatrically ill, criminally violent or professional (habitual) offender against whom the State 
must act to protect the public. No less crucial though, were the failure of rehabilitation and the 
high costs of running prisons, which provided compelling reasons to use prison sentences less.85 
As a result, official penal policy endorsed and integrated bifurcation into the Criminal Justice 
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Act of 197286 and the official guidelines for release on parole issued by the British Home 
Secretary in 1975.87 
However, ‘bifurcation’ and its American equivalent came short of the ideal punishment. 
Both encouraged long sentences, the denunciation of which opened the way for the models in the 
first place. The support for long sentences was apparent in the bifurcation tendency, but with the 
justice model, the major criticism was against its tendency to accommodate traditional views 
about long retributive punishments. Bifurcation also grappled with the very difficult problem of 
determining dangerousness, especially in view of the particular propensity to make wrong 
predictions of dangerousness.88 Nevertheless, the model provided a framework for working out a 
more rational approach to sentencing. Its insistence on punishments that are commensurate to the 
offender’s deserts became a central principle in sentencing guidelines that were developed in 
later years in Britain and America.89  
 
3.2.5.2   The Socio-Political Context of New Attitudes to Punishment in Late Twentieth Century 
It has been rightly stated that criminal policy goes beyond finding technical solutions to the 
problem of crime.90 Its development has to be pursued and explained in a broader political 
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violent offence.  A false negative may also be predicted, in which case an offender who is expected not to be violent 
commits violent acts upon release. Bottoms argued that empirical data suggests ‘there will always be a high level of 
false positives’ and that ‘the serious moral question of false positives cannot be evaded by pious hopes for the 
improvement of prediction techniques. It has also been argued that one of the practical consequences of a false 
positive is the continued detention of two or more non-violent offender after they have completed their lawful term 
in order to make sure that one violent offender is not released. See Bottoms (1977) op cit note 84 at 76-80. 
89 See chapter 6. 
90 John Lea ‘From integration to exclusion: the development of crime prevention policy in the United Kingdom’ 
(1997) being an article based on a talk given at a Conference titled ‘Estrategias alternativas a la resolución penal de 
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context.91 Indeed, the political traditions that formed the bedrock of Western society in the late 
twentieth century considerably influenced penal changes and judicial attitudes on punishment.  
According to Garland,92 the background to these changes lay in widespread disenchantment with 
the rehabilitative ideal, which ‘coincided with a powerful shift in the political orientation of 
several Western governments, with the result that penal organisations … [became] more 
vulnerable to external political pressures than they might otherwise have been’. The changes 
were influenced by permutations in socio-economic policies as well.93 Britain provides vivid 
illustrations.  
Policy changes that occurred during this period originated in economic and social 
programmes of post-World War II economic reconstruction programmes led by a succession of 
Labour Party administrations. The programmes were based on Keynesian economics, a 
macroeconomic theory that construes active roles for government in stimulating economic 
growth, through increased public spending and job creation.94 Accordingly, and with the initial 
support of Britain’s Conservative Party, the Labour government rolled out a programme of 
economic expansion, targeting unemployment, poverty and social vice, amongst others. 
Government assumed controlling stakes in production activities and invested heavily in social 
services and infrastructure, in promoting access to education, health care, housing and other 
social rights.95 Its goal was to build a ‘cohesive, stable and homogenous society’96 and establish 
a more tolerant, welfare-driven penal system.97 By the 1960s however, it was becoming apparent 
that the anticipated benefits were not being achieved: poverty, social inequality and crime rates 
worsened in spite of massive investments in the economy. Public demands for more punitive 
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96 Ibid. 
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measures against crime increased in response, fed by general scepticism over welfare 
programmes for prisoners.98   
The Labour Party’s response to these demands consisted in rather inconsequential 
changes that perpetuated discredited penal policies99 and provided fodder for criticisms by the 
political opposition (the Conservative Party) that the Labour Party had gone soft on crime. 
Seizing the political momentum provided by mounting public angst over persistent crime 
problems, the Conservative Party went on to win the 1979 general elections, on the promise of a 
tough ‘law and order’100 response to crime. However, substantive policy engagements with crime 
were slow to come under the new administration of Margaret Thatcher, who merely continued 
with the liberal ideas of previous labour administrations.101 Radical changes commenced later, 
provoked by a combination of factors that came to a head during John Major’s Conservative 
administration. These included the role that Thatcher’s socio-economic policies played in driving 
up poverty, unemployment and crime rates.102 Major’s reforms, which led to the development of 
more prisons, were predicated on unmistakable aversion for rehabilitation and a preference for 
long sentences. The reforms saw a dramatic increase in prison population.103 
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3.2.6 Punishment and Human Rights in Britain: A New Dawn 
Even though British penal policy evolved along a winding path as illustrated in the periods 
discussed above, some important principles emerged during these developments, which 
increasingly urged moderations in penal severity. Human sensibilities were also becoming more 
civilised. Some of these sensibilities found their way into important human rights instruments, 
such as the Magna Carter of 1215 and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, both of which sought to 
secure individual liberties from arbitrary deprivation and excessive punishments. The Bill of 
Rights of 1689 also included a prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments.104  These 
were important milestones, even if it took considerable time for the spirit of the instruments to 
permeate penal policies and practices.105  Be that as it may, an irreversible trend had started. In 
1951, Britain ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(the Convention).106  The step would later prove to be influential in entrenching a culture of 
respect for human rights in punishment.   
Dramatically noticeable changes began in the 1970s,107 when the European Court of 
Human Rights started handing down decisions that directly impacted British punishment. One 
such decision is Tyrer v UK,108 where the court took a generally dim view of judicial corporal 
punishments. Although the court acknowledged that punishments generally had an element of 
humiliation or degradation, it held that birching in the particular circumstances of the case took 
punishment to a level that was so degrading as to violate the prohibition against degrading 
punishments in Article 3109 of the Convention. By affirming that there were cases of birching that 
would not violate protected rights, the court was willing to allow that certain levels of 
degradation are ‘acceptable’ under the Convention.110 Following a pattern of similar decisions, a 
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different penal climate surfaced in Britain, which made it doubtful that judicial corporal 
punishments ‘would pass muster however administered’.111 
More recent developments confirm a conscious turn in penal policy, even as decisions of 
the European Court continued to alter penal attitudes in Britain. Between 1987 and 2003, 
corporal punishment was progressively outlawed in public and private schools. Drastic pro-EU 
shifts occurred with the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA),112 which domesticated 
articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the European Convention, as well as protocols to the Convention. 
Particularly crucial in the HRA’s provisions are ss 2, 3 and 4.  Section 2 obligates British courts 
to consider judgments, decisions, declarations or advisory opinions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, the European Commission on Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers 
when determining questions that are raised in connection with convention rights.  Under ss 3 and 
4, courts must interpret and apply legislation in a way that is compatible with ‘convention 
rights’, and may declare a primary or subsidiary legislation incompatible with convention rights, 
though they may not impeach the validity and enforceability of same.  A declaration of 
incompatibility operates as an advice for legislative amendment by parliament.113  
Much has been written about how these provisions affect the provisions of the 
Convention.  It has been argued for example, that the provisions were passed with an eye on 
preserving parliamentary supremacy in Britain. Hence, the Parliament did not adopt all of the 
provisions of the Convention. Further, s 2 of the Act serves the purpose of not obligating English 
courts to follow judgments and other jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and 
other EU bodies. English courts may not declare Acts of Parliament invalid even when they are 
incompatible with the Convention. This, in effect, means that the British Parliament can decide 
which of the Convention’s provisions it may allow to be enforced in Britain. This potentially 
weakens the Convention’s enforceability in Britain. Before the European Court, however, all 
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provisions of the Convention can be enforced against Britain.114 All said, European human rights 
have had significant impact on British punishment.  In 2004, an amendment to the HRA 
domesticated the 13th Protocol to the Convention and effectively abolished the death penalty in 
Britain.115 
At this juncture, it is necessary to see how the British colonies of South Africa and 




3.3 Crime and Punishment in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century South Africa 
South African law reflects a history of colonial influence, starting first with the settlement of 
Dutch colonists in the Western Cape in the seventeenth century and continuing through the 
establishment of the British Cape Colony in 1795,116 to the expansion of colonial presence to 
Natal, Transvaal and the Orange River. This colonial history accounts for the Roman-Dutch law 
and English law features of South African law. Indeed, some developments in South African 
criminal law were so contemporaneous and similar to some seventeenth and eighteenth century 
developments in Roman Dutch law and English criminal law, as to suggest that some concepts or 
aspects of South African criminal law were rooted in these other legal systems.117 For example, 
the distinctions between criminal and civil law were as obscured in seventeenth to eighteenth 
century South Africa as they were imprecise in English and Roman-Dutch law at the time.118 
Although the word ‘crime’ began to be used in medieval and eighteenth century Europe, it 
lacked any precise meaning in the penal lexicon of those periods.119 A distinction began to be 
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UK today’ (2013) UCL Policy Briefing. 
115 Human Rights Act 1998 (Amendment) Order 2004.  
116 A Barrat & P Snyman ‘Researching South African law’, (2005), available at 
http://www.llrx.com/features/southafrica.htm; accessed 20 April 2014. 
117 John Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure: Vol. IV, Introduction to Criminal Procedure  (1977) 3, 
5-6, 18. 
118 Ibid at 3 & 10. 
119 G R Elton ‘Introduction: Crime and the historian’ in Cochburn J. (ed.) Crime in England: 1550 – 1800 (1977); 
another example is torture, which was a legal procedure for extracting confessions under Roman-Dutch law. The 
criminal procedure in South African colonies followed the tradition; likewise the tradition of jury trials under 





drawn in the sixteenth century, but vagueness persisted in Roman-Dutch connotations of the 
word.  This, besides other manifestations of legal vagueness, prompted South Africa in later 
years to resort to English law, where concepts and principles of criminal law were beginning to 
achieve greater clarity. However, the greater influence of English law on South African law was 
in the law of procedure. Although a number of English common law notions of crime, such as 
murder, assault wove their way into statutes and judicial decisions in the colony, South African 
judges developed the concepts away from their English roots.120 
The temper of punishments in South Africa during the mid-seventeenth to late eighteenth 
century also tended to coincide with temperaments in Europe.121 Punishments were graphically 
and symbolically arranged to convey the harshest possible denunciation of the offender and his 
crime.122  Torture as a method of extracting confessions in criminal trials was widely practiced, 
while punishments were devised to jar the mind and leave the would-be offender with a sense of 
foreboding.123  During the first British occupation of the Cape in 1795-1803, colonial officials 
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sought to introduce contemporaneous reforms that were taking place in Britain.124  These 
attempts at penal reforms persisted through the second occupation. Torture was abolished, and 
while the Roman-Dutch law of criminal procedure was retained, changes were introduced to the 
structure and jurisdiction of the courts.125 Public exhibitions of punishment began to be de-
emphasized.126 
It is noteworthy that the above reforms coincided with the progress of the slave abolition 
movement in Britain.127 Up until the early nineteenth century, non-Europeans worked as slaves 
or low-level servants on Boer farms and endured brutal punishments.128 With the abolition of 
slavery trade and slave labour, however, there emerged demands for new measures of social 
control, with the result that incarceration began to be seen as a penal alternative.129 At the heart 
of the reforms implemented was Ordinance 50 of 1828, which sought to give non-Europeans 
equal rights with Europeans and free them from compulsory labour and indentured service.  It 
also purported to give non-Europeans the rights to own land, work for wages and receive 
employment contracts, while also seeming to decriminalise vagrancy and reform punishments.130 
On the whole however, it is hard to determine the extent to which these reforms indicated that 
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the colonies were embracing an ideological shift.131 The path to reform was rendered difficult by 
Dutch colonists who opposed them ‒ because they offered equal treatment to non-Europeans ‒ 
and continued to employ brutal punishments.132 The colonists saw in the reforms a threat to 
sources of cheap farm labour. Indeed, colonial correspondences at the time showed that there 
was apprehension among colonists that the reforms would alter the socio-economic and political 
composition of the colony.133 
The above sentiments, occurring as they did in the early years of the colony, hinted at 
how property ownership and labour relations would later define the socio-political order in the 
colonial and post-colonial era, and the treatment of members of the social underclass. 
Essentially, the socio-political order promoted racial differentiation. Over time, natives 
(Africans) were made subservient to Europeans by laws that were in great measure calculated to 
retard their improvement and compel their perpetual submission and enslavement.  The economy 
of the colonies was dependent on this policy and it necessitated racially differentiated approaches 
to crime and punishment as well. A major part of penal policy dealt extensively with how natives 
were to be punished. For errant slaves, the policy required varying degrees of severity for capital 
punishments.134 The Cape Court of Justice even compared the system of differential punishments 
with practice in Western society, saying it was ‘a rule of conduct for the Courts of judicature all 
over Europe’.135 
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Racial differentiation regarding crime and punishment ensured that some of the reforms 
that took place in the colonies, which concurred with changing penal attitudes in Britain, 
especially with the emergence of the rehabilitative ideal, did not apply to natives. Colonist 
sentiments about natives remained crude and debates about law, order and equality exposed 
racial prejudices against reforms that threatened the political economy of the colonies.136 It was a 
classic contest between irreconcilable liberal and conservative ideas, between liberalizing access 
to property on one hand and preserving exclusive control by colonists on the other. Over time, 
compromises were negotiated, but neither side could lay exclusive claims to representing the 
socio-political order. Both positions, it was said, would later have considerable influence on 
future ‘Afrikaner political thinking’.137 
 
3.3.1 Penal Changes in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
Attitudes that fostered racial differentiations persisted through the nineteenth century, 
influencing how crime and punishment were defined. At the same time however, efforts to 
reform persisted and substantial changes were introduced to the four colonies that came under 
British administration. In 1869 public executions were stopped in the Cape Colony.138  In 1903 
Transvaal passed a comprehensive Criminal Procedure Code139 that borrowed from English law 
and from the Cape’s Criminal Procedure Act of 1828140 and Evidence Ordinance of 1830. It also 
had elements of the Canadian,141 Queensland142 and Indian143 criminal codes. Natal and the 
Orange Free State also adopted criminal codes that borrowed from English law and the criminal 
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and evidence ordinances of the Cape Colony. After the four colonies merged in 1910 to form the 
Union of South Africa, the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 1917144 was enacted to give the 
Union of South Africa a comprehensive procedural code.145 The 1917 Act substantially re-
enacted Transvaal’s 1903 code. Subsequently, many provisions in the 1917 Act were re-enacted 
in the current Criminal Procedure Act of 1977.146 
The 1917 code brought uniformity and clarity to punishment. For example, it removed 
uncertainties in Roman-Dutch law regarding offences that were liable to the death penalty.147 It 
also made the imposition of death sentences for treason, rape, housebreaking and robbery under 
aggravating circumstances subject to judicial discretion. For murder however, the death penalty 
was mandatory, save for the exceptions that a convicted murderer who is a nursing mother or a 
person under the age of 16 may not be sentenced to death.148 The Supreme Court was also given 
unfettered discretion to impose fines and prison terms, unless there was a statutorily mandatory 
minimum period of imprisonment. A sentence of corporal punishment could not exceed 15 
strokes.149  Also, judges were given wide discretion in juvenile matters, but the object was to 
reform rather than punish.150   
An opportunity to take the reforms further came with the work of the Lansdowne 
Commission on Penal and Prison Reform. In its 1947 report, the Commission found that South 
African prisons ‘maintain[ed] the previous harsh and inequitable prison system that preceded 
it’.151 Consequently, it recommended greater emphasis on rehabilitation, the extension of literacy 
programmes to offenders (especially black offenders)152 and other wide ranging changes that 
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included improvements in prison administration.153 Unfortunately, these recommendations were 
not implemented.154 However, some changes were subsequently introduced through the Criminal 
Sentences Amendment Act of 1952,155 which made corporal punishment compulsory for rape, 
robbery, culpable homicide, assault with intent to commit rape, robbery, or housebreaking.156 
However, a court could suspend a compulsory sentence of whipping if special circumstances 
were found to be present.157 In practice though, corporal punishments seemed to have been 
frequently imposed,158 and the gains of the reforms seemed to have been very limited.159  
In 1948, South Africa passed laws that institutionalized racial discrimination (i.e., 
apartheid) and further cemented racial differentiation in punishment. The Criminal Law 
Amendment Act of 1953160 and the Public Safety Act of 1953161 criminalised political protests 
and prescribed whippings and imprisonments of up to five years. Violations of the laws were 
harshly dealt with and studies showed a spike in prison sentences.162 Nevertheless, concerns 
about penal reforms persisted and some changes were in fact introduced through the Criminal 
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Procedure Act of 1955.163 The Act’s approach to punishment was reformation oriented and the 
measures it prescribed moved considerably away from deterrence and retribution.  It enlisted 
short term imprisonment for corrective training, periodical imprisonment for less serious crimes 
and preventative incapacitation. It also abolished imprisonment with forced labour. These 
changes occurred when permutations in penal policy in Britain forced rehabilitation to lose its 
appeal. Although the changes were sensitive to the reasons for the failure of rehabilitation in 
Britain,164 growing apprehensions of the political opposition to apartheid provoked legislative 
responses that increased the range of offences for which the death penalty could be imposed.165  
There was a corresponding rise in the use of the penalty. Executions in South Africa accounted 
for 47 per cent of the global toll in the mid to late twentieth century.166  
Following persistent clamour for comprehensive reforms, the Viljoen Commission of 
Enquiry into the Penal System of South Africa was constituted in 1974.167 The Commission’s 
recommendations were decisively aimed at rehabilitation. After strongly rejecting mandatory 
sentences and excessive reliance on imprisonment, it recommended community based 
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alternatives to prison, the curtailment of corporal punishment, the use of pre-sentence reports and 
the involvement of behavioural experts in sentencing.168 The Commission also addressed the 
problem of excessive criminalisation of conduct.169  Its recommendations resulted in the 
abolition of ‘corrective training’ and ‘prevention of crime’ - forms of mandatory imprisonment 
that had been much criticised for making sentencing unduly rigid – under the Criminal Procedure 
Act 1977.170   
Unfortunately, the political rationality that underpinned apartheid did not allow the 
reforms to take full effect. Segregation in penal policy was a necessary part of apartheid’s 
strategy for fending off growing threats to the socio-political order. Indeed, it has been suggested 
that establishing the Viljoen Commission had more to do with rethinking how apartheid 
interacted with the issues of crime and punishment, than it had to do with reforms. Thus, the 
changes that followed rehashed apartheid’s segregationist and repressive penal policy.171 Official 
nuances about crime and punishment continued to reinforce the ownership and class structures 
that underpinned the political system. Segregationist terminologies framed issues about 
delinquency: while delinquency among white proletarians was addressed through ‘stabilization’ 
measures that involved non-institutional community based interventions, black delinquents were 
regularly sentenced to imprisonment, apprenticeship, caning, fines and removal to rural areas.172 
Even when intense political opposition forced the apartheid state to rethink its ideology, it re-
invented racial differentiation in punishment on the basis that South Africa’s heterogeneous races 
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were at different stages of development, which made different approaches to punishment 
necessary. For black offenders, that meant punishments that targeted the body.173  
These policies marked a dark era in South Africa’s criminal justice system. Official 
artifice about penal reforms wore thin as resistance to apartheid deepened.  Unfortunately, the 
judiciary was caught up in apartheid’s moral dilemma. While not all judges supported the 
ideology (some in fact called for the abolition of the death penalty,174 which at the time was 
politicised), they were generally passive or willing implementers of apartheid justice. As 
opposition to apartheid intensified in the 1980s, arrests and trials for political offences spiralled 
to distressing levels. So did judicial executions, which rose to become one of the highest in the 
world.  Most death penalty convictions in the 1980s and 1990s were for political offences and its 
‘victims’ were more likely than not blacks and coloureds who resisted apartheid.175 Prison also 
became strongly associated with the repressiveness of apartheid. Lengthy prison sentences 
spiralled in the mid-1980s. By the early 1990s, about 32,000 young offenders were whipped 
annually in execution of judicial sentences.176  In the early 1990s, however, tidal changes began 
to sweep through the political landscape. No longer able to sustain its repressive rule, the 
apartheid government was forced to lift restrictions on political activity and to negotiate a 
political transition to constitutional democracy. As part of the negotiations, executions were put 
on hold.177 
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3.3.2 Crime and Punishment in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
The post-apartheid era in South Africa has witnessed important changes in penal policy and 
sentencing.  The following discussion reviews the changes in phases.  
3.3.2.1  Criminal Justice Policy during the Transition to Democracy 
A consequence of racialising and politicising penal policy during apartheid was that the 
liberation movement led by the African National Congress (ANC) came to regard the criminal 
justice system as a tool of repressive rule. Crime and punishment, as the ANC saw it, symbolized 
power relations in the Apartheid State, or was concomitant with the ‘structural violence’ of its 
ideology.178  However, the ANC had a poor grasp of the crime problem in South Africa, before 
and soon after apartheid. No sooner had apartheid’s segregationist restrictions been relaxed than 
conventional crime rates shot up.179 Two explanations have been proffered for this. For one 
thing, apartheid’s crime prevention policies focused on conventional crime white communities. 
In this regard, studies imply a substantial ‘dark figure’ of unrecorded crime in South Africa, 
which, given ‘the vagaries of apartheid recordkeeping’, focused on reporting crime in white 
communities.180 The other explanation is that the ANC’s preoccupation with the liberation 
struggle turned the attention of its leaders away from the stark realities of crime in black 
communities.181 
Given its perception of apartheid criminal policy, the ANC opted for a humanitarian 
approach to crime and punishment,182 and constructed crime and criminality as consequences of 
the inequities imposed by apartheid.  This outlook resulted in attempts to address the crime 
problem through strategies that wove social policy into crime prevention. The strategies ranged 
between criminalising social policy and socialising crime prevention. Strategies that criminalise 
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social policy enlist ‘social policy … as a first line strategy against crime’.183 They endorse crime 
reduction as the primary reason behind mainstream welfare programmes, rather than the by-
product.184 On the other hand, strategies that socialise crime prevention adopt ‘the increased use 
of people-centred welfare measures … as ends in themselves and not mere means to the end of 
reducing crime’.185 However, both approaches overlap in the sense that they find the causes of 
crime in ‘social, economic and environmental conditions’186 and believe that redressing those 
conditions alleviates crime.187  The difference lies in the emphasis in the roles that each approach 
attaches to social policy; while one funnels social policy into crime reduction,188 the other sees 
better livelihoods, improved living standards, crime prevention and other welfare programmes 
that improve human conditions as equally legitimate objects of social policy.189 Yet another 
approach, which was compelled by troubling crime statistics soon after the democratic transition 
in 1994, laid emphasis on law enforcement, i.e., the arrest and conviction of offenders.190  
Scholars have pointed out that all three methods were evident in the different 
programmes that post-apartheid ANC administrations adopted in their response to the crime and 
safety question,191 starting first with the adoption of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) in 1994.  The RDP tended to address crime and safety problems through 
social policy interventions. In other words, the ANC subsumed crime under its socio-economic 
development and democratization policy.192 The misjudgement in this approach came to the fore 
two years later, when public fear escalated over rising crimes.  Surveys indicated that the 
percentage of those who felt that crime was a pressing concern doubled over a space of three 
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years between 1995 and 1997, so that by 1998, more than 20 per cent of the respondents 
indicated that crime had become a top concern, behind service delivery and jobs.   
This increase in the fear of crime produced a corresponding decline in public confidence 
in the ability and willingness of the state to deal with it. The crime situation and the criticisms it 
generated began to make government look very inefficient,193 forcing it to reconsider its crime 
policy.  The responses that followed were articulated in National Growth and Development 
Strategy and National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS)194 amongst other crime policy 
documents.195 They introduced a series of policy readjustments that reflected the ANC’s 
increasing awareness that crime’s threat to democracy and economic development required a 
decisive response.196  These readjustments would eventually blend crime prevention and law 
enforcement into a framework that sought two objectives: to move further away from the 
structural abuses of apartheid while still showing resolution against a skyrocketing crime 
problem.197 
The measures were hardly enough to assuage public apprehensions over crime. One of 
the platforms for articulating public concerns over government’s inability to head off rising 
crime rates was the NEDCOR Project on Crime, Violence and Investment, a private sector 
initiative that was prompted by concerns within business circles that the crime problem could 
make the country ungovernable, was deterring foreign investments and tourism, and had led to 
an exodus of highly skilled South Africans. There was also the perception within those circles 
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that the ANC government was soft on crime.  After examining the causes of the crime situation 
and evaluating how it impacted investment, the project report warned that South Africa was 
losing up to five per cent of its gross domestic product to the crime problem.  Although it 
commended the NCPS for its long term strategy, it criticised government’s lack of urgency and 
decisiveness in tackling crime. It called for short term crime prevention measures that guaranteed 
safety and security for citizens, warning that if government failed in this basic responsibility, ‘it 
would eventually fail in other areas’198 of governance.  
Although state officials became defensive of their policies,199 the criticisms had the effect 
of shifting official attitudes. ‘[P]oliticians of all stripes began to support harsh sentencing 
reforms that appeared primarily to serve “ideological goals”…’200 The outcome was a new 
punishment paradigm, an ideological shift in penal policy that has been described as ‘punitive 
humanism’.201 The paradigm sought to balance public demands for tougher sanctions against 
criminals on one hand, with the no less important need to humanize and conform punishment to 
human rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The latter aim became evident in the eventual 
rejection of the death penalty and corporal punishments, a development to which two judicial 
discussions (discussed in the next section) were pivotal. The former gave birth to the minimum 
sentencing requirements in the Criminal Amendment Act 105 of 1997.  
Section 51 of the Act offered a range of steep punishments intended to satisfy popular 
demands for tough measures for serious crimes. It also sought to introduce consistency into 
sentencing.  It introduced minimum sentences into South Africa’s sentencing law, 
recommending penalties ranging from five years to life imprisonment for a number of serious 
offences that included murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances and rape. The provision 
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obliged courts to impose the minimum sentences unless ‘substantial and compelling 
circumstances’ ‘[justified] the imposition of a lesser sentence’.202  
However, the implementation of the Act drove up incarceration rates in South Africa and 
lengthened prison sentences. In its 2000 report, the South African Law Reform Commission203 
observed increases in sentence severity within two years of the Act’s enactment.  Thus, while the 
ANC government showed intent to humanize punishment, it looked to longer prison terms as a 
crime control measure. This approach has since characterized punishment in the post-apartheid 
era. Although initially intended as an interim measure, the life of the Act has been extended a 
number of times.204  How s 51 has impacted South Africa’s sentencing landscape will be 
discussed in chapter 5.  In 2007, the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act205 introduced 
amendments to s 51 and made the provision a permanent feature of sentencing for certain sexual 
offences.206 
 
3.3.2.2   The Political Rationality of Punishment in the Constitutional Era  
It should be noted that by the time minimum sentencing provisions were adopted in 1997, South 
Africa’s sentencing jurisprudence had established a strong link between human rights and 
punishment. Early steps toward humanising punishment started with a moratorium on death 
penalty during negotiations to end apartheid. Negotiations on the country’s Constitution 
ultimately left the question on the constitutionality of the death penalty for courts to resolve. The 
Constitutional Court did this in S v Makwanyane and Another.207 However, prior to 
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Makwanyane, the Constitutional Court had occasion to define the new values that would underlie 
punishment in the post-apartheid state in the case of S v Williams and Others.208  
In Williams, the court outlined the political rationality of South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy, the liberation struggles that underpinned it and the implications these had for crime 
policy. It construed the court’s role in the democratic state as consisting in an obligation to 
ensure that the new political character of the nation is grounded in respect for constitutional 
rights. The obligation required courts to pay attention to how their judicial functions may impact 
individual rights.209 Employing the ‘determinative test’210 which describes those values that are 
inherent to a constitutional democracy and against which the validity of actions must be 
measured, the court reasoned that a new penal rationality had been introduced into the 
Constitution, which necessitated courts to move progressively from retributive and deterrent 
punishments towards punishments that embraced corrective and preventative values, as well as 
human rights.211 It was on the basis of this reasoning that the court found corporal punishments 
to be in violation of constitutional protections against cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishments.  The court held as follows: 
The Constitution clearly places a very high premium on human dignity and the protection 
against punishments that are cruel, inhuman and degrading; …. [T]he Constitution 
ensures that the sentencing of offenders must conform to standards of decency recognized 
throughout the civilized world.  Thus it sets a norm; there is no place for brutal and 
dehumanising treatment and punishment…212 
The court developed this rationality further when it ruled the death penalty 
unconstitutional in Makwanyane.  The case is notable for the court’s exegesis of how cultures of 
punishment are defined by the political rationality of each society. Whereas apartheid fostered a 
legacy of hostile racial relations and gross human rights violations that spilled over into 
punishment, South Africa’s transition to constitutional democracy ushered in a new political 
rationality, which transcended the acrimonious divisions of the past to articulate a new 
commitment to national understanding and reconciliation. The new commitment, as the court 
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rightly observed, was rooted in political considerations that were indispensable to the need for 
new attitudes to punishment. The court then articulated a new paradigm of punishment that 
placed the Constitution’s Bill of Rights at the heart of it all.213 
Read together, Williams and Makwanyane developed a new penal ethos for the post-
apartheid State. The decisions found that courts had a constitutional responsibility to elaborate 
how the political culture that is envisioned by the Constitution applied to punishment.  This 
meant envisioning punishment in a transformative or restorative role. The decisions effectively 
communicated that courts were to pursue liberal and humane ideals in punishment. Subsequent 
judicial sentences have done so. They have established strong linkages between punishment and 
a theory of constitutionality, or a theory of rights that are secured by constitutional guarantees. 
Some of the decisions will be discussed later in this thesis. 
 
 3.4 Penal Evolution in Nigeria  
3.4.1  Criminal Law at the Inception of British Rule  
Before Britain’s colonial venture in Nigeria, distinct systems of customary criminal law were 
enforced in the many autonomous nationalities that came under colonial administration. These 
nationalities administered justice according to traditional constructs of concepts like criminal 
liability, due process, punishment and justice. The concepts varied between nationalities (or even 
between communities) as each nationality defined its penal system according to its value 
system.214 For administrative convenience, the colonialists allowed indigenous customs and 
institutions to continue to regulate criminal matters among natives. This approach was articulated 
in a colonial policy of non-interference in native affairs contained in the Order-in-Council of 
1872. Under the Ordinance, English criminal law and jurisdiction applied only to British subjects 
in territories that came under British protection.215  However, as colonial ambitions extended 
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inland beyond the West African coastline, the policy of non-interference yielded to a new policy 
of indirect rule. Indirect rule subjected indigenous political institutions to the supervisory control 
of Colonial Administrators.216 Starting from 1885, English criminal jurisdiction was extended to 
consenting natives. These developments brought about parallel criminal jurisdictions; English 
law applied to non-natives and natives who consented, while customary criminal law applied to 
natives who did not consent to English criminal law. Subsequently, a strict separation between 
the two systems was established by a duo of 1901 Ordinances,217 resulting in parallel court 
systems. English type courts enforced English criminal law, while native courts implemented 
customary criminal law. 
However, the power of native courts to apply customary criminal law and punishment 
was considerably circumscribed by the Ordinances. Native courts had to comply with the 
statutory requirement that the customs they applied and the decisions they passed conform to the 
principles of English law and be not repugnant to natural justice, good conscience and equity 
(i.e., the repugnancy test).218 Their decisions were also subject to review by colonial officers and 
English type courts, which used the power of review to control and, where necessary, alter and 
conform native court decisions to English principles and perceptions about justice. These 
developments substantially altered the character of customary criminal law.219 They imposed 
restrictions that made customary law punishments statutory in character.  ‘The only truly native 
element [that remained] was that exercise of jurisdiction was mainly over natives.’220 With time, 
customary criminal law gradually came to be replaced by English forms of criminal justice.221  
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3.4.2 Developing Nigeria’s Criminal Law under British Rule 
The replacement of customary criminal law was gradual. Attempts to introduce an English-based 
criminal code did not succeed until 1904 when Ordinance No. 10 was enacted for Northern 
Nigeria.  The Ordinance was substantially modelled after the Queensland Code, which drew 
heavily on a number of other codes, including the English Draft Code of Indictable Offences of 
1879.222 Efforts to legislate a similar code for Southern Nigeria remained abortive until 1914 
when the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria were amalgamated into a single entity 
‒ the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. The Criminal Code of Northern Nigeria was then re-
enacted as the Criminal Code Ordinance No. 15 of 1916 (the 1916 Code). It applied to the entire 
country and was different from the original code in just a few insignificant respects.223  
With the 1916 Code, the process of replacing customary criminal law neared 
completion.224 Although the Code diverged from common law positions in some respects in 
‘order to adapt it to local conditions and the juridical sentiments of the people’,225 it still drew 
upon the English common law of crimes. And while it retained some degree of recognition for 
traditional criminal justice, general discontent arose over its concepts and institutions, which 
native populations found to be incomprehensible. Other criticisms of the code include its 
inelegant phraseology, its unorthodox classification and arrangement of different genres of 
crime,226  and the marginal recognition it accorded native institutions of justice.227 Colonial 
supervision of native institutions would eventually strip them of whatever vestiges of 
indigenousness that was left, so that customary jurisdiction soon became products of statutory 
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creations, to be regulated, circumscribed and reviewed by the latter. Offences that were known to 
customary law had equivalents under the Criminal Code and were tried and punished under the 
code.228 These provisions made customary criminal law superfluous. In the course of time, and 
after colonialism particularly, a succession of Constitutions forbade punishing under any 
unwritten law. Since customary criminal law and its sanctions were unwritten, it became 
unconstitutional to enforce them. 229 
 In Northern Nigeria, however, a version of native law would yet challenge the dominance 
of English criminal law. When the British arrived in the region, they found among its many 
nationalities a widespread ethno-linguistic group (the Hausa-Fulani) that had practiced Islamic 
law for not less than a century. Through the Native Courts Ordinance Act of 1934, colonial 
administrators classified the law as part of native law and custom.230 However, subjugating the 
law and authority of native courts to the supervisory control of colonial courts and officers made 
the Criminal Code of 1916 a touchy issue. Tensions bristled following the landmark case of 
Tsofo Gubba v. Gwandu Native Authority.231 In this case, a conviction for murder was reached 
by the court of the Emir of Gwandu, relying on the rules of criminal procedure and evidence 
under Islamic law. A sentence of death was accordingly imposed. On appeal to the West African 
Court of Appeal, however, it was held that though the accused was rightly convicted under 
Islamic law, the evidence ‒ when English rules of evidence were applied ‒ could only sustain a 
conviction for manslaughter under ss 317 and 318 of the Criminal Code.  Besides, the court held 
that the case should have been tried under statutory law, since there was a statutory equivalent to 
the customary law crime. Accordingly, the court quashed the murder conviction and returned a 
conviction for manslaughter.232  
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The decision, which was vehemently denounced as an unacceptable curtailment of the 
authority of native courts, prompted demands for another code that mirrored Islamic nuances of 
criminal justice. The aftermath of the decision was the most vivid instance – and perhaps the 
only example – in which popular support for the authority of a native institution welled up into 
popular resistance against colonial impositions.  A new Penal Code233 had to be adopted for 
Northern Nigeria to satisfy these demands.234 It was modelled after the Indian Penal Code, but it 
also retained influences of the English Common Law. The Indian code was itself a child of 
British colonization and had been successfully put into operation in multi-religious India.235 The 
Penal Code’s Islamic leanings were nevertheless evident: for example, adultery and drunkenness 
in public places, which are not criminalized under the 1916 Criminal Code, are criminalized in 
the Penal Code. The Penal Code also permits haddi lashing, an Islamic form of corporal 
punishment.  Thus, while it has been correctly argued that colonial influence abrogated 
customary criminal law, it is no less true that it did not completely obliterate the cultural 
dimensions to Nigeria’s pluralistic criminal law.  This was one example where colonial policy on 
criminal law gave way to penal populism, even if the outcome was limited to a handful of 
Islamic offences and punishment.  
 
3.4.3 Penal reforms in Nineteenth Century Britain and British Penal Policy in the Colony 
of Nigeria  
Of interest at this point is the degree to which penal developments in Britain impacted Nigeria. 
Arguably the most significant influence comes from the 1916 code, which was modelled after a 
code that had been substantially influenced by the 1879 English Draft Code of Indictable 
Offences.  This fact lends itself to the supposition that nineteenth century penal attitudes or 
developments in Britain may have been transposed to the British Colony of Nigeria, to some 
degree.  This thesis maintains that that was indeed the case, though the probable dimensions of 
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the influence seems not to have been exhaustively explored in existing literature on penality in 
Nigeria.  
The major influences can be narrowed down to the works of Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen, Lord Carnarvon, Chief Justice H.C. Gollan and the Gladstone Committee.236 Lord 
Carnarvon’s contribution to British penal policy in the nineteenth century was discussed in 
section 3.2.4 above. A contemporary of his was Sir Fitzjames Stephen, the nineteenth century 
English jurist who attempted to codify the English common law of crimes. Although his work 
met considerable resistance in Britain and had to be abandoned, it had significant influence on 
the development of the criminal law in some of Britain’s colonies. His utilitarian views about 
law and punishment regarded the law as a ‘practical system invented and maintained for the 
purposes of an actually existing state of society’.237 With regards to the criminal law, the 
statement suggests that penality responds to contemporary societal needs. Thus, Stephen’s work 
on the history of criminal law in England narrates how penal ideology shifted from extreme 
methods to an emphasis on ‘leniency’ in the nineteenth century.238  
Stephen’s239 utilitarianism was not exceptional; he identified a mutual (though not 
completely symmetrical) relationship of ‘extensive importance’ between the criminal law and 
morality, noting examples of crimes that emphasise the coincidences between both. He argued 
that these coincidences are not isolated notions of right and wrong, as they reflect a universal 
conscience. To deny the moral rejection of such crimes would equal denying something 
intrinsically human. For such offences therefore, punishment fulfils a denunciatory purpose, or it 
conveys public indignation. These are functions that are consistent with retributivist thinking, but 
they are implicitly utilitarian as well, as punishment is used here to assuage moral indignation.  
Thus, Stephen’s assertion of a connection between criminal law, punishment and the expression 
of moral indignation straddled the boundaries between utilitarianism and retributivism. He 
argued that law and morals reinforce one another and that legal punishment expresses, 
solemnizes, ratifies and justifies the hatred that crime excites. 
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In Stephen’s240  views also, hatred of the criminal is a natural, ingrained human sentiment 
that finds healthy gratification in the ‘public provisions of means for expressing it’. He was 
therefore dismissive of utilitarian arguments that denunciatory punishments express sheer 
vengefulness.241 He also did not completely consort with the methods that were promoted by the 
penal thinkers of his time, who emphasized less use for pain and greater maximization of 
treatment-focused punishment. Official penal policy in Britain was obviously less inclined to 
liberalizing punishment at the time and Stephen appeared to have had considerable influence in 
shaping the policy.  He was at odds with the popular thinking of his time and did not entertain 
doubts about recommending punishments that would give the offender as much pain and loss as 
he intended for his victim.242 
 When Britain annexed and made Lagos a colony in 1861,243 Stephen and Carnarvon 
echoed official penal policy in Britain. Stephen it was, who with three other British jurists 
(including Blackburn) attempted to codify English criminal law. The resultant English Draft 
Code of 1879 was essentially a statement of Stephen’s opinions regarding the position of the law. 
Given Stephen’s views, the code leaned heavily towards punitiveness, and though the code failed 
to pass in Britain, it became the model for Queensland’s Criminal Code, which in turn became 
the model for Nigeria’s first criminal code.244  However, and quite unlike South Africa, the 
rationality that underpinned the goal of adopting a criminal code for Nigeria was not tempered 
by any desire to export the relatively modest changes that were beginning to give punishment a 
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more humane face in Britain. Colonial officials felt they were too complex for Nigeria.245 The 
task of drafting a suitable code that was free of these complexities fell to Chief Justice HC 
Gollan, who set about preparing a code that would be easily utilized by colonial officers that 
were not legally trained.  The outcome was the 1904 Criminal Code. 
Given the origins of the Queensland code, it is appropriate to suggest that Nigeria’s first 
criminal code significantly reflected Stephen’s punitive ideas.  No subsequent attempts were 
made to bring the codes ‘in line with the changes in substantive law and in penal thought that 
have occurred in England …’,246 or to commit to the humanitarian ideals that were redefining 
punishment in Britain.247 This explains why Nigeria’s penal policy is devoid of influences that 
favoured humanitarian responses to crime at this time in British history.248 It left the 
development of sentencing jurisprudence in Nigeria mostly insipid: whatever may be said of the 
subsisting jurisprudence is reminiscent of dated penal traditions that are ill-suited to the needs of 
crime control in modern Nigeria. 
It could not have been otherwise. In Adeyemi’s249 views, Britain’s colonial policy in 
Nigeria was motivated by expediency. Consequently, it did not need to justify its criminalisation 
of any conduct or omission beyond whatever was necessary to advance the colonial interest. This 
was unfortunate, as it led to excessive criminalisation. According to Adeyemi250 also, 
criminalising conduct ordinarily ought to be founded on sound justification. This would avoid 
arbitrariness in how crimes were defined and ensure that acts or omissions that are criminalised 
stayed within limits of the society’s tolerance levels for laws that curtail individual freedoms. An 
attempt to find that basis must follow guiding principles that must be evaluated in the context of 
each society. These principles require that penal statutes only prohibit acts or omissions that are 
clearly ethically reprehensible. Also, the sanction must be effective. It must be capable of 
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deterring those who are likely to commit the offence. Lastly, the offender must profit from the 
prescribed punishment.251 By putting forward these principles, Adeyemi offered a synopsis of the 
utilitarian and retributive considerations that should shape policies on crime and punishment. He 
argued that the failure of colonial penal policies to comply with the principles left Nigeria’s 
criminal justice system overburdened and irrational:  
[O]ur criminal law encompasses a baffling range of offences which cannot possibly be coordinated 
on the basis of the above-stated combined guidelines. Thus, the criminal law will be seen to cover 
broadly offences against the interest of the rules of the country. … If one subjects [the] array of 
offences to the guiding principles enumerated above, one will discover that our criminal law 
contains many offences that should not be offences, whilst it omits some which should.252  
 
In sum, and as Adeyemi rightly observed, colonial penal policy excessively resorted to 
criminalisation as a measure of social control: 
[There are] fundamental defects in our criminal law. The ‘a posteori’ (sic) approach, besides its 
lack of rationalisation in criminalisation policy, has always relied upon and employed the criminal 
law as the omnibus and omnipotent machinery for rectifying all sorts of ills befalling the society or 
its members, with a near frightening reckless dedication and frightening faith. … The dedication 
has led to an over-heating of the criminal process because of its resultant over-criminalisation.253 
 
 
3.4.4 Criminalisation and the Nigerian Prison System 
Central to the policy of criminalisation was the prison system. The first English-style prison was 
introduced to the Lagos Colony in 1862.254 It was administered on much the same practices that 
obtained in British prisons at the time and on the same philosophy of severity conceived by 
nineteenth century British jurists and penal administrators. In a well-researched history of the 
Nigerian prison system, Ogunleye255 wrote about striking parallels in British and colonial 
prisons; the bruising severity of English prisons which eventually came under severe public 
censure in 1895 were the same practices that were recommended for adoption in the Colony of 
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Lagos in 1865. The Colonial Secretary, Lord Glanville believed the colonies needed to share in 
the benefits of the ‘experiment’ that British prisons represented.256  
However, Lord Glanville’s eagerness was tempered to some degree by colonial 
administrators who were reluctant to import the cruel methods of the English penal system, lock, 
stock and barrel. They preferred to utilize penal labour in a less punitive and remunerative 
manner, and for public projects.  Thus, the insistence of the Colonial Office in Britain on the 
implementation of a relentlessly punitive regime petered in time, in deference to how colonial 
administrators in the colony interpreted prevailing local attitudes and conditions of punishment. 
Even then, the Colonial Office did not yield in its insistence on hard fare, hard labour and 
solitary confinement. It ensured that the Prisons Ordinance257 adopted for the Colony of Lagos in 
1876 carefully followed the English Prison Act of 1865.258 
What may have been a turning point for the Colony’s penal policy came with the report 
of the Gladstone Committee, which examined the need for reforms in the English penal system. 
In 1895, the Committee issued a report that endorsed deterrence and reformation as goals to be 
sought in punishment, in place of unproductive penal labour. According to Ogunleye,259 the 
Committee’s report had direct influence on Nigeria’s system of punishment. It moved the system 
away from its focus on ‘harsh punishments’ to ‘rewards’.  Under the rewards system, marks were 
awarded for industry and good behaviour, and sentence remission of up to a quarter of the 
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sentence could be earned.260 One feature that stood out is the system’s inclusion of the 
progressive stages of punishment principle, which Lord Carnarvon adumbrated.261 As Britain 
consolidated rule over more territories in Nigeria, more western-style prisons were 
established.262 However, over-criminalisation and the frequent use of prison sentences ensured 
that over time, the prisons came under severe pressure.  
 
3.4.5 Punishment,  the Nigerian Constitution and Penal Statutes 
Since Nigeria became a constitutional democracy in 1960, it has had four Constitutions: the 
Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria 1960, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1963, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 and lastly, the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.263 The 1999 Constitution is currently in 
force.  
It is useful to see how these Constitutions entrench standards that impose constraints on 
the power to punish in order to understand changes that have occurred. The first standard setting 
provision enshrines the principle of legality by prohibiting prosecutions or convictions for crimes 
that are not defined and penalties therefor not provided in written law.264 It is this prohibition that 
makes customary criminal law unconstitutional.265 More about the principle will be discussed in 
chapter four.266 The Constitutions also prohibit retroactive criminal statutes and the award of a 
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penalty that is heavier than the penalty that was in force when the alleged crime was 
perpetrated.267  Penal laws and sentencing decisions must conform to these standards. Further, no 
person may be deprived of his or her liberty except in furtherance of a judicial order.268 The 
intentional deprivation of the right to life is constitutional when it is done in execution of a 
sentence of death pronounced by a competent court against an offender who has been found 
guilty of a criminal offence.269 
Presumably, punishments ought not to infringe constitutional guarantees for human 
dignity. However, a literal and purposeful interpretation of the human dignity clauses in the 1960 
and 1963 Constitutions suggests that stronger protections for human dignity were inserted in 
those Constitutions than can be found in the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions. Section 18(1) of the 
1960 Constitution and s 19(1) of the 1963 Constitution are in pari materia and provide that ‘no 
person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment’. 
The sections provide for ‘treatment’ and for ‘punishment’. On the other hand, s 34(1)(a) of the 
1999 Constitution (which is also in pari materia with s 31(1)(a) of the 1979 Constitution) 
provides that ‘every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, and accordingly 
no person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman and degrading treatment’. The latter 
Constitutions omit ‘punishment’ from the phraseology of their human dignity provision. There 
does not seem to be a plausible explanation for this omission. What may be apparent, however, is 
that the latter Constitutions vaporise an essential component of the constitutional guarantee for 
human dignity, by failing to expressly prohibit punishments that offend human dignity and 
violate rights. How this is so, and its probable consequences will be discussed in chapter four.270   
To some degree, however, what is lacking in the 1999 Constitution may have been 
supplied by international or regional human rights instruments that bind Nigeria. A pertinent 
example is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, which Nigeria 
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domesticated by means of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and 
Enforcement) Act.271 The Act incorporates the Charter as a whole. Article 5 of the incorporated 
Charter states:  
Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to 
the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly 
slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be 
prohibited. 
However, the manner in which this provision will regulate punishment in Nigeria has yet 
to be judicially tested. Nevertheless, its domestication supplies an important human rights 
principle that could moderate penal severity in Nigeria.272  
The legality principles enshrined in the 1999 Constitution is the closest that the 
Constitution came to regulating penal legislation.  However, as long as a piece of legislation is 
not caught by this non-retroactive principle, Nigerian courts have assumed the appropriateness 
thereof. Thus, the penalties prescribed by colonial era criminal codes,273 the main penal 
legislation in Nigeria have been consistently enforced. Likewise, other criminal statutes that 
create and prescribe penalties for offences, including those created under military 
administrations, such as the Robbery and Firearms Act.  Two predicaments emerge from this 
framework. First, there is a focus on severity and excessive criminalisation of conduct in these 
penal statutes, which could easily predispose judicial sentences to being excessive.  Secondly, 
and as will be further discussed in chapter 4, the statutes allow judges to exercise extensive 
sentencing discretion in most cases, or no discretion at all.274  
No account of penal developments in post-independence Nigeria will be complete without 
considering how military rule impacted crime and punishment. It is trite that military incursions 
in governance stultify development. The repercussion extends to penal policy. To start with, 
military administrations repeatedly suspended the Constitution in order to assume legislative 
                                                          
271 No 2 of 1983, Chapter A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. Another example is the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Nigeria became bound by the Convention when it acceded to it on 29 
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powers, and proceeded to issue repressive decrees that infringed rights, prescribed stiff penalties 
and ousted the jurisdiction of courts to adjudicate the constitutionality of military decrees or 
redress the violation of rights.  Conceivably, it may be that these exclusionary measures provide 
the context for evaluating the omission of ‘inhuman and degrading punishment’ from the human 
dignity clause in the 1979 and 1999 Constitution, since both Constitutions were adopted by 
military administrations.  Secondly, successive military regimes took little interest in penal 
reforms,275 and such policy interventions that occurred tended to be ad hoc and political (directed 
against challenges to the legitimacy of military administrations), or to target crimes that 
threatened serious public interests.  Three such interventions aimed to regulate judicial 
discretion, but not in a constructive way. First, mandatory sentences were adopted which 
withheld discretion over the type and severity of punishments that could be imposed for specific 
offences. The second intervention allowed discretion within a range of minimum to maximum 
sentences. The third intervention is called judicial direction; it provided policy guidelines for 
specific cases and allowed sentencers to digress whenever justice demanded.276 However, these 
measures did not enhance consistency in penal policy. In fact, they complicated sentencing 
inconsistencies.277 Since Nigeria’s transition to civil rule in 1999, little has been done to change 
this paradigm.   
On the whole, various criminal statutes in Nigeria give courts significant discretion. The 
exception to this pertains to mandatory penalties.  Beyond mandatory penalties however, courts 
have a range of criminal sanctions to choose from.  In practice though, they have preferred prison 
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is found in the Indian Hemp Decree 1966. S.10 prescribes the caning of male offenders who are under nineteen 
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committal to an approved school, or by taking a security for good behavior, unless there are strong reasons why the 
court should not do so in a particular case.  See Milner (1972) op cit note 218. 
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sentences.278 Different reasons have been offered for this. For instance, it has been argued that 
Nigerian judges were trained in the conservative traditions of English penal jurisprudence.  Thus, 
their sentencing decisions, especially in early post-independence years, were practically similar 
to those passed in England. 279  This was to be expected because Nigerian courts relied on 
English decisions for guidance.280 The second reason is that there is no supporting infrastructure 
to implement non-custodial punishment.281 Yet another factor that could have goaded the courts 
to impose prison sentences is the fact that imprisonment is the most prescribed punishment in the 
statute books.  For these reasons, imprisonment became the first line measure of social control, 
rather than a last resort reserved for very serious cases.  
 
 
3.4.6 Social Trends and Sentencing Policy and Legislation in Nigeria.  
When one pages through the history of modern criminal law in Nigeria, what becomes salient is 
the significant impact that English criminal law continues to have over the country. In pre-
independent Nigeria, English criminal law framed crime and sentencing law and practice. 
Colonial policy at the time did not encourage indigenous involvement in legislating criminal law. 
Probably the closest that crime making policy came to being influenced by popular opinion was 
when Muslims in Northern Nigeria demanded a separate penal code that contained aspects of 
Islamic law in the wake of the Tsofo Gubba case. That demand ignited a campaign that 
culminated in the adoption of the Penal Code of Northern Nigeria 1960, on the eve of 
independence that same year.282  Since independence, however, colonial era penal codes have 
applied in most cases, supplemented by a number of offence specific statutory legislation. 
Overall, no significant changes to the colonial era criminal codes occurred, for the large part 
because there has not been sustained engagement with penal reforms as pointed out in chapter 
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one of the thesis.  Twenty-nine years of military dictatorship also stalled reforms in the criminal 
justice sector.283   
  It is important to point out that the lack of attention to penal reforms in Nigeria stymied 
discourse on crime and punishment, depriving the country of the kind of ideological or political 
contestations that have shaped penal policy in places like Britain and South Africa. One finds 
that in these two countries, discourses about crime and punishment were informed by dominant 
social or political cultures, resulting in responses that sometimes wove the crime question into 
welfare programmes designed to redress the root causes of crime or strengthen social control. 
Unfortunately, no corresponding levels of contestations or crime policy responses can be found 
in Nigeria.  Courts also ruled themselves out of jurisdiction to impeach statutory penalties that 
prescribed excessive penalties, which suggests that the judicial policy on the subject is beholden 
to whatever the legislature determines to be the punishment for a crime.284  
  In what could have changed the paradigm, in the early 2000s, 12 states in northern 
Nigeria adopted sharia criminal codes.285  It has been asserted that the aims of adopting the codes 
were political, to fulfil campaign promises or score political points. 286 The preparation of the 
codes was hasty and the final outcome was flawed. There were no consultations in their 
preparation, meaning the public voice was shut out of the process of their enactment. 
Nevertheless, the codes were widely applauded by Muslim adherents in the states that adopted 
them, but no sooner had the euphoria settled than the implementation of the codes sprang 
dilemmas. Among the first recipients of sharia criminal justice was Buba Kare Garki, whose 
hand was amputated following conviction by a sharia court for the theft of a cow.287 There were 
other convictions and sentence executions, but a particularly notorious one involved Safiya 
Hussaini,288 who, in 2002, was sentenced to death by stoning for committing adultery. Her fellow 
adulterer was never subjected to prosecution, which turned the spotlight on the discriminatory 
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dimensions of sharia justice. Following strident criticisms from national and international human 
rights groups and media, the federal government stepped in to allay fears that the execution 
would be carried out.  The verdict was eventually reversed on appeal289 but a second woman, 
Amina Lawal, soon got convicted of adultery. Amina Lawal also received considerable 
international support, and her conviction was eventually overruled on appeal.290 
 Although the convictions were repealed on technical grounds, different social forces, 
ranging from religious to feminist voices,291 the federal government, human rights groups and 
the media that converged to contest the appropriateness of punishment under the sharia code 
apparently informed eventual outcomes. However, the contestations were inevitably limited, as 
the terms of the debate that raged over the appropriateness of the trials and convictions skirted 
the constitutionality of the sharia criminal law system in Nigeria, a question that remains 
unresolved today. Thus, the issues that revolved around Safiya and Amina’s sentences – even in 
the appeals that emerged - were contested outside questions about the constitutionality of the 
sharia criminal code, and by necessary extension, outside conventional crime policy making in 
Nigeria. There remains a sensitivity around questions of religion in Nigeria that restrains critical 
conversations around sharia criminal law. It is a religious code as it were, applicable to Moslem 
adherents who subscribed to it in a section of the country. Unfortunately, the passion that Safiya 
and Amina’s cases ignited over the sentences imposed has not been witnessed in the larger 
sphere of sentencing under conventional criminal law in Nigeria, which evolved under common 
law and statutory law.  While one or two states have embarked on reforms, Coldham’s 
observation that a vacuum exists in studies about sentencing under Nigerian criminal law 
continues to hold true.  Sentencing as an area of criminal justice administration has yet to witness 
a convergence of interests significant enough to mobilise robust support for research.   
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There have been other opportunities for reform in the last decade or two, but these have 
focused on specific crimes, such as kidnapping, corrupt practices, and economic and financial 
crimes, as well as criminal procedure.  Although the focus was not on sentencing per se, it 
nevertheless brought about a convergence of social and political forces that could have been 
harnessed to achieve sentencing reforms. Kidnappings started off in Nigeria as part of a struggle 
against economic and political repression in the oil rich Niger-Delta region. Most of its victims 
were expatriates, but the perpetrators soon found new targets in high net worth individuals, 
politicians and even religious figures, for whom they demanded millions in ransom. By the time 
a few federating states in Nigeria decided to intervene by enacting anti-kidnapping laws that 
prescribed the death penalty, kidnappings had mutated into a multi-billion naira criminal 
industry, fuelled in large part by poverty and unemployment.292 The federal government (the 
legislature to be precise) also debated a bill that would prescribe life imprisonment for kidnap 
and hostage taking, but the bill never saw the light of day.293  
Corruption and economic and financial crimes also became national priority crimes 
because they had become endemic threats to Nigeria’s social, economic and political fabric. 
Therefore, soon after the transition to civil rule in 1999, the new administration gave attention to 
passing anti-corruption and anti-economic and financial crimes laws. The first legislation, the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000, was signed into law about a 
year after the administration’s inauguration. It prescribed sentences of two to seven years’ 
imprisonment for corrupt practices. The second legislation is the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (Establishment) Act, signed into law in 2002 but subsequently amended in 2004.  It 
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punishes economic and financial crimes by two to five years imprisonment, with option of 
fine.294   
By adopting laws on kidnapping, corruption and economic and financial crimes, federal 
and state governments in Nigeria signalled they would go tough on the crimes. Or so it seemed. 
Salient features of crimes include the fact that the victims or perpetrators were the wealthy, who 
are often perceived to have enriched themselves from the public purse. However, the notion that 
the laws were enacted in the public interest has been challenged.295 The social dimensions of the 
crimes, straddling as it were the class divide and wealth ownership in Nigeria, can be said to 
have prompted a bifurcated governmental response that probably reinforced power imbalances in 
the country. On one hand, it resulted in kidnapping laws that prescribed the death penalty. The 
real beneficiaries were the wealthy victims of kidnappers. Thus, one could construe the laws as 
designed to preserve Nigeria ‘s propertied class.296  
On the other hand, the abovementioned laws targeted offences that were typically 
committed by the wealthy or politically connected. However, though the laws were widely 
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applauded, the process of formulating and enacting them did not include public consultations. 
According to Igbinovia and Edobor-Igbinovia297 ‘government’s desire to establish [the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPD) and the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC)] was not fully and altogether informed or impelled by nationalistic or 
patriotic or altruistic flavour. In part, these agencies were created to meet the demands of the 
government to keep its house in order if it was to benefit from the international community.’ 
Writing with particular reference to the EFCC, the authors observed that its ‘establishment … 
was impelled by social, political and economic expediency and imperatives. Indeed, the coming 
into being of the EFCC was due mainly to the pressure from the international community on 
Nigeria to do something … [to avoid] losing foreign investments and financial support’.298   
Thus, when the ICPC’s activities threatened vested political interests, Nigeria’s Senate passed 
bogus amendments to the Act that essentially whittled down the ICPC. Fortunately, the effort 
failed.  The Nigerian Bar Association, the Nigerian Labour Congress, and the National 
Association of Nigerian Students amongst several eminent others rose up to resist the 
amendment. Some members of Nigeria’s House of Representatives (the lower house of the 
federal parliament) filed a lawsuit that challenged the amendment, and succeeded in getting it 
annulled.299    
The above examples are illustrations of the extent to which the Nigerian government took 
the public voice into consideration on very important issues requiring penal reforms. The laws 
were negotiated away from public spaces that could have engendered the widest possible input 
and the most comprehensive penal solutions. In a rather insightful comment made in the context 
of Nigeria’s campaign against corruption and economic and financial crimes, Kola-Balogun300 
wrote in 2003 that [t]here is a growing perception now in Nigeria that our laws are becoming 
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narrower, partisan and self-serving, aimed primarily at the relatively less well-off citizens while 
those who have influence, power and authority are treated like sacred cows.’ In other words, 
official responses to questions about crime and punishment have reinforced wealth ownership 
structures, giving little or no say to the generality of the public who, lacking the leverages that 
the ownership of wealth would have afforded, are unable to influence penal policy to their own 
advantage.  
Although Kola-Balogun’s prognosis may still hold true, it is not necessarily always the 
case. A few notable reforms to criminal procedure have occurred or are taking place with 
meaningful public participation. Examples include the Administration of Criminal Justice Law 
2011 adopted by Lagos State in southwest Nigeria, and the federal Administration of Criminal 
Justice Bill. The law and federal bill will be discussed in the next chapter.  However, it is 
difficult to suggest that these examples represent a trend that impacts sentencing policy. Public 
inputs in criminal procedure reforms have met with limited success so far.  For example, despite 
several years of civil society lobbying, the federal legislature has not yet passed the 
abovementioned bill.  At any rate, it ought to be re-emphasised that penal laws that have been 
enacted in post-independent Nigeria deal mostly with defining and punishing specific crimes, 
such as the ones described above.  In the area of sentencing, there has been no sustained efforts 
to address overly harsh punishments, the excessive criminalisation of behaviour, or to implement 
alternatives to imprisonment.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The experiences reviewed in this chapter suggest that penal policy, legislation and sentencing are 
influenced by culture, political ideology, history and socio-economic factors. This is particularly 
true of Britain and South Africa. Through the centuries, Britain’s approach to punishment 
shifted, first in response to new paradigms of property relations that instigated a brutal regime of 
punishments, and subsequently in response to the civilising effect of the Enlightenment, which 
instilled greater sensitivity about penal suffering in British society. In the late twentieth century, 





policy. Comparable changes can be traced through South Africa’s penal history, starting with 
seventeenth century colonial settlements, through post-independence years to the emergence of 
the apartheid state.  With the termination of apartheid came an ambitiously humanitarian 
approach to punishment that corresponds with the political rationality of the post-apartheid state.  
Nigeria presents a different spectre of engagement with penal policy. Its continued 
reliance – for the most part ‒ on colonial era criminal law has stultified its penal system. The 
missing elements become particularly glaring when the country’s sentencing law and 
jurisprudence are juxtaposed with penal jurisprudence in South Africa.  First, there is no 
constitutional jurisprudence in Nigeria that offers a lucid exegesis of the ideological foundations 
of punishment as South African courts have done.  This suggests that Nigerian courts have not 
idealized a constitutional principle that would provide a principled and rational basis for 
structuring discretion and allocating punishment. That is not to say that South Africa has 
achieved an effective system for structuring discretion. Her failures in this regard are discussed 
in the next two chapters. However, South Africa has developed a firm constitutional basis for 
punishment that Nigeria lacks, and which the latter can learn from. Nigeria’s failure in this 
regard – and the omission alluded to in her Constitution’s human dignity clause ‒ deprives the 
penal system of a principle for moderating penal severity, resulting frequently in laws and 
sentencing decisions that exact extreme punishments. Just how valuable such a principle is to 





Chapter 4 A Normative Framework for Sentencing 
 
4.1 Introduction 
At the heart of this research is an effort to illustrate the importance of moderating punishments 
through principles that ensure relative proportionality between crime and punishment. Chapter 
three took a step towards this goal by examining penal developments in a socio-historical and 
political context, tracing changes in penal attitudes and policy up to the point where England, 
South Africa and Nigeria undertook different levels of human rights commitment in their 
approaches to crime and punishment. This chapter takes the discussion further by exploring the 
normative sentencing framework in South Africa and Nigeria in order to understand whether and 
how they guarantee proportionality and some degree of protection against inhuman and 
degrading punishments.  
In particular, this chapter examines judicial principles that have been developed or 
accepted as standards that regulate the choice and measure of punishment.1 It begins a process 
that concludes with the next chapter, of examining how sentencers interact with the theories or 
purposes of punishment and illustrating key developments in South Africa’s sentencing 
legislation and jurisprudence that Nigeria can learn from. An exchange of knowledge and 
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experience between Nigeria and South Africa is indeed possible, because sentencing in South 
Africa has evolved in a context of developmental challenges that are comparable to those in 
Nigeria. How South Africa has responded to these challenges is therefore of interest.  
Accordingly, this chapter and the next will endeavour to show what Nigeria can learn from South 
Africa by examining the normative sentencing frameworks of both countries. The object is to 
illustrate some of the positive legislative and jurisprudential developments that underpin the 
South African framework in particular and to offer them as a model for emulation by developing 
countries like Nigeria, while also portraying areas that require further development.  
 
4.2 Clarifying Terminologies 
Some clarification of terminologies is useful at this juncture, in order to shed light on the sense in 
which they are used hereafter in this thesis. Three terminologies are relevant to this study, 
namely the criminal sentence, sentencing and sentencing discretion. Succinctly, a criminal 
sentence is a judicial order that finally resolves the criminal complaint against a convicted 
defendant or accused person.2 It is ‘the formal legal [consequence] associated with a 
conviction’.3 Sentencing, on the other hand, describes the process by which courts arrive at an 
appropriate punishment,4 or the manner in which the principles of sentencing are applied to 
individual cases.5 The process can be quite complex,6 as it involves balancing and converting 
factors and disparate interests that are capable of infinite adaptations into measurable quotients. 
It has been described as a science, art, or intuitive process.7  
                                                          
2 SS Terblanche The Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 2nd ed (2007) 3-5. 
3 Legal Information Institute ‘Sentencing’ available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sentencing, accessed on 01 
December 2014. There are different sentence types, such as incarceration, probation, community service, suspended 
sentence, fine.  
4 Ibid at 114.  
5 Cyprian O. Okonkwo  & Michael E Naish Criminal Law in Nigeria (Excluding the North) (1964) 41. 
6 S v Ntsheno 2010 (1) SACR 295 (GSJ). 
7 According to a research by Mackenzie, ‘balancing’, ‘science, art, or intuition’ are words that judges use to describe 
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The third terminology deserves a little more elucidation. Sentencing discretion is judicial 
discretion at work during sentencing.  Discretion is an important element in legal decision 
making. It is crucial to sentencing. Indeed, it is apposite to say that sentencing is about the 
exercise of judicial discretion, and descriptions that suggest that the process is an art or that it is 
intuitive characterise sentencing as a function in which ‘judicial discretion is both paramount and 
maximised’.8 In sentencing, the judge brings her ‘experience and intuition’9 to bear on the 
principles she applies when selecting an appropriate sentence, with an eye to balancing 
conflicting interests in punishment.10 Without discretion, it becomes ‘almost impossible for 
judges to impose a sentence that adequately reflects the myriad sentencing factors’.11 This 
statement highlights the importance of discretion, as well as the strategic position that the 
sentencing judge occupies in the criminal trial process, which further reinforces the need for 
discretion. In her role as a trial judge, the sentencer obtains a vantage view of the conduct of the 
trials, the demeanour of the offender and all other information that is relevant to sentencing, all 
of which uniquely position her to impose the sentence. In acknowledgement of the uniqueness of 
this position, therefore, appellate courts generally embrace the principle that punishment is ‘pre-
eminently a matter for the discretion of the trial court’.12  
 
4.3  Sources of Normativity in South Africa’s Sentencing System 
Sources of normativity suggest the legal basis of the standards that judges employ in sentencing.  
This chapter identifies two sources. The first source comprises the legislative framework, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that involves intuition and judgment’. Describing sentencing as an art or intuitive process has its challenges, because 
of the inherent subjectivity of the decision making process involved, which constrains objective standards that 
enhance fairness and consistency. However, sentencing as a science suggests an objective process, a ‘reasoned and 
careful methodology’ or ‘a more systematic approach’ that potentially secures a better outcome. The research 
suggests that the third description seems to be less popular among Australian judges. See Geraldine Mackenzie How 
Judges Sentence (2005) 13-20. 
8 Ibid at 41.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid at 41-42. The interests include the facts of the case, the victim and the offender. 
11 SS Terblanche, ‘Sentencing in South Africa: Lacking in principle but delivering on justice?’ (2005) Vol. 18 S. Afr. 
J. Crim. Just. 187-202 at 193. 
12 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 857 para D; accordingly, the court urged caution about eroding the sentencing 





consists of constitutional and statutory provisions that set standards and prescribe penalties that 
courts must adhere to.  The second source refers to judicial precedent.  This source comprises the 
body of binding principles that courts have developed to aid their interpretation and application 
of penal provisions.  
 
4.3.1 The Constitutional Framework: The Principle of Legality as a Normative Standard 
in the South African Constitution  
The primary source of normativity in South Africa’s constitutional period is the 1996 
Constitution.13 The Constitution establishes important constitutional norms or standards, such as 
the principles of equality, legality, proportionality and protections for human dignity, which all 
sentencing procedure and substantive sentencing legislation must comply with.14 These norms 
are expressed in specific rights in the Bill of Rights. For example, s 35(3) in the Bill of Rights 
guarantees the right to a fair trial. Sub-paragraph (l) thereof provides that the right to a fair trial 
includes the right ‘not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under either 
national or international law at the time it was committed or omitted’. This constitutional 
provision enshrines the principle of legality ‒ a rule of law requirement that is so fundamental to 
criminal law ‒ as a component of the right to fair trial. 15  
As a constitutional norm, the principle of legality is predicated on the need to protect 
individual freedoms from the abuse of state power. Thus, it obligates the State to act within the 
limits of law. In criminal law, and with specific reference to punishment, the principle 
establishes two requirements. First, rules or statutes that create crimes and stipulate penalties 
must be accurately and clearly16 defined by statute, so that people can be forewarned and can 
                                                          
13 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The 1996 Constitution was preceded by the 1993 Interim 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, under which two important cases, namely S v Williams and Another 
and S v Makwanyane were decided. 
14 Dirk van Zyl Smit ‘Sentencing and Punishment’ in Stuart Michael Bishop & Jason Brickhill (eds) Constitutional 
law of South Africa 2 ed Revision Service 4 (2012) 49-3.  
15 Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape v Prins [2012] 2 All SA 245 (SCA) at 250; see also EM Burchell 
& PMA Hunt, ‘South African Criminal Law and Procedure: Vol. 1, General Principles of Criminal Law 2 ed (1983) 
59; see also, Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009) 977; see further Lawyers Committee for Human Rights ‘What is 
a fair trial? A basic guide to legal standards and practice’ (March 2000) available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/fair_trial.pdf, accessed on August 12 2013. 
16 Paulius Versekys ‘Liberal construction of the composition of the Criminal Act and the maxim nullum crimen sine 





adjust their conduct accordingly. The second requirement is that the process of imposing 
punishment must also be regulated by clearly defined legal rules.17 Punishment cannot be 
justified when it does not comply with these requirements.18 
How the principle affects criminal law was deliberated by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA) in Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape v. Prins and Others19 (the Prins case). 
The pertinent questions of law in the case revolved around s 5(1) of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 2007 Act 32 of 2007, which created the statutory 
crime of sexual assault without prescribing a penalty therefor. Neither did any other provisions 
of the Act provide penalties for offences created by the Act. The respondent seized upon this 
omission to oppose the charge, arguing that the Act’s failure to prescribe penalties rendered it 
defective.  In effect, the Act created no offences. The court of first instance agreed and, relying 
on the principle of legality, held that the Act’s failure to prescribe penalties violated the accused 
person’s fair trial rights. The ruling was upheld by the high court, which held, apparently also 
relying on the principle, that the charge disclosed no offence because the Act did not provide 
penalties for sexual assault.    
On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal the issue for determination was whether 
the Act was incurably defective because the legislature did not expressly specify penalties for 
offences set out therein.20 The court interpreted the issue as revolving on whether the court had 
power to sentence under the Act, as is. Its response to this was straightforward. It relied on 
                                                          
17 Van Zyl Smit op cit note 14 at 49-4. 
18CR Snyman Criminal Law 4 ed (2002) 39 – 41. For an account of the development, justification and application of 
the principle in criminal law, see Gabriel Hallevy A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law 
(2010) 8-14; Versekys op cit note 16. There are maxims that attach to the principle.  First, no court may punish a 
person for conduct that is not criminalized in common law or by statute, i.e, nulla peona sine lege (‘no punishment 
without a law authorizing it’). Common law is judge-made, but the ius acceptum principle ensures that courts may 
only apply the law ‘as received to date’, meaning they cannot create new common law crimes. Second, the definition 
of the crime must be reasonably precise and settled (i.e., nullum crimen sine poena which means no crime without 
punishment) and the punishment therefor prescribed. A statute must unambiguously and expressly communicate 
intention to create an offence.  Thirdly, statutory crimes must be strictly construed and may not operate 
retrospectively. Neither can the punishment operate retrospectively. Where the intention is to create an offence but 
no punishment is prescribed, the court may use its discretion. Burchell & Hunt op cit note 15 at 59-63; Jonathan 
Burchell, South African Criminal Law and Procedure. Volume I, General Principles of Criminal Law 4th ed. (2011) 
p. 34-5; Black’s Law Dictionary op cit note 15 at 977 & 1173; Elizabeth A. Martin (ed.) A Concise Dictionary of 
Law 2 ed (1990) 277. 
19 Supra note 15. 





judicial precedent that established – in line with the principle of legality ‒ that ‘the nature and 
range of any punishment … has to be founded in the common law or statute…’.21 Accordingly, a 
court may only refrain from punishing a particular crime, when the penalty therefor cannot be 
founded in common law or statute.22  Thus, the relevant question for consideration in Prins 
turned on whether the Act unequivocally conveyed a legislative intention to criminalize the 
prohibited acts. Where that intention can be read into the Act, the offences created thereby are 
consistent with the principle of legality. This is so even where no penalties are provided by the 
Act.23 In such cases, the court may resort to its sentencing discretion under s 276(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, without violating the defendant’s constitutional rights to a 
fair trial.24  
Proceeding from the above reasoning, the court found that ss 2 and 5(1) of the Act 
expressly conveyed the legislature’s intention to create the statutory offence of sexual assault.25 
Accordingly, in the light of the 2007 Act’s omission to prescribe penalties, the court’s power to 
punish offenders reverts to and is limited to the types of punishments provided in s 276(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. This is the case for statutory and common law offences. Without s 
276(1), however, courts are divested of power to punish common law crimes, or punish statutory 
crimes for which there are no specific penalty provisions.26 A corollary of this finding is that the 
principle of legality underlies 276(1),27 and prevents courts from inventing new punishments or 
crimes. 28 
 
                                                          
21 Ibid at 251. 
22 Ibid; an additional ground on which a court may refrain from punishing, as the court held, is where the penalty is 
beyond the jurisdiction of the court.  
23 Ibid at 251-253. 
24 Ibid at 263. 
25 Ibid at 255-257. 
26 Ibid at 264. 
27 Ibid at 260-262. 
28S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) at 472 paras E-G; see s 276(2)(a) of the 1997 Act. In State v Franco 
Johannes Nel unreported case no D 418/10 (16 September 2011) at paras 8 & 9, the high court held the proviso to s 
276(3)(b) ensures that penalties that are prescribed under s 276(1)(h) & (i) are not imposed where (mandatory) 





4.3.2 The Bill of Rights and Punishment  
The Bill of Rights has other far reaching consequences for sentencing law.29 To borrow from 
McIntosh’s analysis on the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments in West 
Indian Constitutions, the Bill of rights is 
a document of principle that lays down general, comprehensive moral standards of justice, 
liberty and political decency regarding ways in which the government may, or may not, 
treat its citizens.  These fundamental rights give expression to our best conception of the 
human person. Taken together, they define a political ideal: they give expression to a 
constitutional vision of a just society; a vision that locates the individual person as the 
moral centre of that society; and one that enjoins the government to treat all citizens with 
dignity, respect and concern.30  
Based on the foregoing, it may be said that questions about whether punishment is just are 
questions about whether punishment ‘respects the value of human dignity, is appropriate to the 
nature of the crime, and is not imposed principally for the purpose of achieving some social goal 
or policy’.31 These questions suggest something rather trite; in penology, issues about an 
offender’s dignity and proportionate punishments are intertwined. If punishments are to be just 
within a Bill of Rights scheme, lawmakers must pass criminal statutes that comply with 
guaranteed constitutional rights, and courts must interpret the statutes in a manner that ensures 
that punishments do not limit rights any more than is necessary. Essentially then, the Bill of 
Rights legitimises the normative framework for regulating punishment. How South African 
courts ought to regard the Bill of Rights was described in the following remarks by Langa J in S 
v Makwanyane:32  
A framework has been created in which a new culture must take root and develop … Implicit 
in the provisions and tone of the Constitution are values of a more mature society, which 
relies on moral persuasion rather than force; on example rather than coercion. …   A culture 
of respect for human life and dignity, based on the values reflected in the Constitution, has to 
be engendered … The ethos of the new culture … describes the Constitution as a 'bridge' 
between the past and the future; … a future founded on the recognition of human rights … 
for all South Africans …' … it suggests a change in mental attitude.  
The abolition of corporal punishment and the death penalty in South Africa are examples 
of instances where the country’s parliament and judiciary worked within the context of South 
                                                          
29Burchell (2011) op cit note 18 at 9-10. 
30 Simeon CR McIntosh Fundamental Rights and Democratic Governance: Essays in Caribbean Jurisprudence  
(2005) 230. 
31 Ibid at 235. 





Africa’s Constitution to uphold a Bill of Rights standard for punishment. Soon after the 
Constitutional Court declared the punishments unconstitutional in S v Williams and Another,33 
and S v Makwanyane,34 Parliament passed three pieces of legislation: the South African Schools 
Act 1996,35 which repealed corporal punishment in schools; the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
1997,36 which repealed the death penalty; and the Abolition of Corporal Punishments Act 1997,37 
which abolished judicial corporal punishment. These outcomes were hinged on s 12(1)(e) of the 
Constitution, which guarantees to ‘[e]veryone … the right to freedom and security of the person, 
[including] the right … not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way’, as 
well as the guarantee for human dignity protected by s 9 of the Constitution.  The setting aside of 
the death penalty was also because it violated the guarantee provided by s 11 of the Constitution 
with regards to the right to life.38 In the Interim Constitution under which Williams and 
Makwanyane were decided, these rights were protected under ss 9, 10 and 11(2). 
The right to a fair trial requires further elucidation. As noted earlier, subsumed under the 
right are guarantees that a trial will comply with due process and the rule of law. The nature of 
the guarantees has been the subject of judicial interpretation. In the pre-constitution era, courts 
interpreted the guarantees as requiring compliance with the rules and procedures laid down by 
law, rather than with ‘notions of basic fairness and justice’.39 Where rules of procedure have 
been complied with, the requirements of fair trial would have been satisfied. However, this rather 
restrictive construct was abandoned in the post-apartheid era, starting with S v Zuma,40 where the 
Constitutional Court held that the right ought to be interpreted in a manner that gave content to 
                                                          
33 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC).  
34 Supra note 32; the Constitutional court held (at 54 para H-55 para A and 56 paras F-I) that offenders are entitled 
to assert the rights to life, dignity and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. The 
rights are absolute and cannot be taken away. 
35 Act 84 of 1996. 
36 Act 105 of 1997. It made provision for the setting aside of all death sentences and the repeal of all provisions 
relating to the death penalty.   
37Act 33 of 1997. 
38Other amendments have introduced sentencing options to the range of punishments. Section 41(a) of the 
Correctional Services and Supervision Matters Amendment Act 122 of 1991 added correctional supervision and a 
sentence of imprisonment from which an inmate ‘could be placed on correctional supervision in the discretion of the 
Commissioner or Parole Board. There have been subsequent amendments since the 1997 Act as well.  
39 See S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at 377, See also S v Mofokeng 1962 (3) SA 551 
(A) at 557; S v Alexander (1) 1965 (2) SA 796 (A) at 808G-809D; S v Tyebela 1989 (2) SA 22 (A) 29G-I,   





‘notions of basic fairness and justice’.41 This meant that the inquiry into whether the right had 
been violated must extend beyond determining whether formalities and rules of procedure for 
initiating or conducting criminal trials had been complied with. To give content to the right 
therefore, the Constitutional Court relied on traditions of constitutional interpretation that 
construe constitutional provisions by having recourse to the character of the instrument, the 
socio-historical origin of the concepts it advances, the purpose or interests it seeks to protect and 
traditions of usage that confer meaning on the language of the instrument.42  
Thus, Zuma established judicial authority for the proposition that fair trial must be defined 
by the Constitution, in accordance with the rules of constitutional interpretation that favour a 
generous and purposive approach.43 The right as provided for under s 35(3) of the 1996 
Constitution has a number of components, such as the presumption of innocence, the right to be 
afforded adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, speedy trial, and the right of appeal.  
In relation to sentencing, the right obligates courts to conduct hearings or appeals against 
sentence in a manner that meets with substantial fairness.44  
Zuma also explained the developmental role that the Constitution enjoins courts to 
discharge when applying the Bill of Rights to criminal law.  It found that the Constitution 
obligated courts to promote the underlying values of an open and democratic society, which, 
within the Constitutional scheme, esteemed individual freedoms.45 In Makwanyane,46 these 
values were interpreted as promoting Ubuntu, an African value that embraces humaneness, 
compassion, respect, human dignity, morality, conciliation, reparation, social cohesion or 
communality, amongst others.47 The contemporary concept of justice that captures this principle 
is restorative justice, an ideal that Bennett48 has described as promoting reconciliation (usually 
                                                          
41 Ibid at 570 para D. 
42 Ibid at 570 para B & 579 para B. 
43 Ibid at 577 para H – 579 para B. 
44 Jacobus Bogaards v The State [2012] ZACC 23 (CC) paras 45, 52, 61 & 64. 
45 S v Zuma supra note 40 at 580 paras A-B. The court found the obligation stipulated in s 35 of the Interim 
Constitution. The function has been preserved by s 39 of the 1996 Constitution. 
46 Supra note 32 at 13 para B – 14 para A. 
47 Ibid at 52 para D – 53 para B, 85 para H – 87 para A and 105 para G – 107 para E. 
48 TW Bennet ‘Ubuntu: An African equity’ (2011) Vol. 14 No. 4 PER/PELJ 30-61 at 34-36. Bennett explained that 
sentencing decisions by South African courts have shown sensitivity to the need to integrate reconciliation and 





between the offender and his or her victim) and, on the larger scale, social harmony. Bennett49 
describes the principle as ‘one of the central aims of South Africa’s sentencing policy’.  
In Makwanyane, the aforementioned constitutional values were held to have a direct 
impact on the death penalty50 in the sense that they facilitate South Africa’s transition from its 
fractured past, when the death penalty was indiscriminately used to entrench social disharmony, 
to a new society in which punishment assumes a different character and object to which the death 
penalty is antithetical. Viewed critically, the Makwanyane decision offered more than a legal 
textual analysis of the constitutional prohibitions against punishment that offend constitutional 
principles. It elucidated a political rationality and a transformative vision that necessarily 
impacted on the restorative (rather than vindictive) roles that punishment ought to play in 
society. Essentially therefore, punishment may not be construed outside the context of the 
transformative vision. For example, to unveil the meaning and give individuals the full measure 
of the protection guaranteed by the constitutional prohibition against inhuman and degrading 
punishment viz the death penalty, the court had to purposively and generously construe the 
prohibition through the contextual lens of the historical background of the Constitution, the 
character and overarching transformative objects of the Constitution itself and the Bill of 
Rights.51 This contextual approach led the court to find that the prohibition against inhuman and 
degrading punishment was associated with the rights to equality before the law, life and human 
dignity,52 and that the death penalty violated them all.53  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2008, and in pending legislative bills, such as the Traditional Courts Bill. The author also noted that the South 
African Law Reform Commission has also recommended it for community tribunals in townships. 
49 Ibid at 35. 
50 S v Makwanyane supra note 32. 
51Ibid at 13 paras F-H. 
52 These rights were provided for in ss 8, 9 and 10 of the Interim Constitution.  Section 8 also provides for the right 
to equal protection of the law. These provisions have been retained with alterations in ss 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the 
1996 Constitution. Section 12(1)(e) prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. 
53 S v Makwanyane supra note 32 at 57 paras D-H; See also S v Dlamini, S v Dladla and Others, S v Joubert, S v 
Shietekat 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC) at para 2, where Kriegler J held that the Bill of Rights ‘exposed all existing legal 
provisions, whether statutory or derived from common law, to reappraisal in the light of the new constitutional 
norms heralded by [the] transition’. See also S v Williams and Another supra note 34, Christian Lawyers Association 
of South Africa v Minister of Health 1998 (4) SA 1113 (T); Case v Minister of Safety and Security, Curtis v Minister 
of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC); See further S v Mamabolo (E TV and Others Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 
409 (CC); Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC); S v Hobo, 2009 





Being some of the earliest pronouncements of the Constitutional Court on the subject of 
punishment and constitutional rights, the Williams, Makwanyane and Zuma cases may be 
described as authorities for the judicial policy that criminal penalties must be infused with human 
rights. Likewise, the process of judicial sentencing, the interpretation of penal provisions and the 
use of judicial discretion in sentencing must reinforce human rights.54  The full measure of the 
impact of these values on penal policy will understandably be developed on an ongoing basis. 
Section 39(1)(a),55 read together with s 8(3)56 of the 1996 Constitution,  allows enough elasticity 
to ensure that judicial interpretations of the Bill of Rights respond to new understandings about 
rights and their interactions with punishment.57  
 
4.3.3 The Legislative Framework 
As explained above, the 1996 Constitution establishes the benchmark that criminal legislation 
must comply with. The principal sentencing legislation in South Africa is the Criminal Procedure 
Act 1977 (1977 Act).58 Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, a court derived its power to 
sentence offenders from the Act, from several specific statutes that create offences and prescribe 
penalties therefor and from the common law, subject to the sentencing jurisdiction conferred 
upon the court by statute. Hence, while courts may impose any of the punishments prescribed by 
the 1977 Act, other penal legislation or the common law, the quantum of the penalty must be 
within the jurisdiction awarded to them by law. Limitations on sentencing jurisdiction typically 
                                                          
54See S v Salzwedel and Others 2000 (1) SA 786. 
55 The provision requires courts to ‘promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom’ when interpreting constitutional rights 
56 Section 8(3) obligates courts to apply, or where necessary, develop the common law to the extent that legislation 
has failed to give effect to a right in the Bill of Rights. The court may also develop the common law in order to limit 
the right, to the extent allowed by s 36 of the Constitution, regarding the limitation of rights. 
57 See Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at 885 para D – 887 para; Kate v MEC 
for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 (1) SA 141 (SE) at 152 paras D-H. In S v Makwanyane supra 
note 32, S v Zuma supra note 40 and S v Williams and Another supra note 33, the Constitutional Court made copious 
references to foreign decisions on the death penalty, the reversal of the onus of proof regarding the voluntariness of 
confessionary statements and corporal punishment. See also Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions supra note 53 
at 51 para G to 52 para D, where the Constitutional Court extended the common law definition of rape to include 
non-consensual anal penetration of the female, thereby making it consistent with the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights. 





apply to magistrate courts, allowing them to impose imprisonment or fines up to a specified 
duration or amount. High courts have unlimited jurisdiction.59 
Chapter 28 of the 1977 Act deals with several aspects of sentencing, including 
jurisdiction and procedure, the proffering of evidence during sentencing, the types or range of 
punishment that may be imposed and the circumstances in which they may be imposed.  Section 
276(1) of the Act provides a range of punishments that may be imposed for statutory or common 
law offences.60  These include imprisonment (for a definite or indefinite period, or for life), 
periodical imprisonment, declaration as a habitual criminal, committal to an institution 
established by law, correctional supervision, or imprisonment with the possibility that the 
offender may ‒ at the discretion of the correctional officer ‒ be subjected to correctional 
supervision. The court’s power to impose these punishments is subject to provisions of the Act, 
other penal statutes that stipulate offences for specific crimes61 and the common law. Given the 
principle of legality, a court may – subject to its jurisdiction - only impose punishments that have 
statutorily recognized and prescribed, or that are permissible under common law.62  
 Another important statute is the Criminal Law Amendment Act 199763 (1997 Act).  
Section 51 of the Act instated minimum sentences for serious or violent offences, ranging from 
robbery to drug related offences, dealing in or smuggling firearms and ammunition, rape and 
murder. The statute became the key framework for sentencing for crimes that fall within the 
categories provided for. Subsequently, in 2007, two other statutes, namely the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act64 and the Criminal Law (Sentencing) 
                                                          
59 Van Zyl Smit op cit note 14 at 49-3. 
60 Regarding common law crimes in South Africa, see JRL Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure 
Volume II, Common-Law Crimes 3rd ed. (1996); with the exception of statutory crimes, crimes in South Africa are 
common law crimes. Examples of common law crime in South Africa include murder, robbery, housebreaking, high 
treason, bigamy, theft, culpable homicide, obstructing the course of justice, contempt of court, assault, arson, etc. 
See also South African Police Service, ‘Common Law Offences’, available at 
http://www.saps.gov.za/crimestop/common_offence_definitions.htm, [accessed February 2 2013]. 
61 An example is the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act, which is discussed is section 4.3.1c below. 
62 According to subsec 2 of the provision, no provision of the Act shall authorize a court to impose a sentence that is 
beyond its sentence jurisdiction. The provision also recognizes that the court may impose any statutory penalty that 
is prescribed in respect of an offence, or impose forfeiture in addition to any other punishment.  
63 Act 105 of 1997. 





Amendment Act were enacted.65 The latter largely amended s 51, and its provisions were 
incorporated into the 1997 Act.  
 
4.3.4  Judicial Elucidations of the Objects and Principles of Sentencing  
Having examined the legislative framework for sentencing, the stage is set for an analysis 
regarding how proportionality principles and the theories of sentencing find expression in the 
normative framework. For the reasons disclosed in chapter two, the theories are regarded as the 
purposes, aims or objects of sentencing.66 Given that there are no statutory statements regarding 
the objects of sentencing in South Africa, the focus of the section is on judicial pronouncements 
regarding the objects. 
 
4.3.4.1 The Objects of Sentencing 
Through several judicial pronouncements South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal has 
enumerated the objects to which sentencing may be directed. Some of these were made while the 
court was constituted as the Appellate Division. Thus, in 1945 in S v Swanepoel,67 after having 
identified deterrence, crime prevention, reformation and retribution as the objects of punishment, 
the Appellate Division proceeded to impose a sentence that was swayed (apparently) by juristic 
opinions that favoured deterrence.68 Nevertheless, the court affirmed the need for proportion, 
measured on the basis of the offender’s blameworthiness.  It acknowledged also that 
disproportionate sentences tend to weaken the deterrent effect of punishment, and that mitigating 
                                                          
65 Act 38 of 2007. The three statutes will be discussed later in this thesis, with particular attention to how they 
impact sentencing proportionality and consistency. 
66 See chapter 2 section 3 regarding why theories are referred to as the objects or goals of sentencing. 
67  1945 AD 444 at 451-455. 
68 For example, the judgment quotes the following words by Beccaria: ‘[t]he end of punishment… is … to prevent 
the criminal from doing further injury to society, and … others from committing the like offence. Such punishments, 
therefore, and such a mode of inflicting them, ought to be chosen, as will make the strongest and most lasting 
impressions on the minds of others, with the least torment to the body of the criminal.’ Again, it quotes 
Salmond, (Jurisprudence, 3rd ed), that ‘[t]he ends of criminal justice are four in number, and in  respect of the 
purposes so served by it, punishment may be distinguished as (1) Deterrent, (2) Preventive, (3) Reformative, and (4) 
Retributive. Of these aspects the first is the essential and all important one, the others being merely accessory. 
Punishment is before all things deterrent, and the chief end of the law of crime is to make the evil-doer an example 





factors, whenever present, should reduce blameworthiness and punishment to the extent that is 
appropriate to the circumstances of the case.69  
These objects represent interests that compete for dominance in sentencing, with the result 
that sentences may sometimes reflect different levels of emphasis on any one object. In the 1966 
case of R v Karg,70 the Appellate Division was mindful of this competition and observed that 
judicial rulings had taken a tendency to assigning preeminent roles to crime prevention and 
correction, over and above other objects. This prompted the court to reiterate the important role 
that punishment fulfilled in expressing society’s natural indignation over crime.71 Affirming this 
role highlights one of the functions that retributivists assign to punishment. Overall however, the 
court seems to have endorsed a more significant role for deterrence.72 More than a decade later in 
S v Rabie,73 the Appellate Division even more directly reiterated the subservient function that 
retribution had come to assume in sentencing. Subsequent judgments have since relegated 
retribution to a secondary role, while affirming the primacy of deterrence at the same time; in the 
1984 case of S v Khumalo and Others74 the Appellate Division observed that retribution had 
diminished in significance and that [d]eterrence had come to be ‘described as the “essential”, “all 
important”, “paramount” and “universally admitted” object of punishment’ to which all ‘other 
objects are accessory’.75 In the post-transition76 case of S v Makwanyane77 also, considerations of 
deterrence and prevention weighed heavily on the mind of the Constitutional Court. The court 
took the position that retribution ought not to be given undue weight when balancing the objects 
and factors that should influence the choice of punishment.78 Thus, even though judicial 
                                                          
69 Ibid. 
70 1961 (1) SA 231 (A). 
71 Ibid at 236 paras A-B.  According to the court, it was appropriate for society to express its natural indignation 
about crime through punishment. See also S v Van de Venter 2011 (1) SACR 238 (SCA) at 244 paras B-E, where the 
SCA held that the natural indignation that the community feels over the appellant’s conduct calls for proper 
recognition in the sentence. 
72 R v Karg supra note 71 at 236 para A; see also S v Selebi (25/09) [2010] ZAGPJHC 53 (5 July 2010) at para 1. 
73 Supra note 12. 
74 1984 (3) SA 327 (AD); in this case, the Appellate Division reversed the sentence of the trial judge because it laid 
undue emphasis on retribution.  It held that the lower court misdirected itself when it did not give proper 
consideration to deterrence and rehabilitation. 
75 Ibid at 330 para E. 
76 The post-transition period refers to the era of constitutional democracy in South Africa. 
77 Supra note 32. 





emphasis on particular objects shifted over time, deterrence has come to enjoy primacy, before 
and after the adoption of a Constitution. Below is an illustration of how courts have tried to 
resolve competition between the objects of punishment. 
 
4.3.4.2  Fitting the Objects into Punishment 
One of the challenges that confronted courts in the abovementioned cases was how the principles 
of punishment functioned in the selection of punishments, or determined what considerations 
should prevail over the choice of sentence. Adding to the intricacy of the challenge is the fact 
that individual criminal cases present diverse peculiarities, varying levels of seriousness and 
blameworthiness and a complex mix of mitigating and aggravating factors.  How these factors 
interact make sentencing for each crime unique.  
Courts have developed different principles to regulate how they decide the objects that 
should influence the choice of an appropriate punishment. The older tradition required that 
punishment should fit the crime. This principle was applied in the 1923 case of R v Motsepe.79 In 
that case, the court explained that the principle encapsulates those factors, such as the nature of 
the offence, its prevalence, the difficulty of detection, the need to communicate effective 
deterrence (in the public interest) and the interest of the accused, that should guide the discretion 
of the judge. The last two factors suggest that punishment should entertain the possibilities of 
reformation and should not be so cruel as to jeopardize the public interest, for example, by 
hardening the criminal.80 The Motsepe case was relied upon in the 1959 case of R v Zonele,81 
which took a step further by expressly requiring that punishment must also fit the criminal.82 
Both cases contribute to a host of judicial authorities that establish a judicial tradition of 
individualizing punishment by weighing the public interest and the interest of the offender. 
                                                          
79 1923 T.P.D 380. Considering these factors, the court reduced the sentence imposed by the trial court from eight 
lashes to four and upheld the sentence of four years’ imprisonment.  Judicial whipping is now unconstitutional. 
80 Ibid at 381. 
81 1959 (3) SA 319 (A); this concept and the requirement that punishment must seek the public interest were not 
necessarily missing from the Motsepe case. It was subsumed under the court’s opinion that punishment should not 
be excessive, lest the offender becomes a hardened criminal.  However, subsequent cases made the interest of the 
accused and the public express requirements. 
82 Ibid at 330(E); Judicial decisions have generally affirmed this principle. See The State v Xolani Matiwane, 2013 





These decisions also affirm the discretion of the court in selecting the type and measure of 
punishment.83 In S v Zinn,84 this deliberative process was moulded into a triad comprising the 
crime, the criminal and the interests of society.   South African courts have consistently affirmed 
the triad.85  
At the heart of fitting punishment to the crime and criminal is a delicate process of 
balancing interests that compete in punishment, so that no one factor (or objective) is unduly 
weighted against the others86 in the effort to establish proportionality between the crime and the 
punishment. In the Salzwedel case,87 the court observed that the competition was an inherent 
feature of the triad and enjoined sentencers to ensure that the offender’s interest received 
appropriate consideration. The decision is also notable for its affirmation of the legitimacy of the 
public indignation that is expressed through punishment and for its emphasis on the need for 
courts to communicate ‒ through punishments of course ‒ that serious crimes that violate the 
values protected by the Constitution will be severely dealt with.  This indicates that courts will 
continue to impose punishments that convey retribution among other messages. Indeed, 
retribution permeated the court’s obviously deterrent focus. The focus on deterrence serves the 
public interest and has been consistently preserved in judicial sentences. In Zinn88 therefore, the 
interests of society necessitated a heavy sentence for the respondent’s crimes of fraud and theft. 
In Karg89 the trial court reasoned that the interest of society was as important as the individual 
harm caused by the crime. In Khumalo90 also, it was held that the appellants deserved a sentence 
that expressed the indignation of the victims of their crime and the society at large. However, 
                                                          
83 See for example, R v Berger & Another 1936 AD 334 at 339-340; R v Taljaard 1924 T.P.D 581; Mudau v The 
State (764/12) [2012] ZASCA 56 (9 May 2013). 
84 1969 (2) SA 537 (A). 
85 S v Salzwedel and others supra note 82 at 794 paras B-E, See also S v Shilubane 2008 (1) SACR 25 (T) at para 4; 
S v Mashiloane 2013 (1) SACR 587 (GNP) at 589 paras E-D; S v Makhakha 2014 (2) SACR 457 (WCC) 457 at 457 
paras E-H. 
86 Moswathupa v S 2012 (1) SACR 259 (SCA). 
87 Supra note 82 at 794 paras B-E.  
88 Supra note 85; the court held that the triad had to be considered when imposing sentence.  Regarding the 
circumstances of the respondent’s crimes, the court held that the sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment imposed by the 
lower court was justified. However, the respondent’s old age (he was 58 years) and poor health were mitigating 
factors. It accordingly substituted the 15-year sentence with a 12-year sentence.  See p 540 para G, p 542 paras A-F. 
89 Supra note 70. 





indignation is no reason for imposing ‘a sentence that is out of proportion to the nature and 
gravity of the offence’.91 
Notwithstanding the prominence that deterrence has achieved, the possibility of 
reformation operates as a moderating factor. Thus, it was held in Khumalo that while an 
appropriate sentence in a given case ‘should be sufficiently severe to deter others’, consideration 
ought to be given to the possibility that the offender may change his behaviour.92  In an earlier 
case, R v Owen,93 the accused person’s character and chances that he will amend his behaviour 
were considered to be relevant factors for fixing a sentence. Both cases indicate that sentencers 
must find a balance between goals that jostle for prominence in a sentence. However, striking a 
balance does not mean that the outcome (i.e., the sentence) will reflect an equal consideration of 
all sentencing factors and objects. In S v Gardener94 the Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledged 
that the weight that is attached to each object and to the accused and his crime, will differ.  This 
is to be expected; the nature of each crime, the circumstances surrounding its commission and 
the personal circumstances of the offender will often determine which object receives a dominant 
consideration.95 In R v Mzwakala96 the appellant loosened the rails on a railway track, causing 
two trains to derail. The Appellate Division rightly regarded the crimes as seriously endangering 
public safety and felt persuaded to accord ‘deterrence … [an] even greater weight, 
proportionately, than it generally accorded’.97 As a balancing measure however, the court held 
that the gravity of the crime should not preclude a consideration of the subjective elements of the 
offender and his crime.98 In this case, the court regarded the absence of a criminal history, the 
fact that the offender laboured under a sense of being unjustly denied his work benefits and had 
not acted with an intention to cause death, to be mitigating factors that were relevant to 
                                                          
91 S v Van de Venter supra note 71 at 244 paras B-E. 
92 S v Khumalo supra note 74 at 332 para E; the appellant was sentenced to 24 years imprisonment while his two co-
appellants were sentenced nine years imprisonment each.  The appellate court halved the sentences.  
93 1957 (1) SA 458 (A) at 462 para F. 
94 2011 (1) SACR 570 (SCA). 
95 Ibid at para 69. 
96 1957 (4) SA 273 (A); the appellant was charged for murder and assault.  He committed the crime to protest his 
grievance at being denied certain entitlements by his employers, the South African Railway.  
97 Ibid at 277 para A. 





determining a quantum of punishment that was proportionate to the objective gravity of the 
crime.  The section below deals more specifically with how courts determine proportionality. 
 
 
4.3.4.3  Proportionality: The Measure between Crime and Punishment 
As held in S v Dodo,99 proportionality is a constitutional principle that ‘goes to the heart of the 
inquiry as to whether punishment is cruel, inhuman or degrading …’ Proportionality requires 
finding the balance between the crime, the offender and the public interest.100 The much cited 
locus classicus on the subject is S v Rabie.  There, the Appellate Division drew on judicial 
enunciations of the principles that should inform sentencing and formed the view that 
‘[p]unishment should fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to society, and be blended with 
a measure of mercy according to the circumstances’.101 As will be shortly illustrated, the fourth 
principle, that is, punishment should ‘be blended with a measure of mercy’ restates a principle of 
moderation that has long been applied by South African courts. Rabie brought all four principles 
together, making it a comprehensive and authoritative statement of the judicial approach to 
sentencing. The principles are briefly explained below:  
 
I. Punishment must Fit the Crime 
The idea of fitting punishment to the crime invokes retributive concepts of moral 
blameworthiness (just deserts) and proportionality. At the core of the just deserts principle is the 
notion that punishment must be deserved.  The proportionality principle that is implicit in the 
notion regulates punishment, increasing its severity as the gravity of the criminal wrong or harm 
increases.102 
 
II. Punishment must Fit the Criminal 
                                                          
99 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) at 403 para H; see also Van Zyl Smit op cit note 14 at 49-9 and 49-10. 
100 Opperman and Another v S [2010] 4 All SA 267 (SCA), see particularly para 30; See also Mudau v S  
 [2012] ZASCA 56 para 18. 
101 S v Rabie supra note 12 at 862 para G. 
102 See for instance, S v Mzazi 2006 (1) SACR 100 (E) at 103B-D where the court held, having regard to the 
offender’s bad criminal record, that the petty offence he committed necessitated a ‘proportionate and reasonable 





This principle emphasizes the individualization of punishment;103 it requires a consideration of 
the personal circumstances of the offender, which may unveil mitigating or aggravating factors 
and inform the levels of emphasis that will be placed on deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation or 
retribution. The principle pervades sentencing decisions in South Africa. In S v Whitehead104 the 
appellant’s grievous crime called for a severe sentence, but the Appellate Division held that the 
appropriate punishment must have regard to the appellant’s history and circumstances, as well as 
the subjective elements of his crime.105 In S v Van de Venter106 also, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal interfered with the lower court’s sentencing discretion because that court ignored 
evidence that showed that the appellant, a schizoid and emotionally depressed person who had a 
difficult family upbringing, had diminished moral responsibility for the grave crimes that he 
committed. Accordingly, it imposed a lighter sentence. In Fanie Masenye Moswathupa v The 
State107 also, the Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the sentence of the lower court because it 
overemphasized the seriousness of the offence and the interests of society, without giving proper 
weight to the personal circumstances of the offender, which should have mitigated the 
sentence.108 In summary, the principle calls for balancing the objective gravity of the crime with 
its subjective elements.  
 
 
III. Punishment must be Fair to Society 
                                                          
103 S v Blank (1995) 1 SACR 62 (A). See also Mudau v The State supra. 
104 1970 (4) SA 424 (A) at 436 para F; the appellant in this case was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on one 
count of murder, and 7 years imprisonment on a second count of assault. The sentences were ordered to run 
consecutively, making an effective prison term of 22 years. On appeal, the Appellate Division, after considering the 
appellant’s personal circumstances (appellant had a very disturbed childhood that left him emotionally 
underdeveloped), upheld the sentences but also held that (i) the trial court failed to take into consideration the long 
term effect of the cumulative sentence on the appellant; (ii) although the trial court observed that the appellant was 
capable of being reformed, it did not take that into consideration when imposing sentence; (iii) accordingly, the 
sentences were reviewed with 6 years of the 7-year sentence to run concurrently with the 15-year sentence.  See also 
S v Peterson en ‘N Ander 2001 (1) SASV 16. 
105 See also S v Blank supra note 104 where the Appellate Division noted that South African courts have long 
emphasized the importance of individualizing punishments; see also Mudau v The State supra. 
106 2011 (1) SACR 238 (SCA) at pp 242-3. 
107 [2011] ZASCA 172. 
108 See also S v Khumalo supra note 74 where the Appellate Division observed that the sentencing judge misdirected 
himself when he did not give consideration to whether a lesser prison term would not have served the aims of 





This principle sustains society’s interest in punishment. This interest has generally been 
interpreted to include the need to protect society from criminal harm,109 to do justice to the 
community,110 to deter further offending,111 or even reform the offender.112 This last point was 
taken into consideration in S v Skenjana113 where the Appellate Division held that reliance on 
excessively long deterrent incarcerations injured public interests by frustrating rehabilitation. In 
the court’s words: 
In a case such as the present the Court must give heed to the demand of the ordinary 
citizen for the condign punishment of robbers who invade the sanctity of the home to 
commit rapine and violent assault and worse. But that demand may well be satisfied by 
the imposition of less than the most severe sentence. Nor is it in the public interest that 
potentially valuable human material should be seriously damaged by long incarceration. 
As I observed in S v Khumalo and Another …, it is the experience of 
prison administrators that unduly prolonged imprisonment brings about the complete 
mental and physical deterioration of the prisoner…. 
The concern that punishment should be set in a way that enhances the chances of 
reformation often recur in sentencing decisions.  In S v Jansen and Another114 the court was 
disposed to a sentence that offered the criminal the opportunity to reform and reintegrate with 
society. S v Van de Venter115 advanced the same rationality: deterrence and retribution may be 
appropriate objects in punishment, but they do not override other objects of sentencing. Neither 
would excessive (deterrent or retributive) punishments promote justice or serve the interests of 
society.116 Ultimately then, punishment is fair to society when it enhances public safety or some 
other common good, either because the offender or would-be offenders are deterred, or better 
still because it enhances the offender’s chances of being rehabilitated and becoming a productive 
member of the society.  
 
                                                          
109 Especially from crimes with high social costs. See S v Blank supra at 73b-e; in this case, the need to protect 
society from prevalent white-collar crimes inclined the court  toward a severe prison sentence. 
110 Either by assuaging the public indignation that is evoked by crime, or by sustaining public interest in the fair 
administration of justice. See R v Karg supra note 70 at p 236. 
111 S v Zinn supra note 84 at 542. 
112 See Peter Reynor & Gwen Robinson ‘Why help offenders? Arguments for rehabilitation as a penal strategy’ 
(2009) Vol. 1 No. 1 European Journal of Probation 3-20 at 7-9. 
113 1985 (3) SA 51 at 55. 
114 1975 (1) SA 425 (A); see also S v Nkosi 2002 (1) SACR 135 (W) at 143; S v Phulwane and Others 2003 (1) 
SACR 631 (T) at 635 paras 10-11.  
115 S v Van de Venter supra note 71. 





IV. Punishment Must Be Blended with a Measure of Mercy According to the Circumstances 
This principle espouses the need to approach sentencing dispassionately, to eschew emotiveness 
when considering factors that weigh against and in favour of the offender and to avoid 
unnecessary severity.  The principle recommends a rational, humane and compassionate 
disposition to sentencing and encourages a judicial mind-set that seeks to preserve the 
sentencer’s humaneness, by treating the offender humanely. In S v Rabie, Holmes JA described 
the principle: 
[M]ercy is a balanced and humane quality of thought which tempers one's approach when 
considering the basic factors of letting the punishment fit the criminal as well as the crime 
and being fair to society.117  
Again, Holmes JA held: 
[W]hile fair punishment may sometimes have to be robust, an insensitively censorious 
attitude is to be avoided in sentencing a fellow mortal, lest the weighing in the scales be 
tilted by incompleteness.118  
Holmes JA seems to have bequeathed to the bench some well-reasoned judicial 
pronouncements on the subject of mercy in punishment. For him, mercy is elemental to justice.  
In 1975, five years before Rabie was decided, Holmes JA made the following oft quoted 
statement, in S v Harrison:119 ‘[j]ustice must be done; but mercy, not a sledge-hammer, is its 
concomitant’. Relying on the same principle two years later in the 1972 case of S v Sparks and 
Another,120 he cautioned against excessive sentences for crimes that required emphatically 
deterrent punishments.121   That same year, he held in S v V:122 
The element of mercy, a hallmark of civilised and enlightened administration, should not 
be overlooked, lest the Court be in danger of reducing itself to the plane of the criminal; 
… True mercy has nothing in common with soft weakness, or maudlin sympathy for the 
criminal, or permissive tolerance. It is an element of justice itself. 
 The need for a rational, humane and compassionate approach to punishment has 
been echoed by other judgements, not the least of which is Makwanyane, discussed below. 
                                                          
117 Supra note 12 at 861 para D. 
118 Ibid at 862 paras C-D. 
119 1970 (3) SA 684 (A) at 686 para A. 
120 1972 (3) SA 396 (A). 
121 Ibid at 410 paras G-H. 






4.3.4.4 A Rational and Humane Approach to Punishment: Proportionality as a Moderating 
Principle   
No study of sentencing principles in South Africa will be complete without discussing the 
Constitutional Court’s views in Makwanyane regarding the objects and factors that should 
influence the choice of punishment. Four points are particularly noteworthy. The first is the 
requirement that personal and subjective elements that may have disposed the offender to 
commit the crime must be evaluated against the main objects of punishment.123 This requires that 
sentences be personalized, regardless of whatever object the court considers to be decisive in the 
choice of punishment. Personalizing (or individualizing) punishment requires evaluating 
aggravating or mitigating factors. The objects must also be weighed against other penal 
alternatives at the court’s disposal.124 
Secondly, while retribution rightly expresses moral outrage over crime, it must not unduly 
burden the balancing process in sentencing.  Retribution must be moderated and must yield to 
the new constitutional ethos of conciliation, which affirms the rights of prisoners, delineates 
permissible limits to the restriction of those rights, promotes humaneness in punishment and 
echoes elements of reformation and restorative justice.125 This view, as expressed in 
Makwanyane, calls for new attitudes about retribution. Indeed, at certain points in the judgment, 
the court sounded pejorative about unbridled expressions of retribution in punishment.126 
                                                          
123 S v Makwanyane supra note 32 at 26 para F – 27 para A. 
124 Ibid at 54 paras D-E. 
125 Ibid at 48 para E – 53 para B, 72 paras H- 73 C, 85 para H - 8 para A, 105 para G - 106 para E and 109 para G - 
110 para D; in his concurring judgment (at 88 para D - 91 para B), Justice Madala argued that the reformatory 
theory of punishment inherent in the African concept of Ubuntu is mentioned in the post amble of the 1993 Interim 
Constitution and permeated the Constitution. For discussions on Ubuntu, restorative justice and the South African 
Constitution, see Anderson A.M ‘Restorative justice, the African philosophy of Ubuntu and the Diversion of 
Criminal Prosecution’ available at www.isrcl.org/Papers/Anderson.pdf, accessed 2 February 2013. However, see 
also Johan Van der Walt Law and Sacrifice: Towards a Post-Apartheid Theory of Law (2005) 101-120. 
126 Note, however, that recent judgments have iterated a necessary role for retribution. According to the SCA in S v 
Van der Westhuizen  2011 (2) SARC 26 (SCA), ‘deterrence and retribution do not recede into the background, as in 
cases of substantial diminished responsibility’. The statement suggests that the subjective circumstances of the 
offender and the crime will often influence the weight that is attached to each object of punishment. In this case, the 
accused person showed a persistent lack of remorse that revealed itself in patterns of self-exoneration. He had 
undergone long years of treatment and was reported to ‘have a relatively minor degree of diminished responsibility’. 
That, in addition to the fact that he continued to be ‘a potential danger’ to those who were close to him, forced 





Punishment, the court held, must be consistent with the values protected by the Constitution. 
However, the object or principle that is allowed dominance in the choice of penalty depends on 
the circumstances of each case. 
Thirdly, Makwanyane elaborated the proportionality test. Until this decision, questions 
about proportionality were resolved by balancing the triad. Makwanyane changed that and 
established – while also affirming the triad ‒ that the test must also be evaluated in the light of 
constitutional protections against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments.127 Punishment that 
offends these protections would presumably be grossly disproportionate.128 In Makwanyane, the 
Constitutional Court considered the terrible and irremediable nature of the death penalty and the 
inconsistencies and arbitrariness that attend its use to be relevant issues in determining whether 
the penalty was proportionate to the components of the triad.129  
The fourth point to emerge from Makwanyane is the recognition that punishment limits 
rights. The recognition brought sentencing ‒ and the proportionality test in particular ‒ under the 
purview of s 33(1) of the Interim Constitution. The provision stipulates conditions that 
limitations on rights must comply with. It has been replaced by s 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution, 
which provides: 
(1)   The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including-  
(a) the nature of the right;  
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
crime and the prevalence of rape moved the court to acknowledge that retribution will in certain cases ‘take a more 
prominent role than the other sentencing objectives’. However, even when retribution takes prominence, the court 
held that other sentencing goals cannot be discarded altogether. Retribution must be balanced with the other objects. 
Van der Westhuizen and Mudau show that expressing retribution through punishment may be justified, but it has to 
be in proportion with relevant considerations regarding other interests in punishment. As Terblanche points out, the 
best act of retribution is achieved through an appropriate sentence and not one that is disproportionately lenient or 
severe. See Terblanche (2007) op cit note 2 at 171. 
127 Section 11(2) of the interim constitution, now s 12(1)(e) of the 1996 Constitution. 
128 This is the logical point to draw from Makwanyane supra note 32 at 41 paras C-E.  
129 That is, the punishment must be proportionate to the interest that the society seeks to preserve, the interests of the 
offender, as well as the gravity of the crime. In Makwanyane, the Constitutional Court held that the death penalty 
did not serve any public interest and denied the offender his rights to life and human dignity, while the requirement 





(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit 
any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 130 
The Constitutional Court’s adopted three lines of inquiry to explain how the provision 
applied to punishment:  
i. Whether the objective of the limitation can be justified in an open and democratic society. 
The court resolved this question on the premise that punishment limits rights. With regard 
to the death penalty, the question was whether the objective of the penalty, which may be 
deterrence or retribution, is a reasonably justified restriction on the right to life.  The court 
answered in the negative;  
ii. Whether the limitation is necessary and reasonably connected with the achievement of the 
objective. The court answered this in the negative citing empirical studies that suggested 
that the death penalty did not necessarily deter capital offences; and 
iii. Whether the objective can be achieved through means that are less damaging or less 
intrusive of rights. Here, the court held that the requirements of retribution can be satisfied 
by long term incarceration without terminating other rights.131 
                                                          
130 The substantial difference between the 1996 Constitution and the Interim Constitution is that the former excludes 
the requirement that a limitation on any right must not negate the essential content of the right. Section 33(1) of the 
Interim constitution provides as follows:  
The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general application, provided that such 
limitation-  
a. shall be permissible only to the extent that it is-  
i. reasonable; and 
ii. justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and 
b. shall not negate the essential content of the right in question, and provided further that any 
limitation to-  
i. a right entrenched in section 10, 11, 12, 14 (1), 21, 25 or 30 (1) (d) or (e) or (2); or 
ii. a right entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 or 24, in so far as such right relates to free and 
fair political activity, shall, in addition to being reasonable as required in paragraph (a) (i), also 
be necessary. 
131 According to Chaskalson P, ‘the limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary 
in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on 
proportionality… Proportionality calls for the balancing of different interests. In the balancing process, the relevant 
considerations are the right that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom 
and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to such society; the extent 
of the limitation, its efficacy and particularly, where the limitation is necessary, whether the desired ends can 





In sum, the balancing process involved in the proportionality test must also be predicated 
on respect for the rights and values protected by the constitution. 
Generally, sentencing decisions have followed the principles enunciated in Makwanyane. 
The ensuing pattern tilts toward balancing or achieving the objects of punishment with no more 
severity than is necessary. The pattern also portrays sentencing decisions as imbibing parsimony 
in proportionality analyses. In NDPP v Kleinbooi and others,132 the court endorsed Hoexter’s133 
views regarding the proportionality test in administrative law.  Hoexter had explained that 
proportionality avoids ‘an imbalance between … adverse and beneficial effects…’ It requires a 
public administrator to ponder and use a ‘less drastic or oppressive means to accomplish [a] 
desired end’.134  Relying on this view, the court held that sentencing entails juxtaposing the 
adverse effects that punishment would have on the offender on one hand and the public good that 
would arise from the punishment on the other.  It requires pondering what type of punishment 
was needful and deciding on a measure that protects the public interest without employing more 
severity than is necessary.  
Of course, this is only a general principle. How the ingredients mix in a proportionality 
analysis will differ on a case by case basis. Also, the outcome of the test depends on which 
object or interest the court perceives to be dominant. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that two 
similar criminal cases will receive the same punishment. Sentencing outcomes are influenced by 
a range of subjective features that must be taken into consideration and by penal sanctions that 
have been tailored in specific legislation to achieve specific objects. 
Crimes that are prosecuted under the Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998 
(POCA) illustrate the nuances of the proportionality test. POCA is South Africa’s response to the 
social malaise presented by organized crimes.  It prescribes forfeiture of criminal assets and 
proceeds of crime for offences committed under the Act. Whether a property is liable to 
forfeiture depends on whether it was used as an instrumentality of the prohibited acts (that is, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
had to the provisions of section 33(1), and the underlying values of the Constitution…’ See S v Makwanyane supra 
note 32 at 43 paras D-G.   
132 [2008] 2 All SA 455 (C). 






used to perpetrate crimes), or is the proceeds of such activities. Forfeiture applications have been 
subjected to robust proportionality tests, directed at determining whether the deprivation of 
property, the ownership of which is constitutionally protected, is commensurate with the public 
interests that POCA seeks to protect. In Mohunram and Another v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others,135 the Constitutional Court laid out the following proportionality test: 
1. A forfeiture proceeding must keep the main purposes of POCA in view.  These purposes 
are essentially targeted at combating organized crimes because they endanger significant 
public interests. 
2. It must sufficiently connect the property to the main purpose of POCA. In other words, it 
must be demonstrated that the property was the instrumentality of the offence in question. 
This means that the forfeiture must be evaluated against the primary purpose that the Act is 
intended to achieve. The more remote the offence is to the primary purpose, the more 
disproportionate an order of forfeiture would be.136 
3. The effect that forfeiture would have on the owner of an interest in the property ‒ 
regardless of his blameworthiness ‒ must also be put into consideration. Also, the property 
in question must not be subject to other asset forfeiture provisions that would make 
forfeiture under the Act twice punitive. Here, Mohunram noted that courts have 
consistently and correctly applied a standard of proportionality that ensures that forfeiture 
orders under POCA do not result in arbitrary deprivations of property or in cruel, inhuman 
or degrading punishment.137 
                                                          
135 2007 (6) BCLR 575 (CC). 
136 The requirement entails that forfeiture must ‘substantially serve[..] the purposes of the Act’. See NDPP v Van der 
Merwe and Another 2011 (2) SACR 188 (WCC) at 208I. 
137 Mohunram and Another supra note at 135 paras 118-127; see also Prophet v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2007 (2) BCLR 140 (CC) where the Constitutional Court held at para 58 that the test of proportionality 
‘[weighs] the severity of the interference with individual rights to property against the extent to which the property 
was used for the purposes of the commission of the offence, bearing in mind the nature of the offence’. However, 
see further NDPP v Vermaak 2008 (1) SACR 157 (SCA), where it was held that the POCA also applied to 
individual crimes. The case found that the car that the respondent drove when she was arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol, was an ‘instrumentality’ for the commission of the offence, in terms of POCA. However, 
having regard to the nature of forfeiture as a remedial measure, primarily, or as serving to inhibit the continuance of 
an ongoing criminal activity, forfeiture in the present case was not justified. The court came to this conclusion 





The same principles were utilized in NDPP v Van der Merwe and Another,138 where the 
court held that its decision to issue an order of forfeiture ‒ which is penal in effect – was 
dependent on whether forfeiture was, in the instant case, the ‘rationally and proportionately 
appropriate manner of achieving the ends of the Act’.139  Forfeiture should not under any guise 
result in an arbitrary deprivation of property ‒ such as when it leaves the owner homeless ‒ as 
that would be disproportionate to the objects of POCA. Another consideration of proportionality 
is whether the property in question had a functional ‒ rather than incidental ‒ role in the 
commission of the crime, or was proceeds of the crime.140 However, considerations of the 
punitive effect of forfeiture should not outweigh the imperative of realizing the objects of the 
Act; whether a forfeiture application is granted or denied must be predicated on realizing the 
aims of the legislation:  
The effect of the forfeiture on the owner, while an important consideration, is but one of the 
relevant factors to be taken into account in the proportionality enquiry; it falls to be weighed 
in the balance with all the other factors that are relevant on the evidence in the case. The 
realisation of the objects of the statute therefore also demands proper consideration in the 
proportionality enquiry.141 
Applying the proportionality principle may yield varied outcomes, depending on the nature 
of the crime, the objective that the penal statute sets out to achieve and the personal and 
subjective elements in each case. Thus, in Van der Merwe, the high court reversed the decision 
of the court a quo not to issue forfeiture order, having found on appeal, that it served the public 
interest in POCA, to order forfeiture.142 On the other hand, in Mohunram, the court found that 
forfeiture, in addition to other punishments that had been imposed on the first applicant, 
exceeded what would have been a proportionate penalty. The test of proportionality may also 
influence the type of punishment that is imposed. For example, in S v H143 custodial sentence 
was said to be disproportionate where no legitimate public interest is at stake.  
                                                          
138 Supra note 137 at 198 paras C-E.  
139 Ibid at 198 para D. 
140 Ibid at 194 para B-195 para B. 
141 Ibid at 212 paras E-F. 
142  The court found that issuing a forfeiture order was not disproportionately punitive, because the livelihood or 
shelter of the owner was not threatened thereby. See pages 211-212 of judgment. 





The need to avoid overemphasising the personal circumstances of the offender, while 
underemphasising the seriousness of the crime, should also be uppermost in the court’s 
contemplation.144 This would entail finding a fair balance between mitigating and aggravating 
factors.  The proportionality test must accord proper cognizance to mitigating factors, without 
rendering aggravating factors impotent.  However, how courts have dealt with forfeiture under 
POCA is noteworthy. It shows that proportionality is complemented by the parsimonious 
consideration of ensuring that forfeitures do not visit unnecessary severity on the defendant, as 
that could amount to cruel and inhuman punishment.  This judicial approach reinforces Von 
Hirsch’s views discussed in chapter two, that proportionality and parsimony are consistent 
principles.145  
 
4.4 Sources of Normativity in Nigeria’s Sentencing System 
Like South Africa, the sources of normativity are essentially three: the Constitution; legislation 
and judicial interpretations. 
4.4.1 The Constitutional Framework 
A dominant feature in the normative framework for punishment in Nigeria is what this research 
considers to be the rather inadequate attention that the 1999 Constitution gives to the subject. To 
lay the foundation for discussing the framework, it must be acknowledged that the Constitution 
enshrines the principle of legality in the criminal law, under s 36(8) & (12). There are three 
elements to the principle as it appears in the provision. First, a person may not be convicted for 
an act or omission that was not a criminal offence under any written law at the time of the act or 
omission. Secondly, the penalty for the offence must be prescribed by written law, and thirdly, 
no penalty shall be imposed that is heavier than the penalty that was in force at the time of the act 
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underemphasise the seriousness of the rape’.   





or omission.146 These requirements – or the principle they enshrine ‒ formed the basis for 
abolishing customary criminal law in Nigeria.147  
There are also protections for human dignity under s 34(1) of the Constitution. Paragraph 
(a) thereof guarantees every individual respect for the dignity of his or her person and prohibits 
‘torture, or … inhuman or degrading treatment’, amongst other forms of treatment it considers 
adverse to human dignity. However, unlike Nigeria’s first two Constitutions, the 1999 
Constitution omits ‘punishment’ from the phraseology of its human dignity clause.148  The 
omission raises pertinent questions.  Why were protections against inhuman or degrading 
punishments dropped from latter versions of the Nigerian Constitution? Does this mean that the 
Constitution no longer guarantees protection against such punishment? Or, does the protection 
against inhuman or degrading treatment extend to punishment? 
An intuitive response to these questions could be that the word ‘treatment’ is elastic 
enough to include criminal punishment. In other words, the ambit of s 34(1)(a) extends to 
inhuman or degrading punishment.  Indeed, this seems to be the way that Nigerian courts have 
approached the ‘application’ of the provision, as will be demonstrated in the cases reviewed 
below.  It is also the manner that it is been approached in scholarly work. A 2010 doctoral 
dissertation149 gave attention to explaining the human dignity clause in Nigeria’s 1999 
Constitution. It placed reliance on the definition of torture in Article 1 of the International 
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 
order to illustrate that ‘torture’, ‘cruel’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading treatment or punishment’ 
differentiated between intensities in state-inflicted suffering and how to evaluate the state’s use 
                                                          
146 Okwonkwo & Naish op cit note 5 at 41; s 36(8) of the 1999 Constitution states that ‘No person shall be held to 
be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute 
such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence heavier than the penalty in force at the 
time the offence was committed’. Section 36(12) of the Constitution also states that ‘… a person shall not be 
convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty therefor is prescribed in a written law, 
and in this subsection, a written law refers to an Act of the National Assembly or a Law of a State, any subsidiary 
legislation or instrument under the provisions of a law. See Malizu v Commissioner of Police (1978) 2 LRN 252 CA 
at 256, where the court of appeal described a sentence imposed by the trial court as an ‘illegal sentence’ because it 
‘was not a sentence according to law’. 
147 See discussion on this in section 3.4.2 above. 
148 The corresponding provision in the repealed 1979 Constitution is similarly worded. 
149 Livinus Ifeanyichuku Uzoukwu Constitutionalism, Human Rights and the Judiciary in Nigeria (Unpublished 





of such suffering. However, the dissertation failed to pay attention to Article 1’s exclusion of 
‘pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions’ – a description 
that apparently excludes judicial punishment - from the scope of its definition of torture.   
The thesis also cited the decision of Nigeria’s Court of Appeal in Ozoukwu v Ezeonu II150 
where the court engaged in a careful exercise of defining the key words in s 31(1) of the 1979 
Constitution (corresponding to s 34(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The key words in the provision 
are torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, slavery and servitude. Tobi JCA, as he then was, 
defined ‘dignity’ to mean ‘being degraded at least in one’s exalted estimation of his social status 
or societal standing’, and ‘torture’ to mean subjecting “a person to some form of pain which 
could be extreme’ or ‘to some form of anguish or excessive pain’. Such acts could involve 
physical brutalization or mental torture that impairs a person’s ability to think and act rationally. 
His Lordship also defined ‘inhuman’ to mean treatment that is barbarous, or uncouth, or cruel, 
lacking in human feeling on the part of the inflictor; and ‘degrading treatment’ to mean treatment 
that lowers a person’s social standing, value, or character. Slavery and servitude were held to 
mean the condition of being enslaved, or of being subjected to ‘irksome conditions like a slave’.  
What the court clearly did not do in Ozoukwu is explain how the interpretation it offered 
extended to punishment. Yet the dissertation relied on these definitions to suggest that 
punishment that is unduly excessive length or severity, or disproportionate having regard to the 
seriousness of the offence may be torture. Clearly, Article 1 of the Torture Convention refutes 
such an imputation. Further, the dissertation cited authorities to the effect that ‘punishment that is 
totally out of tune with contemporary society may be regarded as being offensive to human 
dignity’ or that inflicting punishment selectively or discriminatorily may be ‘cruel or amount to 
torture’.151  That may well be, but the basis for extrapolating conduct that fall under the 
definition of torture under the Convention against Torture to instances of judicial punishment has 
a weak or non-existent jurisprudential basis.  Having conflated treatment and punishment, the 
dissertation went on to discuss how convicted offenders are subjected to inhuman prison 
                                                          
150 (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt 200) 708.  





conditions post-sentence, as if this in itself, were an example of judicial sentences that violate 
human dignity protections.  
The application of s 34(1) of the 1999 Constitution to judicial punishment has taken place 
without a proper elucidation of the text of the provision. In the development of Nigeria’s 
constitutional jurisprudence and scholarship, this omission of ‘punishment’ from the text of the 
human dignity clause in the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions appears to have gone unnoticed when 
Nigeria changed Constitutions.152  The omission and the fact that it has gone largely unnoticed in 
application of the clause under the 1999 Constitution,153 raise the question regarding what the 
actual intention of the drafters of the Constitution is.  It is a valid question: the argument has been 
made that the recognition of the right to life and the death penalty is a contradiction in Nigeria’s 
Constitution.154  Could the drafters of the Constitution have dropped ‘punishment’ from the 
human dignity clause in order to foreclose the death penalty or other statutory penalties from 
being contested as inhuman and degrading?   The 1979 and 1999 Constitutions were both 
bequeathed by military administrations, in what could be said to be consistent with the political 
rationality of a dictatorial regime that invented different forms of harsh punishment to exert 
maximum control.  Could this have had anything to do with the how the clauses in both 
Constitutions were framed?   
Unfortunately, answers to the above questions may not be easy to come by, but they 
suggest that it may not be jurisprudentially right to assume, in the context of the evolution of 
Nigeria’s constitutional and penal jurisprudence, that treatment also connotes judicial sentence or 
criminal punishment.  A comparison of human dignity clauses and their interpretation in other 
Constitutions could be further damaging to the assumption that treatment also connotes 
punishment in Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution.155 For example, the provision of the South African 
                                                          
152 The researcher did not find any judicial decisions from Nigeria that treat the subject. 
153 See for example, Onuoha Kalu v The State [1998] 13 NWLR 531.  This case is the locus classicus on the death 
penalty in Nigeria. It is discussed below. 
154 Onyekachi Wisdom Ceazer Duru ‘The constitutionality of the death penalty under Nigerian law’ (2012) available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2142981, accessed 25 March 2014. 
155 On this point, Nigeria’s National Human Rights Commission offered an interpretation that suggests the provision 
applies to torture or other maltreatment at the hand of state officials or agencies who act in non-judicial capacity, in 
furtherance of their administrative responsibilities. The report interprets the constitutional provision in the light of 





Constitution that corresponds to the Nigerian provision is s 12(1)(e). It prohibits ‘cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment’. The Zimbabwean156 and Namibian157 Constitutions 
contain provisions similar to the South African Provision. According to the Supreme Courts of 
Zimbabwe and Namibia, the words ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ must 
be construed disjunctively, meaning cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is to be differentiated 
from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. The adjectives and nouns are capable of further 
combinations, producing phrases like cruel treatment, inhuman treatment, degrading punishment, 
etc. This interpretation essentially separates treatment from punishment; indeed, it contemplates 
‘punishment’ as a judicial sentence, a distinction that the Zimbabwean Supreme Court affirmed 
when it reasoned that ‘treatment has a different connotation from punishment’.158 However, 
treatment and punishment may sometimes be conflated, as the concurring opinion in Namibian 
Supreme Court case of Ex Parte Attorney-General: In Re Corporal Punishment by Organs of 
State159 appeared to have done. Such conflation and the confusion that may arise from it ought to 
be avoided because ‘treatment’ and ‘punishment’ are fundamentally different concepts, as will 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
attention to treatment per se. See National Human Rights Commission The State of Human Rights in Nigeria (2007) 
Ch 2, available at http://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/resources, accessed 12 April 2014.  
156 Section 15(1) of the 1980 Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that ‘[n]o person shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment'. The 1880 Constitution has been replaced by the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013. Section 53 thereof provides that ‘no person may be 
subjected to physical or psychological torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. The right 
to respect and protection for one’s inherent dignity is provided for in section 51. 
157 Article 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia provides that ‘[t]he dignity of all persons shall be 
inviolable’ and that ‘[i]n any judicial proceedings or in other proceedings before any organ of the State, and during 
the enforcement of a penalty, respect for human dignity shall be guaranteed’. Section 8(2)(b) provides that ‘[n]o 
persons shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. 
158 See S v Ncube, S v Ntshuma, S v Ndhlovu 1988 (2) SA 702 (ZS) at 715C-D, where the Zimbabwean Supreme 
Court held that s 15(1) of the 1980 Zimbabwean Constitution ‘places prohibitions against (i) torture; (ii) inhuman 
punishment; (iii) degrading punishment; (iv) inhuman treatment; and (v) degrading treatment’. Thus, the court 
differentiated treatment from punishment.  However, it observed that treatment could also connote the circumstances 
under which an imposed sentence is served. Thus, the conditions under which a prison sentence is served could be 
described as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, while punishment would specifically refer to the range of 
penalties that a court may impose.  In Ex Parte Attorney-General: In Re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State 
1991 Nr 178 (Sc) at 187 paras G-H, the Namibian Supreme Court also construed the prohibition disjunctively. 
According to the court, ‘it seems clear that the words ... [torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment] have to be read disjunctively. Thus read, the section seeks to protect citizens from seven different 
conditions [namely]: (a) torture; (b) cruel treatment; (c) cruel punishment; (d) inhuman treatment; (e) inhuman 
punishment; (f) degrading treatment; [and] (g) degrading punishment.’ 
159 Supra note 158. Berker CJ at 192I-193A of the judgment directed his mind to considering whether corporal 





be shown shortly. The majority’s approach in Ex Parte Attorney-General, of interpreting the 
words disjunctively ought to be taken as the authoritative statement on the subject.160  
In S v Williams,161 South Africa’s Constitutional Court followed these precedents as well 
as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which treated punishment as a 
judicial sentence. The court also relied on decisions of the United States Supreme Court in 
Forman v Georgia162 and Gregg v Georgia,163 to the effect that the preservation of human 
dignity underlies prohibitions against ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ under the United States 
Constitution. At issue in the American cases was whether the death penalty violated the Eighth164 
and Fourteenth165 Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Gregg v Georgia 
particularly, the court held, relying on Furman v Georgia and a host of its other decisions, that 
since the death penalty was recognized in the Fourteenth Amendment, the penalty, 
notwithstanding prohibitions of cruel and unusual punishments under the Eighth Amendment, 
did ‘not invariably violate the [C]onstitution’, [or] ‘was not invalid per se’.166 The death penalty 
was not ipso facto a ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ within the meaning ascribed to those words 
by the Eight Amendment. That is, it did not violate ‘the Constitutional concept of cruelty’.167 
However, the court did acknowledge circumstances under which the penalty would infringe the 
                                                          
160 In South African jurisprudence, the adjectives in the prohibition against being ‘treated or punished in a cruel, 
inhuman or degrading way’ are also disjunctively construed. See S v Dodo supra note 100 at 403 paras B-D. 
161 1999 (3) SA 632 at 639 paras A-E & 640 para J- 641 para D; the Constitutional Court observed that international 
law jurisprudence associated prohibitions of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment with the prohibition of torture.  
It noted definitions by the European Commission on Human Rights, which describe inhuman treatment as treatment 
‘that causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which in the particular situation is unjustifiable' and view 
torture as 'an aggravated form of inhuman treatment'. On inhuman and degrading punishments however, the 
Constitutional Court resorted to the European Court’s decision in Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 
5856/72 (decided on 25 April 1978), which generally regarded punishment as the aftermath of a judicial sentence. It 
is also noteworthy that the definition of torture under Article 1(1) of the United Nations Convention against Torture 
and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment excludes ‘pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions’. Thus, any form of ‘punishment’ that is imposed outside compliance 
with a lawful order of court, such as a criminal sentence, would not be regarded as criminal punishment.   
162 408 U.S. 238. 
163 428 U.S. 153.  
164 The Eight Amendment provides that ‘Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted’. See US Constitution online, available at 
http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html, accessed 22 July 2013. 
165 Paragraph 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part, that the state shall not deprive ‘any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law’. See US Constitution online, available at 
http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html, accessed July 22 2013. 
166 Gregg v Georgia supra note 163 at 170.  





Eighth Amendment. 168 For instance, punishment would be cruel if the means by which it was 
carried out employed ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’, or the punishment was 
‘grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime’.169 These considerations, the court held, 
constitute the overarching principles of punishment and may be moderated by ‘evolving 
standards of decency’ as society progresses towards maturity.170   
An argument could be advanced that even if the Constitutions of Namibia, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe had not used the words ‘treatment’ and ‘punishment’ in their respective human 
dignity clauses but only used ‘treatment’, the courts could still have found treatment elastic 
enough to mean punishment. It would difficult to imagine what the courts would done in that 
circumstance, but one would at least expect that the courts would elaborate a careful textual, 
contextual and purposive justification to why treatment should also mean punishment in the 
context of their respective Constitutions, as they have done with the extant texts. In Nigeria, 
courts have not offered such rationalisations in connection with s 36(1) of Nigeria’s 1999 
Constitution and its 1979 forebear. Indeed, it does not also appear that they have been alert to the 
textual differences in the foreign Constitutions they have referred to on the matter and how the 
courts in those countries interpreted the texts. But perhaps one may excuse this. Real 
opportunities to do so have been few, and emerged from constitutional challenges to the death 
penalty. As noted above, in Onuoha Kalu v The State,171 Nigeria’s Supreme Court held that the 
death penalty did not violate the human dignity clause in Nigeria’s 1979 Constitution. The court 
presumed that ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ in s 31(1)(a) of the Constitution (s 34(1)(a) of 
the 1999 Constitution), meant inhuman or degrading punishment. It made no attempt whatsoever 
to inquire into what ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ meant within the context of Nigeria’s 
Constitution, or inquire into the nature of protections intended by the provision. The court ought 
to have made that enquiry and examined the historical context of the provision, as the South 
African Constitutional Court did in Makwanyane. The Court also ought to have paid particular 
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attention to the fact that Nigeria’s first two Constitutions172 contained specific prohibitions 
against cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments, which were tellingly excluded by the 
military administrations that bequeathed the latter Constitutions.  Alas, the court missed the 
opportunity for a textual, contextual and purposive analysis of the Constitution’s human dignity 
clause.173 
A more recent opportunity to interpret the phrase arose in the Supreme Court case of 
Joseph Amoshima v The State,174 which also dwelt on whether the death penalty could be 
classified as an inhuman and degrading treatment, and hence constitutionally prohibited.  In 
order to prompt the court to resolve this question, the appellant raised an issue as to whether 
having regard to the adjudicatory powers conferred on the court under s 6 of the 1999 
Constitution, a statutory mandatory penalty did not violate the constitutional doctrine of the 
separation of powers. It was a very pertinent question as it challenged the court to determine 
whether its discretion could be fettered by a mandatory statutory penalty that potentially impedes 
the court’s ability to do justice, having regard to the circumstances of the case. Unfortunately, the 
court missed the point, turning instead, its attention on the constitutionality of the death penalty 
and offering a very restrictive view of the separation of powers.  Accordingly, the court affirmed 
that the death penalty could not be said to be inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning 
ascribed to the word under the constitution. This would suggest that the penalty was not 
disproportionate to the crime of robbing with a firearm. Regardless of the circumstances of the 
crime, courts were obligated to apply the penalty. Secondly, the court held that a legislature acts 
                                                          
172 The argument has been advanced that neither the 1960 nor 1963 Constitutions of Nigeria were autochthonous, 
because both (though the later was indirect) derived from imperial authority.  Notwithstanding colonial antecedents 
that may challenge the democratic credentials of both Constitutions, it may be contended that both were adopted 
after a democratic process in which citizens freely participated. This is very much unlike the 1979 and 1999 
Constitutions, which though autochthonous, were essentially decreed by military administrations. See BO Nwabueze 
Military Rule and Constitutionalism (1992) 341-349; Helen Chapin Metz ‘Nigeria: A country study’ in Martin P 
Mathews (ed) Nigeria: Current History and Historical background (2002) 81 at 107. For a history of Nigerian 
Constitutions, see BO Nwabueze A Constitutional History of Nigeria (1982).  
173 The court came to these conclusions after reviewing a host of foreign decisions, including S v Makwanyane supra 
note 32.  The court’s failure to interpret s 34(1)(a) may be attributed to the narrow approach that was adopted on the 
question of the constitutionality of the death penalty. Had the question been raised for instance, whether the death 
penalty was proportionate to the crime for which the accused was charged, the court might have considered whether 
the proportionality principle could be a basis for determining the constitutionality of any number of statutory 
penalties in Nigeria. It may also have considered the meaning and adequacy of protection provided by s 34(1)(a). 





within the ambit of its constitutional obligation when it enacts a mandatory penalty and that 
courts had no discretion with regard to such penalties (to entertain questions, for instance, as to 
whether or not the penalties are proportionate). According to Fabiyi JSC, there are no escape 
routes where such legislation is involved.175 In effect, Amoshima enunciated the principle that no 
separation of powers doctrine is violated when the legislature decides that courts will not 
exercise discretion in sentencing.176 This principle unduly whittles down the constitutional 
powers of courts to censure statutory penalties that are unduly disproportionate. It is contrary to 
the position in South African, where courts have vigorously opposed mandatory sentences that 
impose limitations on judicial discretion.177 
Even though the Supreme Court adopted a rigid position in Amoshima, it is noteworthy 
that it acknowledged ‘that the death penalty may be ... degrading...”.178 The statement may 
indicate a judicial softening of posture on the issue, or the court’s openness to foreign 
jurisprudence that associate the death penalty with human dignity violations. It may also indicate 
that the court may not be very averse to its abolition.179  Similar sentiments were expressed in 
2014 by the Court of Appeal in Alaba Olagunju v The State180 when Sotonye Johnson-West JCA 
said he ‘would … seek for the … death sentence to be commuted to life imprisonment … in line 
with global trends … which has seen to the abolishment of the death sentence statutes in many 
climes’. He said further that ‘it is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that 
everyone has … [a] right to life, even those who commit murder; sentencing a person to death … 
violates that right’. However, the death sentences in both cases were upheld.  In Amoshima 
particularly, the court held that the punishment cannot be said to be degrading or cruel when it is 
recognised by law.  A constitutional amendment may therefore be necessary before the penalty 
can be regarded as a degrading violation of the right to life, and for judicial sentiments that have 
been expressed against the penalty to crystallise into mainstream jurisprudence on the subject in 
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177 See Van Zyl Smit op cit note 14 at 49-11 – 49-17. 
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Nigeria. The same would apply to other forms of punishment that offend human dignity, because 
they are inherently offensive or grossly disproportionate. However, until a constitutional review 
of punishments happens, judges, lawyers and legal scholars must find innovative ways to 
advance protections for human dignity in the context of sentencing.  
A way to start this is to adopt the reasoning advanced in the American cases discussed 
above and to begin interrogating whether the methods of executing a judicial sentence, or the 
proportion between crime and punishment, are consistent with human dignity protections under 
the Nigerian Constitution. Several penal laws in Nigeria provide a basis for such enquiry; the 
criminal codes in Northern and Southern Nigeria recognize corporal punishments,181 while the 
twelve Nigerian states182 that operate sharia criminal codes have added amputations and death by 
stoning to the list for offences like stealing, adultery and rape. The development regarding sharia 
poses two challenges. One, and if one assumes that the protection afforded human dignity by the 
Nigerian Constitution is vague and imprecise, sharia institutionalizes punishments that may 
violate Nigeria’s international human rights obligations. Secondly, it instates a discriminatory 
system of punishment, as it purports to subject a section of the Nigerian population to a harsher 
penal regime. Besides sharia however, the number of statutory offences for which the death 
penalty can be imposed has increased, following the adoption of kidnapping laws in some states 
in Nigeria.183 Any challenge against the death penalty under these laws has to question whether 
the penalty is proportionate to the crimes in question. Hypothetically, and to use the judicial 
reasoning in the Gregg case,184 it may be argued that the manner in which such a challenge may 
be resolved may depend partly on whether the crimes fall within the degree of gravity that has 
                                                          
181 See s 17 of the Criminal Code Act Chapter 77 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 and s 68 of the Penal Code 
Law.  
182 There are 36 states in Nigeria. The states that have adopted Sharia law are 12 in number. They are states where 
Muslims claim dominance.  
183 On this subject, see Peter A. Anyebe, ‘Sentencing in criminal cases in Nigeria and the case for paradigmatic 
shifts’ NIALS Journal of Criminal Law and Justice Vol. 1 (2011) 151-196 at 160-161; the researcher notes that the 
Kano State Sharia Penal Code 2000 creates offences that are punishable by the death sentence. In the southern states 
of Abia, Imo and Akwa Ibom States, kidnaping is punishable by death.  In Enugu and Rivers states, crude oil theft 
and crude oil bunkering are punishable with death.  
184 In Gregg v Georgia supra note 163 at 177, the Supreme Court of the United States of America held that imposing 
the death penalty for the crime of murder had a history of acceptance and precedent in American society that 
strongly negated a constitutional challenge that it violated the Eighth Amendment. It follows that the cruelty that the 





been traditionally regarded as warranting the imposition of the death penalty in Nigeria.185  A 
second approach, which is discussed in section 4.4.3 below, would challenge methods of 
execution that are inherently painful as to suggest a disproportionality that goes against the core 
of protections for human dignity.186   
 
4.4.2 Punishment and Human Dignity: The African Charter as a Probable Normative 
Basis  
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981 (the Charter) goes further than the 
Nigerian Constitution in securing the right to human dignity. In 1983, Nigeria domesticated the 
Charter by enacting the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and 
                                                          
185 On this account, the sentencing by sharia courts, of two Muslim women, Safiya Hussaini and Amina Lawal, to 
death by stoning following convictions for adultery can be said to be unconstitutional. The challenge may be on two 
grounds. First, the sentence is disproportionate to the alleged crimes, as the death penalty has never been 
traditionally imposed for such crimes in Nigeria. Secondly, the method of execution, which is by stoning, involves a 
cruel and potentially prolonged process. Unfortunately, the constitutionality of the sanction for the sharia law crime 
of adultery has not been subjected to judicial determination. The convictions and sentences for Hussaini and Lawal 
were eventually quashed on technical grounds, in a process that Kamari Clarke has described as illustrating the 
internal capacity of sharia law to self-reform. What she did not consider however, is the question of the 
constitutionality of the death penalty for adultery. See Kamari Maxine Clarke Fictions of Justice: The International 
Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (2009) 206-214. One could also argue, 
in relation to new kidnapping laws in Nigeria, that the capital sentence is grossly disproportionate, because it lacks a 
long history of acceptance and judicial precedent. See also United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘Civil and 
Political Rights, Including Religious Intolerance: Report of the Special Rapporteur of Freedom of Religion or Belief, 
Asma Jahangie – Mission to Nigeria’ E/CN.4/2006/5/Add.2. 
186 S v Dodo supra note 99. What may have been a step in this direction was taken recently in an unreported case, 
when the applicants in James Ajulu and Others v Attorney-General, Lagos State Unreported Suit No. ID/76M/2008 
of 29 June 2012, challenged the constitutionality of death penalty execution methods, namely hanging and the firing 
squad, which they argued were in violation of the constitutional prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. The court was persuaded by the applicants’ argument on this point, but relied on the wrong authorities to 
issue injunctions against the methods.  Its reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Peter Nemi v Attorney-General 
of Lagos State (1996) 6 NWLR 587, was flawed, because the core issue in that case dwelt on the failure to carry out 
a death sentence eight years after it was imposed, and the detention of the appellant in inhumane prison conditions 
while the delay to execute the sentence lasted. Indeed, the court in Ajulu relied on obiter in Peter Nemi which 
queried whether executing a death sentence by a slow, cruelly painful method could be constitutional. Besides, the 
Ajulu decision overlooked a trail of Supreme Court authorities such as Onuoha Kalu v The State supra note 153 and 
Okoro v State [1998] 14 NWLR 181, where different justices expressed dicta on whether the method of execution 
could be challenged, with a majority of the panel in Kalu severally relying on foreign decisions that clearly 
determined that the death penalty and the method of executing it – referring specifically to hanging ‒ could not be 
challenged where the Constitution reserved a qualified right to life. Further, the Ajulu decision perpetuates the error 
of assuming the prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment applies to judicial punishment.  In view of 
conflicting obiter, this researcher is of the opinion that the issue should have been referred to the Supreme Court of 






Enforcement) Act.187 The Act annexes the entire Charter, transforming its entire provisions into 
national law. The Act’s legal status came under consideration in Abacha and Others v 
Fawehinmi188 where Nigeria’s Supreme Court affirmed the supremacy of the Constitution over 
the Act. With regards to other municipal legislation however, the Act will prevail in the event of 
a conflict. The court held that the Act’s pre-eminence is guaranteed by the presumption that the 
legislature will not legislate in breach of an international obligation.189   
Article 5 of the Charter (as incorporated) affirms amongst others, the right to human 
dignity and prohibits ‘[a]ll forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly ... torture, 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment…’ The interpretation of the phrase by the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (the Commission) has been considerably 
influenced by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. For example, in 
Hurilaws v Nigeria,190 the Commission relied on the decision of the European Court of Human 
                                                          
187 No 2 of 1983, Chapter A9, Laws of Federation of Nigeria 2004. By virtue of s 12 of the 1999 Constitution, 
treaties become enforceable in Nigeria only when they have been enacted into municipal law. 
188 (2001) AHRLR 172 (NgSC 2000). 
189 Ibid at para 15; almost in the same breadth, however, the court held that the validity of a domestic legislation is 
not ‘necessarily affected by the mere fact that it violates the African Charter or any other treaty’.  It relied on a 
United States decision in Chae Chan Ping v United States 130 U.S. 581 (1889) which held that treaties did not have 
‘higher dignity than Acts of Congress’.  Given that a domestication statute and other Acts of Congress are enacted 
by the same body exercising sovereign legislative powers, the court must be presumed to mean that only those 
provisions of a domestic statute that violate the provisions of African Charter Ratification Act would be void. 
However, where the main object of the domestic statute or its entire provisions violate the Charter, the conflict 
would perhaps be resolved in a manner that is analogous to the situation under the English Human Rights Act, 
which permits an English court to declare a domestic law to be inconsistent with rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, without impeaching the validity or enforceability of the same.  A declaration of 
inconsistency would then serve as an advice to parliament for legislative amendment.  A legislature’s response to 
such declaration could be to amend the local legislation to bring it into conformity with the treaty, but it may also 
repeal the domestication act, as the court pointed out in the Abacha case. However, as long as the inconsistency 
lingers, courts may be unable to issue more than declaratory reliefs. While there are no statutory provisions in 
Nigeria that have the same effect as these stipulations in the English Human Rights Act, the Abacha case may have 
the same effect. Indeed, the court acknowledged (obviously affirming Nigeria’s legislative sovereignty) that a 
subsequent Act of the legislature may repeal the ratification law, in which case the presumption that the legislature 
would not legislate out of Nigeria’s international obligation will be rebutted by an expressly worded legislative 
intention to do so. See Chinonye Obiagwu & Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, ‘Nigeria: Combating legacies of colonialism 
and militarism’ in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (ed.) Human Rights under African Constitutions: Realising the 
Promise for Ourselves(2003) 211-250; Edwin Egede ‘Bringing human rights home: An examination of the 
domestication of human rights treaties in Nigeria’ (2007) Vol. 15 No. 2 Journal of African Law 249-284; Magnus 
Killander & Horace Adjolohoun ‘International Law and domestic human rights litigation in Africa: An introduction’ 
in Magnus Killander (ed.) International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa, (2010) 3-22 at 13-14. 
But see also A.O Enabulele ‘Implementation of treaties in Nigeria and the status question: Whither Nigerian courts?’ 
(2009) 12 RADIC 326. 





Rights in Ireland v United Kingdom, which interpreted a similar prohibition in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, to find that the detention of Mr Ifowodo and Mr Agbokoba by the 
State Security Service, and the treatment meted out to them while under detention, constituted a 
violation of the protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  
It must be noted that the focus in Hurilaws v Nigeria was the poor treatment meted out to 
the nominal complainants by state security services, rather than on judicial punishment.   In its 
several other decisions, however, it does appear that the Commission has not maintained a 
particularly useful distinction between ‘punishment’ and ‘treatment’. Some of these decisions 
have rightly interpreted article 5 as applying to the treatment of prisoners or detainees during 
periods of incarceration (as the European Court has consistently done),191 and there have been 
instances where the Commission rightly extended the meaning of ‘treatment’ to the method of 
executing a death sentence.192 It does appear that one of the few complaints in which the 
Commission has dealt specifically with the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading 
                                                          
191 In this regard, see decisions of the African Commission in the following Communications: Communications 
27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93 Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture and Association Internationale des juristes 
Democrates) Commission Internationale des Juristes (C.I.J) Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme/Rwanda; 
64/92 Krischna Achutan (On behalf of Aleke Banda); Communication 68/92 Amnesty International on behalf of 
Orton and Vera Chirwa 78/92 Amnesty International on behalf of Orton and Vera Chirwa v. Malawi;  
Communication 143/95, 150/96 Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organisation/ Nigeria; 
Communication 151/96 Civil Liberties Organization/Nigeria; Communications 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93 Amnesty 
International vs/Sudan, Comité Loosli Bachelard vs/Sudan, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights vs/Sudan, 
Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa vs/Sudan. See also Communication 279/03-
296/05 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) / Sudan; 
Communication 266/03 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al / Cameroon. 
192 This use emerged in Communications 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97, 210/98 Malawi African Association 
vs/Mauritania; Amnesty International vs/Mauritania; Ms. Sarr Diop, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme 
and RADDHO vs/Mauritania; Collectif des Veuves et Ayants-droit vs/Mauritania; Association that Mauritanienne 
des Droits de l’Homme vs/Mauritania. One of the allegations was that three military officers convicted of 
involvement in a court plot were executed pursuant to a judicial order. Their execution was staged to ensure slow 
and cruel death.  The Commission returned a general finding that the several allegations of ‘torture, cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment forms of treatment’ were established. However, it would have enhanced clarity on the 
subject if the Commission had made a specific pronouncement on the sentence itself, or the manner in which it was 
executed.  Note also, the 2011 decision of the Commission in Communication 334/06 Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights and Interights v Arab Republic of Egypt. The Commission was asked to hold that the sentence of 
death by hanging, given the way it was implemented by Egyptian authorities, violated the prohibition against cruel 
punishments.  The Commission made general findings that the alleged violation of article 5 had been proved and 
that there had indeed been violations, but it made no specific findings regarding death by hanging, the tortuous 
details of which the complainants had described.  However, the Commission held the opinion that death penalty 






punishment is Curtis Francis Doebbler v Sudan,193 where it held that corporal punishments are 
acts of physical violence that amounted to ‘state sponsored torture’ and violated article 5 of the 
Charter. The Commission’s approach to interpreting this provision has relied on the principle 
that ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment or treatment’ should be extended to confer ‘the 
widest possible protection against abuse…’194  
The Commission’s approach may be pragmatic, but it is not very jurisprudentially 
helpful. There is much more that the Commission can do to develop the meaning and protections 
afforded by article 5. At the moment, its jurisprudence on the provision is rudimentary. That is 
not to say that the Commission’s approach does not offer Nigerian courts guidance. At the least, 
it offers a principle for impugning punishments that have an intrinsic element of excessive force 
or pain.195 However, greater clarity is needful.  
 
4.4.3 Between the Constitution and the African Charter Ratification Act: Making the 
Human Dignity Protection More Meaningful 
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of s 34(1)(a), there may yet be a way of reading a prohibition 
against inhuman and degrading punishment into the Nigerian Constitution.  To start with, s 34(1) 
guarantees protection for human dignity, but leaves the content of the right open to 
interpretation. However, in paragraph (a) of subsection (1), the Constitution comes down to the 
specifics by excluding measures that amount to ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ – amongst 
others ‒ from the protection afforded by the human dignity clause.  The listed prohibitions in s 
34(1) are hardly exhaustive of measures that infringe the constitutional protection for human 
dignity.  Human dignity is an important value; it has aptly been interpreted as the essence of the 
entire system of rights, or as finding expression in every right in a Bill of Rights.196 This quality 
permits reliance to be placed on statutory enactments that contain more robust or more 
                                                          
193 See Communication 236/200.  
194 Communication 225/98 Hurilaws v Nigeria. 
195 Examples will be corporal punishments under statutory and sharia criminal codes, and stoning to death and 
amputations under sharia. 
196 See Arthur Chaskalson ‘Dignity as a constitutional value: A South African perspective’ (2011) Vol. 26 No 5 AM. 





comprehensive protections for human dignity, such as the African Charter Ratification Act,197 for 
the purpose of giving full meaning and expression to the constitutional intendment behind the 
protection of human dignity. Accordingly, the argument would be that the Ratification Act’s 
prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments is consistent with protections for human 
dignity under the Constitution. To foreclose such recourse would be so constrictive as to render 
the constitutional protection for human dignity largely ineffectual.198 
Support for this argument can be found in a number of judicial decisions that have 
applied the golden rule of statutory interpretation to constitutional provisions in Nigeria. The 
golden rule requires words in statutory provisions to be given their ordinary meaning, unless the 
words are vague, or a literal interpretation would cause an absurdity. The court may then refrain 
from applying the literal meaning and resort to other aids in order to reconstruct the true 
legislative intendment behind the legislation.199 The rule is consistent with, or ‘subsumed’ by the 
purposive approach to interpretation.200 In a recent decision, Mohammed Buba Marwa v 
Independent National Electoral Commission,201 the Nigerian Supreme Court relied on principles 
of interpretation that were developed in earlier decisions of the court. Three of these principles 
are particularly relevant to the present purpose. First, a constitutional provision is not to be 
interpreted in a way that ‘defeats its evident purpose’; secondly, and beyond bland adherence to 
the literal meaning of words, the principles that undergird the provisions of the Constitution 
should ‘measure the purpose and scope of its provisions’; and thirdly, ‘the words of the 
constitution [should not] be read with “stultifying narrowness”’.202 In essence, the language 
employed by the Constitution should be reasonably and purposively construed according to the 
                                                          
197 Ibid at 1384-1385. It has been contended that human dignity is a vacuous unbounded concept that lacks a precise 
form or meaning. Nevertheless, judges – South African judges in particular - have consistently regarded the clause 
as providing a normative value system for interpreting constitutional provisions and developing the law. 
198  The United States Supreme Court decision in Gregg v Georgia supra provides persuasive authority for Nigerian 
courts to reject excessive punishments or punishments that apply inherently cruel methods, on the basis that they 
violate human dignity. 
199 Christo J Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 4 ed (2005) 47; the author discusses the 
aids in two categories: secondary aids, comprising the long title to the statute and the headings of its chapters and 
sections: and where secondary aids are inadequate, tertiary aids, consisting of common law presumptions.  
200 Andrew J Burger A Guide to Legislative Drafting in South Africa  (2001?) 25-26. 
201 Unreported suit no. SC. 41/2011, SC.266/2011, SC.267/2011, SC.282/2011, SC.356/2011, SC.357/2011, 
available at http://easylawonline.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/inec-28012012-2.pdf, accessed August 8, 2013; the 
judgment was delivered on January 27, 2012.  





underlying principles of the Constitution. Absurd interpretations ought to be avoided.203  Upon 
this reasoning then, it may be contended that reading a prohibition against cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishments into the Constitution’s human dignity clause is consistent with the 
constitutional intent behind protections for human rights in the Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution as a whole. It avoids the absurdity of a Bill of Rights that is ineffectual against 
inhuman or degrading punishments.   
The above argument is strengthened by a 2009 regulation, the Fundamental Rights 
(Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 204  which calls on courts to ‘expansively and purposely’205 
interpret and apply the human rights guaranteed in the Constitution and the Ratification Act in a 
manner that is consistent with the international jurisprudence on the subject, and ‘with a view to 
advancing and realizing the rights and freedoms’ in the instruments, ‘affording the protections 
intended by them’.206 Courts are to advance and not restrict rights, and may call in aid the 
provisions of ‘municipal, regional and international bills of rights’.207 These are very 
empowering statements. Through purposive interpretation, Nigerian Courts can give robust 
content to the Constitution’s human dignity provision by affirming the prohibition of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishments to be consistent therewith. They may then assume 
jurisdiction to examine and override statutes that prescribe punishments that fit the epithets. 
 
                                                          
203 Ibid. 
204 See Killander & Adjolohoun op cit note 189 at 16; see also Ebenezer Durojaiye ‘Litigating the right to health in 
Nigeria: Challenges and prospects’ in Magnus Killander & Horace Adjolohoun (eds.) International Law and 
Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa (2010) 149-171 at 159; author writes that Nigerian courts increasingly 
apply and enforce the African charter. According to Dakas, the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 
2009 ‘reinforces the imperative of comparative jurisprudence’. Nigerian courts should give effect to the rulings of 
international human rights bodies. See Dakas CJ Dakas ‘Judicial reform of the legal framework for human rights 
litigation in Nigeria: Novelties and Perplexities’ being an enlarged and updated text of an earlier invited paper 
delivered at a training organised by the national secretariat of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), at Osogbo, Osun 
State, on February 21, 2012. 
205 Paragraph 3 of the Rules’ preamble. 
206 Ibid. 





 4.4.4 The Statutory Framework for Sentencing in Nigeria 
Generally, and by virtue of ss 270, 300, 366, 435 and 436 of the Criminal Procedure Act,208 
punishments that may be imposed by a court of law include forfeiture, restitution of stolen 
property, the death sentence, imprisonment, caning, fine and probation.  The power to impose 
these punishments is subject to the provisions of any written law relating to specific offences. 
These laws include the Criminal and Penal Codes and a host of criminal statutes.209 A sentence 
of imprisonment with or without the option of fine is prescribed in most cases and prison 
sentences are with hard labour unless the court specifies otherwise.210 That said, sentencing 
legislation in Nigeria offers a mixed regime of mandatory punishments, mandatory minimum 
punishments and maximum punishments. Mandatory punishments leave sentencers without 
discretion at all, and penal statutes that stipulate the death penalty or life sentence fall within this 
category.211 Some statutes prescribe a minimum212 or maximum punishment, 213 meaning a court 
may impose a penalty anywhere above the minimum, or somewhere below the maximum.214 A 
court would ordinarily construe a maximum penalty as allowing discretion to impose any 
quantum of punishment up to the stipulated maximum.215 Other provisions prescribe a range of 
minimum to maximum penalties below or above which a court may not impose sentence.216 
Although the Criminal Code does not specifically use the word ‘maximum’, s 17 of the 
Interpretation Act makes the penalties that are stipulated in the Code or other penal statute the 
                                                          
208 Chapter C41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
209 Anyebe op cit note 183 at 154-155. 
210 Under s 17(2)(b) of the Interpretation Act Chapter 192, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, a sentence of 
imprisonment shall be with hard labour, unless the court in its discretion decides otherwise. See section 377 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act Cap. In most cases, prison sentences are imposed. Where option of fine is included in the 
sentence, indigent offenders who cannot pay the fine serve the prison sentence. 
211 Examples can be found in s 2 of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act No. 5 of 1984 as amended by 
Act No. 28 of 1986.  A corresponding provision is ss 295 and 296(2) of the Lagos State Criminal Law 2011. 
212 Section 303(1)(a) of the Penal Code prescribes not less than 14 years’ imprisonment for robbery of brigandage 
committed with deadly weapon, or the commission of which results in grievous hurt, or such an attempt to cause 
grievous hurt is made.  
213 Provisions of the codes generally allow courts to impose prison sentences that may extend to a particular 
specified limit. For example, s 365 of the Penal Code Law, Cap 89 Laws of Kano State prescribes life imprisonment 
or less for forgery of a public seal. The penal code law is in pari materia with the Penal Code Law of Northern 
Nigeria. See Okwonkwo and Naish op cit note 5 at 41. 
214 See s 2(3) of the Robbery and Firearms Act 1984 and s 296(1) of the Lagos State Criminal Law 2011; See also s 
18 of the EFCC Act; See Okonkwo Okonkwo and Naish on Criminal Law in Nigeria (1980) 38 
215 See Dada v Customs and Excise Board 1982 (2) NCR 79 at 90-91. 
216 Section 2(1) of Robbery and Firearms Act 1984 prescribes a minimum of 14 years and maximum of 20 years for 
attempted robbery. Section 365 of the Penal Code Law of Kano State prescribes life imprisonment or less for 





maximum allowable, where minimum or mandatory sentences have not been specifically 
prescribed.217 
These penal provisions generally allow considerable sentencing discretion, subject of 
course to the court’s sentencing jurisdiction. However, some qualifiers may be needful. First, and 
as seen already, discretion is absent where mandatory punishments are prescribed, and there are 
crimes, perhaps too many, for which extreme penalties like the death penalty or life 
imprisonment must be imposed. Unfortunately, such crimes have grown in number, as a result of 
the adoption of sharia penal codes ‒ in parts of northern Nigeria ‒ and laws that punish 
kidnapping with death.218 For such crimes, some measure of sentencing discretion would have 
been desirable, if not necessary.  Secondly, some minimum sentences are so steep that they 
render discretion almost redundant.  They foreclose any meaningful judicial examination of the 
proportionality of the sentences.  It is therefore with regard to statutory maximum sentences that 
Nigerian courts may be said to enjoy any meaningfully wide discretion. What remains to be seen 
however, is whether the wide discretion that Nigerian courts enjoy has facilitated the 
development of sound principles regarding proportionality and consistency.   
 
4.4.5 Proportionality in Nigerian Sentences 
As suggested in this thesis, there is a presumption of constitutionality regarding statutes that 
prescribe penalties, which impedes judicial inquiry into the question of the proportionality of 
especially severe punishments. Probably the clearest view about how Nigerian courts utilize the 
proportionality principle comes from Godwin Josiah v The State,219  where the Supreme Court 
stated: 
[J]ustice is not a one-way traffic. It is not justice for the appellant only.  Justice is not even 
only a two-way traffic. It is really a three-way traffic ‒ justice for the appellant …, justice for 
the victim … and finally justice for the society at large - the society whose social norms and 
values have been desecrated and broken by the criminal act complained of.  
                                                          
217 Anyebe op cit note 183; the same can be said of the Penal Code in Northern Nigeria, in which most penalties are 
prescribed with the words ‘punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to …’ 
218 For example, the Lagos State Criminal Law 2011 has preserved and expanded the number of such crimes. States 
in south-south and northwest Nigeria have made kidnapping punishable with the death penalty. In Nigeria, sentences 
of death could be by hanging or firing squad.   





The quote succinctly states the triad as it ought to apply in Nigeria.  The triad comprises the 
offender, his victim and the state. However, it is not quite obvious how Nigerian courts balance 
these interests. It is usual for judgments to strenuously justify conviction and devote a few lines 
to pronouncing the court’s sentence.220 This is because trial courts are under no obligations to 
proffer reasons for the sentences they pronounce.221 There is indeed no constitutional or statutory 
obligation to do so,222 and questions about the constitutionality or proportionality of sentences, or 
regarding whether certain punishments violate human dignity under the Ratification Act, have 
not yet been effectively dealt with by the courts.223 As Okwonkwo and Naish224 observed, courts 
impose punishments ‘because it is the traditional one for that type of offence’ according to some 
legislatively predetermined tariff.  
Such an approach to sentencing is unhelpful. The ability of appellate courts to do 
substantial justice in appeals against sentences is impeded when trial courts do not offer reasons 
for the sentences they impose. Thus, in Ekpo v State225 the Supreme Court could only assume 
that the high court imposed the statutory maximum because it thought that was it was mandatory.  
                                                          
220 Magistrates shoulder the majority of cases that are litigated in Nigeria, making 70% altogether. This could well 
be the statistic for criminal trials in Nigeria. See Tahir Mamman ‘The Role of Magistrates in Perceptions about the 
rule of law and constitutionalism in Nigeria’ (2008) Vol. 9 Nigerian Law and Practice Journal 1-12 at 1. In a 
published compendium of a magistrate’s criminal judgments, about a sentence or two were devoted to pronouncing 
the punishment imposed by the court. In a couple of instances, the magistrate advanced deterrence as the basis of the 
imposed punishment, without elaboration. See Alfred Awala The Nigerian Magistrate in Action (2001).  The 
judgments of superior courts sitting as trial or appellate courts reflect similar patterns. For sentencing decisions by 
high courts in Nigeria, see Alao v Commissioner of Police (1978) 1 LRN 8; for Court of Appeal decisions; For 
sentencing decisions by Nigeria’s Court of Appeal, see Olanipekun v The State (1979) 3 LRN 204 FCA; Price 
Control Bd v Ezema 1982 (1) NCR 7 FCA (Although this judgment discussed sentencing discretion at some length, 
it did not determine whether the trial court exercised discretion judicially). 
221 Ekpo v State 1982 (1) NCR 34 SCN at 40 para 30-3.5. 
222 See for example, Part 28 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 278 of Lagos State’s Administration of Criminal 
Justice Law 2011 makes a departure from the status quo. It requires that the sentencer record in writing his reasons 
for the sentence and his reasons for applying or not applying a non-custodial measure.  However, this only applies to 
criminal trials in Lagos State. There are no corresponding requirements in the Criminal Procedure Act or in Chapter 
XXII of the Criminal Procedure Code Law applicable in the Northern States of Nigeria.  
223 Under s 295 of the Lagos State Criminal Law 2011 for instance, the minimum sentence of 21 years is imposed 
for robbery and death sentence for armed robbery, regardless of whether the arm was used, or life was lost in 
consequence of the use of a lethal weapon.  Most robbery offences prosecuted outside Lagos State are prosecuted 
under the Robbery and Firearms Act and the provisions and penalties are the same as in Lagos. The researcher has 
not come across any judicial pronouncements that have queried the proportionality of these penalties. 
224 Okonkwo & Naish op cit note 5 at 43. 





This was hardly a very informed approach.226 Discussing the paucity of judicial deliberations 
sentencing principles in Nigeria, Okwonkwo and Naish wrote: 
In Nigeria…. discussions on the principles of sentencing are almost non-existent in the 
law reports. But were judges obliged to give reasons, a useful body of law might grow up 
on the subject, which in turn would stimulate debate about the principles and methods of 
punishment.227 
Failure to explain the reasons for the sentence potentially infringes the defendant’s 
fair trial rights and compromises his ability to defend or appeal a sentence. Although 
there have been cases where appellate courts reviewed sentences because they were 
excessive, or because the trial court failed to give adequate attention to factors that should 
have mitigated sentence,228 the reviews offered little in terms of systematically explaining 
how these factors enhance proportionality and consistency. Issues about sentencing are 
typically dealt with in a few lines or paragraphs.229  
 
4.4.6 A New Approach to Sentencing in Nigeria 
The inadequacy of the Constitutional provision regarding human dignity makes the Ratification 
Act about the most authoritative legislative statement on the relationship between punishment 
and human dignity in Nigeria.  However, the impact of the Act has yet to be felt on the debate on 
punishment. It remains rather difficult to distil the principles that moderate how judges approach 
the aims of sentencing.230 More important, however, is the need for Nigerian courts to found 
their approach to sentencing on a regulating constitutional norm, much like their South African 
counterparts have done, and to rationalize the standards for measuring proportionality. Writing 
about Nigeria’s sentencing practice, Okwonkwo and Naish observed that sentencing  
… ought to be a rational process, in the sense that a sentence should be passed with a 
specific principle or principles in mind – retribution, or deterrence, or deterrence and 
just deserts, or rehabilitation, and so on – in the hope that the type of sanction chosen 
                                                          
226 See Okonkwo & Naish op cit note 5 at 44. 
227 Ibid. 
228 See Lumous and Animashaun v Customs and Excise Board 1983 (1) NCR 66; Oyeneye v Commissioner of Police 
1983 (1) NCR 245; Commissioner of Police v Oshifalujo 1983 (1) NCR 307; see also Ekpo v State supra note 225. 
229 See section 5.6 below for further discussion on how Nigerian courts offer reasons for their choice of penalties. 
230 That is not to say that Nigerian courts have not evolved rules to guide discretion, though the rules are inadequate. 





will put the particular principle chosen, however roughly, into effect.  The principle 
to be applied, and therefore the type of sentence to be given, may well vary 
according to the needs of each particular case.231 
This rationality is largely absent in Nigeria’s sentencing process and this significantly 
diminishes the potential for individualizing punishment. One reason for this is the dominance 
that deterrence and retributivist values have over Nigeria’s criminal codes. Even though the 
codes also recognize rehabilitative measures,232 the underlying penal policy of the codes, bogged 
down by the colonial considerations that gave them birth, does not enhance these other 
measures.233 Entrenching deterrent and retributivist values in penal legislation has also 
normalised a decidedly punitive outlook among sentencers,234 which has hindered them from 
developing a well-reasoned approach to sentencing. This, together with the absence of 
appropriate legal training and facilities for implementing alternative sentences, have hindered 
constructive penal developments in Nigeria.235   
Recently, ground breaking reforms were achieved in Lagos State in the South-West 
Nigeria when the state government enacted two laws ‒ the Administration of Criminal Justice 
(Repeal and Re-Enactment) Law 2011 (ACJL)236 and Criminal Law of Lagos State 2011 (CL).237 
The laws introduce sentencing alternatives, new principles and restorative elements to the 
                                                          
231 Okonkwo & Naish op cit note 5 at 42. 
232 See for example, s 435(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
233 This is especially so regarding adult offenders. See Anyebe op cit note 183 at 190. In relation to child offenders, 
it is also argued that the focus is essentially punitive.  See Iyabode Oguniran ‘The lock and key phenomenon: 
Reforming the penal policy for child offenders in Nigeria’ (2013) Vol.10 No.1 Justice Policy Journal 1-20. 
234 M.I. Edopkayi, ‘Suspended sentence: Its desirability in Nigeria’, undated, 
http://www.nigerianlawguru.com/articles/criminal%20law%20and%20procedure/SUSPENDED%20SENTENCE,IT
S%20DESIRABILITY%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf, [accessed July 26 2013]; academic discourse or research on the 
subject remains scant. The more recent publications tend to rehash much older publications that discuss the problem.  
For example, in the cited work, the author, a retired justice of the High Court of Edo State of Nigeria cited a 1972 
publication (which was cited in Chapter 1 of this thesis), which claimed that magistrates do not consider the best 
interest of the offender during sentencing. The most recent resource cited in Edopkayi’s work was published in 
2004, meaning Edopkayi’s paper was published sometime in or after 2004. In order of time, other publications that 
were cited were published in 1990.  The researcher is not aware of any resource in Nigeria that analyses how judges’ 
view about the main objects of punishment influence the choice of punishment. Such analysis is unlikely to be 
available in view of what Nigerian jurists describe as a punitive focus in punishment. See also Okonkwo & Naish op 
cit note 5 at 42. 
235 See Edopkayi op cit note 234; Edopkayi also expresses this belief. 
236 The law provides for plea bargain in ss 75 and 76, while chapter 4 deals with conditional releases, probation and 
community service for juvenile offenders.  
237 No 11 of 2011. See generally Comfort Chinyere Ani ‘Reforms in the Nigerian criminal procedure laws’ (2011) 





administration of criminal justice.238 Particularly, s 3 of the CL states that ‘the need to balance 
the protection of rights and public interest’ and ‘the interest of justice’ will be the law’s guiding 
principle. This is the nearest to a statutory incorporation of the triad in any legislation in Nigeria. 
Under subsec (1)(c) of the provision, courts are to ensure that sentences are made to serve the 
interests of rehabilitation, restoration, deterrence, prevention and retribution. Penal measures 
provided by s 15 of the CL include the death penalty, imprisonment, fine or forfeiture . However, 
the section also provides for ‘other disposition measures’, such as ‘compensation, restitution, 
community service orders, probation, curfew orders, binding-over orders, rehabilitation and 
correctional orders, victim offender mediation and other restorative justice measures’.239  
‘Other disposition measures’ were part of the penal sanctions that were provided for in 
the repealed law. Their retention in the new CL, when read with s 341 of the ACJL signals a 
commitment to infusing criminal law with restorative justice elements. Under s 341, a court may 
dismiss a charge or place an offender on probation after the charge is proved, if having regards to 
the nature of crime and the circumstances of the offender, it forms the opinion that it is not 
expedient to impose a punishment. The court shall also order damages or compensation for 
injury or loss.240 The provision affords the offender the chance of avoiding a criminal 
conviction.241 Even where a conviction is made and a sentence is imposed, s 15 empowers the 
                                                          
238 See Press Briefing by Honourable Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice Mr. Ade Ipaye on the 
Activities of the Lagos State Ministry of Justce on the Occasion of Second Anniversary of Second Term in Office of 
His Excellency Mr. Babatunde Fashola May 2012-April 2013. The briefing is available at 
http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/pagemenus.php?p=383&k=31 [accessed July 29 2013]. 
239 See also ss 286-289, 297, 341-348 of the ACJL: See Press Briefing op cit note 238; according to the State’s 
Attorney General, a Community Service Unit is fully implementing community service orders, while magistrates 
have been trained on the ‘purpose, advantages and workings of community service’.  From August 2012 to March 
2013, 1,154 offenders were sentenced to community service in the state.  This is quite a break from the past. The 
total number of offenders sentenced to community service in 2013 came to 2, 324. See National Mirror ‘Lagos 
sentenced 2, 324 offenders to community service in 2013’ January 30 2014, available at 
http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/lagos-sentenced-2-324-offenders-to-community-service-in-2013/, accessed 10 
January 2015. 
240 Section 341 applies to offences that are triable summarily. An ‘offence triable summarily’ is one that is 
punishable with up to two years’ imprisonment. See s 371 of ACJL. 
241 The same argument can be made regarding the use of binding over as a disposition measure under s 300 of 
Nigeria’s Criminal Procedure Act. In the case of Akanni v State (No. 2), 1980 (2) NCR 383 at 387, the High Court of 
Oyo state in South-West Nigeria held that ‘[a]n offence for which binding over is imposed ranks with a conviction 
… However, the power to impose a binding over order does not depend on a conviction, as an offender may be 
acquitted and still be bound over to be of good behaviour.’ In this case, binding over will be regarded as an act of 





court to impose other disposition measures in addition to the criminal sentence. This again 
highlights the restorative justice emphasis of the law. Where the circumstances permit, 
disposition measures can be used to facilitate victim offender mediation, through which the 
social imbalance occasioned by the criminal act can be repaired. 
The ideas that underpin these developments are laudable, and it is a fortunate 
development that the federal criminal justice bills that await passage by the national legislature 
also emphasise restorative justice. For example, Part 21 of Administration of Criminal Justice 
Bill provides for ‘Probation and Non-custodial measures’. Section 421 of the Bill contains 
provisions that are similar to s 341 of the ACJL, while s 427 of the Bill seeks to introduce 
suspended sentences, community service and plea bargain into Nigeria’s federal sentencing 
scheme.242   
The Lagos State law and the federal bills (when they become law) are a step in the right 
direction. They are capable of aiding a resolution of the uncertainty surrounding Nigeria’s 
sentencing policy.243 They deemphasise custodial measures and offer legislative statements of 
the goals and principles that should underpin Nigeria’s sentencing system. However, what they 
fail to do, is offer an overarching sentencing principle or object, which as discussed in chapter 
two, could yet subject sentencers to the burdensome task of determining which principle or 
principles should be dominant in any given case. At any rate, to ensure reasonable 
implementation of the new standards, the principles will need to be supplemented by guidelines 
that articulate the path to a rational sentencing scheme.  The guidelines may suggest a dominant 
principle or object. The utilisation of plea bargain to dispose of recent cases involving economic 
and financial crimes illustrates the need for guidelines and an overarching principle. The plea 
deals in those cases were negotiated without the aid of a robust, consistent and uniformly 
                                                          
242 Note also s 2 of the Criminal Justice (Victims Remedies) Bill 2006 which proposes that the criminal justice 
system guiding principles shall, amongst others, be to protect victims of crime throughout the criminal process 
(including offering treatment and ensuring victim’s remedy) and achieve more effective sentencing of offenders by 
emphasizing restitutive and compensatory sentencing. See Presidential Commission on Reform of the 
Administration of Justice in Nigeria Proposals for Reform of the Administration of Justice in Nigeria (2006) 123. 
243 See Ani op cit note 237 at 55, 78-82 & 87-89; the author has suggested that the bill proposes a uniform criminal 
justice administration law.  However, having regard to legislative competences within Nigeria’s federal system, the 
bill when passed may only apply in relation to federal offences, federal law enforcement agencies, and Nigeria’s 





enforced sentencing policy and guideline, and have come under severe criticisms for 
encouraging lenient sentences that defeat the objectives that underpin economic and financial 
crimes legislation in Nigeria.244 The criticisms highlight the important role that sentencing 
guidelines discharge in expressing penal policy and rationalising sentencing. Guidelines impact 
how plea bargains are negotiated, what penalties prosecutors may recommend and the factors 
that the court must take into consideration when contemplating sentence under a plea deal. A 
plea deal ought to contemplate the public interests that underpin the creation of particular crimes 
and the need for consistency in sentencing for such crimes. Indeed, the argument has been made, 
rightly, that a plea bargain should not occur outside these considerations, and much less so in the 
absence of a sentencing commission that sets the rules.245 Nigeria’s sentencing scheme does not 
meet these requirements. 
In a development that buttressed the importance or rationalising sentencing, the Lagos 
State government announced plans to develop a ‘sentencing guideline bill’.246  Whether 
legislation is the most appropriate way to go about developing guidelines is of course open to 
debate. The guideline models discussed in chapter 6 suggest there are far more efficient ways to 
develop guidelines. That said, it is a welcome development that the state government is 
contemplating guidelines. A guideline legislation that can be refined through usage is better than 
none.  Nevertheless, while the guideline legislation is being awaited, the State’s courts (and 
federal appellate courts when they sit on appeal over decisions of the State’s courts) need to 
assume the challenge of articulating guidelines that will regulate how the new sentencing 
                                                          
244 This suggests a critical need for reappraising the role of plea bargain in administering criminal justice in Nigeria. 
See Adedayo Adedeji, ‘Plea bargain and the administration of criminal justice’ Punch, February 12 2013, available 
at http://www.punchng.com/feature/the-law-you/plea-bargain-and-the-administration-of-criminal-justice/, [accessed 
August 8 2013] ; See also Roundtable on Conviction to Compromise: The plea bargain option, April 19, 2012 , 
under ‘Observations’, para 53, available at http://www.nials-nigeria.org/round_tables/ROUNDTABLE%20ON%20 
CONVICTION%20TO%20COMPROMISE%20THE%20PLEA%20BARGAINING%20OPTION.pdf, accessed on 7 
August 2013. The Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies has argued against using plea bargains in cases of 
corruption and financial crimes. See also Nkechukwu Nnochiri ‘CJN abolishes plea bargain’ Vanguard November 
16, 2011, available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/11/cjn-abolishes-plea-bargain/ [accessed August 8 2013]. 
245 Jennifer F Reinganum, ‘Sentencing guidelines, judicial discretion and plea bargaining’, undated, 5, available at 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/faculty/Reinganum/juddisc.pdf, accessed on 29 July 2013; Stephanos Bibas ‘White-
collar plea bargaining and sentencing after Booker’ (2005) 47 Wm. and Mary L. Rev 721; see also Alan Vinegrad 
‘Justice Department’s new charging policy, plea bargaining and sentencing policy’ (2010) Vol. 243 No. 110  New 
York Law Journal; see further recommendations 33 to 37 of statement from Roundtable op cit note 244. 





measures are utilized. Daunting as this may be, the task is both imperative and urgent. This is 
because despite the positive reforms introduced through the new laws, there remains a 
worryingly punitive bent in the State’s criminal justice policy. This is borne out by the 
aforementioned 2011 Criminal Law, which endorses steep mandatory or minimum punishments 
that are hardly consistent with the spirit of the reforms.247 The State’s courts must confront this, 
relying on some of the principles or arguments that have been advanced in this chapter. Their 
ability to do so will inspire new jurisprudence on the constitutionality and proportionality of 
punishments. Until the courts are able to do this, the emerging focus on corrective and restorative 
measures in penal policy will obscured by the punitiveness of the laws.  Of course, judicially 
developed guidelines are not without problems, as illustrated in the next chapter, with particular 
reference to South Africa. For Nigeria however, it is a good and necessary place to start.  It is, in 




This chapter has sought to demonstrate that a normative framework is essential to any system of 
sentencing. In South Africa, the search for a normative framework starts with the Constitution’s 
guarantees of human dignity and prohibitions of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments. This 
protection continues to undergo judicial elaboration and has been affirmed as the essential 
standard against which the constitutionality and proportionality of punishments must be 
measured.  South African courts have discharged themselves relatively well in elaborating the 
constitutional principles especially, and Nigerian courts can learn from their willingness to probe 
the constitutionality and proportionality of punishments.   
Ongoing reforms in Nigeria are commendable, because they have the potential to 
modernize sentencing in the country. What needs to be injected into the reforms is an 
unambiguous prohibition against inhuman and degrading punishments in Nigeria’s Constitution.  
                                                          
247 Examples of such offences include robbery, armed robbery, attempted robbery under ss 295 and 296, and some 





There is also a need for sentencing to affirm constitutional principles and enhance other objects 
of punishment besides retribution and deterrence.248 Failure to instil a clear rights-based standard 
in punishment poses at least two serious problems. First, it has resulted in an underdeveloped 
jurisprudence about human dignity and punishment. Secondly, it perpetuates statutes that 
prescribe punishments that verge on cruelty. Examples of this include statutes that prescribe the 
death penalty for armed robbery, kidnapping and adultery, even where the loss of life does not 
accompany the crime.  
The constitutional lapse described in this chapter forestalls constructive discussion of the 
proportionality between crime and punishment by Nigerian courts. In what is a probable 
manifestation of this problem, Nigerian courts have considered it beyond their remit to impugn 
penal prescriptions that are excessively severe or that employ force or pain needlessly. Thus, 
they unquestioningly impose the prescriptions.249 This suggests the need to review the criminal 
legislation in Nigeria, with a view to establishing cardinal and ordinal limits.  Further, as the 
legislative framework stands, it leaves the door open to the individual quirks of sentencers, 
making it possible to apply different standards without offering explanations, and to impose 
sentences that do not enhance consistency and proportionality. Such outcomes have encouraged 
much public cynicism over Nigeria’s criminal justice process.250 It must be admitted though, that 
achieving consistency and proportionality poses practical challenges, as will be seen in the next 
chapter.  
                                                          
248 Ani op cit note 237 at 54. 
249 See Businessday, ‘Criminal Sanction and the parody of the Nigerian law’, February 7 2013, available at 
http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/law/legal-insight/51269-criminal-sanction-and-the-parody-of-the-
nigerian-law, accessed on August 13 2007. 
250 See Premium Times ‘Director jailed 2yrs for stealing N33bn pension fund freed on N250,000 fine’ January 28, 
2013, available at http://premiumtimesng.com/news/117599-director-jailed-2yrs-for-stealing-n33bn-pension-fund-
freed-on-n250000-fine.html, accessed on August 13 2007; Premium Times ‘Man gets 3-year jail term for stealing 
phone handset, as pension thief is freed for stealing N2billion’ January 29, 2013, available at 
http://premiumtimesng.com/news/117872-man-gets-3-year-jail-term-for-stealing-phone-handset-as-pension-thief-is-









This chapter examines how courts have utilised the normative standards discussed in the 
previous chapter to determine appropriate sentences in specific cases.  It examines sentencing 
reforms and trends in South Africa, and further explores the assertion in chapter 3 – that 
sentencing reforms, legislation, and the judicial enunciation of sentencing principles occur within 
a socio-political context – to unveil the context of sentencing for rape crimes. It also uses the 
sentencing framework for rape crimes to illustrate how public apprehensions regarding violent 
crimes provoke tough measures that raise the penalties for certain crimes and how judicial 
interpretations moderate or fail to moderate the outcomes of applying such laws.  
This chapter’s focus on sentencing for rape is for a number of reasons, such as the strident 
criticisms of inconsistencies and the absence of proportionality that have attended sentencing for 
the crime. According to one of the criticisms, sentencers undermine the policy considerations 
that underpin minimum sentencing legislation by imposing sentences that fail to reflect the 
gravity and endemic nature of rape in the South African society.1  The chapter probes the 
criticism, by reviewing the utility of the proportionality principle in enhancing sentencing 
consistency in South Africa.  Another reason for the chapter’s focus on rape stems from the fact 
that the crime has been on the fore of social action lately.2 As a result, the chapter explores how 
                                                          
1 See for example, Nicole J Kubista ‘‘Substantial and compelling circumstances’: Sentencing of rapists under the 
mandatory sentencing scheme’ (2005) 1 SACJ 77. 
2  The rape crisis in South Africa was brought to a head by the gruesome rape and murder of Anene Booysen in 
February 2013. This and several other cases prompted the South African government to launch a national ‘Stop 
Rape Now’ campaign. However, since then, there have been gory rape crimes – some involving infants – that 
continue to stir apprehension and concern. A recent report claims that South Africa has the highest rape rate in the 
world, and that there are seven rapes in the country for every single rape in the United States of America. A high 
percentage of perpetrators of rape are also children. See ‘Remarks by President Jacob Zuma at the launch of the Stop 
Rape Campaign in schools hosted by the Department of Basic Education and LEAD SA, Mitchells Plain, Cape 
Town’ available at http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=14996, accessed 9 September 2013; See Mail 





judicial responses to rape correspond with the public sense of trepidation and with the policy 
considerations that underpin statutory punishments for sexual offences. There are two reasons for 
doing this. First, the chapter aims to highlight aspects of sentencing that require continual 
improvement in South Africa. It argues for instance, that the judicial approach to implementing 
statutory prescriptions for rape crimes exposes inconsistencies that highlight the need for a more 
structured framework within which courts may exercise discretion.  Secondly, it aims to show 
that despite the shortcomings, there is a process of judicial ratiocination of punishment by South 
African courts, which is lacking in the way Nigerian courts approach sentencing. It is suggested 
that Nigerian courts need to take the challenge of embarking on similar processes without 
repeating the mistakes of South African courts.  Consequently, the chapter focuses mostly on 
judicial decisions in order to portray the reasoning process that sentencers employ during 
sentencing.  
 
5.2 The Role of Judicial Discretion in Sentencing  
South African courts typically assert the need for discretion in awarding punishments3 and have 
traditionally resisted attempts to regulate that discretion through mandatory sentencing 
legislation.4 The resistance is rooted in a judicial policy that sentencers have evolved through 
careful enunciation of the principles that should undergird sentencing. The policy upholds 
discretion as the cornerstone of judicial sentencing in South Africa5 and requires that discretion 
be exercised in a judicious manner that balances the ‘triad consisting of the crime, the offender 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-02-15-00-will-anene-booysens-brutal-rape-and-murder-shake-the-nation-
into-action accessed 9 September 9 2013; Dominic Skelton ‘More than 45,000 South African  women raped so far 
this month: Blow the whistle’ Times Live 20 August 2014 available at 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2014/08/20/more-than-45000-south-african-women-raped-so-far-this-month-blow-
the-whistle, accessed  24 August 2014; United States Department of State ‘South Africa 2014  Crime and Safety 
Report’ available at https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15318, accessed 24 August 2014; 
CNN International ‘The end of innocence: Photojournalist documents child sexual abuse’ available at 
http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/26/the-end-of-innocence-in-south-africa-children-raping-children/, 
accessed on 24 August 2014. 
3 Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape v Prins [2012] 2 All SA 245 (SCA). 
4 Jonathan Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure, Volume I: General Principles of Criminal Law 4 
ed (2011) 24; JJ Neser ‘Mandatory minimum sentences in the South African context’ (2001) Vol. 3 No. 3 Crime 
Research  in South Africa available at http://www.crisa.org.za/volume3/vvs.html, accessed 29 April 2013. 
5 See Republic of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Penal System of the Republic of South 





and the interests of society,’6 and complies with the ‘dictates of fairness and justice’. Sentencers 
oppose mandatory sentences because of their proneness to rigidity and to the preclusion of a 
‘careful and meticulous’ balance of the triad. Mandatory sentences also tend to deny proper 
regard for the offender’s interests.7 
A critical reason for the judicial preference for sentencing discretion stems from the 
shortcomings of legislation. Penal statutes are insentient and incapable of foreseeing or 
responding to the infinite and complicated ‘variety of circumstances that attend the commission 
of crimes’.8  To indiscriminately apply statutory punishments to crimes would therefore be 
arbitrary and unfair.  Courts have accordingly regarded themselves as better positioned than 
legislatures to appraise the circumstances in which a crime is perpetrated and to adapt sentences 
to meet the requirements of justice in every individual case.9 This fact has led courts to routinely 
hold that sentencing is ‘pre-eminently a matter for the discretion of the trial court’.10 Discretion 
facilitates a more balanced and fair process that tailors punishment to suit the individual 
circumstances of the crime and offender, while fulfilling the requirements of justice. Mandatory 
sentences achieve the opposite; they unduly constrain this important function by stripping the 
court of discretion over the type and severity of punishment they can impose.11  
A crucial feature of s 276(1) of the 1977 Act is the legislative (and normative) basis it 
provides for exercising judicial discretion in sentencing and the extent to which courts may do 
so. In Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape v Prins and Others (the Prins case),12 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that the provision vested courts with general sentencing discretion 
                                                          
6 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A). 
7 See Republic of South Africa op cit note 5. 
8 S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA).  
9 Ibid at 472 para 1. 
10 The authority for this principle is the decision of the Appellate Division in R v Mapumulo and Other Appellants 
1920 AD 56.  The Court rationalised this principle with the opinion that the trial court is in a position to appreciate 
the case, evaluate the circumstances in which the crime was committed and decide the measure of punishment better 
than an appellate court would.  This reasoning further establishes the principle that appellate courts should be slow 
to interfere with the discretion of the trial court.  In R v Freedman 1921 AD 603, the same court held that an 
appellate court would not interfere with the discretion of the trial court if that discretion was ‘properly and judicially 
exercised’. These judicial principles have been frequently followed. See for example, S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 
(A). 
11 S v Toms; S v Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (A) at 806H-807A. 





to impose punishment for common law crimes, as well as statutory crimes where the relevant 
statute fails to prescribe a penalty.13 The only limitation to this power is s 92 of the Magistrates 
Courts Act,14 which imposes the upper sentencing jurisdiction of district and regional courts. On 
the other hand, there are no limitations to the sentencing jurisdiction of high courts. Section 283 
of the 1977 Act also affirms the role of discretion in sentencing; the provision permits a court to 
impose a lesser sentence than the prescribed penalty if mitigating circumstances permit.  
Although courts have developed guiding principles to regulate discretion, the South 
African Law Commission15 has acknowledged that discretionary sentencing was the subject of 
significant criticisms in the 1990s. The criticisms ranged from claims of differential treatments,16 
to complaints about sentencing decisions that failed to give sufficient weight to the seriousness 
of violent crimes.17 A third criticism was that custodial sentences were being utilized for minor 
crimes that would have been better redressed through reparative strategies. These sentencing 
patterns resulted in serious problems of overcrowded prisons that have had to be resolved 
through early release programmes for offenders. Early releases, in turn, undermined the penal 
purpose behind the penalties and exposed additional sentencing irregularities.18  An examination 
of these problems must start with a review of South Africa’s minimum sentencing legislation. 
 
                                                          
13 Ibid at para 13; the court noted that the ‘measure of punishment’ for common law crimes ‘is a matter for the judge 
who imposes it' and that parliament defers to courts in this regard by not enacting penalties for such crimes.  
14 Act 32 of 1944. 
15 South African Law Commission Report Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) (2000). 
16  Ibid at 3. This resulted in comparable cases not being treated alike. The Commission acknowledged that the 
allegations were hard to deal with and that the situation may have been encouraged by the absence of clear 
sentencing guidelines, which leaves sentencers with very broad discretion. 
17 According to this criticism, disproportionately light sentences were awarded for offences – especially ‘certain 
types of sexual offences’ – that deserved severe, deterrent and incapacitative punishments. It was also alleged that 
victims of serious crimes were not being heard on matters of sentencing for particular crimes, or on serious crimes 
generally, thereby downplaying the importance of the crimes. See Stephan Terblanche ‘A sentencing council in 
South Africa’ in Arie Freiberg & Karen Gelb (eds) Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy 
(2008) 191-199 at 192. 





5.3 South Africa’s Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 
Concerns about irregularities in sentencing coincided with heightened public anxieties over the 
rise of violent crimes in South Africa and an intense period of political transition and 
constitutional development.19 The developments pitted two competing values or interests: on one 
hand was the clamour for heavier sentences for serious crimes, which signalled public gravitation 
towards stiff protectionist measures against dangerous offenders. On the other hand were 
emergent constitutional values that also required a balance between two interests, namely the 
public interest in protecting the values that underpin the Constitution and the interests of the 
offender.20 These competing interests moved the Constitutional Court to caution against allowing 
alarming crime rates to ‘justify extensive and inappropriate invasion of individual rights’.21  So, 
the overarching interest in punishment turns not just on the necessity of punitive and deterrent 
measures against violent offenders, but also on the imperative of directing punishment toward 
more reformative objects. This, essentially, enlists a bifurcated approach to sentencing. 
Section 51 of the Criminal Procedure Law Act 1997 Act was a legislative – and without 
question, a political22 - response to high crime levels and criticisms of sentencing discretion.23 
The provision is reproduced in Appendix A. Section 51 introduced a range of minimum 
sentences under Part I of Schedule 2 of the Act, which courts were obligated to impose. Under 
the schedule, three classifications of rape were rendered liable to life imprisonment on account of 
the seriousness of the classifications. Sentencing for rape that fell outside these classifications 
were liable to minimum sentences of ten to 25 years imprisonment.24 Under s 51(3) however, 
                                                          
19 Lukas Muntingh ‘Sentencing’ in Chandre Gould Criminal (in)justice in South Africa: A Civil Society Perspective 
(2009) 178-200 at 180. 
20 South African Law Reform Commission op cit note 15 at 1-2. In S v Salzwedel 2000 (1) SA 786 (SCA), the court 
held that a lengthy sentence was necessary to communicate a strong message that the court would deal severely with 
crimes perpetrated against the ethos of the Constitution.  
21 S v Dlamini, S v Dladla and Others, S v Joubert, S v Schiertekat 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC) at 666 para B. 
22 Muntingh op cit note 19 at 179. 
23 CR Snyman Criminal Law  4 ed (2002) 424; see also South African Law Reform Commission (2000) op cit note 
16 at 4. According to Kubista, ‘the mandatory minimums in s 51 are also an attempt to impose the same sentence 
upon similarly situated people’. See Kubista op cit note 1 at 79. 
24 The first category of rape crimes liable to life imprisonment comprises rape with aggravating circumstances. Such 
circumstances include multiple rapes, gang rape, rape by a person convicted and awaiting sentencing for rape, or 
rape by a person who knows he has the acquired immune deficiency syndrome. The second category is where the 





courts may depart from the minimum sentences when they are ‘satisfied that substantial and 
compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the 
sentence prescribed...’ This provision is believed to have been modelled after the Minnesota 
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing rules. Unlike the Minnesotan code however, s 51 does not 
define what the ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ phrase means.25  
Initial judicial attempts to interpret the phrase resulted in considerable confusion26 that 
the Supreme Court of Appeal had to clear up in S v Malgas.27  How the court brought clarity to 
the phrase will be discussed below. As a preamble to that discussion however, it is useful to note 
that the court interpreted the statute’s failure to define the phrase as an indication of the 
legislation’s intention that the circumstances should be judicially defined. This, according to the 
court, essentially preserved discretion in sentencing and indicated that minimum sentences are 
not mandatory.  Apparently in response to Malgas and a host of other decisions that reiterated 
the principles in Malgas, s 51 was subjected to amendments. Section 1 of Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Amendment Act 2007 (the 2007 Act), re-titled s 51 from ‘Minimum Sentences’ to 
‘Discretionary Minimum Sentences for Certain Serious Offences’, suggesting the penalties 
prescribed therein are to be regarded as presumptive.28  
 
5.3.1 Section 51: Challenges Surrounding Interpretation and Constitutionality 
Section 51 encountered a wave of criticisms surrounding the vagueness that resulted from the 
Act’s failure to define ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’.29 The vagueness caused 
conflicting judicial interpretations. According to one interpretation, s 51 practically left courts 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rape involved grievous bodily harm. Rapes that occur in other circumstances attract a sentence of ten to 25 years. 
See Appendix A for full provision of section 51 and the Schedule. 
25 See SS Terblanche & Julian V Roberts ‘Sentencing in South Africa: Lacking in principle but delivering on 
justice’ (2005) 18 S. Afr. J. Crim. Just. 187-202 at 192. The authors observe that South African courts have refused 
to interpret the phrase in the same manner as in Minnesota. See also s 11 Criminal Code Chapter 609, Minnesota 
Statutes 2014; see further South African Law Reform Commission op cit note 16; Kubista op cit note 1 at 79. 
26 Kubista op cit note 1 at 77. 
27 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) at 480 para A. 
28 For other amendments to the provision, see South African Law Commission op cit note 15 at 9-10.  
29 See The Western Cape Consortium on Violence Against Women ‘Submission to the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development in Response to the Evaluation of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997’ (4 
March 2005) 2-5, available at http://www.ghjru.uct.ac.za/parl-submissions/Memorandum-Mandatory-Minimum-





with little or no sentencing discretion.30 Another interpretation claimed the phrase merely 
affirmed those factors that courts have traditionally applied in mitigation or aggravation of 
punishment.31 Yet another interpretation of s 51 criticises the provision for breaching protections 
for the right to a fair trial under s 35(3)(c) of the Constitution, as well as the constitutional 
doctrine of separation of powers by purporting to limit how judges exercise discretion.32 
In S v Blaauw33 the court attempted to steer a middle course between extreme 
interpretations of the ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ phrase and how it limits 
discretion. To start with, the court held that by not ascribing a meaning to the ‘substantial and 
compelling circumstances’ phrase, the legislature intended that courts should exercise discretion 
when defining the phrase and the circumstances that would justify departure. The court then 
developed a test that required a cumulative evaluation of the balance between mitigating and 
aggravating factors. Using this test, a court may depart from the minimum sentence if it finds 
that imposing the mandatory sentence would be ‘grossly disproportionate to the crime … or 
startlingly inappropriate or offensive to its sense of justice’.  ‘Substantial and compelling 
                                                          
30 See S v Mofokeng 1999 (1) SACR 502 (W) at 523paras B-C and 524 paras C-D; the court held s 51 had ‘almost 
entirely deprived the courts of their discretionary powers to determine sentences appropriate to the circumstances of 
particular crimes and criminals’. It interpreted ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ to mean the facts must be 
so unusual and exceptional that it exposes the injustice of the prescribed sentence and compels the conclusion that 
the imposition of a lesser sentence is justified’.  The facts must be such that parliament cannot be supposed to have 
contemplated them when passing the legislation. The court criticized s 51 for setting a standard that upstaged the 
balanced approach that courts had hitherto followed, in preference for measures that were prone to inflict arbitrary 
punishments.   
31 In S v Dithotze 1999 (2) SACR 314 (W) at 318, it was held that courts should have regard to all the factors that 
have been traditionally considered when imposing sentence, or employ the test used by an appellate court when 
reviewing sentence, which requires that the appellate court should impose a different sentence if sentence imposed 
by lower court is ‘disturbingly inappropriate’. The South African Law Commission also cited the unreported 
decision in S v Majalefa and Another, where the court held that the phrase in question ‘was intended to denote 
factors of solid material significance in relation to all the component factors which must irresistibly be taken into 
consideration for the purpose of sentence…. The sentence must not lead to an injustice. … I think on this basis that 
the sentencing process will be the same as it was before the passing of the new Act…. [T]he starting point will still 
be a consideration of all the factors relevant to the passing of sentence. Proper consideration should be given to the 
well-known triad of factors, as dealt with in Zinn’s case.’  S v Majalefa was extensively quoted in S v Blaauw 1999 
(2) SCR 295 (W) at 305I-306I. The Commission pointed out that the positions adopted in the Mofokeng and 
Majalefa cases were endorsed by other unreported high court decisions. See South Africa Law Reform Commission 
op cit note 15 at 11-13; Snyman op cit note 23 at 424-425; Neser op cit note 4. 
32 S v Mofokeng supra note 30 at 526 para F; S v Dodo 2001 (1) SACR 301 (E) at 313 paras B–I & 319 paras H-I. 





circumstances’ would, in that instance, be said to be present.34 To impose a mandatory minimum 
sentence when such circumstances exist would be grossly disproportionate and violate 
constitutional guarantees for the rights to a fair trial and to not be subjected to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishments.35 
Valuable as the Blaauw decision was, it did not resolve what circumstances would justify 
departure from the prescribed punishment, or as the South African Law Commission observed, 
how the traditional sentencing factors were to be evaluated within the framework of s 51. S v 
Jansen36 attempted to explain how traditional factors applied under s 51. The accused in the case 
attacked the constitutionality of s 51, arguing that it mandated arbitrary punishments – regardless 
of the factual circumstances of the crime – thereby violating constitutional protections against 
cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments. The court agreed in part that a rigid or mechanistic 
application of mandatory sentences ‘without regard to the individual context’, the ‘prospect of 
rehabilitation’ and how these should affect the choice of punishment could well violate 
prohibitions against cruel punishments and ‘compromise’ constitutional protections for equal 
treatment. At the same time however, the court held that sentencing had to be ‘predicated on [a] 
principle that curtails the evils of unbounded discretion and … ensures that the sentence bears a 
proportionate relationship to the case’. Section 51 supplied that principle by allowing courts a 
limited scope to individualize punishment. By implication then, the overarching question 
regarding the constitutionality of punishments under s 51 would have to be evaluated on a case 
by case basis, in the light of whether a specific punishment would, for instance, be so 
disproportionate as to constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.37  
In S v Malgas,38 the Supreme Court of Appeal imposed some level of clarity and certainty 
on the interpretation and application of s 51. The case dealt with two issues in particular, namely 
whether s 51 breached the constitutional separation of powers and the true import of the 
                                                          
34 The court also found that ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ ordained a stricter test than what obtained 
under earlier pieces of legislation that allowed departure from prescribed sentences in exceptional or special 
circumstances. See S v Blaauw supra note 33, at 302 para I – 305 para C, 311paras G-H. 
35 Ibid at 312 paras F-G. 
36 S v Jansen 1999 (2) SACR 368 (C). 
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‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ clause. With regards to the former, the court held that 
the enactment of statutes that create offences and prescribe penalties fell within the constitutional 
competence of the legislature and that laws made in exercise of such competence are consistent 
with the doctrine of separation of powers. The exception to this however, is when such laws are 
so prescriptive as to strip the court of discretion, or compel it to impose punishments which, in 
the circumstances of a given case, run contrary to the court’s sense of fairness or justness. 
Having laid down this principle, the court found that s 51 was not unconstitutional, as the clause 
‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ allowed a substantial measure of sentencing 
discretion. Thus, where the circumstances justified it, courts were at liberty to depart from the 
prescribed minimum sentence.39  
What emerged from the Malgas decision was a judicial clarification that refuted 
perceptions that minimum sentences were mandatory.  The decision established that s 51 must be 
read through the lenses of the nation’s constitutional values,40 meaning that courts must accord to 
offenders those constitutional protections against excessive punishments, which in this regard 
would be treated as contrary to ss 9 and 12(1)(e) of the Constitution.41 Section 51 must also be 
interpreted with its legislative objective in view, which was to respond to a worrisome escalation 
of the specified crimes, by providing for ‘a severe, standardised, and consistent response from 
courts’.42 Thus, by enacting the provision, parliament hinted at a shift towards greater severity 
for specific crimes.43  This shift in turn signalled that emphasis in sentencing would no longer 
rest on the unfettered discretion that judges enjoyed, but on the objective factors of the gravity of 
the crime and the public need for effective sanctions.44 Nonetheless, courts retained discretion to 
                                                          
39 Ibid at 480 paras A-C & 481 paras F-G. 
40 Ibid at 476 para C. 
41 Section 9 of the Constitution affirms right to equality and equal protection of the law. Section 12(1)(e) prohibits 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.  
42 S v Malgas supra note 8 at 476 para H – 477 para A & 481 para I. 
43 Ibid at 476 para D – 477 para A; related to this point is the court’s observation that weight must be attached to the 
interim nature of the provision, but how this could have influenced the guide that the court formulated, or indeed the 
final outcome of the court’s application of the guide to the case at hand, is not clear.  The lifespan of the provision 
has been repeatedly renewed and Malgas continues to be the authority on the interpretation of the provision.  





depart from a mandatory sentence if in the circumstances of the case imposing it would result in 
injustice.  The reasons for departure, as s 51 provides, must be substantial and compelling.45  
The challenge then remains how to interpret ‘substantial and compelling’.  The court’s 
approach to interpreting the phrase was both robust and restrained. To begin with, a proper 
interpretation would encompass those factors that have traditionally been taken into 
consideration when fixing appropriate sentences. In other words, courts should continue to 
evaluate the triad, balancing them against mitigating and aggravating factors and the main 
objects of punishment. However, when a court forms a deep sense of unease that leads to the 
firm conviction that applying the prescribed minimum in a particular case would occasion 
injustice, it must impose a lesser punishment. In its contemplation of the meaning of ‘substantial 
and compelling circumstances’, the court enumerated circumstances that should or should not be 
considered as fitting that description.46  
In S v Dodo,47 the Malgas guiding principles were affirmed by the Constitutional Court 
as the ‘undoubtedly correct’ interpretation that offers an ‘overarching’, ‘step by step procedure’48 
to applying the provision. Specifically, the court affirmed the procedure as the ‘determinative 
test’ for interpreting ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’. Further, it held that the 
provision acknowledges that the court has both the discretion and obligation to impose a lesser 
sentence when the minimum prescription would, in the circumstances of the case, be 
disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the public interest. In other words, minimum 
sentences operate under a broad scheme of judicial discretion, and no legislature may rightly 
compel courts to impose disproportionate sentences that also violate s 12(1)(e) of the 
Constitution.49 In the court’s view, affirming judicial discretion in sentencing was consistent with 
the undeniably pre-eminent powers that the legislature had to define and penalise criminal 
behaviour. However, the legislature oversteps its remit and breaches the constitutional separation 
                                                          
45 Ibid at 477 para A-B. 
46 Ibid at 480 para G – 481 para E; see also Jonathan M Burchell and John Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3 ed 
(2005) 90-92. 
47 S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC). 
48 Ibid at 392 para B & 393 para B. 





of powers if it enacts laws that obligated courts to impose disproportionate sentences.50  As the 
court said decisively on the subject therefore, ‘[t]he test in Malgas must be employed in order to 
determine when s 51(3)(a) can legitimately be invoked by a sentencing court to pass a lesser 
sentence than that prescribed by s 51(1) or (2)’.51 
The Malgas principles were not meant to be rigid. Dodo reasonably recognised that it 
will continue to be ‘refined and particularised’ on a case by case basis.52 This suggests that the 
specific circumstances that justify imposing a lesser sentence may be as varied as the 
circumstances of each case differ. In apparent cognisance of this and in deference to the 
legislative intent behind the 1997 Act, Malgas accepted that the prescribed sentences are 
‘ordinarily appropriate’ and that courts may only depart from them when there are ‘weighty 
justification[s]’ to do so.53 The enquiry as to whether such justification exists must start with a 
consideration of the sentencing factors that courts have traditionally considered. However, the 
factors put together, must ‘be substantial and compelling’. This test, imprecise as it may seem to 
be, was predicated on the need to avoid rigidity, while also foreclosing subjective interpretations 
that defeat the object of the provision.  Accordingly, ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ 
was held to exclude 
[s]peculative hypotheses favourable to the offender, maudlin sympathy, aversion to 
imprisoning first offenders, personal doubts as to the efficacy of the policy implicit in the 
amending legislation, and like considerations … equally obviously not intended to qualify as 
substantial and compelling circumstances. Nor were marginal differences in the personal 
circumstances or degrees of participation of co-offenders which, but for the provisions, might 
have justified differentiating between them.54 
It is necessary to note that Malgas only provides guidelines for sentences for offences 
covered by s 51. It does not extend to other statutory offences and common law crimes. For these 
other offences, the traditional approach remains valid. This is the obvious import of Malgas’ 
                                                          
50 Ibid at 393 para D – 398 para E; according to the court, the power to require courts to prescribe penalties is 
implicit in s 35(3)(n) of the Constitution, which entitles every accused person to the benefit of the least severe 
punishment if the punishment prescribed for the offence has changed between the time of commission and the time 
of sentencing. 
51 Ibid at 392 and 405 para D.  
52 Ibid at 392A-393C. 
53 S v Malgas supra note 8 at 480 para B. 





affirmation that traditional principles of sentencing were not abrogated by s 51, and that they 
would still apply even for offences covered by the section. In sentencing for statutory crimes, the 
statutory sentencing requirements for such crimes apply, as illustrated by chapter four’s 
discussion of sentencing for crimes under POCA.  The only other issues that may impact 
sentencing for common law and statutory crimes are to be found in the constitutional 
requirements that were also discussed in chapter four.  
 
5.4  Applying Malgas’ Determinative Test and the Problems Associated Therewith 
Naturally, the first point to note is the fact that South African courts have invested considerable 
effort into developing a method for applying s 51. The decisions in Malgas and Dodo were 
profoundly the acme of these efforts. However, criticisms of these efforts echo John Selden’s 
description of the doctrine of equity as an ‘uncertain measure’ that shifted with the conscience or 
compared to the length of the foot of whoever was the Lord Chancellor.55 These criticisms have 
centred on the point that applying the Malgas test has not met the need for proportionality, 
consistency and predictability in sentencing, due to the considerable discretion with which courts 
have interpreted and applied the guidelines that Malgas offered.  
The Constitutional Court’s view that the Malgas test should be refined and particularised 
on a case by case basis suggests the difficulty of using the judicial process to regulate the factors 
that should be considered during sentencing. As noted earlier, an infinite variety of 
circumstances that legislatures cannot all foresee come into play in the commission of crimes and 
have an impact on sentencing. This makes it necessary for legislation to avoid unnecessary 
specificity that may constrain the ability of the court to determine suitable punishments. For 
similar reasons, courts also exercise restraint and lean towards the sagacity of formulating 
general principles, refining and particularising them to meet the requirements of individual cases. 
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the rules they applied; see John Selden & Richard Milward, Table Talk: Being the discourses of John Selden, Esq, 
or His Sense of Various Matters of Weight and High Consequence.  Relating Especially to Religion and State (1786) 





This was the point made in Malgas and Dodo: judicial restraint in this context ensures that courts 
do not establish precedents that stifle the pre-eminently discretionary function that trial courts 
engage in when sentencing offenders.  
The problem with this, in South Africa’s sentencing experience in particular, is that 
broadly formulated principles leave the door wide open for courts to do precisely what was 
deplored in Malgas and Dodo, to wit, to engage in ratiocinations that pander to speculative 
hypotheses, maudlin sympathies and other subjective elements. Indeed, judicial attempts to 
particularise the Malgas test in individual cases and to weigh ‘substantial and compelling 
circumstances’ against the triad of interests and objects of punishment have resulted in 
conflicting outcomes that often stray from the Malgas standard. For one thing, it has not always 
been obvious that courts regard s 51 as obligating compliance. Some post-Malgas interpretations 
have regarded minimum sentences as discretionary or as requiring inquiry into whether the 
prescribed sentence is not disproportionate. Just how they do this is discussed shortly, having 
particular regard to sentencing for rape crimes. But first, it is necessary to illustrate how 
epidemiological patterns of rape crimes in South Africa may have influenced penal and 
sentencing policy regarding the crime. 
 
5.4.1 Epidemiological Patterns of Rape  
Besides rape, s 51 prescribes severe penalties for other violent or serious crimes. In the South 
African society however, the violence and invasiveness of rape vividly and particularly 
illustrates how public apprehensions and outrage over serious crimes have found expression in a 
regime of steep punishments.56  The nature and rampancy of the crime and other sexual offences 
prompt a heightened sense of urgency. Rape is particularly invidious. It violates the victim’s 
individual space, body and sexual integrity. It negates the victim’s autonomy (i.e., control of 
access to her/his body) and exploits the social or power imbalances between the aggressor and 
victim. Rape has more than a victim-only impact, because it projects an ominous sense of 
general insecurity and vulnerability unto the larger public space. Some have even argued that 
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rape is inherently more harmful than other forms of physical violence because its sexual nature 
conveys an element that depicts the crime as having more than physical dimensions of 
aggression. Proponents of this view argue that rape also inflicts severe psychological harm and 
that it is an attack on the identity and dignity of its victim. In her book on the subject, Maria 
Erickson refers to studies that show that victims of rape experience more post-traumatic stress 
than victims of other forms of violence. In her words, ‘[r]ape can make the victim feel 
dehumanized, the mere object of the sexual gratification of the attacker, as well as being 
denigrated and humiliated’.57   
These social consequences have been acknowledged in a host of judicial decisions, such as 
S v Chapman,58 the Prins case and Opperman and Another v S.59 The judgments commonly 
describe rape and other forms of sexual violence as serious crimes that deserve the strict public 
censure that is expressed in the severe penalties provided in s 51.60 With epithets like 
                                                          
57 Maria Eriksson Defining rape: Emerging obligations for States under International Law (2011) 59-61, and see 
generally chapter 3. Feminists have debated whether rape is a crime of physical (aggression) or sexual nature, but 
most generally agree on the presence of all or a combination of the physical, sexual and psychological elements.  
See Vanessa E Munro ‘From consent to coercion: evaluating international and domestic frameworks for the 
criminalization of rape’, Clare McGlynn ‘Feminist activism and rape law reform in England and Wales: a 
Sysyphean struggle?’; and Heléne Combrink ‘Rape law reform in Africa: ‘More of the same’ or new opportunities?’ 
in Clare McGlynn & Vanessa E. Munro (eds) Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives 
(2010) 17-29, 139-153 and 122-135 respectively. See also Pithey, Artz & Combrinck et al, ‘Legal aspects of rape in 
South Africa’, a Discussion Document commissioned by the Deputy Minister of Justice, the Republic of South 
Africa, and prepared for Rape Crisis (Cape Town), Women and Human Rights Project, Community Law Center, 
University of Western Cape, and Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town (April 30 1999), available at 
http://www.ghjru.uct.ac.za/parl-submissions/Legal-Aspects.pdf, accessed on 27 May 2013. The authors say in 
chapter 1, that ‘[u]nlike other crimes against the person, rape not only violates women’s physical safety, but their 
sexual and psychological integrity. It is a violation that is not only marked by violence, but by a form of “sexual 
terrorism”. The act of rape is invasive, dehumanising and humiliating. It is a crime that is akin to torture.’ See 
further, Albertyn, Artz & Combrinck et al, ‘Women’s freedom and security of the person’ in Elsje Bonthuys & 
Catherine Albertyn (eds) Gender, law and justice Cape Town: Juta (2007) 295 – 380 at 299-301; the authors argue 
that sexual crimes must be contemplated within the social context of the power imbalances and culture of violence 
in South Africa. It seems that courts have avoided getting enmeshed in debates about whether sexual crimes are acts 
of physical aggression or intrinsically of a sexual nature. S v Abrahams 2002 (1) SACR 116 (SCA) at 124 para G – 
125 para G; S v Mahomotsa 2002 (2) SACR 435 (SCA) at 442D were rape cases in which the power relationships 
expressed in the many feminist views about rape were identifiable. Yet the SCA’s findings suggest that it regarded 
physical control and lust to be intertwined.   
58 1997 (3) SA 341 (SCA). 
59 (643/09) 2010 ZASCA 83 (31 May 2010). 
60 Ibid at para 15; the court cited 2007/2008 statistics which showed that children were victims in 44.4 per cent of all 
rapes and 52 per cent of all indecent assaults, and that in 2005, yearly estimates  showed that 400,000 to 500,000 
children were sexually assaulted. See also Mathews, Abrahams & Martin et al, ‘“Every Six Hours a Woman is 





“humiliating”, “degrading”, “repulsive”, “brutal invasion’, they describe rape as a crime that 
strikes at the dignity, privacy and personal integrity of its victim. It violates values that are at the 
heart of the Constitution and imposes a sense of public apprehension and insecurity, especially 
for women and children.61 In relation to child victims, society’s abhorrence of the crime becomes 
even more pronounced, as the crime does more than rob them of their childhood. In Opperman62 
the court cited data that suggested that sexually abused victims may become sexual offenders 
themselves. Further, and to underline the seriousness with which the crime ought to be treated, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Vilakazi63 cited epidemiological studies that suggest that 
‘women’s rights to give or withhold consent to sexual intercourse is one of the most violated of 
all human rights in South Africa’.  
Statistics and other researches into the epidemiology of rape in South Africa reinforce 
these claims.   In 2000, Statistics South Africa issued the report of a study that measured the 
frequency of rape crimes and the response of the criminal justice system. According to the study 
55,000 rapes were perpetrated in 1997, meaning 134 in 100,000 women were raped that year. 
Approximately half that number reported the crime, while about 47.6 per cent were referred to 
court.   Of this number, 45.6 per cent were withdrawn from court, while 4.5 per cent settled out 
of court. Only one-fifth of prosecuted cases resulted in convictions.64 In 2000, there was a fall in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
available at http://www.mrc.ac.za/policybriefs/woman.pdf; accessed May 23 2013. According to the study, 40-70 per 
cent of all female homicides are committed by an intimate partner. The perpetrators were ‘overwhelmingly male’. In 
15.3 per cent of the cases, the victims had been sexually assaulted. See further, Anbertyn, Artz & Combrinck op cit 
note 56 at 301. The authors noted sketchy unofficial statistics compiled by a non-governmental organization which 
suggest 1 out of 20 rapes were reported to the police. A subsequent study in 2012 showed that frequency of rape 
crimes had reduced to one incident every eight minutes. See Abrahams, Mathews & Jewkes et al, ‘Every eight 
hours: Intimate femicide in South Africa 10 years later!’ MRC Research Brief (August 2012), available at 
http://www.mrc.ac.za/policybriefs/everyeighthours.pdf, accessed 4 June 2013; Recently, the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC News) reported that Interpol labeled the country as the world’s rape capital. 
According to the report, women were more likely to be raped than educated.  It estimated that a woman is raped 
every 17 seconds, but that 1 out of 36 incidents of rape is reported. See SABC News ‘South Africa, world's rape 
capital: Interpol’, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XqhwEVhebPc.    
61 See S v Chapman 1997 (3) SA 341 (SCA), 5A-C; DPP v Prins supra note 3 at 186 paras E-F.  
62 Opperman and Anor v S supra note 59. 
63 2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA) at 556 paras A-B. A report of crime statistics that the court cited claimed that in 2007, 
36,190 rapes were reported to the police. 
64 Ross Hirschowitz, Seble Worku & Mark Orkin, ‘Quantitative research findings on rape in South Africa’ Pretoria: 
Statistics South Africa, (2000) 1-3, available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/rape/rape.pdf, accessed 4 
June 2013; the report compares data provided by the Victims of Crimes Survey for 1997 and by the South African 





reported cases of rape or attempted rape, but the rate was still disturbingly high at 52,550. Just 
above half of the victims were below 18 years and 7,898 were below 12 years.65  However, rape 
fell in subsequent years. In 2009, the ratio stood at 100 crimes per population of 100,000, 
equalling 49, 320 in actual figures. In 2013, the rate fell to 94.5 per population of 100,000 in 
2012/2013.66 In real terms however, and given population growth, the actual number of reported 
crimes moved from 49, 320.5 in 2009 to 50,067.99 in 2013.67 The figures may also have 
included male rape. In a 2003 publication, the South African Gender Violence and Health 
Initiative cited information provided in 2001 by the South African Police Service which reported 
2,934 cases of ‘indecent assault on men’, of which 1,627 were reportedly perpetrated on 
minors.68  In 2009, South Africa’s Medical Research Council (MRC) noted that 1 in 30 men 
were raped.69 The MRC also analysed the crime in terms of the number of times an offender has 
committed rape; it reported that in 2008/2009, a male person was interviewed from each of 20 
randomly selected South African households in each of three districts in the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu Natal. The results showed that 46.3 per cent of the men had ‘raped more than one 
woman or girl’.70  Disturbing as these statistics may be, it ought to be borne in mind that sexual 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for rape or attempted rape charges as a proportion of reported cases were 8.9 per cent. See generally pages 16-24 of 
report.  
65 Christofides, Webster & Jewkes et al, ‘The state of sexual assault services: Findings from a situational analysis in 
South Africa’ The South African Gender-Based Violence and Health Initiative (2003), 1, available at 
http://www.mrc.ac.za/gender/sexualassault.pdf, accessed 4 June 2013.  
66 South African Police Service ‘Crime statistics overview RSA 2012/2013’ available at 
http://www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/publications/statistics/crimestats/2013/downloads/crime_statistics_present
ation.pdf, accessed 30 August 2014. 
67 South Africa’s population grew from 49,320,500 in 2009 to 52,982,000 in 2013. See Statistics South Africa ‘Mid-
year population estimates 2009’ available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022009.pdf, accessed 
30 August 2014; Statistics South Africa, ‘Mid-year population estimates 2013’ available at 
http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022013.pdf, accessed 30 August 2014. 
68 Christofides, Webster & Jewkes et al op cit note 65. 
69 Jewkes, Abrahams & Mathews et al, ‘Preventing rape and violence in South Africa: Call for leadership in a new 
agenda for action’  MYC Policy Brief  (November 2009) available at 
http://www.mrc.ac.za/gender/prev_rapedd041209.pdf, accessed 4 June 2013. 
70 Jewkes, Sikweyiya & Morrell et al, ‘Understanding men’s health and use of violence: Interface of rape and HIV in 
South Africa’, Medical Research Council, University of KwaZulu Natal, and Emory University, available at 
http://www.mrc.ac.za/gender/interfaceofrape&hivsarpt.pdf, accessed 4 June 2013. According to the study, ‘23.2% 
of [the] men said they had raped 2-3 women, 8.4% had raped 4-5 women, 7.1% said they had raped 6-10 and 7.7% 
said they had raped more than 10 women or girls’. See page 24; See also Medical Research Council ‘Policy Brief’ 





assaults are widely acknowledged to be underreported in South Africa,71 and that many reports 
acknowledge high HIV transmission risks in rape.  
5.4.2 The Responses of Penal Policy to the Rape Crisis 
The above statistics evoked concerns that instigated a tough crime policy response to rape by the 
legislature and judiciary. Judicial portrayals of the crisis were particularly poignant, as the 
following words from a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mudau v The State72 
illustrates: 
Our country is plainly facing a crisis of epidemic proportions in respect of rape, particularly of 
young children. The rape statistics induce a sense of shock and disbelief. The concomitant 
violence in many rape incidents engenders resentment, anger and outrage. Government has 
introduced various programmes to stem the tide, but the sexual abuse of particularly women and 
children continue unabated. In S v RO, I referred to this extremely worrying social malaise, to the 
latest statistics at that time in respect of the sexual abuse of children and also to the disturbingly 
increasing phenomenon of sexual abuse within a family context. If anything, the picture looks 
even gloomier now, three years down the line. The public is rightly outraged by this rampant 
scourge. There is consequently increasing pressure on our courts to impose harsher sentences 
primarily, as far as the public is concerned, to exact retribution and to deter further criminal 
conduct.73  
Alive as the court was to the need for strong measures against rape offenders, it was 
equally conscious of its duty to moderate the quest for retribution. In its words: 
It is trite that retribution is but one of the objectives of sentencing. It is also trite that in certain cases 
retribution will play a more prominent role than the other sentencing objectives. But one cannot 
only sentence to satisfy public demand for revenge – the other sentencing objectives, including 
rehabilitation can never be discarded altogether, in order to attain a balanced, effective sentence.74 
Further along the judgment, the court held: 
Crime has undeniably escalated alarmingly since this dictum, but while retribution remains a 
sentencing objective, this does not mean that disproportionate sentences may be imposed on 
offenders. As Prof S Terblanche has correctly pointed out:  
. . . true retribution is effected only by the imposition of an appropriate sentence, by a 
sentence which is in proportion to what is deserved by the offender. 75  
The caution expressed in the above statements was necessary. Prior to Madau, the South 
African legislature’s initial response to the crisis was to include s 51 of the 1997 Act. In Prins, 
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the court described the provision as vital to South Africa’s fight against sexual violence.76 By the 
year 2000, sentencing for rape inclined toward longer incarceration.77 Ten years later, Nugent 
JA78 observed that sentences for rape had increased from the three to four years that used to be 
imposed before the 1997 Act was passed, to 10 to 20 years subsequent to the Act. This increase 
in the length of incarceration79 signposted the era of ‘punitive humanism’ in South Africa – as 
discussed in chapter three; while the process of judicial ratiocination became suffused with well-
articulated constitutional values that emphasized humane treatment (or punishments) for 
offenders, the epidemiology of violent crimes prompted judges to reach for the upper limits of 
prescribed penalties, apparently driven by deterrent and preventative objectives.   However, 
reaching for the upper limits followed a chequered path that was attended by much criticisms of 
how courts have misapplied the ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ clause. One of the 
critics, the Western Cape Consortium on Violence against Women (WCCVW), observed that 
judicial sentences did not reflect the severity that a crime with rape’s epidemiological patterns 
deserves, and that sentences were inconsistent.80  
Other important policy responses occurred. Before the 1997 Act, sexual offences were 
governed by common law. They subsisted in two forms: rape and indecent assault. The common 
law defined rape as ‘unlawful, intentional sexual intercourse with a woman without her 
consent’.81 The absence of consent was an essential element of the offence. A second essential 
element was that there must be penetration of the victim’s vagina by the aggressor’s penis.82 
Other forms of sexual violence that did not involve this physical element fell outside the 
definition, but were criminalized as indecent assault. They typically attracted lesser punishments. 
Such other forms of sexual assault involving anal rape, the insertion of fingers or objects into the 
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vagina or anus, or sexual assault on male victims, did not fall under the common law 
classification of rape.83  
This restrictive definition of rape has been much criticised by feminists who argue that it 
excludes forms of sexual violence that are just as injurious as rape, even though no vaginal 
penetration is involved.84 The definition has also been judicially criticized.  In the 2006 case of S 
v Masiya85 the court reasoned that the definition was founded on social values that were no 
longer valid in contemporary society. Its limitation to vaginal intercourse was offensive and in 
negation of constitutional and international obligations to ensure the dignity of all and to extend 
equal protection of the law to all without discriminating between the sexes. Thus, the court found 
that the common law definition not only failed to provide protection against unorthodox forms of 
rape (such as anal rape), it also engendered discriminatory sentences86 and ignored rights that 
were violated by such crimes, such as the rights to bodily and psychological integrity and to 
privacy.87  On the whole, the court agreed with a trail of judicial decisions that considered anal 
rape and vaginal rape to be equally serious, and denounced differentiations between the two as 
artificial.88 
The legislative response to these criticisms was the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Act 2007.89 The Act was enacted to deal with all the legal aspects of the crimes 
                                                          
83 See Jonathan Burchell and John Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3 ed (2005) Chapter 51; the development of 
the definition of the crime of rape is also evident in judicial decisions. In R v Mosago and Another, 1935 AD 32 at 
page 34 the Appellate Division held that ‘rape is carnal connection with a woman (not his wife) without her 
consent’. This definition was adopted in the concurring judgment of Schreiner JA in R v K 1958 (3) SA 420 at 421. 
In 2006, the court noted in S v Zuma 2006 (2) SACR 191 at 205D that the definition of the crime, which was current 
at the time of the judgment, was unlawful and intentional intercourse with a female without her consent. 
84 Clare McGlynn op cit note 56; see also Pithey, Artz, & Combrinck op cit note 56. The authors argue that the legal 
definition of rape is narrow and excludes other forms of sexual crimes that are experienced as rape by women and 
men.  
85 S v Masiya 2006 (2) SACR 357 (T). 
86 Ibid at 378 paras G-H. 
87 Ibid at 378 para H – 379 para C. 
88 The court appeared to have endorsed the reasoning in Director of Public Prosecution v Tshabalala 2006 (2) 
SACR 381(T), where the High Court of the Transvaal Provincial Division held, in essence, that distinguishing 
between male and female rape did not serve a practical purpose and that moral blameworthiness of male rape was as 
substantial as blameworthiness for female rape. Accordingly, the court held that a six year old boy who was 
sodomised had in fact been raped. It also questioned the distinction created by the 1997 Act in relation to sentencing 
for vaginal rape and other forms of rape.  





in a single statute, in a manner that was not achieved by the 1997 Act.90 It repealed the common 
law on rape and indecent assault, replacing them with new statutory definitions. By abolishing 
gender distinctions in sexual offences, the Act classified all forms of non-consensual sexual 
penetration as rape.91 It defined rape as an intentional and unlawful act of sexual penetration of a 
complainant without the complainant’s consent.92 It also creates a class called compelled rape, 
applicable to a person who forces a third party to commit an act of sexual penetration with the 
complainant, to which neither the complainant nor the third party consented.93 The common law 
crime of indecent assault was replaced by the statutory offence of sexual assault, and was made 
to apply to all forms of non-consensual ‘sexual violation’.94 
A second legislative intervention was the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act, 
2007,95 which inserted a new s 51(3)(a)(aA)(ii) into s 51 of the 1997 Act. The new provision 
excluded four conditions that courts had hitherto regarded as substantial and compelling 
justification for departure from the minimum sentence. These include the complainant’s sexual 
history,96 absence of physical injury to the complainant,97 the accused person’s ‘norms, beliefs 
and customary practices’,98 or any relationship that existed between the accused and complainant 
                                                          
90 See the explanatory note of the Act for a full statement of the purposes of the Act. In its preamble, the Act alludes 
to the fact that the country’s common law and statutory law fail to deal adequately, effectively and in a non-
discriminatory manner with several issues associated with the commission of sexual offences. 
91 ‘Sexual penetration’ under s 1 of the Act includes penile penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth of another 
person and penetration by an object or any other part of the body of a person, or by any part of the body of an animal 
into the genital organ or anus of another person, or penetration by the genital organ of an animal into the mouth of 
another person. 
92 Section 3. 
93 Section 4; Sexual assault and compelled sexual assault are defined in terms that correspond with the definitions of 
rape and compelled rape, the only difference being the absence of penile penetration.  A third category of sexual 
assault was created, called self-compelled sexual assault. Here, a person compels another to perform sexual acts on 
him or herself without that person’s consent. See ss 5, 6 & 7. 
94 The definition of s 1 under ‘sexual violation’ includes inter alia, (in)direct contact between the genital organ of a 
person, or breast in the case of a female, and any part of the body of another person or animal. It may also be contact 
between these parts of the body and an object. 
95 Act No 38 of 2007. 
96 The high court in Mahomotsa supra note 57 held the view that the complainant’s previous sexual history was one 
of the mitigating factors that justified departure from the minimum sentence.  The SCA disagreed with the view.  
97 In S v Njikelena 2003 (2) SACR 166 (C), the absence of a lasting physical injury was one of the mitigating factors 
that the court regarded as warranting departure from the minimum sentence.  





before the commission of the crime.99 The intervention, coming on the heels of decisions that 
had upheld the excluded factors as justifying departure, acknowledged the need for regulation 
regarding what subjective elements courts may or may not consider as substantial and 
compelling. The measure, or at least its underlying intention, could have enhanced greater 
consideration for the objective elements of the crime, over and above subjective factors over 
which opinions may differ considerably.100  
Of course, there is debate over whether subjective factors should be taken into 
consideration during sentencing. The traditional judicial position is to assert unfettered discretion 
to consider all factors – including subjective factors – that are relevant to determining an 
appropriate sentence. Thus, in S v Nkawu,101 the court queried the constitutionality of s 
51(3)(a)(aA)(ii) because a literal interpretation of the requirement that absence of physical injury 
shall not be regarded as a compelling and substantial circumstance would obligate the court to 
disregard factors that are relevant to deciding proportionate punishments, and infringe the 
accused person’s fair trial rights. This view was approved by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Mudau v The State.102 The judicial objection to the provision is understandable, given that the 
degree of physical injury is, to a considerable degree, an objective fact that bears directly on the 
seriousness of the crime and the damage occasioned thereby. In Mudau however, the court also 
seemed to have acknowledged the appellant’s allusion to his employment and social status in its 
                                                          
99 Ibid; see also S v Abrahams supra note 57, where a father raped his 14-year old daughter. During sentencing, the 
high court held the crime was less reprehensible in part because, as it would seem to have been suggested by the 
court, it was committed in a domestic context, and thus not fit for the minimum sentence.  On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal doubted that a lower degree of reprehensibility was intended by the high court. Nonetheless, the 
WCCVW has noted that sentencing decisions generally seem to view sexual offences committed within familial 
contexts as less blameworthy. 
100 For example, there may be disagreement over the extent to which the offender’s social or employment status 
should influence the sentence. Under the Minnesotan sentencing guideline – which apparently informed the adoption 
of s 51 – factors like ‘(a) race, (b) sex, (c) employment factors [which includes] occupation or impact of sentence on 
profession or occupation; employment history; and employment at time of offense; employment at time of 
sentencing, (d) social factors, [which includes] educational attainment, living arrangements at time of offense or 
sentencing; length of residence; marital status; and (e) the defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights during the 
adjudication process’ are neutral and would not justify departing from the minimum sentence. See Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission ‘Minnesota sentencing guidelines &commentary’ (2013) 41-42, available at 
http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/images/2013%2520Guidelines.pdf, accessed on 9 December 2014; see also 
chapter 6 below for this discussion.   
101 2009 (2) SACR 407 (ECG). 





broadly cumulative appraisal of the substantial and compelling circumstances that obligated 
departure from the minimum sentence.103 The problem with such cumulative appraisals will be 
mentioned shortly.  Particularly pertinent at this point is the risk that courts run when they bring 
employment and social factors into consideration.  A court that mitigates, rejects, or measures 
mitigation on the basis of an offender’s employment, family or educational status engages in a 
discriminatory and potentially unconstitutional process, especially when the discrimination 
disadvantages one offender more severely than another who has been convicted of a comparable 
offence.104  
While one reason or the other may be offered to justify such discrimination – such as the 
need to take the interests of dependants who will be negatively impacted by the offender’s 
sentence into consideration – the public dissatisfaction that has been instigated by judicial 
interpretations of s 51(3) cannot be overstated. Sentences have been impugned for circumventing 
the legislative intention behind the provision or for substituting the test in the provision for the 
court’s own impressions of fairness. The WCCVW,105 for example, has criticised courts for 
showing a tendency to depart from the Malgas guidelines and to impose sentences that fall below 
the minimum sentence.  The discussion below explores the basis of the criticisms.  
 
5.4.3 Applying the Malgas Principles 
Early opportunities to refine and particularize the Malgas principles came before the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in S v Abrahams106 and S v Mahomotsa.107 Both cases involved appeals against 
sentences for rapes that were perpetrated on children who were less than 16 years old, which 
given s 51, was punishable with life sentences. However, using the Malgas principles, the court 
found that both cases exhibited substantial and compelling circumstances that warranted 
imposing a lesser sentence. In finding so however, the court articulated a principle of 
                                                          
103 Ibid at paras 23-28. 
104 On this point, see Cassia C Spohn How Do Judges Decide? The Search for Justice and Fairness 2 ed (2009). 
Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks California, see generally chapter three of the book. 
105 Western Cape Consortium on Violence against Women op cit note 28. 
106 Supra note 57. 





proportionality not contemplated by the Act and possibly not even by Malgas.  In Mahomotsa for 
instance, the Supreme Court of Appeal reasoned:  
[I]t does not follow that simply because the circumstances attending a particular instance of 
rape result in it falling within one or other of the categories of rape delineated in the Act, a 
uniform sentence of either life imprisonment or indeed any other uniform sentence must or 
should be imposed. … Even in cases falling within the categories delineated in the Act there 
are bound to be differences in the degree of their seriousness. … [I]t is only right that the 
differences in seriousness should receive recognition when it comes to the meting out of 
punishment. As this Court observed in S v Abrahams…'some rapes are worse than others and 
the life sentence ordained by the Legislature should be reserved for cases devoid of substantial 
factors compelling the conclusion that such a sentence is inappropriate and unjust’.108  
For support, the court cited the following dictum of Davis J in S v Swartz and Another109: 
As controversial a proposition as this is bound to be, not all murders carry the same moral 
blameworthiness, so, too, not all rapes deserve equal punishment. That is in no way to diminish 
the horror of rape; it is however to say that there is a difference even in the heart of darkness. 
Indeed, the court’s opinion that rapes crimes do not attract the same levels of culpability is 
persuasive. It reinforces the need for differentiations in the levels of culpability and for 
corresponding differences in penal severity as was reiterated in S v Vilakazi,110 where the 
Supreme Court of Appeal deplored the lack of gradation between sentences prescribed by s 51. 
The court also expressed the view that the provision wrongly lumps punishment for certain 
crimes into the same category of gravity, in a manner that could result in disproportionate 
penalties being awarded. However, even if it is admitted that the court rightly declared the 
statutorily mandated life sentences to be disproportionate to the crimes in Abrahams and 
Mahomotsa, something critical is still lacking. The court failed to offer a precise evaluation of 
                                                          
108 S v Mahomotsa supra note 57 at 443 para H – 444 para B. 
109 S v Swartz and Another 1999 (2) SACR 380 (C). 
110 Supra note 63 at 559 para D – 560 para H. The reasoning in this case was preceded by the decision in R v Billam 
[1986] 1 All ER 985,  where the English Court of Appeal held that while rape was always a serious offence that 
demanded an immediate custodial sentence, different degrees of seriousness in the commission of the offence 
demanded different levels of penal severity. See Martin Wasik Emmins on Sentencing 2 ed (1985) 48.  The court in  
 therefore rightly criticised s 51 for failing to ensure that there is gradation between prison sentences for rape and life 
sentence for rape with aggravating features. According to the court, the failure ignored the fact that aggravating 
features could feature different levels of intensity and that moral culpability may not always be the same for 
offences that fall within the same statutory classification. To drive the point home regarding the absence of 
gradation, the court reasoned that it would be unconscionable to impose the same life sentence on a youthful first 
offender who rapes a child once and a ‘recidivist serial rapist’ who ‘repeatedly gang-rapes’ his disabled victim and 
knowingly infects her with HIV. The court also criticized other incongruities in s 51, such as the disproportions 
between sentences for various circumstances of rape and sentences for other crimes, which could result in grossly 





how the mitigating and aggravating factors it took into consideration were weighted to produce 
the 12-year sentences it imposed. This makes it difficult to determine what factors prevailed in 
the choice of sentence. Not surprisingly, the WCCVW criticised the reasons for departure in both 
cases as glossing over the ‘substantial and compelling’ test in a manner that confused the 
jurisprudence, or even probably altered the Malgas test.111   
Here lies the predicament: decisions to depart from minimum sentences are taken using a 
less than methodical weighting process that is validated by the value that each sentencer attaches 
to aggravating or mitigating factors, as he or she perceives them in individual cases. This is 
almost re-enacting Selden’s sentiments about equity and the length of the Chancellor’s foot. 
Given the absence of a weighting system that allocates points to each factor, or some similar 
scheme for allocating value, it is uncertain whether courts weigh the factors individually or 
collectively. A description of how courts have considered aggravating and mitigating factors is 
necessary to illustrate such uncertainty and the need for a more precise weighting system. 
 
5.5 Weighting Mitigating and Aggravating Factors 
When Malgas held that reasons for departing from s 51 may also be found in traditional 
sentencing factors, it clearly suggested that courts may resort to the aggravating and mitigating 
factors they have traditionally112 utilised to elevate or lower criminal liability. Applying the 
factors involves balancing the factual or objective seriousness of the offence against its 
subjective elements, such as the offender’s personal circumstances, or the actual harm caused by 
the offence. Applying itself to this balancing process in Malgas, the court found that the 
                                                          
111 The WCCVW observed this ‘confusion’ again in S v G 2004 (2) SACR 296 (W), which also involved the rape of 
a minor. In that case, the court interpreted Abrahams and Mahomotsa as establishing the principle that minimum 
sentences were not mandatory and that courts may depart from them where substantial and compelling 
circumstances exist, or where, having regard to all the facts, the prescribed sentence would be disproportionate to 
the crime and therefore unjust. This, in other words, meant that ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ need not 
be the reason for departure. The court must consider differences in seriousness as was done in Abrahams and 
Mahomotsa. Consequently, the court decided in S v G that the absence of the use of excessive force in the 
commission of the crime justified the award of a lesser sentence. See Western Cape Consortium on Violence against 
Women op cit note 28 at 5-6. 
112 The phrase ‘traditional aggravating and mitigating factors’ is used in the context on those factors developed in the 





seriousness of murder, the presence of premeditation and common purpose113 and the fact that 
the victim was defenceless, aggravated liability. On the other hand, the following had mitigating 
effect: the appellant was relatively young; she was vulnerable and exploitable, and had been 
coerced into committing the crime by someone with an overbearing personality; she was 
remorseful soon after and spontaneously reported the crime, bringing it to light; she had no 
criminal record; she derived no personal benefit from the crime; and, lastly, she had high 
prospects of being rehabilitated.114 These examples are not exhaustive; different genres of crime 
may require nuanced approaches to balancing the factors. Generally though, subsequent 
decisions have followed the Malgas example of juxtaposing factors that elevate or lower 
liability.115  
In S v Mahomotsa,116 the seriousness of the offence, the offender’s brazenness and the fact 
that he exploited a relationship of trust or position of power were all held to be aggravating.117  
In a number of cases, the presence of lasting physical, emotional, psychological or other injury 
on the victim and the threat or use of actual force,118 or the fact that the victim is below 16 years 
have also been held to be aggravating factors in rape.119 Examples of mitigating factors include 
the absence of serious violence or threat of violence, of lasting physical injury or injury beyond 
such as is inherent in rape,120 and the offender’s youthfulness and personal circumstances.121 
                                                          
113 Common purpose is said to be present were two or more individuals agree to embark on a joint criminal venture, 
or are active accomplices in a criminal venture.  Under the doctrine, each accomplice becomes liable for the actions 
of other accomplices that occur within their common design. See Managay Reddi ‘The doctrine of common purpose 
receives the stamp of approval’ (2005) 122 S. African L.J 59-66; see also S v Safatsa (1988) 1 SA 868 (A) at 898 
para A. 
114 S v Malgas supra note 8 at 1238 para H - 1239 para B. 
115 On this point, see also S v Sikhipha 2006 (2) SACR 439 (SCA) at 445 para E-F. 
116 Supra note 57. 
117 See also S v Abrahams supra note 57; Mudau v S supra note 72. 
118 S v Mahomotsa supra note 57; S v Abrahams supra note 57; S v Vilakazi supra note 63. 
119 S v Abrahams supra note 57. 
120 Violence in this context means extraneous violence.  The sense in which the qualification is used is that force 
beyond what is necessary must have been employed to perpetrate the crime.  The qualification acknowledges that 
rape is in itself an act of physical violence.  Force is extraneous when for example, it involves physical assault on the 
victim. See S v Vilakazi supra note 63; S v Mahomotsa supra note 57.  
121 S v Mahomotsa supra note 57 at 444 paras E-F. However, in S v Vilakazi supra note 63 at 574 paras C-F, the 
court held that where the offence is serious, ‘the personal circumstances of the offender, by themselves, will 
necessarily recede into the background’. They may however be relevant with respect to whether the offender may be 
expected to recidivate. The court considered that his stable employment and family status did not indicate that the 





Personal circumstances include those subjective elements that may have predisposed the 
offender to the crime.  These include a dysfunctional family background or upbringing, poverty 
and the offender being a victim of sexual abuse, amongst others.  It has also been held to be a 
mitigating factor when the offender utilises a condom as a precaution against pregnancy or 
transmitting disease,122 or is of middle age and has no criminal record,123 or is married, has 
children and is employed.124  
As noted earlier, courts attach different weights to these factors, using their perceptions 
of the gravity of the crime. While such differences are to be expected in a discretion driven 
sentencing system, failure to rationalise the discretionary function involved can result in 
contradictions. An analysis by Terblanche and Roberts,125 of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
decision in S v Ferreira and others126 illustrates the point. Three judicial opinions in that case 
imposed three widely conflicting penalties using the same principles.  Such incongruity, argued 
the authors, stems from the fact that courts have to balance the triad in sentencing and find a way 
in which the selected penalty will serve the purposes of punishment.127 How and whether all of 
these purposes should be funnelled into the punishment ‘is a matter of conjecture and much 
difference and variance of application’.128 According to Terblanche and Roberts: 
There is much to be said for these principles. It allows the court to make a true assessment of the 
seriousness of the offence, to bring the personal circumstances of the offender into 
consideration, and to have regard for the interests of society. The crime is the factor that set the 
                                                          
122 S v Vilakazi supra note 63 at 573 para B. 
123 S v Abrahams supra note 57. 
124 On the mitigating effects of marriage, parenthood and employment on sentencing, see Terblanche & Roberts op 
cit note 24 at 199.  The authors wrote that courts generally give the impression that these factors mitigate sentence, 
but that it is hard to find actual cases in which punishments were reduced on these accounts.  A possible explanation 
comes from a problem that the authors acknowledged in the article, that courts discuss the basic principles of 
sentencing and move on to the facts of the case. ‘No intermediate set of principles have been developed’ that would 
show, for instance, how a mitigating or aggravating element influences the choice or quantum of punishment.  
125 Ibid at 189. 
126 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA); this case involves sentencing for murder. The reality of variations in judicial 
perceptions about the seriousness of a crime and the effect of circumstances that attended to its commission were 
acknowledged in Malgas, when the SCA held that an appeal court should not interfere with the sentencing discretion 
of the trial court merely because it prefers another sentence. In the absence of a material misdirection on the part of 
the trial court, resulting in the award of a disturbingly disproportionate sentence, the sentence of the trial court must 
stand.  In other words, differences in the measure of punishment that different judges would consider appropriate in 
a given case, are to be expected.  Problems would arise where the judge’s discretion results in excessive punishment. 
See also S v Barnard 2004 (1) SACR 191 (SCA) at 194 paras B-D.  






whole criminal process in motion -- there is no way in which it could ever be disregarded. The 
offender and society are the true parties involved in the crime, and the victim(s) are not forgotten 
either, because society's interests are only served when the interests of the victims are 
paramount. Unfortunately, the courts have not made the most of these principles.129 
The authors then conclude that judges have adopted an unhelpful intuitive approach to 
sentencing.130 The problematic nature of the approach was also revealed in the divergent 
opinions in the appellate decision in S v Nkomo,131 where the high court imposed a life sentence 
on the appellant after finding no basis to depart from the minimum life sentence. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal conducted the usual balancing exercise. With regards to aggravation, 
the court noted – in obvious allusion to the worst cases of rape ‘principle’ in S v Abrahams – that 
it could not imagine rape under worse conditions.132 On the other hand, the appellant’s youth (29 
years at the time of committing the offence), the absence of a criminal record, the fact that he 
was employed and had three dependants were admitted in mitigation of sentence.  The court also 
formed the belief that the appellant had a probable chance of being rehabilitated, though it 
observed that no evidence was led to that effect.  
In South African sentencing jurisprudence, how courts allocate weights to each 
aggravating and mitigating factor is not so clear. In Nkomo the court relied on sentencing 
patterns to arrive at a 16-year prison sentence, which it believed was appropriate. It cited 
Mahomotsa, where the Supreme Court of Appeal imposed an effective sentence of 12 years for 
two counts of multiple rapes,133 and S v Sikhipha,134 where the same court reversed a life 
                                                          
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 2007 (2) SACR 198 (SCA). 
132 Specifically, the features that the court considered to be aggravating include the abduction and rape of the 
complainant, while holding her captive overnight; dragging her back into captivity and repeatedly raping her after 
she suffered a fall that left her injured after a failed attempt to escape; forcing the complainant to perform oral sex on 
him and physically assaulting her when she resisted; stripping the complainant and taking her clothes away to 
prevent her from leaving; and lastly, the appellant’s lack of remorse for his actions. The fact that the appellant had 
an education and a job, which placed him in a comparatively better position than the complainant, was also treated 
as an aggravating factor.  Of all the cases that have been reviewed in the course of this research, this is the only case 
where these factors had an aggravating effect in sentencing for rape.  The trend has been to consider them as 
mitigating.  However, it is hard to tell what particular effect the factors had on sentencing in the case, for the reasons 
offered by Terblance and Roberts.  
133 In Mahomotsa supra note 57, the court examined previous sentencing decisions in similar cases to determine 
what was traditionally imposed for rape. These decisions include S v Gqamana 2001 (2) SACR 28 (C) where a 23 
year old who raped a 14 year old complainant, thinking she was 18 years, was sentenced to eight years. The 





sentence for the rape of a 13 year old girl, imposing 20 years instead.  In Sikhipha, the absence of 
serious injury to the victim, the possibility that the appellant could be rehabilitated and the fact 
that he was 31 years old during the trial, practiced a trade, and had a wife and children who were 
dependent on him, were all regarded as ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ that justified 
departure from the minimum life sentence.  
Beyond intuition, the examples that Nkomo relied on did not offer logical explanations 
regarding how aggravating and mitigating factors translated into the quantum of punishments 
that the court imposed in those cases. While intuition (or perceptions) may not be completely 
ruled out because of necessary value judgments that must be made, relying on it is hardly 
sufficient and is prone to produce sentences that are neither rational nor evidenced based.135 The 
reasoning process in the decisions that Nkomo relied on were more intuitive than rational, or 
even empirical.136 The same intuitive process formed the basis of sentencing in Nkomo; beyond 
the necessary attempt that the court made to differentiate and particularise the Malgas principles, 
no logical explanation was offered regarding why sentence had to be mitigated to the extent that 
it was. The court held that the absence of a weapon, the relative youthfulness of the offender, the 
absence of a criminal history and the prospects of rehabilitation, were mitigating, even though 
the court had said it could not imagine a worse instance of rape. Not surprisingly, Theron AJA 
strongly dissented with the court’s reasons for interfering with the lower court’s sentence:  
This court in S v Abrahams and S v Mahomotsa recognized that while all rapes are serious, 
‘some rapes are worse than others’. In my view, the rape of the complainant is one of the worst 
imaginable. If life imprisonment is not appropriate in a rape as brutal as this, then when would it 
be appropriate? I am of the view that this is precisely the kind of matter the legislature had in 
mind for the imposition of the minimum sentence of life imprisonment. Courts must not shrink 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
his shack. The fact that the victim was a minor – though he claimed to have through she was 18 years old – was 
considered an aggravation. The mitigating factor was that the offender had no criminal record. The second case the 
court referred to was S v Abrahams supra note 57, where for raping his less that 16 year old daughter, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal imposed a 12-year prison sentence on the defendant. The issue with these decisions however, is that 
they followed the intuitive process that Terblanche and Roberts criticized. 
134 2006 (2) SACR 439 (SCA). 
135 Richard E Redding ‘Evidence-based sentencing: The science of sentencing policy and practice’ (2009) Vol. 1 No. 
1 Chapman Journal of Criminal Justice 1. 
136 Ibid; the sense in which the words ‘rational’ and ‘empirical’ are used connotes sentences that can be verified on 





from their duty to impose, in appropriate cases, the prescribed minimum sentences ordained by 
the legislature.137  
Theron AJA also did not think that the court’s intervention met the need to respond to 
rape crimes with a measure of severity that satisfied expectations: 
Against the backdrop of the unprecedented spate of rapes in this country, courts must also be 
mindful of their duty to send out a clear message to potential rapists and to the community that 
they are determined to protect the equality, dignity and freedom of all women.
 
Society’s 
legitimate expectation is ‘that an offender will not escape life imprisonment –   which has been 
prescribed for a very specific reason – simply because [substantial and compelling] 
circumstances are, unwarrantedly, held to be present’.138 
In conclusion, Theron AJA, following what she called the Malgas approach ‘of 
balancing societal and personal interests’, held that the totality of the facts did not constitute 
substantial and compelling circumstances.139 
What emerges from the foregoing discussion is that habitual resort to the Malgas 
principles has not guaranteed sentencing consistency. Neither have the principles satisfied the 
quest for proportionality. When judicial sentences for rape are examined, a telling tale of 
disproportionality and inconsistency unfolds.  One reason for this, according to Terblanche and 
Roberts, is that courts are reluctant to actively probe and obtain accurate information on which 
sentencing decisions ought to be predicated, in order not to be seen as ‘descending into the 
arena’. True to this observation, South African courts have often deplored the paucity of 
sentencing evidence, and then proceeded nevertheless to decide a punishment.140 The tendency to 
prod on to resolve questions that arise from the lack of accurate or adequate information, 
apparently prompted Terblanche and Roberts141 to caution that courts should not ‘fall back on 
mere speculation to resolve the question’ regarding what would be an appropriate sanction.   
                                                          
137 S v Nkomo supra at 207 note 131 para A-B. 
138 Ibid at paras B-D. 
139 Theron AJA rejected the notion that the offender’s youthfulness and absence of a criminal record, or employment 
could on their own, provide enough reasons to depart from the minimum sentence. In her words, ‘there is hardly a 
person of whom it can be said that there is no prospect of rehabilitation. The appellant was 29 years old at the time 
and would ordinarily not be regarded as a youthful or immature offender. Employment in itself would not 
necessarily qualify as a substantial and compelling circumstance’. See S v Nkomo supra note 131 at 207 paras E-F. 
140 S v Vilakazi supra note 63 at 573 para D – 575 para A; S v Mudau supra note 72 at para 25. 





In Kubista’s142 helpful analysis on the subject, the problem originates in a hybrid judge-
made scheme for sentencing, in which courts utilise pre s 51 (traditional) sentencing techniques 
as a basis for departure from mandatory minimums. The hybrid scheme allows courts to ‘misuse 
the subjective severity of the crime as a mitigating factor’, 143 while jettisoning the legislative 
goal of establishing an objective basis for measuring offence gravity. This preference for judicial 
discretion over the objective standards of the legislation has grown ‘a rape jurisprudence that 
minimises the inherent violence of rape’,144 and ‘could have long-term negative effects on 
sentences for rape’.145 She noted further how sentencing decisions (Abrahams and Mahomotsa in 
particular) that have followed the Malgas principles created subcategories of gravity ranging 
from minor to heinous rapes, which were not contemplated by the 1997 Act.146  In her words:  
The Supreme Court of Appeal increased the sentences of the accused in both Abrahams and 
Mahomotsa. Still, these cases demonstrate the process of judicial categorization of rape, where 
the court imports a false benchmark standard into the definition of rape contained in Part I of 
Schedule 2. This means that any crime scenario which does not meet the judicially created 
benchmark can be seen as a situation for which the imposition of the guideline sentence would 
be unjust, since the crime committed is less deviant than those envisaged by the legislature. In 
other words, by creating a false high-water mark, the courts excavate an enormous space where 
‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ to depart from mandatory minimums may dwell.147 
Traditional factors that courts rely on ought not to justify departure from minimum 
sentences when they would have the effect of minimising the objective gravity of the offence, or 
undermining s 51 – including the legislative intention of treating rape as an inherently violent 
crime148 that should be dealt with severely. Similar criticisms have been echoed elsewhere. 
According to O’Sullivan and Murray149 ‘some judges revert to stereotypical assumptions about 
women and rely on rape myths’ in order to circumvent s 51’s minimum sentences.  Van der 
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Merwe’s150 views sum it up: courts have inverted the Malgas principle that the minimum 
sentences should be the ordinarily appropriate, replacing it with the rule ‘that if it is not one of 
the worst cases, life imprisonment will not apply.  By implication, the prescribed sentence of life 
imprisonment in rape cases will therefore ordinarily be departed from’.151 
 
5.6  The Judicial Response to Criticisms and Problems that are Implicit in Section 51’s 
Allocation of Penalties  
Not to be lost in this discussion is the fact that the Supreme Court of Appeal has acknowledged 
the inconsistencies illustrated above. In Mudau v S152 for example, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
acknowledged the conflicting opinions in Nkomo153 and the widespread criticism that followed 
that decision, but it blamed inconsistencies on legislative interference with sentencing discretion. 
Taking this sentiment further in S v Vilakazi154 the court subjected s 51 to the following criticism: 
It requires only a cursory reading of the Act to reveal other startling incongruities. And when the 
sentences that are prescribed for rape in various circumstances are related to sentences prescribed 
for other crimes even more incongruities emerge. It is not surprising that the leading writer on the 
subject of sentencing in this country, Professor Terblanche, advanced the following acerbic 
observation on the Act ten years after it took effect: 
I have criticised the Act elsewhere and, if anything, have become more critical with time. 
There is hardly a provision in sections 51 to 53 that is without problems. The number of 
absurdities that have been identified and which will no doubt be identified in future is simply 
astounding. The Act's lack of sophistication disappoints from beginning to end. There are too 
many examples of disproportionality between the various offences and the prescribed 
sentences.155 
The frustration that the above statement communicates is palpable and one can hardly 
disagree with its logic. As pointed out earlier,156 sentencers resort to skirting statutory 
punishments when they believe that they are unduly severe and therefore unjust. Based on the 
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views expressed by Terblanche and Roberts,157 however, the real problem lies in the absence of 
intermediate principles that would show for instance, how a mitigating or aggravating element 
influences the choice or severity of punishment. Elsewhere, Terblanche argued that ‘there is little 
… principled guidance for sentencing for rape, apart from general acceptance that it is a very 
serious offence’.158 This, as noted earlier, has led South African courts to hypothesize when 
evaluating a rape crime, or the impact it has had on the victim.  Two problems emerge from 
hypothetical evaluations of victim impact. First, it highlights the probability that the court may 
understate victim impact. Secondly, it raises the possibility of mitigating sentence on a highly 
rebuttable supposition that the victim showed no lasting signs of trauma. This approach is 
unfairly discriminatory. It assumes, without a scientific basis, that a victim who shows obvious 
signs of rebounding quickly was not as badly affected as the one who wallows in the trauma of 
rape. Such thinking has the tendency of minimizing the gravity of rape.  
In the 2011 case of S v Matyityi159 the Supreme Court of Appeal attempted a more 
constructive response to criticisms of inconsistent applications of the ‘substantial and compelling 
circumstances’ test. The respondent in this case was convicted of rape and murder, which he 
committed with other co-offenders. The convictions fell within s 51, but the trial court 
considered the relative youthfulness of the offender (he was 27 years at the time the offence was 
committed) and his expression of remorse during trial as substantial and compelling factors that 
justified departure from the minimum life sentence. Accordingly, it imposed an effective 
sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment for rape and murder. The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected 
the lower court’s reasons for departure and held that the objective gravity of the offence and its 
prevalence, including the brazen brutality and leading role the respondent played while 
committing the offences, besides other aggravating factors, ruled out any basis for mitigation. 
Accordingly, it substituted the lower court’s sentence with life sentences.  
Two things stand out in the appellate court’s decision. First, the court iterated the need for 
a more balanced sentencing approach that places adequate and precise information pertaining to 
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the accused and the victim at the court’s disposal. In other words, courts should hypothesise less 
and exercise discretion rationally.  Not only would precise information enhance the objective 
gravity of the offence, it would also make victim impact more assessable, thereby creating a 
proper sense of balance that enriches the court’s analysis and enhances proportionality. 
Proportionality is impeded when – as is often the case – sentencing information focuses more on 
the offender, foisting as it were, information asymmetries on the court. It leaves the court with 
half the information it needs to exercise discretion judiciously160 and potentially diminishes the 
objective gravity of the offence.  Secondly, the court decried the eagerness and frequency with 
which sentencing courts depart from minimum sentences and subvert the legislative intention 
behind s 51, usually for flimsy reasons that do not hold up to scrutiny, or for ‘vague, ill-defined 
concepts … and other equally vague and ill-founded hypothesis that appear to fit the particular 
sentencing officer’s personal notion of fairness’.161 One of such vague concepts that the court 
rejected – but which had mitigated sentence in its previous judgments162 – is ‘relative 
youthfulness’. These observations led the court to reassert the Malgas guideline, insisting that 
sentencing courts must act within the boundaries of its powers and defer to the legislative 
intention behind the adoption of minimum sentences.163 It held that the only reason for departure 
ought to be ‘truly convincing’.164  
Thus, Matyityi both offered an important restatement of how courts should approach s 51, 
as well as a timely caution against misapplying (or devaluing) the Malgas guidelines. By urging 
a proper balance between information pertaining to victim impact and the offender, the court 
idealised a scheme that potentially enhances a more judicious exercise of discretion and could 
reduce margins of disproportionality. However, when all has been said and done, the function of 
evaluating ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ through traditional aggravating and 
mitigating factors essentially remains discretionary and the scheme remains more of an idea than 
a methodical guideline. Notwithstanding the important restatement of the Malgas principles and 
the need for balanced approach to sentencing, Matyityi’s approach to weighing aggravating and 
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mitigating factors did not follow any particularly different trajectory from how courts had 
traditionally weighed the factors. Its approach was still intuitive. Besides, Matyityi did not 
segregate the offences for which it awarded sentences in order to illustrate how aggravating 
factors elevated the sentence for each offence. This makes it difficult to determine the extent to 
which any combination of aggravating factors impacted the sentence for rape especially. This 
desegregated approach raises cogent questions. First, was the rape sentence influenced in any 
way by the fact that a brazen act of murder arose from the same criminal transaction?  Secondly, 
and having regard to the pattern of sentences that the Supreme Court of Appeal has imposed for 
rape, would the court have found a reason to depart from the minimum sentence if the murder 
did not occur? Unfortunately, Matyityi does not yield answers to these questions.  
To conclude this discussion on sentencing for rape in South Africa, it must be observed 
that over and beyond criticisms that courts avoid minimum sentences, a substantial problem 
emerges from s 51’s failure to provide a mechanism for progressively increasing penal severity 
for rape crimes where differences in offence seriousness can be factually or objectively drawn. 
As Vilakazi rightly noted, courts are confronted with a proportionality and fairness dilemma 
when they are required to impose sentences that do not differentiate levels of offence gravity. To 
redress this situation, an amendment may be necessary, which further differentiates between rape 
crimes in terms of objective gravity and clearly specifies those aggravating circumstances in 
which a life sentence will be more likely than not.   
 
5.7 A brief Observation about Sentencing Factors in Nigeria 
As pointed out earlier in this thesis, unlike South Africa, there is little explicit judicial reasoning 
that goes on when Nigerian courts impose sentences. Sentencing, as it has also been pointed out, 
is the least developed aspect of Nigeria’s criminal jurisprudence. Although courts have itemised 
what principles need to be considered in sentencing, there is little jurisprudence surrounding the 
development and application of those principles.165 This imposes a serious limitation on any 
enquiry into the ‘science’ or ‘art’ of sentencing in Nigeria.  Nevertheless, it is possible, and 
                                                          





pertinent’ to recognise that Nigerian courts have identified and used sentencing factors.  This 
section considers how these factors feature in Nigerian’s sentencing scheme. It has been noted 
that Nigerian courts generally claim to fit the punishment to the offender, his crime and the 
interests of society, and to allow adjustments necessitated by aggravating and mitigating 
factors.166 Unfortunately, their ability to achieve a proportionate balance is constrained by rigid 
adherence to statutory penalties and the absence of a moderating constitutional principle.   
Examples of factors that have been held to be mitigative include youth167 or old age, the 
poor health of the offender, absence of a criminal record and demonstration of remorse or 
admission of guilt.168 Having an education or not having one and playing a minor role in 
furtherance of a common purpose may also mitigate sentence.169 The fact that the offender and 
victim are members of the same family may also result in sentence reduction in order to mitigate 
the consequences the crime and the punishment may have on the victim.170  On the other hand, 
the seriousness of a crime, the brutality or callousness with which it was committed and the use 
of force with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, may enhance the severity of punishment or 
diminish the influence that a mitigating factor, such as being a first offender, could have on the 
sentence.171 Before the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act 1984 was enacted, the 
use of violence or arms during robberies prompted courts to increase the length and severity of 
prison sentence.172  By virtue of the Act however, armed robbery became punishable with a 
mandatory death sentence.  Abusing a position of trust, the prevalence of a crime, or playing a 
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lead or major role in the crime also aggravate sentence.  Likewise previous convictions; the mere 
presence of a previous conviction, whether or not it was for a similar offence as the current 
conviction, is an aggravating factor.173  
The cases suggest that Nigerian courts have applied these factors to conceivably much the 
same effect as their South African counterparts even though unlike the latter, they offer little to 
digest in terms of the reasoning behind the application of the factors. However, Nigerian courts 
have also developed an approach that responds to sensibilities in particular social contexts. For 
example, in criminal suits where the defence of provocation is pleaded, courts have applied the 
meaning assigned to the provocative words by ‘the ordinary reasonable man’ of the offender’s 
station.  Thus, where a woman called her devout Muslim husband a pagan,174 or mocked her 
husband’s impotence,175 the defendant was allowed to plead provocation, resulting in a 
substitution of charges of murder with manslaughter and a consequential reduction in 
sentence.176 In Uwa v The State177 where an appeal against a death sentence depended on a proper 
determination of the age of the appellant at the time he committed the offence, the court resorted 
to the native Igbo (or Ibo) calendar to determine that a boy who would have been 13 years old 
under the Gregorian calendar, and thus liable to the death sentence, was still below that age when 
the offence was committed.178  
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These examples indicate how social contexts may inform the weight that accompanies an 
aggravating or mitigating factor.  Taking these contexts into consideration potentially ensures 
that the sentence reflects the entire circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. 
However, the lingering problem – as pointed out in Onyilokwu v Commissioner of Police179 – is 
that courts characteristically do not give enough thought to sentencing principles, or to 
proportionate values that may be assigned to the objects of punishment.  A cursory survey of 
sentencing for rape cases illustrate this predicament.  
 
5.7.1 The Approach of Nigerian Courts to Sentencing for Rape 
The characteristic failure described above is exemplified in sentencing for rape crimes in 
Nigeria, but first, to look at the social context within which such sentencing occurs. Like their 
South African counterparts, judges of Nigeria’s Supreme Court have expressed concerns over the 
pervasive and invidious nature of the crime, and pointed out the need for punishments that 
correspond with the seriousness of the crime. Some of these comments were made against the 
backdrops of a growing number of girl children who were becoming victims of rape crimes, 
called the offence of defilement in Nigeria180 - and the tendency of courts to visit the crimes with 
light sentences. Thus, in Ndewenu Posu & Anor v The State,181 the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
expressed the following opinion, per Adekeye JSC: 
I cannot be remark that the sentencing policy of judicial officers need to be revisited. The purpose 
of the criminal law is to prevent harm to the society. The offence of rape is by every standard a 
grave offence which often leaves the victim traumatised and dehumanised. A light sentence as in 
the case of the appellants must never be imposed. This may have the unsavoury effect of turning 
rape into a pastime by flippant youths. 
The two defendants in this case were convicted for conspiracy to rape and rape, and 
subsequently sentenced to one and three years’ imprisonment respectively, to run concurrently. 
Under the South African minimum sentencing rules, a crime of this nature, perpetrated by two in 
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the prosecution of a common purpose, would have attracted a life sentence, as the minimum 
sentence ordinarily applicable, unless substantial and compelling circumstances justified 
departure. Section 358 of the Criminal Code Law of Ogun State182 under which both defendants 
were prosecuted, makes the perpetrators liable to life imprisonment, with or without caning. This 
gives the sentencer considerable discretion in calibrating punishment. In this case, the lower 
court imposed three years’ imprisonment for rape.  Since this sentence was not challenged on 
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed it, howbeit after first bemoaning the lightness of the 
sentence, and the fact that it was not challenged.  However, the court did not offer a template or 
dictum regarding how trial courts ought to engage with sentencing for such crimes.  It probably 
would have considered it academic, since it was never raised on appeal. Nevertheless, it would 
have been a worthwhile exercise, having regard to the court’s precedent or standard setting role, 
and to important roles that the English Court of Criminal Appeals has fulfilled in issuing 
guideline judgements to regulate sentencing discretion.  The court’s roles in this regard will be 
discussed in chapter six. 
Notwithstanding instances of self-restraint that Nigerian appellate courts have exercised 
regarding interfering with sentencing decisions in criminal appeals, it is noteworthy that the 
Supreme Court is coming to terms with the growing rates of sexual offences in Nigeria, the fact 
that it targets children in growing numbers, and the need for a sufficiently deterrent policy 
measure. Boniface Adonike v The State183 was a 2015 Supreme Court decision in which the 
appellant sexually defiled (raped) a five year old girl, and was sentenced to six years 
imprisonment with hard labour and six strokes of the cane.  There was no appeal against this 
sentence,184 prompting the Supreme Court to uphold it. Nevertheless, this was one case that drew 
the court’s attention to the need for a clear and consistent sentencing policy.  In the court’s 
words: 
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This type of case should be an opportunity for sentencing authorities to really come out vehemently 
to show that society abhors the type of conduct exhibited by the appellant on this innocent young 
girl of five (5) years. Imagine the trauma (both physical and mental) the young girl was subjected 
to as a result of the insatiable urge of the appellant for mischief which he has invoked from the pit 
of hell.  Violating a girl of just five years by the appellant in the manner he did is condemnable, 
barbaric, immoral and devoid of any reasoning whatsoever. I wish I have the power to increase his 
punishment. I could have done it in order to serve as deterrence to would-be rapists. 
In Muntaka-Coomasie JSC’s supporting opinion, he may well have sentenced the 
defendant to life imprisonment. In Idris Rabiu v The State185 also, the Court of Appeal observed 
that child rape had become awfully prevalent in the jurisdiction in which the offences were being 
tried. The accused persons, who were first offenders, were being tried for raping an 11-year-old 
girl.  Describing their act as callous, the court affirmed the need to protect children and women 
by punishing sexual predators severely. 
These judicial pronouncements are pretty strong acknowledgments of the problems that 
rape is becoming in the Nigerian society.  Various reports confirm an upsurge of child rape in 
Nigeria.186 However, the appellate courts need to do more than refrain from interfering with a 
trial court’s sentencing discretion. In the absence of appropriate policy responses from the state, 
the Supreme Court especially needs to take the initiative to issue directives (sentencing 
guidelines) that lower courts can follow.  
Indeed, a survey of sentencing decisions for rape crimes reveals quite a perturbing array of 
problems. For one thing, and as this thesis has consistently maintained, sentencers’ decisions are 
terribly pithy when it comes to ratiocinating the objectives, principles and factors that should 
influence sentence. In the Posu and Adonike cases, it was obvious that the Supreme Court had 
little insight into how the trial court determined sentence, because no reasons were offered by 
that court.  Had reasons been offered, one would have expected the Supreme Court to comment 
thereon, to evaluate whether the courts had exercised discretion judiciously or otherwise, even if 
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no appeal against sentence had been placed before it. Secondly, one also finds inconsistencies in 
the sentences that courts have imposed. Sentencing for rape crimes in which children are the 
victims illustrates the problem. In Habibu Musa v The State187 for example, a sentence of 14 
years in prison was upheld by the Supreme Court. The victim in this case was a five-year-old 
girl.  In Edwin Ezeigbo v the State,188 the appellant was sentenced to two years imprisonment and 
a N500 fine, and a further three months imprisonment if he failed to pay the fine, for repeatedly 
raping an eight year old girl.  A stiffer sentence of seven years imprisonment was imposed in 
Oludotun Ogunbayo v The State,189 where the victim was a 13 year old girl, whom the defendant 
sexually and physically assaulted.  In The State v Hassan Audu,190 the defendant was sentenced 
to three years imprisonment for raping a nine-year-old girl, while the court in Hassan Ibrahim v 
The State,191 substituted a sentence of fine for a ten years sentence of imprisonment. The victim 
in the case, was a five-year-old girl.   
The disparities revealed in the above cases and the lack of attention to ratiocinating 
punishment that is evident in the cases ought not to be allowed to persist. It is important that 
Nigeria’s appellate courts have taken judicial notice of the pervasiveness of rape, the inadequacy 
of sentences imposed therefor and the need for a policy response.  However, the courts can do 
much more than beckon on penal policy makers. When resolving cases, they can develop and 
harmonise a set of sentencing principles for specific crimes and offer these as guidelines for trial 
courts.  Just how this can be achieved is discussed in chapter six. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has endeavoured to show that judicial engagements with sentencing in South Africa 
illustrate a continual process of developing and applying sentencing principles to individual 
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cases. However, besides anchoring the constitutional validity of s 51, judicial applications of the 
provision has not met the desired objectives. Interpreting and applying ‘substantial and 
compelling circumstances’ under the provision has been controversial. Section 51 did not 
automatically instigate the desired change.192 Judges dug in, asserting as before, their traditional 
aversion to legislative interferences with judicial discretion. Although Malgas established a 
standard determinative test that cleared uncertainties surrounding the meaning of ‘substantial and 
compelling circumstances’, subsequent decisions that purported to apply, refine and particularize 
the test created judge-made rules that minimised objectivity in sentencing. One of the 
consequences of this has been conflicting sentences by different courts in similar situations, 
using the same set of principles, as illustrated by cases like Ferreira and Nkomo.  
Of course, differences are to be expected in a discretion-driven system that idealises 
individualising punishment. Thus, even though two cases may have similar facts, their penalties 
may not necessarily be alike. There is always that probability that two judges weighing the issues 
will come to different conclusions about sentence.  This makes comparing cases difficult. Even 
when there are important factual coincidences between two or more cases, they are often offset 
by differences that cannot be ignored for sentencing purposes.193 Therefore, dissimilarities in 
sentences are inevitable.194 However, problems emerge when the differences are so divergent as 
to portray significant sentence disproportionalities, or suggest a wonted judicial approach to 
sentencing that undermines the legislative purpose of a penal statute.  Wide disproportionalities 
diminish certainty and predictability, which are important elements in the administration of 
criminal justice. In the South African experience, it has thwarted legitimate societal expectations 
that rape, as a genre of violent crimes, will be treated with deserving severity. 
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South Africa’s sentencing problems expose deeper problems in penal policy, which rape 
illustrates. The deviation from the legislative purpose of s 51 that is apparent in judicial decisions 
conveys the absence of agreement on key policy issues regarding how to respond to the social 
pandemic that rape is. The policy quagmire is not because there have not been legislative and 
judicial activity around the issue. This chapter explored the measures that have been taken to 
address the problem.  Rather, it seems to be the case that the legislature – and the public, if one 
considers that legislatures exercise popular mandates – and courts are at variance regarding the 
penal values to attach to rape.  The courts in particular have come under serious criticisms for 
‘retreat[ing] from the initial purposes of the minimum sentencing legislation’ and for ‘overusing’ 
and interpreting the ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ provision in a way that 
undermines the legislation and women’s rights.195 The lack of agreement is also evident in the 
court’s resistance to s 51(3)(a)(aA)’s list of factors that should not be regarded as ‘substantial 
and compelling circumstances’.  
However, the blame does not all belong to the courts. As suggested in this chapter, courts 
are right to exercise caution around penal statutes that do not provide gradations in punishment, 
as s 51 of Act 105 fails to do. Also, sentencing discretion, when exercised without the aid of 
definitive guidelines for instance,196 is prone to produce controversial outcomes. As such, even if 
sentencers were to review their approach to sentencing, much more would still be required to 
enhance consistency.  That would mean that even if Nigerian courts were to borrow examples 
from how their South African counterparts have developed jurisprudence around how 
constitutional principles should moderate punishment, they would still come against the 
challenge of determining how these and other principles translate to sentencing tariffs. 
Fortunately, South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal has hinted at the desirability of sentencing 
guidelines that are modelled after the sentencing guidelines adopted by the United Kingdom.197 
The next chapter examines how those guidelines have been utilised to introduce consistency to 
sentencing in the United Kingdom, and why this type of model will be beneficial to Nigeria.  
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Before a sentencing guideline is adopted however, a legislative review of s 51 may be 
necessary to resolve the absence of gradation between the sentences provided in the section.  
This is necessary if public confidence in the sentencing process is to be reclaimed. That said, 
whether the review should retain mitigating elements that have been imported into s 51 by 
courts, how or the extent to which this ought to be done and how penal severity for crimes that 
are covered by s 51 ought to be measured are questions that have to be determined within the 
social context of crime in South Africa. These are questions that should be resolved through 
empirical surveys.   
Another reason for a legislative review, which also applies to Nigeria to some extent, boils 
down to the fact that the current system exacts an unacceptable toll on judicial resources. It is 
common knowledge that appeals against sentence may take years to conclude, increase the 
court’s workload and the costs of litigation,198 which in turn may impede poor offenders from 
exploring their fair trial rights to the full. Even if it is argued that the appellate process reduces 
sentencing discrepancies and the propensity for disproportionate sentences, it would not justify 
the toll on judicial resources. The toll and delays in the current process can be significantly 
reduced if sentencing guidelines are put in place. 
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Chapter 6  Structuring Discretion: Key Principles for 
a Model Sentencing Guideline  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding two chapters illustrated how the absence of a system of guidelines that 
rationalizes judicial discretion impedes the achievement of proportionality and consistently fair 
sentences. Thus, how sentencing can be rationalised to achieve consistency and proportionality 
becomes the next focus this thesis. This chapter seeks to identify and explain those essential 
features of a sentencing guideline that may contribute towards achieving consistency and 
proportionality.  However, a caveat is needful; the goal is not to find a perfect model for 
structuring sentencing discretion. However detailed a guideline may be, selecting punishment 
still requires a measure of intuition that allows the individual sentencer’s own perception of the 
seriousness of the case at hand.1 Without a guideline, several sentencers, separately bringing 
their instincts to bear on the facts of the same case, are likely to pronounce dissimilar sentences. 
The aim of a guideline is to create a rational framework within which that instinctive process can 
occur, so as to reduce margins of differences to a necessary minimum. Thus, it may be said that 
no guideline should seek to completely eliminate differences in sentences.  Some degree of 
difference is also necessary to accommodate the individualisation of punishment. The aim of this 
chapter therefore, is to find that model that enables the exercise of discretion within a structured 
scheme that can be rationally defended.  
  The challenge of achieving proportionate and consistently fair sentences also raises 
questions about the fairness of the sentencing process. For the present purpose, a fair sentencing 
process connotes a rational system that strives towards ensuring that offenders get no more and 
no less than the punishment that they deserve. Evidently, the subject of ‘deservedness’ prompts 
serious moral and philosophical challenges regarding quantitative measures of punishments, 
which have proven hard to resolve. The precise difficulties surrounding this was considered in 
                                                          





chapter two and need not be revisited in this chapter. The aim of this chapter is essentially 
practical, and it is to identify those principles that are essential to a rational sentencing scheme 
for Nigeria, which would be conducive to fair sentencing and minimise inconsistencies.  The 
chapter charts the path to this goal by looking at some of the critical developments that shaped 
the sentencing guidelines discussed below.   
 
6.2 Two Model Guideline Systems: Contrasting the Strengths 
Jurisdictions across the world adopt different approaches to structuring sentencing discretion, 
ranging from mandatory minimum sentences to determinate sentences, numerical guidelines, or 
even appellate review.2 Of these, two models, namely the Minnesota Sentencing Guideline and 
the model for England and Wales will be examined. The two offer the most developed guideline 
systems available.3  
 
6.2.1 The Minnesota Sentencing Guideline 
By the 1970s in the United States of America (USA) the ideal of rehabilitation that underlined 
the practice of indeterminate sentencing had become seriously discredited.4  Indeterminate 
sentencing gave courts unfettered discretion, which undermined the imperative for consistency 
and predictability in sentencing.  According to Stuart and Sykora, an example of the scope of 
discretion that courts wielded can be found in sentencing for robbery, where an offender who 
                                                          
2 Andrew Ashworth ‘Four techniques for reducing sentence disparity’ in Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth 
(eds) Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 2 ed (1998) 227-239; Andrew Ashworth ‘Structuring 
sentencing discretion’ in Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and 
Practice 2 ed (1998) 212-218. 
3 Andrew Ashworth and Julian V Roberts ‘Origins and nature of the sentencing guidelines of England and Wales’ in 
Andrew Ashworth and Julian V Roberts Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring the English Model (2013) 1-11 at 1-2. 
Other jurisdictions like Canada, New Zealand and Australia follow different systems ranging from appellate review 
to legislation that sets out general guiding principles and factors that courts should consider, or prescribe sentencing 
laws. See Gary Trotter ‘Appellate review of sentencing decisions’ in Julian V Roberts & David P. Cole Making 
Sense of Sentencing (1999) 230-241; Gareth Griffith ‘Sentencing guidelines and judicial discretion: A review of the 
current debate’ (1994) Briefing Note No 015/94 New South Wales Parliamentary Library, available at 
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/key/ResearchBf1521994/$File/SENTENCINGGU
IDELINES.pdf, accessed 13 April 2014. 





receives an indeterminate custodial sentence of between ‘0-20 years’, could see his prison time 
reduced to three years because the Corrections Board returned a favourable review of his 
conduct.5 Such incongruous outcomes in the USA spurred the quest to rationalise discretion, 
improve consistency and find a suitable alternative to rehabilitative sentences. 
The first state-wide reforms in USA were in the State of Minnesota, which in 1978 
adopted legislation6 that established a specialized autonomous administrative agency called the 
Sentencing Guideline Commission, which was vested with responsibilities for developing 
guidelines. Besides wanting to reverse the very discretionary trend that sentencing in the state 
had assumed, the idea of vesting an autonomous agency with responsibility for developing 
guidelines also aimed to insulate the formulation of sentencing policy from volatile political 
pressures that elected officials brought to bear on policymaking.7   
The Commission’s task involved developing guidelines that determine situations for 
which custodial sentences would be appropriate, and recommending presumptive sentences for 
crimes for which prison sentences are necessary.8 This clearly showed that the underlying 
rationale did not support custodial sentences for all crimes. Presumptive sentences were 
preferred in the belief that it would introduce a measure of predictability that was missing in 
rehabilitation-based sentencing. Henceforth, sentencing was to be based on proportionality, or a 
scale of presumptive sentences that match sentence severity with offence seriousness and the 
degree of blameworthiness. The sentences were also to be developed with proper regard for the 
need to reduce inconsistencies and maintain prison populations within the capacity of available 
correctional resources within the state.9   
To develop guidelines that met these requirements, the Commission researched judicial 
sentencing and early prison release practices to determine the actual duration that offenders spent 
                                                          
5 See John Stuart & Robert Sykora ‘Minnesota’s failed experience with sentencing guidelines and the future of 
evidence-based sentencing’ (2011) Vol. 37:2 William Mitchell Law Review 426-468. 
6 Minnesota Laws 1978 ch. 723. 
7 Stuart & Sykora op cit note 5 at 428; the discussion below on UK sentencing model explores this concern about 
political influences on sentencing policy in a little more detail. 
8 Minnesota Laws 1978 ch 723 sec 9 subd 5. 
9 Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission ‘Report to the Legislature’ January 1 1980 1, available at 





in custody.10  Its findings provided the data for putting the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 
together. The guidelines, which came into force on May 1 1980 made the severity of the crime 
(i.e., actual or risked harm) and the criminal history of the offender the decisive factors in fixing 
sentences.11  The retention of these two elements expressed the underlying principle of the 
guideline system, which will be discussed further shortly. But first, a description of the guideline 
is necessary.  
 
6.2.1.1    The Structure of the Minnesota Guidelines 
The standard guide12 is a two-dimensional grid that attaches numerical values to the seriousness 
of an offence and the criminal history of the offender.  The dimensions are represented on 
vertical and horizontal axes that intersect to form cells that contain a range of numbers that 
represent a predetermined number of months. These numbers convey the length of sentence that 
is presumed to be appropriate for each category of crime. The vertical axis categorizes offences 
into eleven severity levels,13 while the horizontal axis represents the offender’s criminal history 
score, also represented in seven levels, starting with ‘0’, representing absence of criminal history 
and ending with ‘6 or more’ previous convictions.14    
With each cell therefore, the ‘severity level of the offence’ and the offender’s criminal 
history tally into a ‘presumptive fixed sentence’ that is represented in months. The cells also 
contain a range of months that provide the scope of ‘permissible deviation’. The range ensures 
                                                          
10 Ibid at 1-2. 
11 Ibid at 5; another important factor the Commission identified was whether or not the offender was on parole or 
probation at the time he committed the current offence.  
12 Ibid at 38. A single guideline was first adopted in 1980. Subsequently, due to significant concerns that sex 
offences were not being dealt with the level of penal severity they deserved, a separate guideline began to be used 
for sexual offences. See Debra Dailey ‘Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines – 1995 update’ in Michael Tonry & 
Kathleen Hatlestad (eds) Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times: A Comparative Perspective (1997) 45-49; see 
also Richard Frase ‘Prison population growing under Minnesota Guidelines’ in Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad 
(eds) Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times: A Comparative Perspective (1997) 40-45. 
13 The 1980 sentencing grid had ten categories of severity levels, but this changed to eleven in 2002. It has remained 
eleven since then. See Appendix B for the current grid.  See also Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 
‘Minnesota sentencing guidelines and commentary’ Revised August 1 2002 available at http://mn.gov/sentencing-
guidelines/images/2002%2520Guidelines.pdf, accessed 29 December 2013. 
14 Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission ‘About the guidelines’ http://mn.gov/sentencing-
guidelines/guidelines/about/, accessed 23 December 2013; see also SS Terblanche ‘Rape sentencing with the aid of 





that sentencers retain discretion, and can depart from presumptive sentences.15 At the same time 
however, it narrows down the range of discretion in order to reduce sentencing inconsistencies.16 
The current 2013 standard grid (see Appendix B) contains a shaded area that suggests when a 
prison sentence may not be appropriate.  Offences that fall within the area would ordinarily be 
subjected to a stayed sentence (or stayed execution of sentence). A decision to stay sentence may 
also adopt intermediate or other non-incarcerative sanctions, meaning the court may opt to 
impose a probation order, a fine, restitution, community service or rehabilitative treatment, etc.17 
For offences that come within the non-shaded areas, prison sentences are presumed to be 
appropriate, and the threshold for imprisonment decreases as the gravity of the crime increases18 
For crimes like aggravated murder, first degree assault, murder, and second or third degree 
murder, imprisonment is recommended for first offenders. First degree murder attracts a 
mandatory life sentence and is excluded from the application of the guideline.19 
 
6.2.1.2    The Overarching Rationale of the Minnesota Guideline 
Some notable things stand out in the grid system. As mentioned above, the grid’s focus on 
offence severity and criminal history as the basic criteria for formulating proportionate sentences 
gives a strong deserts basis to the guideline system.20 The selection of these basic criteria was the 
outcome of the Commission’s research findings, which indicated that offense severity and 
                                                          
15 Debra Dailey ‘Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines – past and future’ in Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad (eds) 
Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times: A Comparative Perspective 35-40 at 36. 
16 Minnesota Sentencing Guideline Commission op cit note 9 at 12. 
17 Intermediate sanctions have been described as those range of punishments that are less severe than imprisonment, 
but more burdensome than probation. See Dailey’ Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines – Past and Future’ op cit note 
15; for a detailed discussion on intermediate sentences, see David Levinson, Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment 
California (2002) 594-595 & 916; see also Michael Tonry ‘Intermediate sanctions in sentencing guidelines’ (1998) 
Vol. 23 Crime and Justice 199-253. 
18 Criminal history index score calculated by awarding a point for each felony conviction that occurred before the 
current sentencing. A point is assigned where the offender is on probation, parole, or imprisoned following a felony 
or gross misdemeanour conviction, or where he or she is released pending conviction when the current offence was 
committed.  One or two points may be assigned respectively for each misdemeanour conviction and for each gross 
misdemeanour conviction incurred before the current sentencing, if certain conditions are met, such as where the 
misdemeanour or gross misdemeanour convictions are for statutory offences, and where multiple sentences are 
imposed for a single course of conduct.  However, no more than two points shall be imposed for prior multiple 
sentences that arose from a single course of conduct involving multiple victims.  See Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission op cit note 9 at 27-29. 
19 It is excluded by virtue of  Minn. Stat. § 609.185. 





criminal history constituted the most relevant considerations in past sentencing dispositions and 
in parole practices in the state. But the research also found that other theories of punishment 
were present in judicial sentencing. For instance, the Commission found that ‘dispositional lines 
emphasised (a) just deserts, (b) incapacitation and (c) various degrees of emphasis between the 
two’.21 Dispositional lines are gradients that are drawn with the help of sentencing patterns. They 
are used to indicate the rationale that a particular sentence should emphasise, when a court would 
impose one dispositive measure or the other, and how long the sentence ought to be. A line with 
a flatter slope emphasises the seriousness of the current conviction, as the primary sentencing 
factor, and is thus considered to be just deserts oriented. A steep line makes the offender’s 
criminal record a weighty sentencing factor and reflects an incapacitative rationale.22 The 
Commission weighed the comparative benefits between these levels of emphasis, and adopted 
the position that a modified just deserts approach was the way to go. Its decision was influenced 
by the impact that emphasis on either theories or on the offence, over and above criminal record, 
would have on prison population and resources.23  
This modified approach was incorporated in the grid with the overarching objective of 
establishing a rational standard that minimizes sentence disparities and ensures that sentences are 
proportionate to the offence and the criminal history of the offender.24 Thus, just deserts25 
became the ‘primary sentencing principle’, but also imbedded in the grid was an important 
                                                          
21 Minnesota Sentencing Guideline Commission op cit note 9 at 9. 
22 Andrew von Hirsch ‘Structure and Rationale: Minnesota’s Critical Choices’ in Andrew von Hirsch; Michael H. 
Tonry and Kay A Knapp The Sentencing Commission and its Guidelines (1984) Press, 84-106 at 84-94; Blumstein; 
Cohen & Martin et al Research on Sentencing: The Search for Reform, Volume 2 (1983) 279-280. 
23 See Minnesota Sentencing Guideline Commission op cit note 9 at 6-10. The Commission considered the theories 
of punishment that became apparent in its review of sentencing practices. In its words on page 9 of the report, “in 
terms of philosophies of punishment, the Commission considered dispositional lines which emphasized (a) just 
deserts, (b) incapacitation, and (c) various degrees of emphasis between the two. A just deserts dispositional line 
would have a very flat slope, and the offence of conviction would be the dominant factor in deciding who should be 
imprisoned. Our assessment of system impact indicated that a line which heavily emphasized just deserts would be 
incompatible with available correctional resources. An incapacitation dispositional line would have a very steep 
slope, emphasizing criminal history much more than offence of conviction. Between these two extremes, the 
Commission considered a number of options where the slope of line varied less drastically, but gave greater 
emphasis to one goal or the other.” 
24 Ibid at 13, 26; the guidelines goal of achieving proportionate punishments encapsulates the principle of equity, 
which requires that felons who are convicted of committing similar offences in similar circumstances receive similar 
punishment. Conversely, convicts whose crimes are ‘substantially different from [the] typical case’ receive different 
punishment. 





utilitarian slant. It favoured prison sentences for violent crimes, but also allowed mitigating 
circumstances to justify departure from the presumptive sentence.26  The choice of just deserts as 
the primary underlying principle was predicated on the view that the principle was more likely to 
further the objectives of achieving sentencing consistency and proportionality. However, 
imbedding a utilitarian slant in the guideline ensured that even when deserts ‘define[d] the 
maximum sentence severity in almost all cases’ and prescribed flexible minimum sentences for 
most serious cases in particular, it demanded no minimum sentences for most other offences.27  
This approach ensured that judges retained sentencing discretion and, more importantly, imposed 
prison sentences only for serious sentences, or where the criminal history, in correlation with the 
severity of the offence, made a prison sentence imperative. In deciding sentences, the seriousness 
of harm clearly received priority over criminal history.28  
The point has been made that the above approach expresses the principle of parsimony, a 
staple theme of utilitarian justifications of punishment.29 It operates within the Minnesota 
guideline as a measure for facilitating the stated goal of keeping prison inmate levels within the 
capacity of prison and correctional resources. It therefore follows that unless the crime is of the 
prescribed level of seriousness or the offender has a serious criminal history, the court is likely to 
impose a stayed sentence. A stayed sentence allows the offender to be placed on probation, 
community service, rehabilitation or house arrest.30 This arrangement illustrates the clearly 
utilitarian dimension to the grid system, which besides seeking parsimony, also aims to 
incapacitate serious or habitual offenders by incarcerating them. The severity of sentence and the 
probability that a prison sentence will be imposed increases in direct proportion to offence 
gravity and the offender’s criminal history.31  
                                                          
26 Minnesota Sentencing Guideline Commission op cit note 9 at 9-10; in the 1980 grid, there is a presumption 
against imprisonment for severity level one offences. See page 11 of Report. 
27 Richard S Frase ‘Limiting retributivism’ in Michael Tonry (ed) The Future of Imprisonment (2004) 83-120 at 98; 
at the time, about one-quarter of Minnesota’s annual caseload comprised of serious offences. 
28 Ashworth ‘Four techniques for reducing sentence disparity’ op cit note 2 at 232. 
29 Frase (2004) op cit note 27 at 94-95. 
30 Minnesota Sentencing Guideline Commission ‘About the guideline’ at http://mn.gov/sentencing-
guidelines/guidelines/about/; see also Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission op cit note 9 at 26. 





One of the outcomes of the scheme was that there were more prison sentences for assault 
crimes and fewer for property crimes.32 Property crimes, which were generally regarded as less 
serious than violent crimes, were ordinarily dealt with by stayed sentences.  On the whole, the 
design of the system ensured that Minnesota’s overall sentence levels, the intersections between 
the vertical and horizontal axis on the grid, and the place given to suspended sentences operated 
at such levels of efficiency that kept prison population within the capacity of the State’s 
correctional resources.33  
 
6.2.1.3  Individualizing Sentence under the Grid System 
Minnesota’s presumptive sentences were set in the grid on the basis of what the Commission 
considered to be typical crimes, or crimes that are committed in typical circumstances. Where the 
circumstances of the crime are atypical, such as where it is committed with unusual brutality or 
with less ferocity than is typical, the guideline system permits the imposition of a sentence that is 
higher or lower than the presumed sentence.  The test for departure is that the crime must involve 
substantial and compelling circumstances which would make the imposition of the presumed 
sentence unfair,34 and the sentencing judge must put his or her reasons for departure in writing.35 
On one hand, the substantial and compelling circumstances clause underlines the advisory nature 
of the guideline, as it recognizes that the presumed sentence may not be applied for valid 
reasons.36 On the other hand however, the clause also serves as a control measure on the exercise 
of discretion. The requirement that the reasons for departure must be stated in writing conveys 
the point that the presumptive sentences may not be lightly departed from, and that departures 
may be subject to appellate review. 
As already pointed out, the guideline seeks the overarching aim of establishing a rational 
and consistent sentencing standard that ensures a proportionate balance between offence severity 
and criminal history. Sentencers must take this aim into account with a view to achieving what 
                                                          
32 Ibid at 15. 
33 Ashworth ‘Four techniques for reducing sentence disparity’ op cit note 2 at 232. 
34 Minnesota Sentencing Guideline Commission op cit note 9 at 30-32. 
35 Ibid at 9-10. 





the Commission describes as equity in sentence. Equity is a principle that entails similar 
treatment for similar cases and the treatment of substantially atypical crimes with sentences that 
appropriately reflect that difference.37 The determination of the appropriate sentence in 
individual cases is enhanced by a set of aggravating and mitigating factors that are intended to 
further rationalize sentencing discretion. These factors incorporate the underlying principle that 
race, sex, employment38 and social factors39 shall be neutral values in sentencing. Hence, a court 
may not impose a stiffer or lighter sentence on the basis of any one of these values, or consider 
any one of them as justifying departure from the presumptive sentence.40  
The fact that the victim was the aggressor, or that the offender played an insignificant 
role in the commission of the crime, or that he was coerced into participation, may be mitigating. 
Where the ‘offender lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offence was committed’, 
due to some ‘physical or mental impairment’, the court shall consider sentence mitigation. 
However, where diminished capacity is caused by voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol, it 
shall not be a mitigating factor.41  The list is not exhaustive and ‘other substantial grounds that 
excuse or mitigate the offender’s culpability may also apply.42 On the other hand, factors that 
may aggravate sentence and justify departure include where the victim had a vulnerability of 
which the offender was aware,43 where the offender was particularly cruel to the victim, or where 
the offence is a serious economic crime that involves two or more aggravating features.44 The 
fact that the victim was injured in the current offence and that the offender had a previous felony 
conviction for an offence in which the victim was also injured may also aggravate sentence.45 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid at 30; this factor excludes consideration of the impact that sentence would have on profession or occupation 
of the offender, the offender’s employment history, whether he was employed at the time of committing the offence 
or at the time of sentencing. 
39 Social factors include ‘educational attainment’, ‘living arrangements at the time of offence or sentencing’, ‘length 
of residence’, and ‘marital status’. The list also excludes ‘the exercise of constitutional rights by the defendant 
during the adjudication process’. See Minnesota Sentencing Guideline Commission op cit note 9 at 30-31. 
40 Ibid at 26, 30-31. 
41 Ibid at 31. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid; vulnerability may be due to age, infirmity or reduced physical or mental capacity. 
44 Other aggravating features include abusing a position of trust to perpetrate the offence and where the offence 
involved actual or threatened financial loss that was substantially greater than the usual offence.  






6.2.1.4  The Successes and Demerits of the Minnesota Guidelines 
The Minnesota guideline system was successful in reducing sentencing disparities and achieving 
parsimony. It de-emphasized imprisonment for property offenders, increased the use of prison 
sentences for violent offenders and tied sentencing policies to available prison resources. As a 
result, Minnesota’s incarceration rates dropped to record lows46 and the Minnesota State 
Supreme Court was able to develop a ‘jurisprudence of permissible and impermissible 
departures’.47 Sentencing consistency increased by about 50 percent in the 1980s. The more 
violent offenders went to prison and the less violent were kept out.48 The scheme kept prison 
population within capacity of the State’s correctional resources in the early 1980s.49 
 The Minnesota guideline system received widespread acceptance in America. Shortly 
after it was adopted, a host of other states in the USA adopted similar guidelines. Even the US 
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which established the United States 
Sentencing Commission and gave it the responsibility of developing a federal grid-based 
guideline.50 An important element in the success of the Minnesota guideline lay in the fact that it 
introduced a primary rationale for sentencing ‒ just deserts. Even though it was a modified 
principle, it was nevertheless the crucial factor, as it agreed with public sentiments that widely 
rejected rehabilitation-based sentencing on one hand and favoured proportionate sentencing on 
the other.  By endorsing a primary rationale, the guideline was probably spared the glitches that 
the implementation of the federal guideline experienced. According to Ashworth, those glitches 
arose because the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 failed to affirm a primary rationale for 
sentencing. Instead, the guideline adopted an ‘indiscriminate mixture of rationales’ that caused 
fundamental problems for judges who, without the assistance of a primary ‘guiding aim’, had to 
                                                          
46 Debra Dailey ‘Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines – past and future’ op cit note 15 at 35. The author wrote also 
that racial differences in sentencing patterns lessened. 
47 Ashworth ‘Four techniques for reducing sentence disparity’ op cit note 2 at 232. 
48 Debra Dailey ‘Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines – past and future op cit note 15 at 36. 
49 Frase (1997) op cit note 12 at 41; Susan Easton and Christine Piper Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for 
Justice (2012) 99. 
50 Ashworth ‘Four techniques for reducing sentence disparity’ op cit note 2 at 232. About 20 US states created 
sentencing commissions. Of these, guidelines recorded successes in Pennsylvania, Oregon and Washington, while 





decide which factors should mitigate or aggravate sentence. It rendered the guideline’s goal of 
achieving consistency ‘a forlorn hope’.51  
However, it was not all smooth sailing for the Minnesota guideline. Its categorization of 
crimes into ten and subsequently eleven levels of seriousness was rather rudimentary and gave 
sentencers and prosecutors a discretionary range that allowed them to skirt the guidelines.52 The 
guideline also did not provide standards for the use of non-prison sentences as it did for prison 
sentences. As a result, inconsistencies and disproportionalities emerged in the use of non-prison 
sentences in the state, while also provoking a spike in the use of custodial measures. 
Imprisonment came to be seen widely ‘as the only legitimate means of punishment and 
control’.53  
There have been challenges that are external to the guideline.  For example, the guideline 
was unable to hold up under a changing political climate that favoured tougher sentences. From 
the late 1980s into the 1990s the number of convictions for repeat offenders, violent offenders, 
drug offenders and sexual offenders increased, resulting in more prison sentences.54 The rates at 
which probation orders and parole were revoked also increased. In response to growing public 
quest for tougher sentences, the Minnesota Legislature and the Commission increased the 
severity of sentences.55  The state also established a task force on sexual violence, which called 
for significant increase in rape sentences and mandatory maximum terms for repeat rape 
                                                          
51 Ibid at 233. 
52 Ibid at 232; to be able to sentence, judges would have to fit the crime into the categories offered by the grid. It is 
hardly feasible that all crimes could quite simply be classified into so few a number of categories.  Not surprisingly 
perhaps, there are 43 offence levels in the US Sentencing Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines Manual September 2013 395; available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/2013_Guidelines_Manual_ Full_Optimized.pdf, 
accessed 5 February 2014.  
53 Dailey op cit note 15 at 39; the author also wrote that the omission resulted in ‘a widening of the net in the use of 
intermediate sanctions’. She notes however that there was widespread opposition to the development of state-wide 
standards for non-custodial sanctions.  The reasons were that it was thought that a state-wide policy would be 
difficult to manage effectively, since implementation would have to depend on locally funded correctional 
resources. It was also believed that developing an additional guideline for such sanctions would result in a complex 
sentencing system.  The author concluded nevertheless that increasing emphasis on the use of community 
corrections increases the need for standards for intermediate sanctions.  
54 See Dailey op cit note 15 at 36-39. 





offenders. These interventions resulted in a growing prison population.56  Despite the increases, 
however, prison population managed to stay well within prison capacity, meaning the guideline 
succeeded in checking prison population growth, at least during its early years of coming into 
operation.57  
With the passage of time, the problems of implementing the sentencing guideline system 
became bigger. A 2011 publication by Stuart and Sykora58 reported on the implementation of the 
Minnesota sentencing guideline system over a thirty year period and came to the conclusion that 
the promise that the guideline system held remained unfulfilled. The authors attributed the failure 
to repeated legislative interventions in sentencing policy, which eventually eroded the deserts 
rationale that underlay the guideline. These interventions ran afoul of the political rationale 
behind establishing an independent administrative agency to develop sentencing guidelines in the 
first place. Indeed, the interventions conveyed a different political rationality that favoured 
incapacitative sentences for serious offenders, especially those convicted of violent, sexual and 
drug related crimes. Legislation that prescribed stiffer sentences passed and because these 
sentencing prescriptions ignored the principle of proportionality, judges and lawyers who felt 
that the penal prescriptions were too harsh sought ways to skirt them. This caused sentencing 
disproportionalities and disparities to thrive again, and the original intention of reserving prison 
sentences for violent offenders to fail. The goal of achieving parsimony did not survive political 
interventions either. 59  
Pertinently, the study noted that the guideline could have worked well but for political or 
legislative interventions. Even then, it could still play a useful role if sentencing practice returned 
to the primary aim of achieving proportionality and economy in sentencing. Political 
interventions stifled the Commission, relegating it to a rather insignificant role in developing 
sentencing policy. Thus, the initial goal of insulating sentencing policy from political pressure 
floundered and the objective of keeping the size of prison population under control became 
                                                          
56 Stuart & Sykora op cit note 5 at 432-433. 
57 Frase (1997) op cit note 12 at 43-44; The legislature also introduced measures to reverse the rise in prison 
population, such as a 1990 crime bill that created an ‘intensive community supervision’ programme for offenders in 
prison or those who faced the revocation of probation.   
58 Stuart & Sykora op cit note 5 at 428. 





threatened by a fivefold growth in the size of inmate population occurring over the thirty-year 
period. In Minnesota, these developments ‒ and the fact that questions about how to measure just 
deserts remained unanswered despite the guideline ‒ prompted a new approach to sentencing.60   
 
6.1.2.5    Evidence-Based Practice: ‘A New Frontier in Sentencing Policy and Practice’ 
Within the context of the above challenges judges and practitioners began to utilize pre-sentence 
reports to set sentences. This development resulted in ‘evidence-based practice’ (EBP) in 
sentencing in Minnesota.61 EBP consists of a body of ‘empirically-derived practice guidelines 
[that are utilised to enhance] the quality of decision making’.62 However, no single definition 
describes EBP. It is perhaps more useful to define it in terms of its features. First, EBP uses 
scientifically generated knowledge to assess causes (risk factors) that increase the chances of 
reoffending. Conversely, it also assesses those factors that diminish risk factors.  Furthermore, it 
enables the court to determine the offender’s criminogenic needs (i.e., traits that show clinical or 
functional impairment). Lastly, it facilitates the court’s ability to determine those characteristics 
of an offender for indications of the type of punishment that would be cost effective and most 
appropriate to reduce the risk that he will re-offend.63 As a sentencing practice, EBP signals a 
commitment to use correctional resources to address the offender’s needs for rehabilitation.64 
EBP utilizes developments in the behavioural sciences, such as the ‘actuarial risk 
assessment tool’65 to predict future criminality. Usually, its targets are offenders who pose the 
                                                          
60 Ibid at 428-433.  The questions included whether the deserts of a given offence should be probation, some 
intermediate sanction or a prison sentence, how proportionate gradations from one degree of seriousness to another 
should be determined and how sentences for one crime may be kept in comparative proportionality to sentences for 
other types of crime. 
61 Richard E Redding ‘Evidence-based sentencing: The science of sentencing policy and practice’ (2009) Vol. 1 No. 
1 Chap. J Crim. Just. 1-19 at 6-7. 
62 Ibid at 2. 
63 Ibid at 2-4.  
64 See Kirk Heilbrun ‘Risk assessment in evidence-based sentencing: Context and promising uses’ (2009) Vol. 1 No. 
1 Chap. J Crim. Just. 127-142 at 127-128. 
65 Ibid at 134. The ‘actuarial risk assessment tool' uses statistical methods and the presence or absence of 
predetermined set of risk factors to estimate the probability of the risk of violence within a given period, or to draw 
conclusions on the risk levels of an offender. According to Heilbrun, the tool is “‘a formal method” of prediction 
that “uses an equation, a formula, a graph, or an actuarial table to arrive at a probability, or expected value, of some 
outcome.” It uses empirical research to relate numerical predictor variables to numerical outcomes. The sine qua 





most serious risk of reoffending. According to Stuart and Sykora,66 it evaluates criminogenic 
needs not just to predict an offender’s risks of reoffending, but also to determine what 
behavioural stimuli might motivate him to alter his behaviour.67 It also helps the sentencer 
identify situations where deserts-based punishment ‘unproductively increases … cost, recidivism 
or both’.68 This information enhances the court’s capacity to select punishments that reduce 
recidivism and costs, seek evidence regarding these aims, be more involved in providing the 
offender with the tools that will facilitate his rehabilitation and be part of managing that process. 
From the post-sentence side of things, it allows parole boards to hinge their decisions on the risks 
posed by the offender, rather than on a deserts-based grid system.69  
More than two decades of rigorous research in Minnesota have recorded evidence of EBP 
successes in reducing recidivism and costs. A respectable number of offenders who were 
selected to participate in EBP rehabilitation programmes posted remarkable results of not 
reoffending.70 But there are inherent problems in the practice, such as the propensity to base 
sentence on risk of reoffending rather than on offence severity. To avoid this risk, Stuart and 
Sykora recommend fusing EBP and determinate sentencing methods, so that ‘the judge [can] use 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
selected and validated through empirical research, against known outcomes that have also been quantified’. See also 
Monahan, Steadman & Appelbaum et al ‘Developing a clinically useful actuarial tool for assessing violence risk’ 
(2000) 176 BJPsych 312-319; Fazel, Singh, Doll et al ‘Use of risk assessment instruments to predict violence and 
antisocial behavior in 73 samples involving 24, 827 people: Systematic review and meta-analysis’ (2012) BMJ 345, 
available at http://www.bmj.com/content/345/bmj.e4692, accessed 26 September 2014.  
66 Stuart & Sykora op cit note 5 at 447, 453 and 460-461; in 1997, Minnesota developed an evidence based tool 
called the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised.  The tool incorporates 16 ‘empirically verifiable items 
… to predict sex offence recidivism’. It’s incorporation of these items shows a departure from assessments that are 
based on the sentencer’s intuitive appreciation of the risk factors.  According to Stuart and Sykora, in EBP, the 
judge’s ability to determine criminogenic needs is essential for sentencing efficiency. The needs are typically 
associated with ‘behaviours, attitudes and values’ that are most likely to predispose an offender to reoffend. The 
judge usually looks at determinants of behaviour such as ‘low self-control, anti-social personality, antisocial values, 
criminal peers, substance abuse, and a dysfunctional family’.  
67 See Redding op cit note 61 at 3-4. A variant of actuarial method is ‘structured professional judgment’ (SPJ). SPJ 
‘analyses risk factors in a less formulaic way, allowing for limited clinical judgment as the needs of individual cases 
dictate’. According Heibrun op cit note 64 at 134, SPJ is flexible because the assessor can assess other factors 
beyond those specified, but not as precise as the actuarial method because the assessment does not have to assign a 
quantitative value to high and low risk factors.  
68 Stuart & Sykora op cit note 5 at 448. 
69 Ibid at 453, 458-459. 





her discretion to tailor sentences to address individual defendant’s risk and needs while 
maintaining proportionality based upon seriousness of the offense’.71  
 
 
6.2.2 A Developing Country’s Penal System: The Way Forward  
The phrase ‘substantial and compelling’ in s 51 of the South African Criminal Law Amendment 
Act 105 of 1997, is presumed to have been borrowed from the Minnesota Mandatory Sentencing 
Guideline.72 However, unlike Minnesota’s Sentencing Guideline, s 51 of the 1997 Act offered no 
guidance on how to apply the ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ clause. Courts rightly 
interpreted this as according them the discretion to depart from the minimum sentences when 
imposing them would be result in a sentence that is disproportionate and therefore unjust.73 The 
interpretation and application of the provision resulted in considerable differences that put paid 
to any ambitions of introducing consistency to sentencing.  Fortunately, the South African bench 
is not averse to sentencing guidelines.74 It would seem then that the challenge revolves around 
how best to go about a guideline that carries with it an authority that judges can respect.75   
Terblanche76 once suggested that the English sentencing guideline model would be better 
suited to the South African context than USA’s grid-based model. His reasons were hinged on 
the comparative advantage that the English approach has over the grid-based system. English 
sentencing guidelines include statements of principles, which allow more flexibility than the 
grid-based numerical system.77 But perhaps more pertinent to Terblanche’s reasons were two 
important recommendations that the South African Law Commission made in 2000, after it 
conducted a review of sentencing practice in the country.  The Commission recommended 
                                                          
71 Ibid at 463 & 465. 
72 SS Terblanche & Julian V Roberts ‘Sentencing in South Africa: Lacking in principle but delivering on justice’ 
(2005) 18 S. Afr. J. Ctim. Just 187-202 at 192. 
73 S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SAC) at 481 paras A-C. 
74 S v Vilakazi 2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA) at 558 paras B-C. 
75 The South African Law Reform Commission gave considerable attention to this subject while it was constituted as 
the  South African Law Commission.  
76 SS Terblanche ‘Sentencing guidelines for South Africa: Lessons from elsewhere’ (2003) 120 SALJ 858-882 at 
881. Terblanche also held the view that the points system of the Dutch Prosecution Service was preferable to the 
American grid-based system.  
77 Andrew Ashworth & Julian Roberts ‘Sentencing: Theories, principles, and practice’ in Mike Maguire, Rod 





legislation that states the basic principles that should underpin sentencing in South Africa, and 
the establishment of a sentencing council that would develop sentencing guidelines for the 
country.78  Associated with these recommendations were two critical remarks that the 
Commission also made: first, ‘an ideal sentencing system’ should aim for consistency in 
sentences; and secondly, it should be mindful of the state’s capacity to enforce those sentences.79   
The Commission prepared a draft Sentencing Framework Bill that proclaimed a 
statement of guiding principles. First among these was the requirement that sentences must be 
proportionate to the gravity of the offence and, within the overall sentencing scheme, be relative 
to sentences for ‘other categories or subcategories’ of crimes.80 Gravity is measured by the 
harmfulness or risk of harm posed by the offence and the offender’s blameworthiness. The court 
must also work toward proportionality between the traditional triad in sentencing. That is, the 
court must seek an optimal balance between the victim’s right to restoration, the need to protect 
society from the offender, as well as the need to offer the offender an opportunity to reform.81 A 
decision about proportionality may also take the offender’s criminal record into consideration 
and a departure from the guideline may be allowed where substantial and compelling 
circumstances increase or decrease the offender’s blameworthiness.82 Appositely, the proposed 
principles were infused with elements of restorative justice, as may be deduced from the 
requirement that courts seek a balance in the triad. However, the proposed primary rationale lies 
in its emphasis on proportionality, which stresses the deserts principle that an offender should 
not get more or less than his culpability deserved.83 It may also be pointed out that the bill’s 
approach echoed existing judicial disposition regarding the objects of punishment;84 in the South 
African experience, the considerable effort that judges make when seeking a balance between the 
competing aims of punishment is much influenced by salient themes of proportionality. The 
guidelines proposed by the bill were intended to bring consistency to the application of the 
                                                          
78 See South African Law Commission Report: Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) (2000) chapter 2; see 
also Stephan Terblanche ‘A sentencing council in South Africa’ in Arie Freiberg and Karen Gelb (eds) Penal 
Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy (2008) 191-199. 
79 Terblanche (2003) op cit note 76 at 193. 
80 South African Law Commission op cit note 78 at 40. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid; see also Terblanche (2003) op cit note 76 at 193. 
83 Ibid. 





sentencing principles and were to be designed to ensure that the committal of offenders to prison 
stayed within the capacity of the prison and penal system.85   
 There were key elements to the Commission’s recommendations for a Sentencing 
Council. Two institutions, the Sentencing Council and the Supreme Court of Appeal, were to 
collaborate in developing guidelines on an ongoing basis. At the time these proposals were made, 
England’s Criminal Court of Appeal (the highest court of criminal appeals) and Sentencing 
Council were in such collaboration. This collaboration and the changes that have since occurred 
in the United Kingdom will be discussed shortly. For now, it is pertinent to observe that the Law 
Commission’s proposals incorporated elements which go to the heart of the authority and 
acceptability of the proposed guidelines.  For one, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
was to be involved in issuing guidelines. Second, the composition of the proposed Sentencing 
Council would be representative of the entire criminal justice system.  It would include 
representatives of the judiciary, magistracy, relevant criminal justice departments, sentencing 
experts from outside the government and representatives of the public who have expertise in 
victimization. 
Had this bill been passed, it could have brought about a ‘radical departure from current 
practice’.86 Unfortunately, however, the bill has remained a proposal and the lifespan of 1997 
Act was extended repeatedly.  Further legislative amendments in 2007 gave a rather permanent 
face to the temporary arrangement intended by the 1997 Act. Not to be overlooked however, is 
the fact that the problems that prompted the South African Law Commission to recommend the 
establishment of a Sentencing Council that will develop sentencing guidelines persist today.87 
They have also prompted the South African bench to contemplate the desirability of a framework 
to regulate discretion. In S v Vilakazi88 the Supreme Court of Appeal, after acknowledging the 
difficulties that judges experienced during sentencing, expressed the opinion that the 
                                                          
85 For the Commission’s comments on the principles of the draft bill and proposed guidelines, see South African 
Law Commission Sentencing (A new sentencing framework) (2000) chapter 3, see particularly 56-60. 
86 See Terblanche (2003) op cit note 76 at 198. 
87 About eight years later, Terblanche wrote that these problems continue to persist notwithstanding the 
‘combination of legislation and loose guidance from the appellate courts’ that courts have at their disposal. See 
Terblanche (2006) op cit note 14 at 1-2. At best, the combination offers a loose, piecemeal approach that has failed 
to enhance consistency and rationality in so complex a matter as sentencing.  





‘sophisticated guideline-system’ recommended by the South African Law Commission  in 2000 
would have been welcomed by judges.  
 
6.2.3  Rationalizing Sentencing: The UK Experience 
As in other penal jurisdictions, the United Kingdom has had its share of concerns regarding 
sentencing disparities.  The reasons for, and the patterns of these concerns are to a large degree 
similar to those that have been examined earlier in this thesis.89 As such, they need not be 
revisited here.  Efforts to redress sentencing disparities began to crystalize in the early 1980s 
when the Court of Appeal began to issue occasional guideline judgments.90 Typically these 
guidelines judgments focused on harm, the manner it was caused, and features that may increase 
or reduce culpability.91 Guideline judgments continued to be issued through 2009 when the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 was passed. The discussion below explores these developments.  
 
6.2.3.1   Guideline Judgments by the Court of Appeal for England and Wales 
Guideline judgments are pronouncements in which the Court of Appeal prescribed sentence 
levels and guidelines. According to Easton:  
Such judgments considered sentencing for a whole category of offences or particular 
sentencing factors, rather than one individual and individualised case, and gave indications of 
the ‘proper range’ of sentences, the interpretation of sentencing legislation, and listed 
                                                          
89 The Criminal Justice Act 2003, which will be discussed shortly, introduced provisions to address the problem of 
inconsistent sentences. See Rebecca Huxley-Binns & Jacqueline Martin Unlocking the English Legal System 4 ed 
(2014) 342. 
90 Ashworth & Roberts op cit note 77 at 882. According to Ashworth and Roberts, the movement toward structuring 
or rationalizing the use of sentencing discretion in England and Wales spans four phases.   The first phase started in 
the early 1980s with guideline judgments from the Court of Appeal. The second phase came with the establishment 
of the Sentencing Advisory Panel. The movement entered the third phase with the enactment of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, and the fourth phase with the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.  However, it should be noted that the 
practice of issuing sentencing guidelines predates the 1980s. In the preface of a compendium of cases put together 
by UK’s defunct Sentencing Guidelines Council, the Council made the point that courts had been issuing guidelines 
for decades.  See Sentencing Guidelines Council ‘Guideline judgments: Case compendium’ (2005) iii, available at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web_case_compendium.pdf; accessed 5 February 2014. It would 
seem then that attribution of guidelines judgment to the pronouncements of the Court of Appeal in the 1980s had to 
do with the fact that those pronouncements marked a watershed in the movement to rationalize sentencing discretion 
through authoritative and readily available guidelines.  





particular factors as legitimately aggravating or mitigating the seriousness of the offending 
and the level of punishment.92  
An opportunity to issue a guideline judgment arose when an appeal came before the court 
for which it considered a sentence guideline needful. The court would then issue a set of 
statements regarding how sentencing for offences in the same category as the one on appeal 
ought to be determined. The statements were essentially obiter and were not necessarily the ratio 
decidendi in the appeal, even though its principles may be relevant to deciding sentence in that 
appeal.  
Some of the most important guidelines that the Court of Appeal has passed were for rape.93  
In R v Roberts and Roberts94 the court held that ‘rape [was] always a serious crime’ that called 
for ‘an immediate custodial sentence’, the exception being only where ‘wholly exceptional 
circumstances’ dictated otherwise. The court’s support for prison sentence was on the premise 
that it communicated the seriousness of the crime, emphasized public disapproval, warned others 
and punished the offender.95  It also held the view that prison sentences for rapists protected 
women. Of course, the length of sentence is subject to the circumstances of each case. In the 
court’s opinion, there will be aggravation of sentence if: 
1. The rapist 
i. injured or threatened injury with a weapon; 
ii. used violence gratuitously or excessively,96 beyond what was necessarily inherent in 
rape; 
iii. employed brutal threats;  
iv. is in a position of trust in relation to the victim; or 
v. committed different acts of rape on the same woman or on different women;  
2. The victim was 
i. made to endure ‘further sexual indignities or perversions’; or 
                                                          
92 Eason & Piper op cit note 49 at 47, see also p 48. 
93 The court has also issued guidance for sentencing for other types of crimes. See R v Willis [1974] 60 Cr App R 
146 (involving sodomy, now no longer an offence in the United Kingdom). 
94 (1982) 75 CR App R 242. 
95 Ibid at 244. 





ii. deprived of her dignity for a period of time; 
iii. very young or elderly; or 
iv. suffered rape or succession of rapes carried out by a group of men.97 
With respect to mitigation, the court held that: 
1. a plea of guilty that was entered into before the victim was subjected to the further 
indignity of reliving the rape experience in the trial, mitigated sentence. However, its 
mitigative effect may be negated by aggravating elements in the offence; and  
2. there would be mitigation where medical report showed that the defendant was 
impressionable and could be easily influenced to act against his better judgment.98   
The Roberts guideline principles were revised in R v Billam.99 New additions to the 
principles emphasised the need to maintain some sense of proportionality between different 
offences and to provide a guide regarding sentence duration. Having regard to the seriousness of 
rape, however, the court observed that sentences tended to be too short.100 And though the Court 
of Appeal acknowledged that rape’s many mutable factors complicated the task of developing 
sentencing guidelines,101 it nevertheless set forth an important principle. Being a serious crime, 
rape necessitated an immediate prison sentence the starting point of which was to be determined 
by the seriousness of each crime. This essentially recognises that different levels of brutality 
could be associated with each crime. After reviewing judicial practice, the court adopted a 
starting point of five years imprisonment where the defendant did not contest the charge and 
where aggravating or mitigating circumstances were absent.102 Where the defendant acted in 
furtherance of a common purpose, or forcefully or unlawfully gained access to where the victim 
lived, or was in some position of responsibility over the victim, the starting point was eight 
years. The same starting point applied to the defendant who abducted his victim and held her 
                                                          
97 R v Roberts and Robert supra note 94 at 244. 
98 Ibid. 
99 [1986] 1 All ER 985; the appeals in this case related to ten different convictions for rape.  
100 Ibid at 987 para g; the court may only resort to an alternative sentence in ‘wholly exceptional circumstances.’ In a 
noteworthy observation, the Court of Appeal remarked that criminal statistics in 1998, which showed that about 95 
percent rape offenders were sentenced to prison terms, also suggested judges needed reminding about what sentence 
was appropriate.  
101 R v Billam supra note 99 at 987 para G. 





captive over a period of time.103 A serial rapist was regarded as a threat to society and therefore 
liable to 15 years imprisonment or more.104  Life imprisonment was also considered appropriate 
where the offender was manifestly perverted, or exhibited psychotic tendencies or gross 
personality disorder, or where he was likely to be a danger to women for an indefinite time if he 
remained at large.105  
The starting point, which was lacking in the Minnesota guidelines, was the quantum of 
sentence that is presumed to be applicable to a first time offender who does not contest the 
indictment. This was an important innovation that was aimed at consistency and it did help to 
ensure that sentencers commenced calibrating sentence for similar offences using the same 
baseline.106 Salient in the court’s views also was the belief that existing sentences for rape 
offences were not proportionate to the crime. The concomitant of this belief, that punishment 
should be proportionate to the crime, underlined the ‘deserts’ basis of the starting point that the 
court adopted.107 This would later become pivotal to the guideline structures that were prescribed 
by subsequent legislation.  
Billam added other conditions to the aggravation list in Roberts; there will be 
aggravation where the offence was carefully premeditated, or left the victim with ‘especially’ 
serious mental or physical harm. These aggravating circumstances could raise the sentence 
considerably higher than usual.108 Regarding the mitigating effect that a plea of guilt would have, 
the court held that the extent of sentence reduction would depend on the circumstances, 
including the possibility that a verdict of acquittal could have been returned had the indictment 
been contested. Previous good character constituted little relevance and the fact that the victim 
may have acted imprudently, or was sexually active before the crime, is irrelevant to sentence 
mitigation. Sentence would however be mitigated where the victim’s behaviour led the offender 
                                                          
103 Ibid at 987 paras H-J. 
104 Ibid at 987 para J. 
105 Ibid at 988 para A. 
106 See Sentencing Council ‘Frequently asked questions about sentencing guidelines’ available at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Frequently_asked_questions_about_sentencing_guidelines(1).pdf, 
accessed February 7 2014.   
107 See Martin Wasik Emmins on Sentencing 2 ed (1985) 48. 





to believe she would consent to sex.109 Also, attempted rape would attract a lower sentence, 
especially if the defendant desisted at an early stage. The rationale for this was simple: the 
offence was not completed. However, the presence of aggravating features may make an 
attempted offence more serious than some instances of the completed offence. 110 For rape 
offenders below 21 years old, a custodial sentence would be ordinarily appropriate.111 
 The Billam principles were consistently applied in subsequent sentencing decisions.112 
In R v Bibi113 and R v Kefford114 also, the court made prison overcrowding a relevant factor for 
consideration where a prison sentence is necessary and laid down the principle that a prison 
sentence may be imposed only when it is necessary. Furthermore, it should not be longer than is 
necessary to protect public interests, punish the offender and deter him. Guideline judgments 
also established the principle of totality. The principle regulates consecutive sentencing for 
multiple offences and requires the court to weigh the overall sentence, in order to ensure that the 
imposed sentence is not disproportionate to the overall seriousness of the crimes. The principle 
operates as a discounting or mitigating principle in sentencing for multiple offending, and was 
first incorporated into the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and subsequently in the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003. 115    
 
                                                          
109 Ibid at paras C-D. 
110 Ibid at paras D-E. 
111 Ibid at para E. 
112 See Celia Wells & Oliver Quick Lacey, Wells and Quick Reconstructing Criminal Law: Text and Materials 4 ed 
(2010) 536. 
113 (1980) 2 Cr.App.R. (S) 177; it was held that courts must look at each case to determine whether imprisonment is 
necessary and apply the shortest sentence possible where imprisonment is necessary. Sentence must be consistent 
with the duty of protecting the public and of punishing and deterring the offender. Sentence should be short in view 
of the danger of overcrowded prisons. It was held further that medium or long term sentences were appropriate for 
most cases of robbery and violent crimes, large scale drug trafficking, etc. See Sentencing Guidelines Council 
(2005) op cit note 89. 
114 [2002] 2 Cr. App. R (S) 106; the decision issued a sentencing manual for the offence of obtaining money transfer 
through deception. The court reiterated the sentencing principle in R v Bibi supra, and held that when a court 
considers imposing a sentence of 12 months or less, particularly if the offender has not had a prior prison sentence, it 
should consider whether a shorter sentence would not be an effective to satisfy the public interest and punish and 
deter the offender.  See Sentencing Guidelines Council (2005) op cit note 90.  
115 See Julian V Roberts and Anne Rafferty ‘Sentencing guidelines in England and Wales: Exploring the new 





6.2.3.2   The Sentencing Advisory Council: An Era of Collaboration 
Although guidelines judgments were obiter, courts generally complied with them. However, they 
were inadequate to address the need for a comprehensive guideline which formed part of an 
overall strategy to reduce sentencing disparities. For one thing, the Court of Appeal was ill-
equipped to undertake the comprehensive project of developing a detailed sentencing guidelines 
for different categories of crimes; it could only make a cursory attempt at it,116 through 
piecemeal efforts as opportunities came.117 To address this inadequacy, the United Kingdom 
enacted the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998. The Act established a Sentencing Advisory Panel 
(SAP) with responsibilities for drafting sentencing guidelines and advising the Court of Appeal 
on appropriate forms of punishment that should be imposed. Essentially, the Act created a 
relationship of collaboration between the Court of Appeal and SAP in the task of developing 
guidelines.  
In view of the Act, the Court of Appeal could no longer act on its own to issue guidelines. 
It could only do so after requesting and receiving advice on a sentencing matter from the SAP.118 
This statutory procedure significantly eroded the control that the court had over the issuance of 
guidelines.  Upon the receipt of a request, the SAP would review existing sentencing law and 
practice, gather sentencing data, issue consultation papers and confer with the public and with 
persons or authorities that the Act required it to consult. Thereafter, the SAP formed and 
communicated its views (advice) on the matter to the court.119 The SAP could also act on its own 
(i.e., without a request from the Court of Appeal) and decide that a guideline on any criminal 
matter should be developed.  It may also do so upon the request of the Home Secretary.120 
In 2002, the SAP issued and submitted an advice to the Court of Appeal, wherein it 
proposed a revision of existing sentencing guidelines for rape.  Based on the advice, the court 
                                                          
116 Easton & Piper op cit note 49 at 48. 
117 See Andrew Ashworth ‘English sentencing guidelines in their public and political context’ in Arie Freiberg and 
Karen Gelbs (eds) Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy (2008) 112-125 at 112. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Section 81 of Crime and Disorder Act 1998; see also Ashworth (2008) op cit note 117 at 116-117. A little more 
elaboration about the panel’s modus operandi is provided below in the discussion about changes introduced by the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003.  





delivered a guideline judgment in R v Millberry121 that retained the basic structure of guideline 
that was developed in Billam, but made significant modifications to accommodate changes that 
had occurred in legislation and in the nature of the offences since those guidelines were issued.122 
Essentially, the court accepted the SAP’s many recommendations. First, it agreed that weighing 
the seriousness of each offence of rape should involve three components, namely the degree of 
harm to the victim, the extent of the offender’s culpability and the degree of risk that the offender 
poses to the society.123 Second, ‘relationship and acquaintance rape’ ‒ a term which extends to 
marital rape, rape between persons who had a consensual sexual relationship at the time of the 
offence and male rape ‒ should be treated with the same level of severity as rape by a stranger. 
These recommendations were based on research findings regarding public attitudes that rejected 
any differentiations of gravity between different types of rapes.124 Third, the SAP recommended 
that the sentencing guidelines for male to female rape should apply to male on male rape.125 
Fourth, it saw no inherent distinction between vaginal and anal rape that could impact sentencing 
and recommended that a victim who is raped anally and vaginally should be treated as having 
been raped repeatedly.126 
Having accepted the proposals, the court went about implementing them by adopting 
the same starting point for all kinds of rape, while also noting that the appropriate sentence in 
individual cases would, in the end, depend on a proper consideration of the circumstances of 
each offence, including the particular circumstances of the offender and victim. Sentence may be 
                                                          
121 [2003] 1 Cr.App.R. 25 at 396. 
122 According to the court, the changes include the Sexual Offences Act 1993, which allowed rape convictions for 
boys below 14 years, the recognition of marital rape in R v R [1991] 4 All ER 481, and of male rape as offences by s 
142 of Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; the prescription of a life sentence by s 109(5)(a) of the Powers 
of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 for a second conviction for rape or attempted rape. In the last instance 
however, the court may depart from the sentence on the basis of exceptional circumstances, but must state its 
reasons in open court (s 109(3)). See para 6 of the judgment; see also Andrew Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal 
Justice 4 ed (2005) 128. 
123 R v Millberry supra note 121 at para 8. 
124 Ibid at para 9; in 2002, the SAP published a report of the feedback from research on the ‘relative seriousness of 
different rapes’. The research elicited ‘strong views’ in support of removing distinctions, ‘in terms of seriousness’, 
‘between male and female rapes or between stranger rapes and relationship rapes’. See Alan Clarke, Jo Moran-Ellis 
& Judith Sleney ‘Attitudes to date rape and relationship rape: A qualitative study’ Research Report 2 (2002) 
Sentencing Advisory Panel, 24, available at 
http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Attitudes%20To%20Date%20Rape%20and%20Relationship%20Rape%20%20%
20%20A%20Qualitative%20Study.pdf, accessed February 6 2014; see also Ashworth (2008) op cit note 116 at 117. 
125 R v Millberry supra note 121 para 10. 





mitigated where the offender is the husband of the victim, though this may not necessarily be the 
case. However, the victim’s experiences of bitterness over being raped by someone she trusted 
may aggravate sentence. To arrive at an appropriate sentence therefore, the court must strike a 
balance between aggravation and mitigation and may have to pay attention to particular elements 
of the crime that may have exacerbated the victim’s experience of the crime, or stir 
apprehensions within the victim or the public in the wake of the crime.127   
The list of proposals that the court agreed to goes on. An offender’s culpability differs 
from case to case and may be reduced if the victim’s behaviour conduced to the commission of 
the crime, such as where she consented to sex but changed her mind at the last moment. His 
culpability in such a case would be less than if he had intended to rape his victim from the onset.  
Thus, sentence would be determined ‒ in this particular example, mitigated ‒ to the extent of the 
offender’s culpability. Sentence may also be mitigated where the victim has not been gravely 
affected by the crime.128  Regarding starting points for sentences, the court agreed with the 
proposals of the Panel and observed that they were not substantially different from Billam. The 
only difference that the court pointed out was in the new emphasis on relationship rape, which 
draws attention to the fact that victims may still be seriously impacted because there was a 
relationship with the offender.129  The court accordingly reaffirmed the following starting points: 
a. A five year starting point where the case involves a single uncontested offence of rape, 
provided there are no aggravating features.  
b. The higher starting point of eight years will be imposed either on the basis of victim 
impact, the level of the offender’s culpability, or both, where any of the aggravating 
features mentioned in Roberts or Billam are present.  In addition to those features, the 
court added the following: 
i. the victim is a child or other person ‘who is especially vulnerable because of 
physical frailty, mental impairment or disorder or learning disability’; 
                                                          
127 Ibid at para 13; the court pointed out that in drawing the balance for instance, it should not overlook the fact that 
in stranger rape, the victim’s fear may be increased by the fact that the offender is an ‘unknown quantity’, in which 
case she is confronted with the dreadful fear as to whether the offender is both a rapist and murderer. 
128 Ibid at para 14. 





ii. the rape was ‘racially aggravated’, or ‘the victim was targeted because of his 
or her membership of a vulnerable minority’; 
iii. rape was repeated in the course of one attack; or 
iv. the offender committed the crime knowing that he was suffering from a 
‘life-threatening sexually transmissible disease’. It is irrelevant that the 
victim did not contract the disease.130 
Factors that highlight a high level of risk to society will aggravate sentence 
substantially.131  
                                                          
130 Ibid at paras 19-20. 
131 R v Millberry involved three appeals by Robert Morgan, Stuart Lackenby and Christopher Millberry, against 
sentences for rape crimes.   Resolving Morgan’s appeal, the court held that the fact that the crime (which was a 
relationship rape) was planned and carried out with considerable degree of humiliation and degradation to the 
victim, who suffered substantially from the crime, made the crime of a nature that justified the aggravated sentence 
imposed by the trial court. The court also found that the appellant had a relatively high ‘risk of further offending in a 
similar manner, within the context of personal relationships’, and that the he initially denied responsibility. The 
appeal was accordingly dismissed.  Lackenby’s appeal against excessive sentence was also denied. He repeatedly 
denied responsibility during long interviews by the police, claiming that the victim cooperated with him. He 
eventually made a plea of guilty at the ‘plea and directions hearing’ but the court, having regard to his attitude 
during investigations, could only award a modest discount in mitigation of sentence. The fact that the appellant was 
on the victim’s premises unlawfully, used threats and violence that made the victim fear and plead for her life, and 
put his victim through several hours of his ‘horrendous, humiliating and frightening’, ‘degrading [and] demeaning 
…’ sexual acts that terrified her, aggravated sentence.  He raped her vaginally and also attempted anal rape. With 
regard to the appeal against extended sentence however, the court held that the seven year extension was excessive. 
An extended sentence is an additional period of imprisonment that the court imposes on top of the term of 
imprisonment it would have imposed on an offender because it considers the latter term inadequate to prevent him 
from reoffending and to ‘secure his rehabilitation’. It is issued pursuant to s 85 of the Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act. The third appeal involving Millberry, was a male on male rape in which a relationship of trust was 
abused. The offender was 17 years old, and had been cautioned just about a year before for an indecent assault on an 
11 year old boy.  The pre-sentence report for that crime indicated he had a high risk of reoffending.  His victim in 
the instant case was 15 years old, who belonged to the same social group as the appellant’s brother. The appellant 
and victim met two weeks before the commission of the offence. In deciding the sentence, the trial court took 
cognizance of the fact that the offender was 17 and had made a ‘full and frank admission’, and apparently weighed 
this against the fact that in the presentence report, the appellant had said he could not give any undertaking that he 
would not act upon his sexual impulses in the future, meaning he had a high risk of reoffending. Accordingly, the 
trial court imposed five years of detention in a young offenders’ institution. On appeal, the court held that the youth 
of the victim, the fact that force was used (though not beyond what was inherent in the act itself), and the significant 
impact it had on the victim, were aggravating factors.  While the court must accept that the offender made a full and 
frank disclosure, it must not overlook the probation report which said he had a high risk of re-offending, and was 
therefore a threat to the public and to pubescent boys from the age of 11.  That said, the court had regard to the fact 
that the case was not contested and the plea of guilty was offered early enough.   It upheld the appeal and imposed a 





c. The offender is liable to a fifteen year prison sentence or to a life sentence if the 
crimes attained the level of seriousness for which those terms would have been 
imposed in Billam.132 
Millberry reaffirmed the mitigating and aggravating features in Billam with one important 
qualification; the measure of discount (sentence mitigation) that an offender gets for entering a 
guilty plea depends on how early he made the plea. A plea of guilty that is not given early 
reduces the percentage discount awardable.133 The court also developed additional grounds of 
aggravation. These included the perpetration of the crime in the presence of a child, drugging the 
victim in order to render him or her incapable of resistance and where the offender had a history 
of sexual assaults against the victim.  
Having formulated these and other rules on the basis of the Panel’s advice, the court 
proceeded to warn against rigidity: 
‘[W]e would emphasise that guidelines such as we have set out above can produce sentences 
which are inappropriately high or inappropriately low if sentencers merely adopt a 
mechanistic approach to the guidelines. It is essential that having taken the guidelines into 
account, sentencers stand back and look at the circumstances as a whole and impose the 
sentence which is appropriate having regard to all the circumstances. Double accounting 
must be avoided and can be a result of guidelines if they are applied indiscriminately. 
Guideline judgments are intended to assist the judge arrive at the current sentence. They do 
not purport to identify the correct sentence. Doing so is the task of the trial judge.134 
 
6.2.3.3  The Criminal Justice Act 2003 
A third wave of reforms in sentencing procedure came with the enactment of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003). The Act was passed after a government-sponsored review found 
the SAP-driven scheme fragmentary and inadequate. For example, the scheme was found to be 
incapable of meeting ‘the need for guidelines on types of sentences and matters of general 
                                                          
132 R v Millberry supra note 121 at paras 22-23. 
133 The court noted that s 152 of the Powers of Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2000 required the court to take note 
of when a plea was made. The court permits a reduction for early plea because it spares the victim the distress of re-
enacting the experience in her testimony, and because it shows that the offender realizes his conduct is wrong and 
regrets it.   





principle’.135 In other words, the scheme lacked a primary regulating principle (i.e, objective or 
rationale) that would regulate the type and quantum of sentence that can be imposed. The time 
had come for a comprehensive guideline with an overall strategy for sentencing all manner of 
crimes.  
 CJA 2003 has been described as ushering in a new era of definitive sentencing 
guidelines. The Act favoured a scheme that vested responsibility for developing comprehensive 
guidelines in a separate institution called the Sentencing Guideline Council (SGC). This 
approach was inspired by the rationale that the function of developing guidelines ought to be 
kept apart from the judicial function of deciding individual appeals.  It was also believed that 
separating the functions would increase the range of public inputs – including inputs from the 
Parliament – in so important a matter of public policy that sentencing is. The approach was seen 
as correct in principle because it made it easier to introduce new sentencing principles and 
alternatives than the Court of Appeal could develop.136   
 
I  The Process of Formulating Guidelines under the 2003 Act 
CJA 2003 retained the SAP, but altered the nature of its obligations to accommodate the new 
SGC. Although the SAP could carry out activities as it did before, those activities were triggered 
on the request of the Justice Minister or the SGC. SAP was also mandated to submit its advice to 
the SGC rather than the court.137 The process of formulating the guidelines involved several 
stages of intensive research, data collection and broad consultations, all designed to ensure there 
was wide public input and that current sentencing standards were taken into consideration. Thus, 
the development of a guideline started with the collection of data by the SAP, in order to identify 
sentencing patterns for particular offences. The SAP then evaluated decisions of the Court of 
Appeal to ascertain whether they offer sound principles that may be incorporated into the 
guideline. Legislative provisions were examined ‒ where these were available ‒ and included in 
                                                          
135 Ashworth (2008) op cit note 117 at 113. 
136 Ibid at 113-114. 





the development of a guideline.138 Importantly, SAP could also commission empirical studies, as 
it did on domestic burglary, in ‘order to examine public evaluations of the seriousness of 
different types of burglary’ and to seek those factors which in the mind of the public should 
aggravate or mitigate sentence. These very objectives underlined SAP’s empirical research on 
the ‘relative seriousness of different rapes’.139 The Panel then examined responses from the 
consultations, developed a guideline and transmitted it to the SGC.  
The SGC’s procedure for issuing a guide was quite as elaborate as the SAP’s.  Whenever 
it received an advice from the SAP, it formed its views regarding whether to draft a guideline. If 
a decision to formulate a guideline was made, the SGC was required to consider sentencing 
patterns in England and Wales, the need to promote sentencing consistency and the cost and 
relative effectiveness of sentences in preventing re-offending. The SGC was also required to 
have regard to the need to promote public confidence in the criminal justice system, and to the 
SAP’s views.140  Statutorily, the SGC had to publish whatever rules it formulated, first, as draft 
guidelines. Thereafter, it embarked on a range of consultations with the Secretary of State, such 
persons as the Lord Chancellor may direct, or persons that the SGC deem fit to consult,141 though 
it was not obligated to follow their views. 142  The SGC could also consult with the Justice 
Committee in Parliament,143 though this was not required by the Act. A set of ‘definitive 
guidelines’ – or amendments to existing guidelines ‒ was issued after these consultations.144   
 
                                                          
138 Ashworth (2008) op cit note 117 at 116-117; the author disclosed instances where the SAP disagreed with a 
Court of Appeal decision which held that the mitigating effect of a guilty plea diminished in value where the 
offender was caught in the act, leaving him without a realistic defence. The Panel reasoned that the decision could 
not be right because the aim of a guilty plea mitigation is to encourage guilty offenders to save the time of the court 
and spare the victim the distress of testifying by taking a plea of guilty at the earliest opportunity.  In pages 116-118 
of his book, Ashworth describes the process used by the SAP and SGC to formulate guidelines. 
139 Ibid at 117.  
140 Section 170(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
141 Section 170(8) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
142 There are few instances where public views had obvious impact on the development of a guideline, an example 
being the aforementioned SAP’s reports on public attitudes regarding burglary and different types of rape. However, 
Ashworth points out that it is difficult to evaluate how public opinion influenced the guidelines. See Ashworth op cit 
note 116 at 119. 
143 Ibid at 114. 





II The Rationale for the SGC’s Consultative Process  
Consultations were crucial to the development of guidelines under CJA 2003. Although they 
made the process long-drawn, they fulfilled an important function. They provided opportunities 
for wide public inputs in formulating guidelines. Consultations were included because the Court 
of Appeal had been wielding control over a matter of public policy that ought not to be left to 
judges alone to determine. At the same time however, a reality that could not be sidestepped was 
the fact that judges typically resisted unduly prescriptive penal statutes ‒ such as mandatory 
minimum sentences ‒ that stifled discretion.145 The challenge then was to find an acceptable 
scheme for structuring sentencing discretion.   
To address this challenge and to ensure that guidelines were practical, CJA 2003 settled 
for an independent agency with strong judicial representation. Proponents of separating judicial 
function from the formulation of sentencing policy had argued for an independent administrative 
institution that had the resources and time to develop guidelines. It was also thought that an 
independent body would insulate sentencing policy from the political pressures that often 
predispose legislatures to enact disproportionately harsh measures.146 These considerations led to 
the establishment of the SGC. Its membership was accordingly made up of ‘judicial and non-
judicial’ members, and it was chaired by the Chief Justice.  Thus ‘the council [was] constituted 
by individuals who [knew] what judges [wanted] and [responded] to’.147 
 
III The duty of Compliance under the 2003 Act, and the problems thereof 
A brief examination of the nature of the duty of compliance that was required of courts by the 
CJA 2003 is needful. Under s 172(1) of the Act, courts were obligated to ‘have regard’ to 
                                                          
145 Such statutes were abhorred by courts because they violated the principle of proportionality and the need to 
individualize punishment. Indeed, they were often portrayed as instances of legislative trial (or sentencing), meaning 
they violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers through the legislative usurpation of the role of the 
court in sentencing. See Kieran Riley ‘Trial by legislature: Why statutory mandatory minimum sentences violate the 
separation of powers doctrine’ (2010) Vol. 19 Public Interest Law Journal 285-310, see particularly pp 298-310. 
146 This ‒ and as the procedure of the SAP and SGC showed ‒ did not make sentencing completely free from 
legislative involvement. Rather, the object of constituting an independent council was to ensure that responsibility 
for making the guidelines for implementing legislative prescriptions lay in an apolitical body.  





relevant guidelines.148 Although the Act clearly underscored the fact that guidelines were 
intended to be definitive,149 the language employed in s 172(1) meant that courts ‘simply had to 
consider’ applicable guidelines, but not necessarily follow them. Section 174(2) of the Act 
affirms this interpretation; the provision permitted courts to impose alternative sentences (that is, 
to impose sentences outside the prescribed sentence range), provided it gave reasons for doing 
so.150 These provisions convey the discretionary nature of the court’s sentencing function; courts 
retained enough discretion to roam between category ranges within the overall range in offence-
specific guidelines.  Compared to the subsequent Coroners and Justice Act 2009, CJA 2003 
allowed considerably more discretion, so much so that a 2008 review of CJA 2003 concluded 
that s 172 offered ‘the least prescriptive test’. Consequently, the review called for sentencing 
guidelines with ‘a greater degree of presumption’.151 
Be that as it may, CJA 2003 drove up the use of sentencing guidelines significantly, 
indicating that judges supported them.152 Even though departures were permissible, the 
guidelines were still definitive.153 Thus, courts were ordinarily expected to apply them. However, 
the long-drawn approach to developing the guidelines posed its own predicament; it ensured that 
the SGC’s attention was focused on individual offences over long periods of time. This made 
attention to the development of comprehensive guidelines that covered all offences impossible. 
                                                          
148 The precise wording of s 172 (1) is as follows:  
Every court must— 
(a) in sentencing an offender, have regard to any guidelines which are relevant to the offender’s case, 
and 
(b) in exercising any other function relating to the sentencing of offenders, have regard to any 
guidelines which are relevant to the exercise of the function. 
149 Section 170(4) & (9). 
150 Julian V Roberts ‘Sentencing guidelines and judicial discretion: Evolution of the duty of courts to comply in 
England and Wales’ (2011) 51 Brit. J. Criminol. 997-1013 at 1001. 
151 Ibid at 1006. 
152 According to Ashworth and Roberts, the majority of sentences in the lower courts were imposed with the aid of 
the Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guideline (2008). The greater number of sentences imposed by the crown court 
were also with the use of guidelines. See Ashworth & Roberts op cit note 77 at 882. 





Since the SGC’s approach was necessarily piecemeal, the Court of Appeal retained the default 
role of issuing guidelines for offences for which the SGC had not issued guidelines.154 
 
6.2.3.4   The Coroners and Justice Act 2009  
In 2010, significant changes were introduced to the sentencing scheme. The changes followed 
two government-appointed reviews that were prompted by a surge in committals to prison, 
lengthier sentences and a corresponding surge in prison population. The first review was led by 
Lord Carter, whose report stated that the condition of the prison had become unsustainable. He 
recommended strengthening existing sentencing guidelines and establishing a Working Group to 
study how to refine them. Following these recommendations, the Sentencing Commission 
Working Group was created in 2008. The Working Group studied different guideline systems, 
and rejected numerical guidelines (such as the Minnesota guideline), recommending instead an 
overhaul of the existing arrangement in order to enhance greater judicial compliance. The result 
of the ensuing overhaul was the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (CJA 2009), which came into 
force on 13 June 2011. As Roberts155 describes it, CJA 2009 was the response to a call for higher 
compliance with sentencing guidelines. It did in fact instate stricter compliance than was the case 
under CJA 2003.  
Yet another significant change that the Working Group recommended came with the 
abolition of the SAP and SGC by s 135 of the 2009 Act156 and their replacement by a ‘single 
authority’, the Sentencing Council of England and Wales (SC), by virtue of s 118 of the Act.157 
The new SC comprises judicial members and non-judicial members, with the judicial members 
being in the majority. A judicial member appointed by the Chief Justice chairs the Council.158 
                                                          
154 Indeed, the court issued guidelines regarding shop thefts in Page [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 221. It also issued non-
prescriptive guidance on provisions of UK’s Sexual Offences Act 2003 before the SGC subsequently adopted 
guidelines. See Ashworth (2008) op cit note 117 at 120-121. 
155 Julian V Roberts ‘Structured sentencing: Lessons from England and Wales for common law jurisdictions’ (2012) 
Vol. 14 No. 3 Punishment & Society 267-288 at 270-271; Roberts (2011) op cit note 148 at 2-3; see also s 125(1) of 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
156 See also Schedule 23 Part 4 of the Act. 
157 See also Ashworth & Roberts op cit note 77 at 882.  
158 See Schedule 15(1) & (2); there are eight judicial members, and the appointment of the chairman or his pro tem 





The new legislation and the establishment of the SC ushered in a new era of sentencing in 
England and Wales. 
 
I Duties of the Sentencing Council  
The SC’s functions are defined in fairly detailed terms in CJA 2009. To start with, the SC is 
vested with the responsibility of developing guidelines. The guidelines ‘may be general in nature 
or limited to a particular offence, particular category of offence or particular category of 
offender’.159 The guidelines shall also include rules regarding the mitigation of sentence on a 
plea of guilty and ‘the application of any rule of law as to the totality of sentences’.160 It may also 
prepare guidelines regarding other matters161 and may review and revise its guidelines 
periodically.162  The SC’s procedure is much the same as the SGC’s before it. It starts with the 
publication of a draft guideline, which then proceeds to a series of mandated consultations and 
terminates with the issue of definitive guidelines.163 Section 120(11) provides a list of matters to 
which the SC must have regard when developing guidelines.  These include sentencing patterns 
in England and Wales, the need for sentencing consistency and how sentencing decisions impact 
victims, ‘the need to promote public confidence in the criminal justice system’ and ‘the cost of 
different sentences and their relative effectiveness in preventing re-offending’. The SC shall also 
take the results of monitoring the operation and impact of its guidelines into consideration.164 
                                                          
159 Section 120(2). 
160 Section 120(3); the provision makes reference to s 144 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which deals with 
sentence reduction for plea of guilty. Section 144(a) provided that the measure of discount shall be influenced by the 
stage of the proceeding at which an intention to enter the plea was made, and the circumstances in which that 
intention was communicated.  
161 Section 120(4). 
162 Section 120(9). 
163 Section 120(5), (6), (7), (8) & (10); the SC must consult the Lord Chancellor and such persons as the Lord 
Chancellor may direct, the Justice Select Committee of the House of Commons, and such other persons as the SC 
considers appropriate. 
164 The monitoring function is carried out under s 128 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Specific things which 
the SC is required to monitor include the frequency and extent of judicial departures from the guidelines, the factors 
that influenced sentences that courts impose, the impact that the guidelines have on promoting sentence consistency 





The Act also stipulates other ‘monitoring’ functions that the SC must discharge.  These 
include publishing its evaluations of the resource implications of the guidelines,165 monitoring 
‘the operation and effect’ of guidelines (in order to draw conclusions about compliance)166 and 
promoting awareness about the guidelines.167 Transitional provisions in the Act preserve the 
guidelines that predated the 2009 Act168 and allow the Lord Chancellor to issue provisions that 
empower the SC to discharge the functions that were formerly discharged by the SGC, until such 
a time that the provisions of the CJA 2003 under which those functions were discharged are 
repealed.169  
 
II The Structure of the Guideline 
Section 121 of the Act lays out the framework that every guideline should follow. To start with, 
guidelines should, as much as the nature of the offence reasonably permits, describe the varying 
degrees of seriousness involved in the commission of a particular offence.170 Offence seriousness 
is determined by the following factors: 
a. the culpability of the offender; 
b. the harm that was occasioned by the offending act, or intended to be occasioned, 
which foreseeably could have been caused by the act; and 
c. other factors that the SC deems ‘particularly relevant’ to the question of seriousness 
for that offence.171 
                                                          
165 Section 127; the resource assessments are an evaluation of the likely resources required for the provision of 
prison places, probation services, and youth justice services. Resource assessments shall always be kept under 
review and revised as the need arises.  
166 Section 128; the section requires the SC to draw conclusions on the frequency and extent of departures from 
guidelines, the factors that influence the sentences imposed by court, how the guidelines impact the promotion of 
sentencing consistency and public confidence in the criminal justice system. 
167 Section 129; this function extends to publishing information about sentencing practice for individual magisterial 
districts and areas that fall under the jurisdiction of Crown Courts, for sentences imposed by courts in England and 
Wales, and ‘the cost different sentences and their relative effectiveness in preventing re-offending’. 
168 Under Schedule 22 Part 4 para 28(1)(b), the Lord Chancellor may make provisions for sentencing guidelines that 
predated the act to be treated as guidelines issued by the SC. Ashworth and Roberts have also written that the old 
guidelines that were issued by the SGC continue to apply until such a time that the SC ‘revises and reissues them’. 
See Ashworth & Roberts op cit note 77 at 883. 
169 Schedule 22 Part 4 para 28(1)(a).  
170 Section 121(2); the provision describes it as ‘categories of case involving the commission of the offence’. 





Essentially therefore, the SC must develop separate guidelines that reflect the different categories 
or subcategories of each offence. Offence categories are defined according to levels of the harm 
or risk involved (i.e., seriousness). Corresponding to each offence category or subcategory is a 
sentence range – called a category range in the guideline – which consists of a range of years,172 
much like the sentence range in the Minnesota guideline. The sentencer’s role is to identify the 
offence category that bears the closest semblance to the case at hand and apply the corresponding 
sentence range. However, and as earlier pointed out, a unique feature of the SC’s guidelines is 
the ‘sentencing starting point’ they incorporated in each category range.173  The sentencer 
commences his calibration of punishment from this ‘point’ and may adjust the sentence up or 
down to reflect his evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating elements of the crime. Assisting 
this process is a list of aggravating and mitigating factors that is provided in the guideline.174 
These factors may include statutory factors, or such other mitigatory factors that the SC may 
consider relevant. The guidelines may also include criteria for determining what weight may be 
attached to the offender’s previous convictions.175 How these requirements are met in offence-
specific guidelines shall be discussed subsequently. 
 
III The Duty of Compliance under the 2009 Act 
The ‘critical element’ in any guideline is the extent to which it restricts courts. Rigidity in 
guidelines is not advisable, because it prevents sentencing outside a prescribed range, except in 
exceptional circumstances. Such a standard may fetter discretion unnecessarily. At the same 
time, however, guidelines that permit sentencers to go beyond the sentence range may impede 
consistency.176 CJA 2009 struck a middle course between these concerns by incorporating a 
more directive posture on compliance that was markedly different from the position under CJA 
2003. While CJA 2003 allowed courts much more discretion through the requirement that they 
                                                          
172 Section 121(4). 
173 Section 121(5); this provision shows the influence that guideline judgments had on CJA 2009 and guidelines. 
Starting points enhanced the acceptability of the guidelines to sentencers. 
174 Section 121(5) & (10) of CJA 2009; see also Sentencing Council ‘Frequently asked questions about sentencing 
guidelines’ available at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Frequently_asked_questions_about_sentencing_guidelines(1).pdf, 
accessed 7 February 2014. 
175 Section 121(6). 





only have regard to – but not necessarily follow ‒ relevant guidelines,177 s 125(1) of the 2009 Act 
obligates courts to follow offence-specific guidelines. The emphasis on offence-specific 
guidelines is a defining hallmark of CJA 2009. The provision also obligates judicial compliance 
with any other sentencing guidelines that are relevant to the exercise of any other function 
related to sentencing. This other requirement may be seen as a further indication of legislative 
intention to bring those other elements of sentencing that are not offence specific ‒ such as when 
the court seeks to apply the totality principle, or extend sentence, or even discount sentence on 
the basis of a plea of guilty ‒ within the rationalized framework that the Act provides.178  The 
only reason a court may excuse itself from complying with the guideline is where it is satisfied 
that compliance would not serve ‘the interests of justice’. The ‘interests of justice’ clause 
suggests that s 125(1) permits a limited range of discretion that is defined by considerations of 
fairness.  
However, some leeway is embedded in s 125(3). The provision obligates the court to 
impose a sentence within the offence range in the relevant guideline and to decide which of the 
various offence categories within that guideline ‘best resembles’ the case at hand. The purpose 
was to help the court determine the starting point for sentence. With regard to this obligation 
however, nothing in the provision shall be read as imposing a ‘separate duty’ on the court to 
select a sentence within the category range.  A court that selects a sentence for a different 
category range does not have to explain that choice – i.e., the sentence does not have to be 
selected from any particular category of seriousness.  An obligation to justify departure only 
arises when the court imposes a sentence that is ‘outside the overall offence range’.179   
Since the SC was created in 2010, it has issued six definitive guidelines, the first of which 
was on assault.180 The first guideline was issued pursuant to s 120 of CJA 2009181 and replaced 
                                                          
177 Ibid at 274; see also Roberts & Rafferty op cit note 114 at 687. 
178 That is, the court may apply its discretion to such other elements but within the safeguards provided therefore in 
the sentencing guideline. 
179 Roberts & Rafferty op cit note 115 at 687. 
180 The other guidelines covered burglary, overarching principles of allocation, totality and TICs [an acronym for 
offences taken into consideration which means …. ], dangerous dogs and sexual offences. See Sentencing Council 
‘Sentencing guidelines’ available at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/sentencing-guidelines.htm, accessed 





the guideline before it.182  Issuing the new guideline was a significant step because it followed 
the structure devised by the Act. It is discussed below. Being the first, it provided a model that 
subsequent guidelines were expected to follow.183   
 
6.2.3.5 The Guidelines on Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm: How it Works 
In 2011 the SC issued a definitive guideline on assault.184 The guideline’s structure was 
significantly different from previous guidelines by the SGC, particularly with regard to the nine-
stepped procedure it established for setting sentences. The first two steps are pivotal to 
determining sentence and are therefore explored below.185  There are five offence ranges in the 
guideline,186 each of which is divided into three categories of seriousness. Fixing a sentence has 
to go through the nine steps and a sentencing starting point is identified for each category of 
seriousness.187 Roberts and Rafferty provide a useful analysis of the structure of the sentencing 
guideline for ‘assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ (ABH).188   
Step One stratifies ABH into three layers or categories of seriousness. It allocates a 
sentence range and starting point for each category and requires the court to determine which one 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
offenders on victims’ available at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/media/974.htm accessed 21 January 
2014.   
181 Sentencing Council ‘Assault: Definitive Guideline’ (2011) available at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Assault_definitive_guideline_-_Crown_Court.pdf, accessed 21 
January 2014.  
182 Roberts & Rafferty op cit note 115 at 681; the previous guideline was issued by the SGC in 2008. 
183 Ibid. 
184 See note 181 above. 
185 Steps three to nine of the guideline cover the reduction of sentence under the Serious Organized Crime and Police 
Act; the reduction and magnitude of reduction of sentence for plea of guilty; the imposition of extended sentence 
having regard to Chapter 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003; the application of the totality principle where an 
offender is to be sentenced for more than one offence, or is already serving term, having regard to the need to ensure 
that the total sentence is just and proportionate; the making of compensation and other ancillary orders, the duty of 
court to explain the effect of sentence to the offender, and to take time served on remand or bail into consideration 
when determining sentence. Roberts remarked that the guidelines’ structure promotes consistency by prescribing a 
series of steps the court must follow. See Appendix C for guideline extracts; see also Roberts (2012) op cit note 
155 at 278. 
186 These include ‘Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm/Wounding with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm’; ‘Inflicting grievous bodily harm/Unlawful wounding’ and ‘Racial/religiously aggravated 
GBH/Unlawful wounding’; ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ and ‘Racially/religiously aggravated ABH. 
187 The starting point is the ‘position within a category range from which to start calculating a provisional sentence’; 






of these categories applies to the offence before it. A ‘Category 1’ offence must involve a greater 
level of harm and culpability’. Normally ‘serious injury’ must also be present and the 
corresponding category range is ‘1 – 3 years’ in custody. A ‘Category 2’ classification would 
apply where the facts of the offence indicate ‘greater harm’ and ‘lower culpability’, or ‘lesser 
harm and higher culpability’. ‘Serious injury must normally be present’ and the corresponding 
category range is a ‘low-level community order to 51 week’s custody’. A ‘Category 3’ offence 
also involves two elements, namely ‘lesser harm and lower culpability’  and attracts a ‘Band A 
fine – high level community order’.189  Each of these categories has a number of principal factual 
elements (or aggravating factors) which help to place the case at trial within one category of 
seriousness or the other.   
The principal factual elements consist of a combination of harm and culpability 
indicators190 that help to determine what offence category should apply to the case at hand. 
Determining sentence involves a two-staged process of evaluation. First, the court determines the 
culpability of the offender and the harm occasioned or intended by his criminal act, having 
regard to the main facts. Principal factual elements help to place the crime in an offence category 
(that is, match the case to a category of seriousness).191 Because the new guideline places the 
elements at the heart of matching a particular case to an offence category, they have been said to 
exact the ‘greatest influence on sentence severity’.192 The list is exhaustive, meaning courts are 
restricted to considering only those elements that appear on the list when determining what 
sentence range is appropriate.  
                                                          
189 Ibid at 12, 27; A ‘Band A fine’ is 25 - 75 % of relevant weekly income’, with the starting point at 50%. 
‘Community orders’ could be one of three levels, ranging between low to medium and high level orders.  
190 Ibid; an offence indicates greater harm where the injury (which may include transmission of disease) is serious in 
the context of the offence, or where the crime was perpetrated on a particularly vulnerable victim, or with sustained 
or repeated assaults on the victim. The offence indicates lesser harm if the resulting injury was less serious in the 
circumstances of the crime. Indicators of higher culpability include a combination of statutory and other aggravating 
factors. The statutory factors are indicated where the offence was a motivated by hate, the victim’s (presumed) 
sexual orientation or disability. Other aggravating factors include where the offence involved substantial 
premeditation, or a weapon was used, playing a lead role in the commission of the offence, causing more harm than 
was necessary for the commission of the offence, etc. Lower culpability is indicated where there was no 
premeditation, the offender played a minor role, or had mental disorder or learning disability that could be linked to 
the offence, etc. 
191 Ibid at 12; Roberts & Rafferty op cit note 115 at 683; see also Roberts (2012) op cit note 155 at 276-277. 
192 See Roberts & Rafferty op cit note 115 at 682-683; the authors explain that offences which did not involve 
premeditation fell to the lowest category, and were punished through non-custodial measures, and that under the 





Once the offence category has been determined, the process of ‘fine tuning’ or refining 
the sentence commences. Step Two is the most significant part of this process; it provides the 
starting point within the category range that corresponds to the relevant offence category, which 
the court must employ to arrive at an appropriate sentence. For instance, the starting point when 
the facts and circumstances place the offence in ‘Category 1’ is one year and six months’ 
imprisonment. The starting point would apply regardless of the offender’s plea or criminal 
history. However, the category range, which represents the range between the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed for that offence, is one to three years’ imprisonment. 
The court will adjust the starting point upward if the facts are particularly serious, as it would be 
expected to do when the commission of the offence indicates the presence of the ‘principal 
factual elements’ enlisted in step one. The sentence at this stage is only ‘provisional’. The court 
may make further adjustments, using a non-exhaustive list of additional factual elements that 
help to measure the seriousness of the offence, the culpability of the offender and such features 
that may indicate ‘personal mitigation’. These additional elements are designed to fit punishment 
into ‘the context of the offence and factors relating to the offender’. The court’s duty is to 
‘identify whether any combination of these, or other relevant factors, should result in upward or 
downward adjustment from the starting point’.193  Further improvements to the provisional 
sentence can be achieved by applying the remaining seven steps in the sentencing process.194  
A couple of salient points need to be made about the guideline before ending this section. 
First, courts may impose sentences outside the identified category range if after considering the 
additional factual elements, they are satisfied that a departure from the range is needful. 
Secondly, the guideline incorporates statutory threshold requirements for custodial and 
community order sentences; with regards to ‘Category 2’ offences, the guideline requires the 
court to consider whether the custody threshold has been passed, and if so, whether a custodial 
sentence is unavoidable. If it is unavoidable, it should consider whether sentence can be 
suspended. In relation to ‘Category 3’ offences, the court is also required to consider whether the 
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community order threshold has been passed.195 These provisions fulfil the important function of 
reserving custodial sentences for the most serious ABH crimes, or as a last resort in cases for 
which alternative measures may be more appropriate. As Roberts and Rafferty explain it, they 
are ‘a salutary reminder to sentencers of the need to consider a hierarchy of sanctions and the 
statutory criteria which must be fulfilled before disposals are imposed’.196 
 
6.2.3.6  Some Criticisms of the Guideline System  
The new guideline system is not without challenges. Its attempt to allocate factual elements to 
Steps One and Two came short of creating ‘completely airtight’ classifications. That in itself 
may not be a problem, but potential problems may arise when the circumstances of a crime are 
such that the elements that accentuate seriousness and offender culpability fall under Step Two, 
rather than Step One.197 This could result in the imposition of a sentence that is less than what 
the offence deserves. Also, the allocation of criminal history, which is usually a serious factor in 
determining sentence severity, to Step Two where its impact on the severity of sentence is less, 
diminishes its aggravating effect.198 Yet another problem arises from the lack of clarity regarding 
whether a court’s discretion to review a sentence upward from the starting point is restricted to 
the sentence range that corresponds to that offence category, or whether that discretion extends 
to selecting a sentence from a higher category in Step One.199  
Not to be ignored also is the quantum of discount that should be allowed for a plea of 
guilty.  In Roberts’200 view, the issue exposes the political tensions that emerge between 
government, independent guideline authorities and the judiciary in their efforts to shape 
sentencing policy, as well as the impact that fiscal considerations have on such efforts.  Early 
guilty pleas are encouraged because this saves the state the costs of gathering evidence for 
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successful prosecution. In principle therefore, the degree to which sentence is discounted 
depends on how early in the criminal process the defendant communicates his intention to enter 
the plea. The earlier the intention is communicated, the higher the measure of discount and vice 
versa. However, setting the precise measure has often been a controversial exercise. A 2007 
guideline by the SC now sets the discount for a plea that is tendered at the earliest opportunity at 
one-third of the prison sentence.201  
Notwithstanding the above challenges, the English guidelines have their strengths. While 
concerns have been expressed that discounting sentence for guilty pleas results in sentences that 
do not reflect the severity of the offence, those concerns can be moderated. Sentences that reflect 
the gravity of the harm and culpability may still reflect proper consideration for the contrition 
that is expressed in a guilty plea that is communicated early.  Such sentences are consistent with 
the principle of parsimony and should be encouraged. At any rate, the English guideline system 
offers a credible alternative, a middle ground as it were, between rigid numerical guidelines and 
guideline systems that are loosely regulated by judicial statements of guiding principles. At the 
heart of it, the English guideline is a combination of numerical values and definitive principles 
that can be adjusted with a considerable measure of flexibility, all within a framework that 
enhances predictability.  It is rooted in a tradition of considerable judicial familiarity with 
sentencing that makes it agreeable to sentencers.  When applying it, sentencers are not faced with 
a set of rules that they are not adept at applying. It is equally an important indicator of their 
suitability that the guidelines are issued by an autonomous administrative agency where judicial 
officers hold the majority.202 
 
                                                          
201 In 2010, government issued a Green Paper which proposed to increase the amount of discount by up to 50 
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underlying reason for the proposal was its potential to save costs; prosecutors would be spared lengthy preparations 
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that the criminal justice system favours the offender. Ongoing research suggests that public support for guilty plea 
discounts is limited, and that there is no support for it where serious crimes are involved. See Roberts (2012) op cit 
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6.3 Distilling the Key Elements of the Models Examined 
The point was made earlier that the English model has been preferred to the grid based system 
because of the flexibility it offers.  Notwithstanding the differences this suggests, there are 
important similarities at the heart of the underlying principles that have made the models 
successful in their respective jurisdictions. First, both models were hinged on a political 
rationality that supported vesting responsibility for making sentencing guidelines on an 
independent specialized agency, in order to separate the public policy function of developing 
sentencing guidelines from the judicial function of imposing sentences. The rationality was 
pertinent, as it facilitated the development of an overall sentencing strategy that courts were not 
adequately equipped to do.  It also helped to insulate the formulation of sentencing policy from 
political influences by politicians who often come under public pressure to adopt tough measures 
against crime.  
Vesting responsibility for developing guidelines in an independent agency also expanded 
the range of public inputs in the guidelines. This was especially the case with the English 
guidelines. The sentencing guidelines for burglary and rape – which the SAP and SGC 
developed - are examples, as both were developed after public consultations to determine how 
the public viewed the crimes and the punishments it deemed to be appropriate. All told, the 
consultations enriched the outcome of the guidelines. Such inputs would not have been possible 
if guideline development was left to the courts as courts do not necessarily maintain such ties 
with the community that would enable them to gauge public opinion.  Even though judges may 
sometimes be sensitive to how the public reacts to punishments for serious crime, Roberts203 
points out that it is not so obvious that public perceptions do in fact have a demonstrable impact 
on sentencing in individual cases. Besides, suggestions that sentences should be influenced by 
public opinion may run against notions of judicial independence. Traditionally, courts shield 
themselves from public pressure.204  
The constitution of the sentencing guidelines agencies is also an important feature of the 
models. The agencies are headed by judicial officers. In the Sentencing Council for England and 
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Wales, judicial members form the majority. Besides the judicial members, membership also 
includes persons who have expertise in criminal prosecution and defence, policing, correctional 
services, sentencing policy, victim’s welfare, etc.205 This arrangement ensures that guidelines 
reflect the views of all critical stakeholders, including representatives of the judges who will 
apply them.   
The next notable features are within the structure of the sentencing guideline. Here, the 
English model’s approach is preferable; the guideline categorizes offences into different levels of 
seriousness against which individual cases may be matched. An important guiding aid in this 
scheme is the ‘sentencing starting point’, which applies to all offenders, regardless of criminal 
history and guilty plea.206 Without it, sentencers may commence fixing sentences at different 
points within a given sentence range, guided only by their appreciation of the aggravating and 
mitigating elements of the crime that should influence the choice and quantum of punishment. 
Sentences set under such circumstances can hardly achieve consistency.  The starting point was 
introduced to resolve this.  
Another critical feature for consistency is the list of principal factual elements, which 
constitutes the first checklist in the process of setting punishment. The list is exhaustive, meaning 
the scope of factors that could define offence seriousness is confined to the elements on the list.  
They are the precise elements that define how the sentencer should address cases of particular 
gravity. A second non-exhaustive list of ‘additional factual elements’ occupies the second line in 
the sentencing process and is devoted to refining or contextualizing the sentence. The 
combination of principal and additional factual elements is very instructive; principal factual 
elements fulfil the important function of delineating discretion, of infusing greater certainty or 
predictability into the specific elements that should determine categories of seriousness. Once the 
category is determined, the ‘additional factual elements’ open the door to the sentencer’s 
appreciation of how the facts and circumstances of the case should reflect in the final outcome of 
                                                          
205 See Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission ‘Commission member selection’ available at 
http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/about/memberselection/, accessed 9 February 2014; see also Schedule 15 of 
CJA 2009. 





sentence. The combination narrows the foreseeable margin of sentence disparity which would 
have been wide if judges were at complete liberty to interpret or define offence seriousness.  
A few other important features are worthy of mention. The guideline maintains a 
threshold that reserves prison sentences for very serious forms of ABH and as a last resort.  This 
serves as a check against the indiscriminate use of prison sentences. Furthermore, category 
ranges and starting points are designed in such a way that they introduce gradation between the 
sentences applicable to each offence category. This brings about relative proportionality between 
sentences for different levels of seriousness and culpability, not just for ABH, but between the 
different forms of assault identified by SC’s definitive guideline for assault. There are six types 
of assault in the guideline and each assault type is divided into three offence categories. As per 
the types, presumptive sentences are allocated in a manner that reflects the relative seriousness of 
each. The highest sentence that a court may apply under the definitive guideline is 16 years’ 
custody, for ‘[c]ausing grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm’.207 On the 
other hand, the least sentence ranges between a discharge and a ‘Band C fine’ for common 
assault.208  Between these sentences are different other sanctions that reflect the relative 
seriousness of each assault type and offence category.  This internal gradation between category 
ranges shows that the overall strategy of the guideline gave careful holistic consideration to the 
relative weight of sanction that should attach to each offence category in the guideline.  There is 
therefore a relationship of proportions between the different sentences. In principle, such relative 
proportionality ought to be sought vis-a-vis other offences.  
To make a final point, while the success of the Minnesota guideline has been attributed to 
the existence of a primary rationale and legislative clarification of how other aims of sentencing 
should feature in the imposition of sentences, no such feature can be found in English sentencing 
statutes and guidelines. Yet, the English model is no less successful and its deserts basis is clear.  
The success of the model must be attributed to the clarity with which English guidelines 
categorise offences and attach sentences, and to the relative expertise and familiarity of English 
courts on the subject of sentencing.  Hence, a legislative statement of the primary aim of 
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sentencing and of how the other aims may influence sentencing may not necessarily be 
indispensable.  However, for jurisdictions that are deficient in relevant expertise, or do not have 
guidelines that are as descriptive as the English guidelines, a legislative statement may be a 
useful way to start. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
In its remarks about the need for guidelines in South Africa, the South African Law 
Commission209 said that an ‘ideal sentencing system’ should aim for sentencing consistency and 
be mindful of the state’s capacity to enforce those sentences. This remark emphasises the 
relevance of two important principles that should be integral to every guideline. The first is 
proportionality, which in this thesis, has been taken to mean that sentences should both match 
offence severity and instate relative proportionality between sentences for different offences. A 
concomitant of proportionality is the principle of equity, which dictates that like cases be treated 
alike and that cases that are different in a substantially significant respect are subjected to 
punishments that reflect that difference. The second principle is parsimony. It emphasises the 
need for courts to direct their minds to the capacity of states to implement the sanctions they 
impose, and to resort to prison sentences as a last measure.  
The models that this chapter looked at were designed to uphold both principles, even 
though the points of emphasis for each differed in a few respects.  The Minnesota guidelines 
were developed with the express goal of reducing prison sentences and keeping prison levels 
within the state’s prison and correctional resources. However, the rigidity of the guideline, 
together with the frequent foray of the legislature into sentencing policy, impeded both goals. 
Indeed, they prompted sentencers and attorneys to find ways to skirt the guidelines. An evidence 
based approach to sentencing evolved out of these attempts. On the other hand, the English 
system fared better due to its flexibility, its lucid statements of principles and how those 
principles should apply. Its adoption of custodial thresholds bore ample testimony to the higher 
                                                          






bar it set for custodial dispositions. Properly applied, the guideline can ensure that only serious 
offenders are committed to prison and that prison population is kept within capacity.  
Apparently, the level of judicial involvement in developing the guidelines, both through the 
Court of Appeals guideline judgments and the involvement of judicial members in the 
Sentencing Council, also contributed to the success of the guidelines.  
For Nigeria, the challenge of evolving a guideline that achieves consistency and 
parsimony must face up to the peculiar challenge of the country’s poor attention to penal policy. 
Until deserved attention is given to the establishment of a sentencing guidelines agency, the 
Country’s Supreme Court may need to take up the challenge of issuing guideline judgments as 
the English Court of Appeal did. The Supreme Court may not sense an urgency to assume this 
function because Nigeria’s convict prison population is not bulging at the seams. However, 
extant penal legislation in the country raise a spectre of punitiveness that needs to be reined in.  
From a penological point of view, and as has been illustrated in this thesis, excessive 
punishments can be counterproductive. They lack a deterrent value and weaken the promise of 
the criminal law to award just punishments. It would therefore be useful, for instance, if the 
Supreme Court issued authoritative statements that reinforced the criminal law’s commitment to 
a just system of punishments and enhanced the ratiocination of sentences that courts imposed, 
making it a necessary part of the process of judicial sentencing.  The next chapter offers 





Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the underlying motivations for this research arose from previous reviews that the 
researcher conducted into prison conditions and prisoner’s rights in Nigeria. During the review, 
it became obvious that overcrowding and inhumane quartering conditions in Nigerian prisons 
arise from problems that are endemic and inherent in Nigeria’s criminal justice system, such as 
the tendency to resort to custodial measures for detention or punishment. With regards to the 
latter, the researcher realised that there is a lack of clarity in Nigeria’s sentencing policy that 
continues to saddle courts with the difficult challenge of determining what principles or goals 
should be the predominant factor in sentencing in individual cases.  The realisation was nothing 
new. As the thesis has shown, a good number of judicial pronouncements and scholarly writings 
on Nigeria’s post-colonial criminal justice system have acknowledged it one way or the other. 
However, what has been unsettling is that long after Nigeria became self-governing, the problem 
has remained largely ignored.   
 Amidst the lack of clarity is a sentencing pattern that has leaned towards undue severity, 
illustrated in part by the fact that custodial sentencing is the most utilised penal remedy in 
Nigeria, even for petty, nonviolent crimes.  Complementing the tendency toward severity is a 
lack of consistency in sentencing, which, as the thesis showed, stems from unduly wide 
discretion and unnecessarily punitive legislative provisions. The serious negative consequences 
that these have for offenders provided yet another motivation for this research.  Penal legislation 
and sentencing discretion combine to abridge protections for human dignity in Nigeria.  
 To address these issues, the thesis set about finding answers to the overarching question 
regarding what measures will ensure that sentencers integrate proportionality principles in 
sentencing and avoid imposing penalties that infringe constitutional rights. Four sub-questions 
were also framed to explore the components of the main question. The thesis’ primary concern 





that affirms the constitutionality and proportionality of punishment. Below is a summary of the 
findings.  
7.2 Summary of Key Findings 
This thesis commenced with a description of the problems associated with sentencing in Nigeria, 
noting amongst others that the lack of attention to the constitutionality and proportionality of 
punishments in academic writings in Nigeria highlights the importance of the contribution that 
the thesis seeks to make to penal scholarship in Nigeria. Chapter one portrayed how misuses of 
custodial sentences abridged human rights and sought to show why redressing such misuses must 
start with reforms that inject constitutionality and proportionality principles into the country’s 
sentencing scheme. 1   To guide its quest for solutions, the thesis adopted a combination of 
comparative methods of legal research that offered a prism for examining the penal experiences 
of South Africa and Britain, with a view to extracting lessons in either countries’ experiences 
with penal reforms that may be valuable for Nigeria.  Using this prism, the thesis examined the 
socio-historical context of punishment and sentencing developments in all three countries, 
engaging also with an analysis of their respective sentencing jurisprudence.  Further, the thesis 
embraced ‒ as its main method of engagement with the issues ‒ the criminological approach in 
discourses about punishment, which allowed the researcher to assume the accuracy of official 
accounts and research publications regarding sentencing problems in Nigeria. This approach in 
turn ensured that the thesis stayed focused on finding solutions to identified problems without 
having to collect and analyse primary data that depicted the problems. However, the thesis’ 
preference for the criminological approach did not necessarily discard the philosophical2 or 
sociological traditions,3 as both traditions were also useful to understanding the socio-historical 
context in which punishment evolved to assumed forms and meanings in the countries 
considered in the study. 
The thesis commenced its search for answers to the overarching question by examining 
the meanings that attach to official claims concerning the purposes of punishment in Nigeria, 
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setting the discussion within broader discourses regarding the theories or purposes of 
punishment. The goal was to understand how Nigerian penal policy makers and sentencers 
conceptualise punishment in Nigeria, and how this has enhanced or failed to enhance consistency 
and proportionality.   
As the thesis noted in chapter two, exclusively utilitarian or retributive accounts of 
punishment fail to offer an effective basis for allocating punishment. Punishment is neither solely 
utilitarian nor retributive, because sentencers often seek a combination of goals that may be 
deterrent, retributive, incapacitative or rehabilitative when sentencing. As such, traditional (i.e., 
exclusive) accounts of punishment do not offer sentencers a practical guide for distributing 
punishment or rationalising discretion.  They do not offer a particularly useful scheme for 
moderating penal severity. The chapter noted that Nigeria’s reliance on traditional accounts has 
engendered punitiveness in penal legislation and judicial sentences. It has also hindered the 
development of a useful sentencing jurisprudence.  
These problems suggest the need to imagine a new rationality for allocating punishment 
in Nigeria.  Chapter two made an attempt at it, by examining hybrid models of allocating 
punishment. Hybrid models combine utilitarian and retributivist principles in an attempt to 
reconcile the antinomy between traditional accounts. The earliest suggestions of the models 
came with the works of Hart and Rawls, amongst others. The quest for a more principled basis 
for allocating punishment prompted further hybrid refinements, eventually resulting in what 
came to be known as the modified theory of deserts.  The theory became the most influential 
penal theory in the 1980s, and its premise was simple: offenders may only be punished to the 
extent that their crimes deserve and unnecessary penal suffering was to be avoided because it 
lacked a utilitarian value. By settling for deserts as a primary distributive principle, it spared 
sentencers the arduous task of selecting between conflicting objects of punishment. But it did 
more; it offered a scheme for ranking punishment in order of severity, ensuring that like-situated 
offenders receive like treatment in accord with the principle of equality and that sentencers had a 





  These principles are relevant to reconstructing punishment and ensuring sentencing 
proportionality in Nigeria, but not to be left out of the emerging framework is the need for a 
moderating constitutional principle. Essentially, this principle asserts the need to protect the 
dignity of offenders by prohibiting cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments.  But then, for a 
country with as low a rule of law compliance rating as Nigeria,4 the question may be why 
sentencers should begin to pay attention to ensuring that the human dignity of offenders enjoys 
constitutional protection. The question is important because as one philosopher rightly pointed 
out, the dignity of individuals is inextricably bound up in the fortunes of others, so that denying 
the dignity of others inevitably impedes the fulfilment of one’s own dignity.5 Indeed, South 
African courts have rightly asserted that punishments that are grossly disproportionate or cruel, 
inhuman and degrading violate human dignity, and the court runs the risk of reducing itself to the 
level of the criminal when it leans towards excessive severity.6 
Accordingly, a sentencing framework and the policy that underpins it must have due 
regard to the need to ensure that punishment complies with the standards established by the 
constitution, that offenders receive their just deserts and that similarly situated offenders are 
treated alike, having proper regard to those individual elements of the crime and the offender that 
may refine sentence. Punishments that fail these requirements risk being unconstitutional, 
because they violate necessary constitutional constraints on the power to punish.7  Courts are 
increasingly affirming these principles, but this is also because their respective national 
Constitutions have taken measures to ensure that protections against cruel, inhuman and 
degrading or grossly disproportionate punishments are provided for.  Although these 
Constitutions do not expressly provide that punishments should be proportionate to the crime and 
the offender, courts have rightly affirmed proportionality as the test for determining whether 
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punishments are consistent with human dignity, or do not violate the prohibition against cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishments.8  
How South Africa and Britain came to the point of establishing human rights constraints 
on punishment in their respective constitutions was the focus of chapter three.  This entailed 
looking at punishment in a socio-historical and cultural context, to understand how punishment 
evolved to assume the meaning, uses, form and content that it has today. The analysis reveals 
quite an interesting trajectory, starting especially with basic notions about personal injury in 
medieval England, when distinctions between civil and criminal wrongs were unknown and 
punishment was exacted as a matter of private justice, lending it to extreme expressions of 
personal vindictiveness. This vindictiveness persisted through the age of Enlightenment and 
Industrialisation, when crime assumed a distinctive penal character, and Britain’s propertied 
gentry assumed responsibilities for defining crime. Most of the crimes that emerged during this 
period were constructed to protect property rights, with a vastly significant number exacting the 
death penalty for crimes of minimal monetary value. Similar class structures were defining 
property relations in eighteenth century South Africa, with the result that Dutch colonists exacted 
severe penalties for crimes that threatened the society’s political economy, though Britain’s 
colonial presence had a rather moderate influence of constraining some of that severity. British 
colonial ambitions largely defined modern criminal law in Nigeria and one could find in both 
South Africa and Nigeria the significant impact that the English common law had in shaping      
the criminal law of both countries. Since both countries’ colonial experience commenced in the 
19th century, extending to the early twentieth century for South Africa and the mid twentieth 
century for Nigeria, penal attitudes for the most   reflected corresponding attitudes in Britain. In 
South Africa, however, a racially segregated penal system subjected non-white citizens to a 
punitive penal regime. 
But change eventually began especially in Britain and South Africa. In Britain, the 
changes were encouraged by increasing awareness of international human rights norms, which 
eventually resulted in the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998. In South Africa, the change 
was ushered in by the transition from apartheid and the adoption of a Constitution with a Bill of 






Rights.  These developments changed the paradigm of punishment in both countries, ensuring 
that punishments came under high standards of constitutional scrutiny.  The Human Rights Act 
and South Africa’s Bill of Rights prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment,9 thereby 
indicating that the criminal law was not only focused on preventing crime. Equally important 
was the affirmation provided by the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, 
that offenders have intrinsic human worth that should be protected through penal measures that 
offer offenders a meaningful opportunity to amend their behaviour.  Unfortunately for Nigeria 
however, little has changed in its sentencing system since colonial era laws. Her approach to 
allocating punishment fails to engender rational sentencing or ensure that offenders receive 
punishment that is proportionate to their crime and individual circumstances, and consistent with 
human dignity. If Nigeria will chart a different course towards meaningful reforms, it must begin 
by integrating constitutional values that place proportionality at the core of respecting the rights 
of offenders. 
Chapters 4 and 5 began to give attention to what a suitable sentencing scheme must look 
like. However, since Nigeria lagged behind considerably in penal development, the chapters 
focused more on South Africa. Chapter 4 took a closer look at the normative framework for 
punishment in South Africa and Nigeria. This normative framework consists of constitutional 
and legislative provisions that regulate punishment, as well as judicial interpretations that give 
the provisions meaning and content. Normativity necessarily starts with constitutional guarantees 
for human dignity – inclusive of the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishments – amongst other rights, which South African courts have aptly interpreted as 
providing a benchmark for evaluating the constitutionality of punishment, or of statutory 
penalties. One of the benefits of adopting this benchmark is that it imposes constraints on penal 
severity, even if the constraints are more cardinal than ordinal due to the judicial position that a 
sentence must be grossly disproportionate to be unconstitutional.  Nevertheless, the constitution 
– or the values it incorporates ‒ constitutes the basic norm that underlies the system of penal 
laws. Accordingly, in South Africa the constitutionality of s 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
of 1977 and s 51 of the 1997 Criminal Law Amendment Act have been subjected to 
                                                          





constitutional validity tests, with the result that s 277, which prescribed the death penalty for 
certain crimes, had to be repealed, while the constitutionality of s 51 was upheld in the light of 
the judicial view that it allowed judicial discretion to depart from prescribed minimum sentences 
where the circumstances permit.   
The judicial elaboration of the normative basis of sentencing in South Africa provides a 
model for Nigerian courts to emulate. As the thesis did show, the human dignity clause in 
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution is vague because of its omission of punishment. This has created a 
misleading presumption that penal statutes in Nigeria are constitutional when they have been 
duly passed by the legislature. Many of these statutes have been unduly punitive and have paid 
no regard to proportionality.  Examples of such laws that the thesis discussed, include the 
Robbery and Firearms Act that prescribed the death penalty for armed robbery, sharia laws that 
prescribed decapitation and stoning to death for crimes like theft and adultery, and recent kidnap 
laws that also prescribe the death penalty. The list goes on to include prison sentences for 
offences that would have been better dealt with through non-custodial measures. Nigerian courts 
have considered themselves obligated to apply these laws without enquiring into whether the 
penalties they prescribe are proportionate, or could infringe the right to human dignity.  
South Africa’s Constitution of 1996 had a salutary effect on sentencing in the country. 
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, sentencing for common law or statutory offences 
involved selecting a suitable utilitarian or retributive objective to which sentencing could be 
directed, following which a suitable sentence was selected by balancing a triad of factors 
involving the crime, the criminal and the interest of the public. The process was considerably 
discretionary, premised on the principle that sentencing is a matter for the discretion of the trial 
courts and that appellate courts should not interfere with such discretion unless it was not 
judiciously utilised. The mere fact that an appellate court would have imposed a different 
sentence was not sufficient reason for interfering with the discretion of the trial court.  
Accordingly, sentencers were at liberty to select an appropriate object to which sentencing could 
be directed and to strike a balance within the triad – without necessarily seeking parity between 
them – guided mostly by the impressions they formed about the gravity of the case, the 





mitigate sentence), as well as such guidance as they could find in judicial precedents. They 
exercised considerable discretion while doing this and this fostered significant sentencing 
disparity.  
Sentencing for rape portrays some of the disparities that emerge from the scope of 
discretion that South African courts exercise. In order to regulate discretion and ensure that 
criminal sentences were more consistent and proportionate to the gravity of the offence, South 
Africa enacted s 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. The provision provided 
minimum sentences for a range of violent or serious offences that included rape, and allowed 
departure only when ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ were present. Initial judicial 
interpretations of what qualified as ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ either asserted 
that the circumstances had to be exceptional, over and beyond traditional factors that courts had 
hitherto considered as aggravating or mitigating sentence, or that the phrase merely required 
courts to apply the traditional factors. These conflicting interpretations brought confusion to the 
meaning of the phrase, which the Supreme Court of Appeal resolved in the Malgas case.  
Essentially, Malgas established the principle that courts were to regard the minimum sentences 
as ordinarily appropriate, and as signalling the legislative intention that sentencing for the 
affected crimes were no longer to be business as usual. In order words, courts were to respect the 
intention of the legislature that the minimum sentences are to be the standard and may only 
depart from imposing them if substantial and compelling circumstances were present. 
Pertinently, the court held that an evaluation of substantial and compelling circumstances starts 
with a consideration of traditional sentencing factors. The court may only depart from the 
minimum sentence if after weighing the cumulative effect of all the factors that are relevant to 
sentencing, it forms the opinion that the prescribed sentence is disproportionate to the crime, the 
criminal and the interests of society as to make imposing it unjust. 
In the Dodo case South Africa’s Constitutional Court affirmed that the Malgas principles 
were the determinative test for applying the substantial and compelling circumstances phrase.  
However, applying the test in individual rape cases has achieved less than the desired result, 
mainly due to the fact that it allows courts to continue exercising considerable discretion when 





process to the idiosyncrasies of individual sentencers. As such, applying the Malgas test failed to 
meet the need for proportionality, consistency and predictability in sentencing. Indeed, judicial 
applications of the test attracted criticisms, including the claim that departure from minimum 
sentences became the norm rather than the exception.10  In some sentencing appeals, members of 
the appellate panel differed considerably in how they applied the same sentencing principles and 
came to considerably different conclusions.11 The Supreme Court of Appeal was compelled to 
acknowledge these disparities in the Mudau case and to suggest in Vilakazi that sentencing 
guidelines would indeed be a welcome development in South Africa’s sentencing scheme.  Not 
to be overlooked also is the court’s pertinent observation that the absence of gradation in s 51’s 
minimum sentences precipitated sentencing disparities. In Terblanche’s views, discrepancies in 
sentencing for rape occur because there is little in the way of a principled sentencing guide for 
the crime.12  
Although the thesis identified important milestones that South Africa has achieved in 
interpreting constitutional provisions relating to punishment, it also acknowledged that more 
needs to be done to rationalise discretion.  Accordingly, chapter six examined two models for 
rationalising discretion, namely the Minnesota Sentencing Guideline, which apparently inspired s 
51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the English guideline model. The Minnesota 
guideline consists of a grid-based sentencing system that awards numerical values to offence 
seriousness and criminal history.  These values represent a predetermined number of months that 
are presumed to be an appropriate term of imprisonment that may be imposed on an offender. 
The calibration of sentence severity on the basis of offence seriousness and criminal history 
reveals the strong deserts basis of the grid. However, dispositional lines in the grid may also 
emphasise incapacitation and a sentence that emphasises the offender’s criminal history does in 
fact suggest that incapacitation was uppermost on the sentencer’s mind.13  
In its early years, the Minnesota sentencing guideline achieved the aims for which it was 
adopted. It kept the prison population low and within available correctional services, while also 
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12 See chapter 5 section 5.  





de-emphasising prison sentences for property offences, reserving it for violent or serious 
offenders.  Importantly, sentencing consistency increased considerably and a useful 
jurisprudence of permissible and impermissible departures emerged. However, there were 
hiccups. The guideline’s approach to grouping offences into a handful of categories was rather 
elementary. It permitted a wide range of discretion that revived disparities between sentences.  
External pressures were also at work, coming from lawmakers who came under political 
pressures to adopt tough measures against crime. The results were legislation that prescribed 
stiffer penalties that sentencers, prosecutors and defence counsels felt were unfair, and thus to be 
circumvented. This eventually resulted in the emergence of evidence based sentencing, an 
approach that utilised empirically generated data to evaluate factors that enhance or diminish the 
risks of reoffending, provided details of the offender’s criminogenic needs and set sentences. 
This was a very important development, but its tendency to base sentencing on risk factors rather 
than offence seriousness posed a problem. 14  
The chapter also examined the English guideline model. There were two reasons for this. 
First, Terblanche, one of the foremost contemporary scholars on South Africa’s sentencing 
system, has suggested the English sentencing system as a model for South Africa to adopt, 
saying the guidelines contain statements of principles that make it more flexible than a grid-
based system. The second reason emerges from the recommendations of the South African Law 
Commission, which had suggested that the ideal sentencing scheme for South Africa should aim 
at sentencing consistency and should be mindful of the state’s correctional resources.  The 
English model was clearly developed around these considerations, and has been quite successful 
in rationalising discretion in English sentencing.  
The manner in which the model evolved apparently contributed to its success. It started 
with the English Court of Appeal issuing guideline judgments that recommended sentence levels 
and guidelines. Guideline judgments typically provided guidelines for a category of crimes or 
sentencing factors, giving indications of what should be considered to be the appropriate range of 
sentences, how sentencing legislation should be construed and what factors should aggravate or 
mitigate sentences. Although the guidelines were issued obiter, courts generally followed them.  
                                                          





However, the piecemeal manner in which the guidelines were developed as opportunities arose 
in individual cases could not satisfy the need for a comprehensive guideline that provided 
detailed guidelines for different categories of crimes.  A number of developments unfolded to 
address this need, starting with the establishment of a Sentencing Advisory Panel to research, 
consult, advise and work with the Court of Appeal in developing guidelines and culminating 
with the establishment of the Sentencing Council of England and Wales, which then assumed 
powers to establish definitive sentencing guidelines.  An important feature that linked these 
developments together was that the sentencing guidelines that the Sentencing Council began to 
issue incorporated elements that were developed in guideline judgments. An example of this is 
the sentencing starting point that was adopted for each category of offences. It is from the 
starting point that the sentencer commences calibrating sentence, adjusting the point up or down 
as the circumstances of the case may dictate. It is this element, the flexibility it provided, as well 
as the statement of principles that were contained in the guidelines that gave the English model 
an edge over the Minnesota sentencing grid. 
However, when both models are examined together, one finds important principles that 
an ideal sentencing guideline model should incorporate. The principles are enumerated in the 
recommendations below.  
 
7.3 Recommendations 
By now, the range of reforms that Nigeria should embark upon is perhaps obvious, because they 
were discussed as the chapters in this thesis unfolded. Below, a summary of these possible 
solutions is presented.   
There is clearly a myriad of challenges confronting Nigeria’s sentencing system, which 
requires a multi-layered programme of solutions. The first necessary course of action is to revisit 
the normative framework for sentencing in Nigeria, in order to instate a clear and unambiguous 
protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and resolve the problem of excessive 





Constitution of 1999. Section 34 is the provision that guarantees respect for human dignity. 
Subsec (1)(a) thereof prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, but makes no 
corresponding prohibitions against inhuman or degrading punishment. The thesis argued that this 
omission is inconsistent with the history of human dignity provisions in Nigeria’s earlier 
Constitutions, notably the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions, both of which expressly prohibited 
torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.  Also, and at the very least, the omission 
in the 1999 Constitution shrouds the meaning of the human dignity clause or the prohibitions 
therein with ambiguity, which also weakens the provision, or leaves offenders without protection 
against forms of punishment that violate human dignity.  An appropriate response to this 
constitutional lapse would therefore be to amend s 34(1)(a) to include a prohibition against 
inhuman or degrading punishment.  Better still, the additional epithet, ‘cruel’, should be added to 
the list. 
An amendment of this nature would also serve the additional purpose of establishing 
cardinal limits on punishment. The importance of such limits was discussed in chapters two and 
six. Cardinal limits anchor the outer limits of a penal scale, establishing limits of tolerance for 
penal severity relative to the offence.   However broadly defined outer limits may be, they fulfil 
the important function of imposing a ceiling on the penalties that sentencers may impose.  Thus, 
a principle of proportionality comes into play, ordering the stage for ensuring penal relativity 
between offences, such that when penalties for crimes like theft, burglary, bribery, rape, armed 
robbery and murder are compared, defensible differences in penal severity are revealed. 
However, as the thesis pointed out, constitutional provisions do better at defining the outer 
boundaries of penal severity. They do not establish ordinal rankings between categories of 
offence seriousness. They must be supplemented by sentencing guidelines to achieve ordinal 
proportionality. 
This requires not just developing guidelines. It necessitates a more fundamental look at 
the legislative framework that will underpin the guideline.  As the thesis suggested, the 
legislative framework must comply with the constitutional reforms suggested above.  This will 
entail a holistic look at the penal system, in order to remove the contradictions that arise from the 





punishing criminal behaviour.  Thus, it is expedient to unify penal law and procedure in Nigeria 
and to repeal needlessly punitive laws. These suggestions are not new.  They have been the 
subject of discussion in different forums, including the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies and the National Working group on the Reform of Criminal Justice Administration, 
which produced a draft Administration of Criminal Justice Bill.15 What needs to be done at this 
point, is to take the process forward by passing the necessary law without further delay. 
Resolving the sharia question would however require a different approach. First, whether sharia 
criminal law should be enforced in Nigeria’s penal system has to be resolved through a 
constitutional process.16  Secondly, the constitutional process may also have to determine 
whether sharia criminal law should be assimilated and made part of a uniform penal system.  
Lastly, should the question be resolved in favour of assimilating sharia, its penalties, processes 
and evidentiary standards have to be subjected to the scrutiny of the proposed constitutional 
standards regarding human dignity and the prohibition of punishments that violate dignity. 
However, constitutional and legislative reforms take time, especially when this has to do 
with reforming the penal system. Protracted efforts to reform Nigeria’s criminal justice system 
exemplify the point and raise the important question of what can be done in the interim while 
reforms go through necessary constitutional and legislative amendment.  The English example of 
developing a guideline system offers a useful model for Nigeria to emulate. As noted above, the 
English example starts with guideline judgments. A suitable role for Nigeria’s Supreme Court to 
discharge in this regard would be to begin to issue sentencing guidelines in sentencing appeals 
that come before it. The court should begin to offer guidance on what should be the appropriate 
sentencing range and starting points for such crimes, how to interpret the relevant legislation, 
what sentencing factors would be relevant and how sentence could be aggravated or mitigated.   
Of course, discharging this role requires readiness on the part of the court to examine the 
appropriateness of many statutorily prescribed penalties against the all-important principle of 
proportionality. The Supreme Court, and indeed Nigerian sentencers generally, must reconceive 
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their role from that of unquestioningly accepting, interpreting and enforcing statutory penalties. 
They must envision a new role that is rooted in the present constitutional scheme, which 
authorises them to scrutinise the constitutionality of any penalty that is prescribed by law, in 
order to ensure that the limitation of rights contained therein is such that can be tolerated within 
the democratic society that the Nigerian Constitution envisions for the country. Nigerian courts 
have had a history of questioning the constitutional validity of duly passed legislation. In 
Independent National Electoral Commission and Another v Musa and Others,17 the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria declared certain provisions of the Electoral Act 2001 null and void for violating 
the provisions of 1999 Constitution.18 There is a respectable history of judicial annulments of 
statutory provisions that violate constitutional provisions in Nigeria. There is therefore no reason 
why penal statutes or penalties cannot be subjected to similar levels of constitutional scrutiny. 
The failure of Nigerian courts to do this constitutes a serious lapse.  
It is not too late to rectify this lapse. Even if courts were to find it difficult to do so 
because of the ambiguity in s 34(1)(a), they may yet have recourse to the human dignity 
provision of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) 
Act. Article 5 of the Charter provides a more comprehensive guarantee for human dignity by 
prohibiting cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.  In Fawehinmi v Abacha, the Supreme 
Court held that the Act would prevail over other national legislation (the Constitution excluded) 
in the event of a conflict. Courts may seize on the opportunity afforded by the Act to ensure that 
punishments are not so severe and disproportionate in kind and measure as to constitute cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment.  
To develop guideline judgments, the Supreme Court may seek assistance from agencies 
that are carrying out research and proposing criminal justice reforms in Nigeria, such as the 
Nigerian Law Reform Commission, or the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. They 
may be invited as amici curiae, in order to increase the range of inputs in the guidelines that 
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would ensure its wider acceptability.   That said, judicial development of guideline principles can 
only be an interim measure. Its case-by-case approach makes it painstakingly slow and 
inadequate to the need for a comprehensive guideline. That need would be best served through a 
specialised agency established in line with the principles advocated in chapter six, to research 
and consult widely for the purpose of developing sentencing guidelines.  
Only the key principles need be restated here. First, the agency must be an autonomous 
one, constituted to ensure that the judges, magistrates, agencies within the criminal justice 
system, penal scholars and experts in victimisation are represented in its membership. This will 
ensure that all necessary views are included in the development of guidelines and that the final 
outcome is acceptable to those who will implement them. The agency should also have powers to 
recommend the enactment or amendment of penal legislation. An independent agency will 
ensure that the development of sentencing policy and guidelines is insulated from the kind of 
political pressures that gave rise to sharia criminal codes in northern Nigeria, or the kind of 
emotive responses that resulted in laws that mandated the death penalty for kidnapping. 
Secondly, it will be useful that the legislation that establishes the agency also provides a primary 
rational for sentencing. This is not to suggest that a statement of primary rationale in legislation 
is a sine qua non for the success of a sentencing guideline. However, a legislative statement or a 
primary rationale that is supplemented by a list of key principles that further rationalizes 
discretion by narrowing the range of principles that sentencers have to consider will at least 
enhance consistency.   
Thirdly, the guideline must be anchored on cardinal and ordinal scales that introduce 
limits on severity and enhance proportionality in sentences for various offences, while also 
ensuring that sentences are not bunched into clusters that obscure differences in offence gravity. 
It must pay attention to the equality principle in proportionality, which ensures that like situated 
offenders receive similar punishments and that sentences reflect the differences in offence 
gravity. Also, the guideline and the policy underlying it should ensure that the most severe 
sentences are reserved for serious offences. This would require a change of legislative and 
judicial policy on the use of prison sentences and the adoption or development of other penal 





offenders who pose a real threat to society and need to be incapacitated. The death penalty, if at 
all sanctioned, should be reserved for crimes involving human life. 
Some penal alternatives already exist in Nigeria.19 Nigerian courts, with guidance from 
the Supreme Court, need to develop jurisprudence around utilising the alternatives. They need to 
elaborate how sentencers can adopt an evidence-based approach to sentencing and emphasise the 
imperative for sentencers to offer logical explanations for the sentences they impose. Adopting 
an evidence-based approach calls for the leading of evidence solely for sentencing purposes: 
witnesses testify in aggravation or mitigation of sentence and the court may draw on the 
expertise of behavioural experts, social workers and experts in victimisation to reach an 
appropriate sentence.  Subjecting sentencing to a trial-led process will indeed bring a paradigm 
change to sentencing in Nigeria. Lawyers, on their part, need to become proactive in subjecting 
prescribed sentences to constitutional scrutiny and proportionality tests.  
The potential that these recommendations have for reforming Nigeria’s sentencing 
scheme will of course be curtailed if the State does not create the necessary infrastructure for 
implementing alternative non-custodial sentences. Necessary infrastructure will include an 
efficient system for managing criminal information, recruiting, training, and deploying social 
workers, probation officers and community service supervisors, while also providing for a parole 
system.20 Given recent publications that claim that the staff-inmate ratio in the Nigerian Prisons 
Service is almost one to two,21 it may even be proposed that some prison officials should be 
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redeployed and retrained to implement alternative sanctions. That way, the State incurs less costs 
recruiting and training new hands, while also increasing the capacity of those already in the 
State’s correctional services to work more efficiently.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The above recommendations are offered with a view to encouraging less use for prison 
sentences, reserving them for habitual, serious or violent offenders. These recommendations are 
consistent with the idea that sentencing policies should utilise the available prison resources of 
the state efficiently, and that prison levels are kept within the capacity of prison facilities.  
However, the recommendations are such that they may only be achieved in the long term. 
Reforms engage a slow process that demands significant political will to see them through. The 
recommendations in this thesis demand political will from lawmakers in starting a process that 
will result in the establishment of a specialised agency that will lead the process of formulating 
guidelines on an ongoing basis, and, having done so, to refrain from interfering with the 
autonomy of the agency.  In the short to medium term however, the process or reform must be 
led by Supreme Court, which must assume responsibilities for developing an effective 
sentencing guidelines and jurisprudence, which the proposed specialised sentencing agency may 
take into consideration in its work. 
It will be instructive to conclude this thesis with a few insights form Morris and Wilson. 
According to Morris,22 ‘[n]o principled jurisprudence of sentencing will emerge before 
legislatures bring order to their penal statutes or before judges routinely provide reasons for the 
sentences they impose. Only in this manner can the broad and detailed sweep of a common law 
of sentencing evolve’.  This thesis illustrated Morris’ point by showing the constitutional reforms 
that are needful, and that it is necessary to review and unify Nigeria’s penal laws in order to 
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reduce the propensity for sentencing disparities. It has also illustrated that courts need to develop 
Nigeria’s sentencing jurisprudence by scrutinising the constitutionality of punishments and 
offering reasons for the penalties that they impose. At its very core, needful reforms must 
embrace three values suggested by Wilson,23 namely moderation, speed and certainty. These 
qualities, in his aptly held view, infuse punishment with a preventative quality. In his words:  
‘When ... punishments are moderate and mild, everyone will, from a sense of interest and of 
duty, take his proper part in detecting, in exposing, in trying, and in passing sentence on 
crimes. The consequence will be, that criminals will seldom elude the vigilance, or baffle the 
energy, of publick justice.24 
Mildness does not necessarily suggest that penalties should be tame. Severity may be necessary 
in deserved cases, but adopting severity as a method of crime control ‒ as is the case in Nigeria – 
over-criminalises and overheats the penal system.25 Wilson’s words provide compelling reasons 
for Nigeria to chart a course away from its tradition of penal severity: 
True it is, that, on some emergencies, excesses of a temporary nature may receive a sudden 
check from rigorous penalties: but their continuance and their frequency introduce and diffuse 
a hardened insensibility among the citizens; and this insensibility, in its turn, gives occasion or 
pretence to the farther extension and multiplication of those penalties. Thus one degree of 
severity opens and smooths the way for another, till, at length, under the specious appearance 
of necessary justice, a system of cruelty is established by law. 
Such a system is calculated to eradicate all the manly sentiments of the soul, and to substitute, 
in their place, dispositions of the most depraved and degrading kind. It is the parent of 
pusillanimity. A nation broke to cruel punishments becomes dastardly and contemptible. For, 
in nations, as well as individuals, cruelty is always attended by cowardice. It is the parent of 
slavery. In every government, we find the genius of freedom depressed in proportion to the 
sanguinary spirit of the laws. It is hostile to the prosperity of nations, as well as to the dignity 
and virtue of men.26 
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24 Ibid. 
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CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT 105 OF 1997 
 







Discretionary minimum sentences for certain serious offences 51 
  (1) Notwithstanding any other law, but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional 
court or a High Court shall sentence a person it has convicted of an offence referred to in 





a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 15 
 years; 
 
a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to 
imprisonment for a period not less than 25 years; 




a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 10 
 years; 
a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a 
 period not less than 15 years; and 
a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to 
imprisonment for a period not less than 20 years; and 
(c) Part IV of Schedule 2, in the case of- 
(i) a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 5 
a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a 
 period not less than 7 years; and 
 (ii) 
a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to 
imprisonment for a period not less than 10 years: 
(iii) 
Provided that the maximum term of imprisonment that a regional court may impose in 
terms of this subsection shall not exceed the minimum term of imprisonment that it must 
impose in terms of this subsection by more than five years. 
   (3) (a) If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) is satisfied that substantial and 
compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the 
sentence prescribed in those subsections, it shall enter those circumstances on the record 
of the proceedings and must thereupon impose such lesser sentence: Provided that if a 
regional court imposes such a lesser sentence in respect of an offence referred to Part 1 
of Schedule 2, it shall have jurisdiction to impose a term of imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 30 years. 
a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a 
 period not less than 20 years; and 
   (2) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional 
court or a High Court shall sentence a person who has been convicted of an offence 
referred to in- 





   (a A ) When imposing a sentence in respect of the offence of rape the following shall 
not constitute substantial and compelling circumstances justifying the imposition of a 
lesser sentence: 




an apparent lack of physical injury to the complainant; 
an accused person's cultural or religious beliefs about rape; or 
 any relationship between the accused person and the complainant prior to 
the offence being committed. 
(4) ...... 
[Sub-s. (4) omitted by s. 1 of Act 38 of 2007.] 
   (5) (a) Subject to paragraph (b) , the operation of a minimum sentence imposed in 
terms of this section shall not be suspended as contemplated in section 297 (4) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 ( Act 51 of 1977 ). 
   (b) Not more than half of a minimum sentence imposed in terms of subsection (2) may 
be suspended as contemplated in section 297 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, if 
the accused person was 16 years of age or older, but under the age of 18 years, at the 
time of the commission of the offence in question. 
   (6) This section does not apply in respect of an accused person who was under the age 
of 16 years at the time of the commission of an offence contemplated in subsection (1) or 
(2). 
   (7) If in the application of this section the age of an accused person is placed in issue, 
the onus shall be on the State to prove the age of that person beyond reasonable doubt. 
   (8) For the purposes of this section and Schedule 2, 'law enforcement officer' 
includes- 
             (a)a member of the National Intelligence Agency or the South African 
                    Secret Service referred to in section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act, 
                    2002 ( Act 65 of 2002 ); and 
(b) a correctional official of the Department of Correctional Services or a 
person authorised under the Correctional Services Act, 1998 ( Act 111 
of 1998). 
   (9) The amounts mentioned in respect of the offences referred to in Part II of Schedule 
2 to the Act, may be adjusted by the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette. 
    [S. 51 amended by s. 33 of Act 62 of 2000 and by s. 36 (1) of Act 12 of 2004 and 
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